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The  task assigned to the Commission  of the European Communities  in the 
social field by  Articles 117  and  118  of the Treaty of Rome  includes matters 
relating to employment,  labour law and  working  conditions,  basic and  advanced 
vocational training,  social security,  prevention of occupational accidents 
and diseases,  occupational hygiene,  the right or  association and  collective 
bargaining between  employers and  workers. 
Furthermore,  pursuant  to the Council  Resolution of 21  January  1974  on 
the social action programme  (1),  the  Communi~y institutions must,  on  the 
basis of the situation in the various countries,  promote  the conclusion of 
European collective agreements  in the appropriate fields. 
On  the vasis of these prov1s1ons the Commission  has undertaken a  study 
with a  view to identifYing the most  significant  recent  collective bargaining 
trends and  outlining future trends  .. 
The  following have  contributed to this study 
Professor G.  de Broeck 
Mr F.  Poulsen 
Professor B.  Freudenfeld 
Professor J.D.  Reynaud 
Mr  C.  XcCarthy 
Professor T.  Treu 
Mr X.  Wagner 
Mr  P.S.  Pels 
Professor B.C.  Roberts. 
Final rapporteur  :  Professor J.D.  Reynaud. 
The  Commission  thanks these contributors for their expert  and  constructive 
co-operation. 
In presenting to interested circles this study,  for which the final 
rapporteur takes sole responsibility,  the Commission,  while not  regarding 
itself bound  by its findings,  wishes to submit  for consideration to all 
those concerned an  important  contribution to our knowledge  of collective 
bargaining trends in the Kember  States of the EEC. 
(1).  OJ  C 13  of 12  February 1974 Introduction 
In the early 1960s  it seemed  likely that collective bargaining,  which 
had  taken vigorous root  in most  European  countries after the Second  World 
War,  would  henceforth develop along simple and  easily foreseeable lines. It 
seemed  that the gradual  establishment of organizations and  institutions and 
the benefits derived from  growth would  calm  down  conflicts, regularize 
relations and  bring a  wider acceptance of economic  constraints.  In addition, 
it seemed  that  industrial relations would  no  longer be a  focus of social 
conflict or of the hopes of transforming society.  Since then,  two  successive 
crisis have  produced a  different outlook.  The  first crisis, between  1968  and 
1971?  involved a  sudden  increase in strikes, often spontaneous,  at times 
unofficial,  the sudden  emergence of new  groups  ane the use of new  methods, 
the affirmation of new  priorities and  new  objectives and  a  widescale 
questioning of accepted differences and  traditional authorities.  In some 
countries this crisis was  a  minor one,  as in the Federal Republic of Germany; 
in others it was  more  seriuos,  as in France,  the United  Kingdom  and  Italy. 
But  everywhere it shattered accepted values.  The  second crisis,  since 1973 
and  even more  since the second half of 1974 1  involved not  only a  rise in 
inflation and  an imbalance in most  countries'  foreign trade balance,  but 
also destroyed what  seemed  the most  solid post-war achievement,  full 
employment,  and  thus  shook  people's confidence  in growth prospects.  The 
second crisis did not  eradicate the first, although it changed  some  of the 
basic data (indeed,  it probably intensified the crisis of values that went 
with it).  No  doubt  both are still too recent to  be  assessed fully and  too 
complex for us to see all their consequences and after-effects. 
But  this uncertainty only makes  it all the more  necessary to attempt to 
pinpoint the questions they raise. 
To  what  extent is collective bargaining still an efficient method  of 
determining,  in this new  context,  employment  and working conditions,  wages 
and  salaries, basic allowances,  social benefits  ?  To  what  extent  has it 
managed  to cope with the new  problems raised by  unemployment  and  dismissal, 
the fight  against inflation or the new  requirements concerning the quality 
of working life ?  What  can and  should one  expect  during a  period of profound 
economic  and  social  change  ? 
These  questions can be answered  only on  the basis of established fact, 
by  compiling,  collating and  comparing the answers given in the nine countries. 
A problem of definition arises at the outset of this enquiry,  for where  does 
collective bargaining begin and  end  ? 
A purely legal answer would  not  be very satisfactory.  If one  followed 
national custom,  then it would  be  ne.cessary for the Federal  Republic of 
Germany  to make  a  careful distinction between the field of bargaining and 
the field of workers'  co-management  and  exclude  everything dealt with by 
the works  council.  On  the other hand  one  would  have  to include most  of the 
activities carried out  by  the Italian works  council.  The  oppositions would 
be further reinforced by  our use of language  :  the concerted action which for many  years brought  together government  and  the two  sides of industr,y 
in the Federal Republic of Germany  does not  fall within the sphere of 
bargaining,  although it obviously influences it. B.y  contrast, many  of the 
Italian confederations'  discussions with the government  are often regarded 
as contrattazione. 
Furthermore,  the terms used vary in precision from  country to country. 
Federal  German  law is very precise in this respect,  as French law was  in 
principle.  But  in Denmark  any agreement  between  the parties,  even a  ver~l 
agreement,  has contractual value if it can be certified,  and  in the United 
Kingdom  custom  and  practice is no  doubt  even more  flexible. 
At  the risk of making it impossible to draw  any caparisons,  we  must 
therefore discard the legal definitions and  adopt  a  more  common-sense 
definition which  is as wide  as possible  :  'not  only talks which  end  in the 
conclusion of genuine collective agreements,  as defined and  laid down  by  law, 
but also the whole  gamut  of consultations,  insofar as they involve actual 
negotiation,  between employers  and  workers or between their respective 
representatives'.  (1,  (Obviously,  the public authorities play more  than one 
role in these relations.)  We  shall not  hesitate to do  this,  especially 
since a  purely legal  study is being undertaken parallel to this which will 
give all the necessary legal details. 
Since it is the purpose of this study to examine  changes that have  taken 
place and  that are now  taking form  in bargaining legislation,  we  shall try 
instead to begin with the developments that have actually occurred and  fields 
that have  been examined,  such as employment,  wages  and  salaries,  the quality 
of working life.  We  shall then go  back to the bargaining parties,  those who 
take part in the bargaining and  those who  exert  an influence on it. We  shall 
ask which organizations represent  the bargaining parties and  the place of the 
public authorities in industrial relations.  Then  we  shall  consider how  they 
meet  in disputes ane  how  they reach a  compromise,  in the context of conflict 
and  negotiation.  We  shall  conclude  by  discussing the present  situation of 
collective bargaining and  likely future trends. 
Three  remarks must  be  made  first. 
Firstly,  we  do  not  pretend to cover the subject  in its entirety and  even 
less to compare  precisely in what  manner  a  same  issue has been dealt with in 
the various countries or the results achieved.  We  want  merely to pinpoint 
what  is new  and  the general  trend.  For  instance,  we  shall not try to assess 
the measures  taken in youth employment,  with or without  the participation of 
the two  sides of industry,  nor the results achieved,  but merely indicate the 
attitudes and guidelines according to which  employment  questions have been 
negotiated.  We  shall not  give a  full picture of the agreements and  their 
clauses but  will discuss the main  agreements and  show  the main  lines of change. 
1.  International  Labour  Office,  Collective bargaining in the industrialized 
market  economies,  Geneva  1974,  p.  2. 
2 Secondly,  we  are trying to discover future trends but  not to direct or 
guide them.  We  are attempting to make  forecasts,  not  recommendations.  Of 
course, it is only human  that once  a  trend has  been recognized and  identified 
b,y  one or other of those concerned,  it should give rise to reactions and 
responses.  But  fragile as our findings may  therefore be,  it seemed  necessary 
to confine ourselves to these limits. 
The  third remark is the most  important.  This is a  consolidated report. 
That  means  it makes  use of the material,  facts,  ideas and  thoughts of nine 
national reports.  Clearly it is from  them  that  we  have derived not  only our 
information but many  of our basic ideas.  Furthermore,  we  have  had  the privilege 
of being able to call upon  the other eight experts on  two  occasions  :  first 
when  we  presented our first draft report  on  29  November  1977,  then when  we 
compiled their opinions and  criticisms on  the edited report in January 1979. 
Most  colleagues took the trouble to make  detailed comments  which  enabled us 
to correct our statements or give more  details.  They  have generously shared 
their thoughts and  personal  conclusions,  of which we  have mede  abundant  use. 
In order not  to encumber  the text further,  we  have  not referred  ~stematically 
to the national reports.  May  we  therefore express our overall gratitude here. 
Naturally the author alone is responsible for any errors of fact or  judgement 
he may  have  committed. 
Lastly I  would  like to thank Madame  Nicole Mercier,  my  assistant at the 
Conservatoire national des Arts et  M~tiers, for her  invaluable aid throughout 
this work,  and Madame  Jeanne Bailly and  Miss  Huguette Alline,  who  despite 
their many  other duties undertook the onerous task of finalizing the manuscript. 
Paris,  February 1979 
3 1.  Problems and  their solution in collective bargaining 
1.1  Job and  income  security 
In the nine countries,  the 1973-1974  crisis produced a  sharp rise in 
unemployment  which  became  a  major if not  the main  social  issue.  However, 
there is a  striking difference in the situations in the various countries 
Luxembourg,  where  mining is the main  industry,  is no  doubt  an  extreme  case. 
Ireland had already experienced major unemployment  in the recent  past.  The 
trend  in the Federal  Republic of Germany  as a  result  of the moderate rate 
of inflation and  the positive foreign trade balance is probably the most 
favourable of all. Countries with an  econo~ largely dependent  on  exports 
such as Denmark,  Belgium  and  the Netherlands must  be particularly prudent  in 
their attempts to relaunch their economy.  But  in all cases the employment 
market  suffered profoundly and  has little chance of recovering as  soon as the 
economic  trend improves.  The  chances of absorbing this unemployment  vary 
according to  situations and  policies,  but at best it will  take several years 
(obviously,  it is possible that  the crisis may  worsen).  So  the problems are 
long-term ones. 
It has proved  especially necessary to find  solutions,  even partial ones, 
because the long period of full  employment  experienced by  most  of the 
industrialized countries has made  loss of employment  or unemployment  even 
less palatable.  As  shown  by the vigorous local  reactions to manpower  reductions 
and  firms closing down  in Italy and  Belgium,  the  UK  and  France,  people find 
it more  difficult than ever to accept  these  'accidents'  - perhaps because the 
full-employment  policies convinced  employees of the governments'  ability to 
take action in this field,  and  perhaps also because relative prosperity and 
the habit of growth make  the  sudden  loss of employment  a  great  shock. 
So  it is not  surprising that  in most  of the  countries the  1973-1974  cr1s1s 
caused  new  measures to be  taken,  some  legislative some  contractual.  Often 
they went  beyond  mere  pay  increases to reveal  a  profound  change  in basic 
attitudes and  perhaps guiding principles. 
1.1.1  Unemployment  benefit~ 
Leaving aside the question of compensation  for dismissal  (of 1.1.2), 
before the crisis unemployment  benefit was  governed  both by  law and  by 
agreement,  with the law  predominating in most  oases,  apart  from  the striking 
exception of Denmark  where  there is a  voluntary unemployment  insurance  s~stem 
(since  1967  the state budget  finances it above  a  certain  __ level of contribution) 
and  mixed  cases such.as France.  The  changes that have  occurred in recent years 
have given a  more  important  place to bargaining,  perhaps because this method 
is more  likely to succeed rapidly and  because it is more  pragmatic by  nature 
so that  emergency measures  can be taken even if they  sometimes run counter 
to certain principles. 
4 For  example,  in France  an inter-trade clause of 30 October.1974 fixed 
compensation at 90% of gross wages  for twelve months  for workers dismissed 
for economic  reasons;  in Belgium  the 60% social  security is supplemented 
in many  branches by  'security of living standards funds'  set up  by  agreement; 
in the Federal Republic of Germany,  although the law retains the main 
responsibility,  branch agreements have also  supplemented the payments  (15% 
for chemical  workers).  Italy is an intermediate case because the  unemploymen~ 
fund which  covers layoffs  (cassa integrazione guadagni)  was  gradually 
increased by  law but  only under pressure of various agreements ane in the 
form  of a  law which was  half  'negotiated'  between the government  and the two 
sides of industry. 
In almost  every case the intent of these decisions,  whether legal or 
contractual,  aha  been substantially to increase the level of payment.  This 
level,  sometimes  fairly low  as in Italy and  France  (between  30 and  40% of 
wages)  has been raised to between  80  and  100 % (and often the percentages 
below  100 % apply to gross wages  :  the 80 %  in Italy are 95 %  of the net 
value:  the 90% under the French agreement  more  or less coincide with net 
wages).  Denmark,  where  the payment  was  already high,  increased it to 90% 
in 1972.  This practically ensures maintenance of full wages,  or nearly,  in 
the case of loss of employment.  Generally these benefits are granted for a 
limited period of six to twelve months  ane do  not  therefore offer full 
security at a  time when  long-term unemployment  is on  the increase.  But  in 
fact this limitation only excludes a  small  percentage of the unemployed. 
As  regards those covered,  sometimes it is the unemployed  whatever the 
cause of unemployment,  although generally they must  have  had  previous 
employment,  sometimes  only the victim of dismissal  for economic  reasons, 
(eg France),  sometimes,  as_ in Italy, those who  are temporarily dismissed, 
which  encourages lay-offs.  In the latter case,  the range was  gradually 
extended from  those who  were  to be given special  encouragement  to retrain, 
to those who  had  been laid off.  At  the  same  time,  unemployment  benefit, 
which was  very low  at the outset  (800 lire per day),  was  raised to two-thirds 
of earnings by  the social  security (INPS)  in the case of victims of economic 
dismissal.  Often  (Denmark,  France),  young  people who  have  completed vocational 
training courses and  cannot  find work  are treated in the  same  way  as unemployed 
workers. 
If we  wanted  to assess the full  implications of these measures we  would 
have  to undertake a  detailed study of,  for instance,  the proportion of 
unemployed  effectively covered by  the new  measures,  the number  of persons 
in France to whom  they do  not  apply because they were  not  dismissed for 
economic  reasons  (end of fixed-term contract,  for example),  in Italy because 
they were  not aware of their rights or in Denmark  because of voluntary 
insurance.  What  is the proportion of those who  have  exhausted their rights ? 
It is clear that the gap  between the accepted principle and its full 
application can be a  wide  one.  Even  in the best of cases,  only  some  of the 
unemployed  benefit  from  the new  measures 
Yet  this reform of principle remains a  decisive one  as is underlined by 
the wave  of criticism the measures provoked  in some  countries,  from  Ireland 
5 to Italy to France.  Is it possible,  ask the critics, to give wages  to people 
who  do  not  work  without destroying their will to work  ?  Does  this not make 
dismissals even easier ?  lay there not  in certain cases be collusion between 
employer  and  worker  ?  There is some  ground  for  these criticisms which may 
well refer to real wrongs.  But  no  doubt  their main  interest is that the.y 
stress the breadth and  scale of the innovations. 
On  the other hand,  the  jumble of measures or simply the diversity of 
schemes  (according to ade,  sex,  sector,  skills,  type of dismissal)  sometimes 
needs to be put  in order.  For  example,  this was  the aim  of the law of 16 
January 1979  in France,  which  provides an outline for the simplification 
and  unification of schemes  and  calls on  the two  sides of industry to establish 
the rates, duration and  conditions of award.  In future,  all schemes will be 
administered by  joint institutions to which  the State will make  a  contribution. 
Compensation  for partial unemployment  has developed in the same  way, 
sometimes  being laid down  in the  same  texts.  Sometimes,  to prevent  abuses, 
the payment  must  be made  by the undertaking itself (as in the February 1968 
agreement  in France).  But  with the worsening economic  situation the payment 
is more  frequently reimbursed to the undertaking (France)  or takes the form 
of a  subsidy to the undertaking to maintain employment  (Luxembourg,  law of 
26  July 1976). 
In all cases,  compensation for partial unemployment  has two  different 
purposes  ;  to maintain the worker's income  and,  at least as important,  to 
protect his  job,  either by making  shorter working hours less advantageous 
to the undertaking because it has to pay  part of the compensation  (although 
this is a  double-edged weapon,  for if the situation worsens,  it simply leads 
to dismissal),  or by  subsidizing the firm to maintain employment.  So  it is 
not  just a  compensatory measure  but also a  job protection measure. 
1.1.2  Job protection 
Leaving aside protection against arbitrary dismissal  (which is governed 
by  a  series of laws  but  apparently by  few  agreements)  because,  important as 
it is, its purpose is quite different,  special  importance must  be attached 
to measures to protect the worker  in his  job against  economic  fluctuations 
by  making his dismissal more  costly or more  difficult and  subject to special 
procedures.  In most  cases,  the dismissals to be regulated are mass  dismissals. 
But  under certain laws  (as in France)  individuaLdismissals can be  covered 
by  the same  rules,  provided they are for economic  reasons,  in other wo~s, 
connected with a  reduction or change  in activity. 
Here  again,  legislation and  agreement  are inextricably entangled and 
their roles vary widely.  Sometimes  the agreement  is given general application 
by  law  (France,  law of 3  January  1975  and  inter-trade agreement  of 21  November 
1974),  sometimes  the law is based on  company  practice even if the latter is 
barely recognized in official agreements  (the Employment  Protection Act  of 
1975  in the UK  prolongs and  develops the 1965  Redundancy  payments  Act, 
6 although branch agreements  signed between these two  dates barely incorporate 
its provisions);  sometimes the agreement  supplements the law or deals with 
a  specific issue  (for instance,  in Belgium,  a  national collective agreement 
2  October  1975  determines the additional  information the employer must  give 
if he plans mass  dismissals after notit,ying the works  council.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany,  since 1961,  branch agreements give protection against 
'rationalization'). 
Tb  avoid going into excessive detail  (and unnecessary detail,  since the 
specific national  solutions can only be understood fully in their own  context), 
we  shall nto review these decisions and will merely classi(y their results 
under three major headinge. 
1.  Redundancy  payments.  Apart  from  cases of unfair (or,  as the Germans 
call it,  'anti-social') dismissal  which  have  a  different purpose,(1)  the 
legislation or the agreement  may  require fairly high redundancy payments 
which will make  the transition easier for the worker  concerned and  in 
addition may  dissuade the employer  from  dismissing him.  In Italy, the 
length of service allowance  (indennita di anzianita),  frequently a 
substantial  sum,  is granted in the case of dismissal and  also in the case 
of resignation.  Legislation and  agreement  combine  in various ways  to achieve 
this.  In Belgium,  a  national  collective labour agreement  requires the employer 
to give four months'  supplementary pay  in cases of collective redundancies. 
In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  the law of  15  January  1972  makes  the 
works  council  responsible for reaching an agreement  with the employer  on 
social questions,  including the appropriate payments.  No  doubt  this was 
modelled on  the agreements on  protection against rationalization made  in 
1961  and  later and  applicable to undertakings which are being reorganized, 
which  forbid dismissal above  a  certain age (55)  provided the worker has 
completed ten years of service,  extend the period of advance warning, 
increase the proposed  payments  and  cover losses of inc.ome  due to transfer. 
Similar agreements were  signed in Luxembourg  in  1969.  This is a  particularly 
interesting case because it lends itself to economic  calculation - and  no 
doubt this is not  by  chance.  The  aim  of reorganization and  rationalization 
is efficiency and  profitability;  so  it is only logical for it to pay its 
'human  costs'. 
2.  Notice.  In addition to the notice given for dismissal,  ie the period 
between notification of dismissal and its taking effect  (which  can often be 
replaced by  payment  of an equivalent  lump  sum)  there is also the advance 
warning period,  ie the time between  announcing  a  collective redundancy and 
notifying it to the individuals concerned.  The  first form  of notice is 
mainly based  on  the desire to make  the dismissal less brutal and  to give 
the worker  time to  seek other employment  (for which he is often given time 
off during this period).  The  purpose of the advance warning is quite different 
it allows time for  joint discussion or examination of the decisions to be 
taken.  So  it cannot  be  replaced by  an additional  payment  and  in many  cases 
an  employer  who  does not  give this notice will  find his decision cancelled 
or at  le~st penalized before a  tribunal. 
1.  It is generally fixed by  law.  But  in Denmark  it is governed  b.y  a 
confederal agreement  between the D.A.  and the L.O.  of 1973. 
7 3.  Information and  discussion.  It is largely up  to the employer,  especially 
vis-a-vis a  works  council or committee,  to provide regular and detailed 
information on  production and  employment  prospects.  In several countries this 
obligation has been taken further and  made  more  specific  (by  law  in France, 
1966,  and  in the Federal  Republec  of Germany,  1972;  by  collective national 
agreement  in Belgium,  1970).  This obligation is often particularly strict if 
dismissals are planned.  In France it involves  informing the works  council, 
joint discussion and  the possibility of applying to a  joint branch committee 
(agreement  of 21  November  1974;  the law  of 3 January  1975  also requires the 
authorization of the industrial  inspector to whom  the employer must  justif,y 
his decision);  in Belgium obligatory information without  the employer having 
to  justify mass dismissals  (national  collective agreement  of 2 October  1975); 
in the Federal Republic of Germany,  obligation for the employer to agree with 
the works  council  on  the measures to be taken. 
In fact  these information and  consultation procedures are often a  discreet 
form  of bargaining.  Although the Federal  German  works  council has no  right to 
call a  strike, it is certainly involved in internal bargaining.  Although the 
French works  council  cannot  sign a  formal  agreement,  it is often its opinion 
that determines whether a  dispute will take place,  and  whether a  process of 
bargaining will begin with the unions.  There is almost  total continuity 
between these procedures and  those in Belgium,  Italy,  or Luxembourg  where 
such problems are settled by  actual bargaining. 
In some  cases,  job protection is embodied  in specific agreements.  In 
Belgium  there are sectoral or company  agreements under which  the employers 
undertake not  to make  dismissals and  even to maintain the employment  level; 
in return,  the unions agree to accept  early retirement,  partial unemployment 
and  the suppression of overtime,  severance payments,  transfers from  one 
establishment  to another and  the retraining of woukers.  As  a  supplementary 
measure,  the food  union in the Federal  Republic  of Germany  has proposed 
setting up  a  fund  financed by  contributions from  workers'  earnings,  in order 
to compensate for the gradual  release of the oldest workers in that branch. 
The  Italian examples  are very  similar to the Belgian ones  :  in 1973  several 
agreements were  signed in major undertakings to  cover the location of job-
creating investment.  In Italy, after the reversal  in the economic  trend, 
the Fiat agreement  of November  1974  provides that Fiat will  continue to hiFe 
workers to make  up  for natural departures in the south and  that there will 
be  no  dismissals  elsewhere;  in return the union accepted additional  'bridging 
days'  and  the possibility of redundancies and transfers between establishlents. 
In 1976,  most  sectoral agreements  in industry provided,  more  modestly,  for 
mutual  information and  joint  examination of investment  and  production decisions 
(sometimes with very precise procedures,  as in the chemical  industry). 
Luxembourg  is probably the extreme case because of the very serious cr1s1s 
in the iron and  steel industry.  After many  other measures,  Arbed  resolved to 
implement  a  plan actively seeking ways  to  save  on  labour  (a department  has 
been. set  ~P for.thi~ purpose)·  it made  great efforts to redeploy the resulting 
superfluous staff and  persuaded the unions to sign a  special agreement  endorsing 
this plan (its implementation is being followed  up  by a  joint committee). 
8 1.1.3  Two  policies? 
Is it possible,  from  the above  examples,  to distinguish two  possible 
lines of action,  or even,  using a  stronger term  to bring out  the opposition 
more  clearly,  two  policies ?  In the one  case the decision is left mainly to 
the employer is not  asked to account  for it, although this policy also makes 
dismissal  costly,  if not very costly.  But  provided he  pay~ this cast,  which 
is regarded as  just compensation for the  inconveniences he is inflicting, the 
emploter is free to follow the logic of pure efficiency.  The  other case,  on 
the contrary,  makes  greater demands  on  the employer to  justify his decision 
in both social and  economic  terms~  It seeks leas to increase the coat  than 
to impose  periods of notice and  opportunities tor examination and  reflection, 
in fact  for bargaining within the firm or with the other side  (public autorities 
or workers'  representatives) who  will  judge the matter on  criteria other than 
those of economic  efficiency (although they cannot dismiss that  entirely)~ 
The  first case makes  dismissal  easier because it merely adds a  further element 
to the calculation of casta without  changing the rules of calculation.  The 
second  inhibits dismissal  by  involving other criteria and  other considerations 
in the decision. 
We  can now  revise our notion of opposition;  often the two  lines of action 
coexist  in the  same  country.  Far from  being opposites,  they are often 
complementary.  Thus  the beat  example  of the first policy is perhaps the Federal 
German  agreements: on .protection against rationalization;·yet an  equally important 
place is occupied by the discussion  of'th~ 'sociaL plan'  with·  .. the works  council, 
as required by  the Federal  law of 1952  (amended  by  the law  of 15  January  1972) 
-which is closer to the  second policy.  (1)  French practice,  especially since 
the 1974  and  1975  texts,  mainly follows the second policy.  But  the first also 
0ccurs and  as a  result the level of severance payments has risen. 
Yet  the  second  remains quite distinct  from  the first.  The  beat  proof is 
the recent  scandal  provoked  in France by  the system of offering severance 
payments  (an undertaking persuaded a  large numger  of workers to leave 
voluntarily by  offering a  substantial  lump  sum  to anyone  who  gave in their 
notice).  Why  this practice (in accordance with the law and  elsewhere frequently 
considered,  particularly by  UK  trade unions,  as completely normal  subject to 
discussion of the amount  of the payment)  is regarded as  shocking by  some  French 
trade unions can be understood only if it is realized that by  so  doing the 
employer was  dodging the  judgement  of the unions with whom  he  should have 
dealt.  Otherwise,  there seems  nothing surprising in an adult  employee  who 
knows  his rights deciding whether or not it is in his interests to accept 
a  severance payment. 
The  two  directions also  correspond to two  types of discussion.  The  first 
consists of general bargaining to determine the general rules to be  observed. 
It tries to place potential  specific cases under a  jointly decided  law.  Thus 
the discussion can have  a  bearing on  the decision but is not  a  part of  i~. 
1.  However,  the council has no  right to oppo$e  the management's plan and 
~  only discuss its social implications. 
9 It judges after the event,  a  posteriori, whether the decision taken complies 
with the rules (this is especially easy when  it is merely a  question of checking 
whether a  payment  has been made).  Naturally it therefore takes place at  some 
distance from  the undertaking,  for instance at  branch level.  The  other type 
of discussion,  b7- contrast,  lays down  the procedures for examining a  case 
in poi~v, as the jurists call it. It does not  specif,y in detail the criteria 
of assessment  because it reserves itself the right to consider a  given case 
in all its complexity.  It intervenes before.the decision is taken in order 
to influence that decision,  to know  on  what  grounds and  according to what 
criteria it has been taken.  In fact,  it takes part in the decision-making 
(even if at present the two  parties are on  a  far from  equal  footing);  so  it 
intervenes a  priori and  not after the event.  Naturally,  this also involves 
direct contacts with the interested parties or at least with the decision-
making body  which is the undertaking. 
The  labour disputes which are  common  throughout  Western Europe,  particularly 
widespread  in Italy and  France and  also  frequent  in the UK  and  Belgium, 
illustrate this second procedure.  At  first  sight it seems  absurd for workers 
to occupy a  firm that is going bankrupt,  to continue to produce without  a 
boss,  or to go  on  •strike'  in the absence of any  employer.  Once  bankruptcy 
has been declared,  what  is the use of the economic  weapon  os the strike ? 
Of  course,  it could prevent  the sale of equipment  or the premises,  thus giving 
workers a  hostage against  compensation.  But  this procedure  seems  more  sensible 
if it is regarded as a  passionate and  sometimes  unruly appeal  for an examination 
in social terms of employment.  The  successful  cases,  of which there are not 
many,  involved the use of political means.  But  this is surely quite natural 
when  it is a  question of protesting against the results of a  decision taken 
by  an  employer or a  tribunal according to the criteria of profitability 
alone. 
It could also,  of course,  be a  means  of exerting pressure on  the government 
to come  to the rescue,  or  'quite simply'  provide a  subsidy to avoid bankruptcy 
(sometimes it is difficult to draw the line between operations arising from 
a  rational industrial policy and  those protecting lame  ducks. 
In general it is the rank-and-file movements  which use these methods  and 
aim  at these objectives.  In the UK  labour disputes are the affair of the  shop 
stewards.  In Italy, it is the workers'  delegates,  delegati, directly elected 
from  the  shop  floor,  who  often organize strike action.  In France,  the 
federations have  played a  minor role in relation to the local unions  (often 
even backed by  staff meetings which made  no  distinction between union and 
non-union members). 
The  judgement  of society which is called for and  on  which the action is 
based is often at local level.  Curiously enough,  strikers have  sometimes 
obtained support  and  effective aid from  the local  employers and  the Chamber 
of Commerce.  They  have also  found  it among  traders, municipalities and  local 
political figures  (sometimes acting independently of their party).  Where  it 
is a  question of protesting against  the constraints of the balance sheet  by 
appealing to the public interest and  the realities of work  and  production 
or the value of the social bonds,  this is in fact an obvious procedure. 
10 Of  course such events are marginal,  even  in the countries where  they have 
aroused most  notice and  been emulated most.  If one asked how  many  collective 
redundancies led to disputes and  how  many  such disputes ended  in success one 
would  find that they are incidents of only local  importance.  But  they could 
be assessed in another way.  Surely the influence exerted on  the employers' 
decisions and  on  the  joint discussions  (or discussions within a  works  council) 
goes further and deeper  ? 
This cannot  be measured.  But  at least it shows  that practice,  when  based 
on the deeply held convictions of those concerned,  is somewhat  remote  from 
any model  labour policy based on  freedom  of hiring and  firing,  compensatory 
payments,  training,  redeployment  and mobility  (which one  might  be  tempted 
to call the  'Swedish model'  if the Swedish unions had  not  been the first to 
discard it and  the Swedish  economists the first  to criticize it). This model 
is more  expensive than it might  seem,  since it creates a  fringe of workers 
who  cannot  be  redeployed or are not mobile.  In addition it disregards the 
basic sense of solidarity within the undertaking or establishment and  the 
fact that,  when  faced with difficulties, that is where  the employees derive 
their main  strength. 
It is hardly surprising that a  model  of organized mobility should lose 
its attraction when  the economic  trend worsens.  But  the change - which 
occurred before the economic  downswing  - goes further and  puts in question 
the very criteria of  judgement  in the field of employment. 
1.1.4  Job distribution,  job creation 
Many  of the prov1s1ons of the Belgian and  Italian agreements we  have 
mentioned relate to what  is called  job distribution,  that is to  say,  the 
attempt  to distribute existing employment  more  fairly.  The  same  methods 
have  been used fairly generally. 
Firstly,  they  involve the abolition or reduction of overtime.  In Belgium, 
overtime is generally limited to 40 hours a  week  by  law.  In fact  it is 
surprising that this trend has not  been more  general or more  far-reaching. 
While  redundancy remains widespread,  several branches still consistently 
work  more  than a  forty-hour week.  The  slow  change  cannot  be  explained only 
by  the demand  for a  compensatory increase in wages.  Quite apart  from  the 
fact  that this demand  has been formally abandoned  in several  cases 
(cf 1.2.3.2), it mig~t not be sufficient.  Perhaps it can be  expl~ined merely 
by the  'viscosity'  of the work  force,  that is to say,  by  the time it takes 
to make  up  for shorter working hours by  new  recruitment  ?  Or  perhaps. one 
should point  out that in the UK  and  no  doubt  elsewhere too,  overtime,  in 
spite of its disadvantages and  because it offers each individual a  degree 
of flexibility and  choice in his earnings,  has  become  a  matter of custom 
and practice and  employers  follow this practice for very similar reasons. 
Lowering the retiring age may  have  the same  purpose.  In most  countries 
early retirement  schemes  have  been introduced,  at first reserved to the 
II unemployed  aged  over 60,  then extended to the most  arduous  jobs  {or to  women 
with two  children) and  finally in some  cases open to all with no  restrictions 
except  the veto on  retirement  and  employment  at  the  same  time  {Belgium,  France). 
In some  cases the links between  shorter working  hours and  job creation is 
clearer.  For instance,  in Belgium  an agreement  in the banks reduces the working 
week  in 1978 to  36  hours.  In return the  employers undertake to create 750 
additional  jobs.  The  same  applies to  insurance  companies.  However,  these are 
both sectors which are not  affected by  international  competition.  An  agreement 
was  also reached  in a  glass factory to maintain  employment  by  giving longer 
leave {Glaverbel). 
Similarly,  in the Federal  Republic of Germany,  the printing union is 
asking for a  35-hour week  in the hope  of creating more  jobs.  This was  also 
the aim  which the strike in the iron and  steel  industry in 1978-79  failed 
to achieve in Germany.  Demands  for a  35-hour week  are tending to become 
general  in Europe  {see 1.4., particularly 1.4.1). 
Perhaps one  could go  even  further and  really create  jobs.  In this same 
glass factory in Belgium  and  under the same  agreement,  the employer undertakes 
to make  job-creation investments.  There are similar French examples  in the 
same  branch.  The  Fiat agreement  mentioned earlier had  the same  aim,  although 
in a  quite different  economic  climate {1973).  The  regional agreement  on 
mining in Charleroi also aims at creating new  jobs. 
It has been  said several times that it should be  part of the employers' 
responsibilities,  whether individually or as a  body,  to create  jobs.  In 
France this idea gave rise to the first results of the Lip affair,  namely 
the creation - unfortunately ephemeral  - of an undertaking by  the Shoemakers' 
Federation in Romans  and  job-creation investment  schemes  to make  up  for the 
dismissals at Rive-de-Gier  (1977). 
But  in a  situation where  in the long term insufficient  jobs will  be created 
naturally,  perhaps other methods  should be  considered.· The  national  (tripartite) 
conference on  employment  held in Belgium  in 1976  proposed  creating a  'third 
labour network'  which would  be  neither the traditional public employment 
network nor that of the market  economy  as  such.  According to the traditional 
formula the unemployed  were  to be  put to work  on  'major works',  and this has 
left some  bitter memories,  since the time of the 1848  national workshops. 
One  could,  however,  conceive of a  network of work of social utility which, 
without  being  'profitable'  or steady,  could be  undertaken by those who  could 
not  find  jobs elsewhere for the time being. 
The  Belgian government  paid the unemployed  to work  in the social services 
and  on  improving the living environment.  Luxembourg  has  signed contracts 
in the usual form  £or  'extraordinary work  o£  general interest'  with 
undertakings which  had  excess staff.  In this way  one  iron and  steel firm 
cleaned up  the rivers,  cleared the forests,  developed the parks and 
recreation grounds and  improved  road signs and  road  safety. 
12 Perhaps it would  be  reasonable to add  to these two  examples  the programme 
of subsidies adopted by  the Danish Parliament  in 1975  and  1976  and  designed, 
among  other measures to promote  employment,  to  improve  accommodation  (by 
insulation)  or to  improve  the working environment. 
Lastly,  the increase in public sector employment  may  be due  to the  same 
reasons and  have  the same  results.  In most  of the countries,  this is 
one  of the rare sectors in which  the staff complement  continues to increase. 
1.1.5  New  trends 
1.1.5.1  Job  control 
We  have  observed a  new  tendency  (1.1.3) or at least a  more  important 
trend in  job protection  :  in addition to financial  compensation,  there is a 
trend towards control  (by  those concerned and/or by  the public authorities) 
of employment  decisions.  This new  trend,  which  is certainly encouraged by 
the short-term economic  situation but  which  perhaps also reflects a  deeper 
change of attitude,  is likely to have major consequences for collective 
bargaining. 
We  noted earlier the tendency to apply criteria other than the calculation 
of economic  results,  to introduce into the decision-making a  logic other than 
that of the classical  employer.  This logic surely goes back quite simply to 
an idea familiar to English and  American  trade unions,  the idea that the 
employees,  in particular the craftsmen,  own  their craft and  the  job that goes 
with it (job ownership).  This  idea is reflected in very practical form  in the 
joint administration to access to these  jobs and  in the rules on  length of 
service governing dismissal  and  promotion,  means  by  wpich the union ensures 
that the body  of workers to  some  extent  own  their jobs,  but  without  taking 
the place of the employer. 
This classical analysis has the merit of illustrating in practical terms 
what  a  different kind of logic can involve and  can lead to.  It is doubtful, 
however,  whether this fully describes the new  trend. 
Firstly, it is clear that the body  which,  according to S.  Perlman, 
collectively manages  the available  jobs is first of all a  trade  community. 
Although S.  Perlman outlined possible ways  of extending his theory to cover 
unskilled groups of workers,  today we  must  go  much  farther  :  this coramunity 
may  be a  category (eg unskilled workers,  especially if they are very largely 
women  or immigrants,  ie if they are held together by  a  further distinctive 
feature),  or simply an undertaking (especially if threatened with bankruptcy), 
or a  local  community.  The  logic reflected here will not  necessarily be that 
of the craftsman but of a  variety of industrial  and  local units which  have 
nothing in common  except  that they do  not  follow the usual  economic  rational. 
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accepts the number  of available  jobs as a  fact  of life. It merely sees that 
they are distributed in such a~  as·not~to:offend the sense of fairness of 
the workers and  to protect their interests and  above all their unity in face 
of the employer.  But  job control relates to the actual decision to abolish 
(or create)  jobs.  It is no  longer simply a  question of adapting the results 
of that decision to the rules of length of service,  for example.  The  very 
principle may  be disputed because other criteria are being employed,  relating 
not  to the distribution of existing jobs but  to the decision governing their 
existence. 
This control therefore impinges far more  on  the employer's privileges. 
Job ownership  imposed  major,  but  in the end  peripheral constraints on  him  : 
ie whom  to assign to  jobs once they had  been created  (or rather, whom  to 
dismiss once  jobs had  been abolished).  Now,  on  the contrary,  under the new 
job control  procedure,  the demand  is for a  share in the actual decision-making 
of the undertaking (of course,  not  necessarily an  equal  share).  This transition 
from  a  posteriori control of the results of the decision to a  priori control 
of the decision-making is certainly an important  change. 
The  uncertainty begins when  we  ask what  forms this takes.  In some  cases 
these matters are included in the collective bargaining as such.  We  quoted 
examples of this in Italy,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  the UK  and  France.  But  usually 
(here the examples of Italy and the UK  are very  enlightening),  they spring 
from  a  rank and  file movement  more  or less closely directed by  the unions; 
and  in all cases the action is taken within the  framework  of the undertaking. 
How  effective can negotiation on this issue really be,  especially during 
periods of crisis when  it is most  necessary ?  Are the traditional bargaining 
forms  appropriate here  ?  In fact,  often the  'agreements'  are not at all in 
the traditional  form.  And  the rather irregular nature of the means  used  shows 
the need  for other parties to appear on  the stage and  for a  different backdrop. 
It might  appear quite natural for discussions on  job control to be reserved 
to the directly elected staff delegates and to  be limited to consultation, 
that is to  say to a  less strict form  of negotiation.  This would  certainly have 
the advantage of flexibility.  But  it might  entail the risk of forgetting or 
underestimating the importance of possible disagreements and  disputes. 
Paradoxically,  in France it was  after open disputes that the company  union 
officials and  the unions accepted the most  economic  responsibility and  that 
the  same  people who  vigorously refused co-management  constructed economic 
plans for undertakings in trouble.  This is only an apparent  paradox however. 
In the case of a  serious dispute,  the two  sides do  not  really enter into 
consultation but  declare themselves in dispute.  It seems  that the kind of 
agreements reached  by  the Betriebsrat  (works  council)  in the Federal Republic 
of Germany  have  not  raised the same  problems.  But  this could also be a  result 
of the more  favourable  economic  situation there. 
It remains very difficult, therefore,  to define the ways  and  means  of 
'dispute-sharing'. 
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To  what  extent are there two  labour markets  in Europe,  one that is 
protected,  organized,  priviliged,  the other with unstable  employment,  no 
guarantees and  lower wages;  and  above all, to what  extent are they separated 
by real barriers ?  The  rise in immigration and,  more  generally,  the entry of 
new  strata of society into the wage-earning category (especially rural workers, 
as in France and  Italy) has certainly fostered  this distinction. 
Its scope has been limited by  the fact  that most  European unions have 
little control over recruitment and dismissal and/or have  pursued an active 
policy of solidarity.  One  could ask,  however,  to what  extent the measures 
that have  been taken to protect  employment,  that is to  say the situation 
of those who  have  a  job,  in fact  create a  further division.  B.y  maintaining 
some  jobs are not  other unemployed  workers  being deprived  ? 
Unemployment  strikes unequally,  as it has always done.  In general the 
proportion of unemployed  is higher among  young  people than adults {with,  as 
it seems,  wide differences according to country)  and  among  women  than among 
men.  In short,  the new  arrivals (or most  recent  arrivals) are at a  disadvantage. 
In some  cases,  as in Italy, the problem is even  more  serious  :  the young 
unemployed  and  in particular young unemployed  graduates form  a  new  fringe 
group that has become  massive and  unregulated and is not  under the control of 
the unions in spite of their endeavours.  The  very sudden fall in immigration 
has not prevented immigrants from  leaving again,  sometimes  in large numbers, 
nor the high unemployment  level among  recent  immigrants.  Lastly,  the increase 
in temporary work  reflects the fact that today hiring has  become  a  more  serious 
and more  costly decision. 
A country like Italy also has a  substantial  number  (perhaps nearly two 
million)  home  workers or workers  in an irregular position not  covered  by 
collective agreements.  The  law  (1973)  protectjng them  is difficult to apply. 
One  of the things that worries employees  in the  'primary industries'  is that 
in times of crisis a  substantial amount  of available employment  escapes to 
the non-protected sector as a  result of sub-contracting. 
Lastly,  perhaps it is basically the same  difference which makes  the distance 
between the large and  medium  scale undertakings  and  the small undertakings 
even wider.  In the former,  employment  can be  controlled with some  success by 
the works  councils and  before the public authorities.  The  latter usually remain 
outside this control. More  generally,  sometimes  the benefits of a  collective 
agreement  are reserved only to the former  group  and  when  competition becomes 
keener one  finds  several  cases,  in France,  Italy and  Belgium  for example,  where 
the  'non-protected'  sector gains ground  because it imposes  fewer  constraints. 
Here one must  of course distinguish carefully between the different 
national  situations.  They  differ in this respect  because of the difference in 
the powers of the unions and  in economic  level  and  traditions. 
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effects of job protection ?  Nowhere  has it been  shown  that these specific 
measures  produced a  massive  increase in temporary work.  If there is any trend 
in that direction it is caused more  by  the whole  body  of regulating machinery, 
whether legal or contractual,  than by  specific measures.  The  public authorities' 
and  employers'  immigration policies have dove  more  to create this problem than 
the social protection measures.  So  it would  be  pointless to blame  the privileges 
of existing employees. 
Nevertheless,  it is true that the economic  trend as a  whole  has made 
competition on the labour market  keener and  thus made  it more  difficult for 
the individual to protect his benefits.  It is only natural  for the weakest  to 
suffer most.  The  public authorities are trying to correct this trend,  with 
varying degrees of success,  by  creating youth employment,  ie trying to find 
a  way  of opening the most  difficult door to  them,  the door to the first  job. 
This is certainly a  problem  to be  consid,red. 
1.1.5.3  The  two  sides of industry and  employment  policy 
As  the last  section clearly shows,  action by the two  sides of industry 
alone has only a  limited effect  in face of a  serious employment  crisis.  No 
doubt  bargaining and  consultation can do  more  than merely redistribute the 
crisis and  the poverty.  They  can  improve  economic  competitiveness by  easing 
some  of the burdens or making  them  more  foreseeable and  they can help ensure 
that the undertakings'  policies are socially justifiable. Particularly in the 
long term,  these are important  achievements. 
On  the other hand,  the two  sides have little power  of action on  the economic 
trend.  And  when  the trend is very bad,  it greatly reduces the chances of 
consensus.  There is a  wide  gap  between the objectives of the 1976  bargaining 
campaign  in Italy and  the results achieved  :  job and  investment  control were 
often reduced  simply to the obligation to disclose information.  The  public 
authorities have  the main  power  of overall action on  employment. 
At  least they often try to bring together the two  sides of industry.  In 
Belgium  two  tripartite conferences on  employment  were  held in 1973  and  1976. 
Although the participants had  no  powers  of decision,  the exchanges of view 
led  each of them  to take very pratical steps.  They  influenced legislation, 
government  policy and  negotiation.  The  conciliation agreement  of August  1976 
in Denmark  closely involved both Parliament  and  the two  sides of industry in 
a  decision relating to wage  restraints and  action to promote  employment  (mainly 
by giving subsidies for specific cases).  The  tripartite national  conference 
in Luxembourg  in 1977  was  of the  same  kind.  On  several  occasions the Netherlands 
Government  has settled issues by  law.  In France,  youth employment  measures 
were decided  jointly by  government  and  employers,  while the unions remained 
rather reserved or critical. 
These  joint meetings certainly do  not  reach agreement  easily.  In several 
cases the resulting decisions taken by  the government  have  provoked  strong 
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Belgium  and  the decisions of the Danish Parliament  in 1975  and  1976.  The 
government  sometimes  plays the role of arbitrator;  but more  often it imposes 
rules which  the two  sides of industry accept  reluctantly as a  temporary evil. 
The  same  problem arises,  in more  acute form,  with wages  policy. 
There is one  road that deserves to be  explored,  however.  Where  it is 
possible to establish a  'third labour network'  (cf 1.1.4),  the two  sides of 
industry could perhaps have  a  special part to play both in organizing this 
and  defining its limits and  objectives. 
1.2  Determination of wages  and  salaries 
The  rising rate of inflation which  occurred  in all the countries in the 
1970s made  it necessary to re-examine or review the machinery for determining 
wages  and  salaries.  The  same  problems arose everywhere,  though they varied in 
urgency according to the economy  concerned  (especially according to the share 
of exports in the national product),  to sector  (whether or not  protected from 
competition)  and  according to national traditions (the Federal Republic of 
Germany  has good  reason to fear galloping inflation even more  than others). 
From  1974  on  this was  joined by  the problems arising from  a  high level of 
unemployment.  The  so-called  'stagflation'  is a  monster which the economists 
have  not  yet managed  to tame,  and  the specialists in industrial relations 
even  less.  From  this point of vieH it can be said that  a  radically new  kind 
of crisis occurred in 1974  and  that  we  are only  just beginning to realize 
its social consequences. 
1 •  2. 1  The  usual bargaining structures 
In spite of their differences the nine countries have many  features in 
common  as regards their usual bargaining structures for wages  and  salaries. 
The  traditional bargaining framework  is the branch of industry.  Although 
the terms used to designate it vary a  ~eat deal  and  although the division 
into branches and  the definition of an individual branch,  which is even more 
important,  also differ widely according to country (for instance the definition 
of 'engineering'  or metal-working)  and  although divisions by  trade can also be 
superimposed,  as in the UK,  in the main  the framework  for the discussion of 
wages  and  salaries is a  branch as defined by its product,  its techniqu~ or 
its materials rather than the trades involved.  The  bargaining unit  can be 
regional  (preferably,  in the Federal Republic of Germany)  or national  (except 
in the Federal Republic of Germany,  the tendency has been to  increase the 
national bargaining powers)  or both.  The  difference from  the usual practices 
found  in North America  and  Japan is. striking. 
The  role of the confederations (the inter-trade organizations of employees 
or employers)  is much  more  varied.  In every case they have at the very least 
co-ordinating responsibilities;  they attempt  to  lay down  the rules of pl~, 
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(or national unions)  responsible for the negotiations,  they m~  well  assess 
the economic  trend and  indicate what  is possible and  desirable,  as occurs in 
France and  the Federal Republic of Germany  and  even more  in the UK. 
At  times,  however,  they play an  even more  important role.  The  extreme 
cases are probably Denmark  and  the Netherlands.  In Denmark,  branch bargaining 
is preceded and  regulated by  confederal  bargaining to decide on  the margins 
of increase.  In the Netherlands,  the confederations,  meeting in private in 
the Labour  Fbundation or a public organization like the Economic  and  Social 
Committee,  have  long been responsible for deciding on  wage  increases and 
also for supervising and  endorsing the branch decisions.  In spite of the 
eclipse of the wages  policy in the 1960s,  they were quite prepared to return 
to their traditional role when  the crisis came.  In Ireland national  (ie 
inter-trade) agreements were  not unknown  even before the crisis.  In Belgium, 
finally,  although the  joint branch committees are autonomous,  the confederations, 
particularly in the context of inter-trade negotiations which link up  with the 
work  of the National  Industrial Council,  exchange their views and  also make 
social planning agreements which  become  the basis of a  consistent policy and 
settle a  good  number  of issues at national  industrial conventions. 
The  British TUC  does  not  have  the  same  powers,  but  of necessity it played 
a  decisive role during the years,  of which there have  been many  since 1945, 
when  British governments  endeavoured with varying degrees of success to 
establish an  incomes  policy and  introduce wage  restraints.  In France,  although 
wages  and  salaries remain the federations'  prerogative, it was  the confederations 
which built up  the whole  supporting structure of supplementary pensions,  protection 
against dismissal  and  supplementary unemployment  benefits.  In Italy,  the traditional 
method  of confederal  bargaining has regained  importance in recent years as shown 
by  the confederal  agreements of 1975  on  wage  and  salary protection and  the sliding 
scale. 
In many  cases,  however,  the bargaining has  tended to  involve the undertaking. 
Of  necessity,  branch bargaining fixed minimum  as opposed  to real wages.  Individual 
undertakings may  therefore pay more  if they consider it advisable.  This makes 
it inevitable for wages  to drift away  from  the  agr~ed rates,  a  tendency further 
encouraged  by  growth,  prosperity and  perhaps inflation.  The  question is how 
are these increases decided,  whether unilaterally or by  bargaining ? 
The  reply varies greatly according to country.  Bargaining at the level 
of the undertaking exists in Denmark,  especially among  undertakings which do 
not  belong to the employers'  association;  in the Federal Republic of Germany 
it exists for the  same  reasons and  also because the unions are attempting to 
take over this domain,  which  has been  reserved mainly to the internal 
agreements  (Vereinbarungen)  of the works  council  (Betriebsrat).  The  most 
striking development  is probably that in the UK  where  the activities of the 
shop  stewards have  gradually created a  second  bargaining level,  which has 
become  the main  one,  as shown  in the Donovan  report.  The  tendency in Italy 
is the same;  there the great wave  of strikes in the hot  autumn  of 1969 
strengthened the trend towards bargaining within the undertaking,  which  then 
acted as much  more  than merely a  relay of the branch in question.  The  same 
18 applies in France,  but there the trend is confined more  to large undertakings 
and  gives an  important  place to the quite unofficial action of the works 
council.  A similar trend emerged  in the Netherlands,  especially in the 1960s, 
and  in Belgium. 
Government  intervention also varies according to country.  The  extreme 
cases are the Netherlands,  where  for years the government  'managed'  and  even 
supervised the bargaining and,  at the other extreme,  the Federal Republic of 
Germany  where  respect  for the  'autonomy'  of the two  sides of industry is a 
basic principle and  no  open  intervention is permitted (indirect  intervention, 
particularly through monetary means,  is obviously not  excluded,  and  more  than 
elsewhere the courts have defined mutual  relations).  Between  the two  is a  whole 
range of systems,  from  exemplary government  action via the public sector to 
concerted action and  authoritarian decisions,  from  periodic intervention to 
medium-term  planning,  from  the determination of minimum  wages  to aid for the 
less-favoured categories or the promotion of bargaining. 
We  shall return later to the nature of the agreements arrived at in these 
ways.  Fbr the moment  we  shall merely note the differences between countries 
where  the agreements have  a  fixed term  ( eg the  Federal Republic of Germany, 
Denmark)  and  those where  they do  not  (France,  the UK,  although the latter 
is tending towards fixed-term agreements).  Even  more  important  is the 
difference between  countries where  the agreement  cannot  be  contested once 
it has been  signed  (Federal Republic of Germany,  Denmark,  Netherlands)  and 
those at the other extreme where  the bargaining can begin again at any 
moment  and  on  any  subject  (France,  the UK  and  now  Italy).  Clearly,  the wages 
agreements have  very different implications in the two  cases. 
1.2.2  Reactions to inflation 
1.2.2.1  Spontaneous reactions 
Without  attempting to settle the discussion between  economists on  the 
causes of inflation, it is obvious that in seeking to correct it individual 
agents alone have little influence.  The  fight against inflation is mainly 
dependent  on macro-economic measures  (ie mainly governmental).  But  it is 
worth considering how  the agents react to it in negotiations,  regardless 
of the concerted efforts whic~ may  be made  at'national level. 
Although we  only have partial information on the subject,  five trends 
can be noted. 
1  ~  Firstly, the proposed duration of agreements is tending to become _.shorter 
for very understandable reasons of caution.  Employers are reluctant to commit 
themselves for more  than the short  term in view  of the monetary instability. 
Employees  fear they may  not  obtain sufficient protection.  This tendency was 
noted in the United States, reversing the previous tendency to prolong 
contracts.  It is evident  in France,  at both branch and  enterprise level. 
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J It has also  emerged  in Belgium,  where  branch agreements have  tended to be 
reduced to twelve months,  and  in exceptional  cases to  six months,  or at least 
to include a  clause stipulating that they shall  be reviewed within that period. 
It is illustrated dramatically in Ireland by  the increasing frequency of 
national agreements between  1970 and  1976  and  in particular by the increasingly 
short time  span for which agreements are valid. 
In all cases where it is easy to reopen negotiations,  this phenomenon  is 
almost  automatic.  The  extreme  case seems  to be  the Federal Republic of Germany 
where little change has occurred,  apart  from  the unexpected  events of  1~69. 
2.  Not  only do  the agreements  signed tend to  be valid for shorter periods, 
they also  seem  more  difficult to obtain,  for the same  reasons.  Deadlock~ on 
issues where  agreement  must  be reached are becoming more  frequent  and  extensions 
of time make  no  difference.  In cases where  temporary solutions can be  found, 
this is done  more  frequently  ('employers'  recommendations'  in France).  Or 
again,  where  possible,  the preference is for less official and  less binding 
negotiations,  for decisions which  have been more  or less fully discussed and 
accepted,  rather than for agreements- in brief,  for arrangements which do 
not  require the formal  agreement  of the parties. 
3.  At  company  level  in particular,  the formulas  used to deal  with  ..  infJ_~tion· 
are often emergency  measures and,  as a  result,  benefit the least-favoured 
categories  :  a  wage  increase which  is not  or not  entirely linear,  a  lump-sum 
increase or a  combination of the two.  In Belgium,  for  instance,  some  sectors 
(eg the banks)  made  a  serious effort to increase the lowest  wages  in that 
sector and  women's  wages.  Certainly this often has an equalizing effect, to 
which  we  will return later.  It should be pointed out that historically a 
period of great  inflation like the First World  War  has the effect of seriously 
eroding the hierarchy of wages  and  salaries,  in  some  cases permanently. 
4•  Has  the shift to  decent~alized bargaining slowed  down  or speeded  up 
inflation ?  The  second view  i.s  frequentlY- maiutained and  the British experience 
of the intervention,  in principle supplementary  but  in fact  independent,  of 
the shop  stewards  seems  to confirm it. It deserves more  detailed study,  however, 
for other observations suggest  the opposite  :  the small  gaps in the adjustment 
to the cost of living (gaps which widen with the rise of inflation)  and  the 
non-linear wage  increases could in fact  slow down  the rate.  Whether  the theory 
of 'structural inflation'  has any universal application remains to be proved, 
at least as regards wage  and  salary bargaining. 
5.  One  could ask whether the more  informal nature of the bargaining and 
the resulting arrangements do  not  lead to  even  greater dispersal and  fragmentation. 
Surely every undertaking or every group of employees  tends to settle their 
problems themselves without  paying .much  attention to collective rules or 
solidarity.  That  seems  to be  the lesson of Belgium - although the phenomenon 
can also be  found  in other countries - and  it suggests that perhaps the distance 
and  tension between  small  and  large undertakings is increasing. 
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The  obligation to respect  a  national  m~n~mum wage  is particularly useful 
in times of rapid inflation because the  same  reasons which  caused the low 
wages  in some  sectors or groups also tend to delay and  hinder the adjustment 
of these wages  to the rise in the cost of living. 
In countries which  had  long since had  a  m~n1mum wage  (France,  Luxembourg, 
for example),  the rising rate of inflation often became  an opportunity to 
increase it as part of a  policy to raise low  wages  (because this was  urgently 
necessary,  because  such a  policy is more  acceptable in such circumstances 
and  as a  concession for certain sacrifices).  For instance in France the SMIC 
(minimum  wage)  has  been  increased periodically since it was  reviewed  in 1970, 
and  at a  faster rate than the rise in the cost  of living (this was  true even 
under the wage  restraint  system known  as the  'Barre plan'). More  spectacularly, 
the minimum  guaranteed wage  in Denmark  was  increased to Dkr  29  an hour on 
24  March  1977. 
In certain countries which  had  not  yet  adopted  such prov1s1ons,  the 
accelerated inflation and  the employment  crisis became  an opportunity to 
do  so.  The  Netherlands did it by  law  (but  an the advice of the Industrial 
Foundation and  the Economic  and Social Committee)  in 1968  and  indexed the 
monthly minimum  according to prices and  wages.  This measure  seems  to have 
had  considerable effect  since the number  of employees  covered has doubled 
between  1971  and  1974.  Belgium  established a  monthly minimum  indexed to the 
cost of living by the national  industrial agreement  of March  1975  (endorsed 
by  royal decree in October). 
Some  countries,  however,  do  not  wish to adopt  such a  measure.  In the UK 
and  Ireland,  for  example,  unions and  employers  both fear that it would  weaken 
their bargaining power  and  that bureaucratic or political machinery  (or both) 
might  come  to replace bargaining.  In the UK  other institutional instruments, 
the Wage  Councils,  look after the least-favoured sectors.  Although they have 
been strongly criticized for their inefficiency,  they have  the advantage of 
being in a  kind of bargaining position and  perhaps paving the way  for it. 
1.2.2.3  The  sliding scale 
The  establishment of a  sliding scale of wages  is a  direct  response to 
inflation.  It is still a  matter of controversy today whether or not it is 
contrary to  sound  monetary policy,  whether it brakes or speeds up  inflation. 
The  second question,  which  one  should be able to answer  on points of fact, 
remains unresolved,  probably because the sliding scale has different effects 
according to the different bargaining structures and attitudes of the two 
sides - and  perhaps also according to the inflation rate. 
Some  countries proceed by  the general  indexation of wages  to the price 
index and  have  done  so  for a  long time,  like Belgium  (1950)  and  Luxembourg. 
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business as a  whole  {it also applies to the public sector),  and  reviewed the 
methods  of calculation in the 1975  agreement.  Denmark  also has a  general 
indexation system. 
other countries are less systematic.  In the  UK  indexing has been  introduced 
in many  collective agreements,  but it is far from  universal.  Naturally the 
changes  in wages  policy often meant  indexation was  questioned again.  In Ireland, 
in the absence of any real  indexing,  some  national agreements provide for more 
or less automatic adjustments usually in line with the fluctuations in the 
cost of living.  In France this practice was  at  first prohibited by  law,  then 
tolerated,  and  now  rather·indirect or even direct sliding scale formulas  have 
become  widespread.  especially in the public sector,  although they are still 
far from  general. 
The  Federal  Republic of Germany  remains apart  because any  indexing clause 
in a  collective agreement  must  first be  authorized by the Federal  Bank. 
Application has never been made  for  such  autho~i·zation.  Public op1n1on as 
a  whole,  both on  the side of the wage  earners and  trade unions and of the 
employers,  is deeply hostile to indexing. 
Certainly, it is not  the countries where  indexing is the rule which have 
the highest  inflation rates.  Yet  this does not  imply any causal  connection 
one way  or the other. 
The  formulas  used are far from  identical.  Some  merely align wage  rates 
closely to the cost of living{Belgium).  Provided the latter is measured 
correctly (in Belgium  by  the tripartite determination of the index),  this 
sliding scale is socially neutral.  But  in other  cases the sliding scale 
device includes a  degressive  element  so  that  even while maintaining average 
wages  in parity with the cost of living, its application results in a 
degressive rise in wages  in relation to wage  rates.  Thus,  in Italy and  in 
Denmark  where  the systems are very similar,  a  one point rise in the price 
index produces a  flat-rate rise of all wages  {the flat rate is fixed at 
about  1  ~of the average or most  frequent  wage).  So  the adjustments have  an 
equalizing effect,  particularly when  inflation accelerates.  In Denmark  this 
has brought  the wages  of unskilled and  skilled workers,  or of men  and  women, 
substantially closer.  Effects of the same  kind  were  obtained in the Netherlands, 
for instance,  with the minimum  rises. 
It is very interesting to note that in several  countries the  speeding up 
of inflation led to a  partial suspension or correction of the sliding scale, 
as though beyond  a  certain rate of inflation there was  an increased danger 
that the sliding scale would  reinforce or at least maintain this trend.  Thus 
in Belgium,  following the breakdown  of confederal bargaining concerned mainly 
with this matter,  the government  suspended the sliding scale for salaries over 
BF  40 000 a  month  for a  period of nine months  in 1976  (law of 30 March,  not 
extended in 1977).  In Italy a  law passed in October 1976  abolished half the 
increase• based on  the sliding scale for wages  of between Lit 6-8 million a 
year and all increases in wages  and  salaries 6f above  Lit  8 million.  The 
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amounts  to credit institutions for small  and  medium-sized undertakings.  !n 
April  1977,  some  elements of the cost of living were:dissociated from  the 
index,  which  slowed  down  their increase.  Lastly,  in 1976  the Danish Parliament 
decided in a  single flat-rate increase during that year and  that a  second one, 
if, as was  likely,  the price trend caused a  second rise, would  be  paid to the 
supplementary pension  fund~ 
The  French government  decisions for  1977  were  of a  similar kind.  Wages 
were  to be adjusted to the cost of living over that year,  no  more  and  no  less, 
except  for very high wages  and  salaries where  the adjustment  would  be  reduced 
by  half (FF 18-24  000  a  month)  or abolished entirely (over FF  24  000). 
These  partial suspensions of indexing thus  had  two  purposes  :  firstly to 
reduce the rate of inflation by  putting a  brake  on  it, secondly to correct 
certain inequalities. Moreover,  a  formula  such as that applied by  Denmark 
freezes increases without abolishing them;  that  of Italy is intended to 
promote  investment  and  therefore employment  (in  1976  France imposed  a  special 
tax on  high incomes  in the form  of a  compulsory  loan for the same  purpose). 
1.2.3  Fbrmulating an  incomes  policy 
In the wider sense,  we  shall describe as incomes  policy any measure  taken 
by  the public authorities which affects the distribution of incomes,  at the 
time of incomes  formation or after they have  been received.  In this sense, 
every modern  state has an  incomes  policy,  whether formal  or not,  by  the very 
fact of having a  tax policy.  In the narrow  sense an  incomes  policy is any 
measure  by  the public  a~thorities affecting incomes  formation which aims  to 
be comprehensive and  consistent  (and,  in general,  fair).  In this sense,  in 
spite of the variety and  scale of measures taken in response to the short-term 
economic  trend,  it is not  certain that any of the nine countries under 
consideration has a  genuine  incomes  policy,  if only because  so  many  of their 
decisions are taken as a  matter of urgency. 
1.2.3.1  Institutional methods 
Some  prov1s1ons of the branch agreements  can be laid down  by  the two  sides 
of industry as part of an incomes  policy.  In several recent  Belgian agreements 
(machine  production,.dockers)~ the two  sides agreed to reduce to  zero  or 
strictly curtail the increase in wages  and  to pay the amount  thus  'saved'  to 
the social  security fund  of the branch as a  supplementar.r- contribution.  To 
some  extent this freezes purchasing power:  and  to  some  extent it releases 
posts by  promoting early retirement.  In the  same  way,  the setting up  of 
employees'  funds  (by branch agreement)  in various German  industries was 
designed specifically to avoid inflationary tendencies. 
Although not  exceptional,  these cases are not  the rule either. At  present, 
incomes  policies are aimed  at restoring the overall balance and  therefore are 
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of the confederations which  normally act as the bargaining partner of the 
public authorities. 
The  first effect an  incomes  policy has  (which is also a  condition of its 
success)  is to shift,  in part at least, the decision-making centre from-the 
federation to the confederation,  from  the  branc~ to the industry.  The  British 
Trades Union  Council,  a  traditionally weak  organization if only because of the 
low  dues it levies,  has managed  to increase its influence and  authority since 
1945,  in spite of some  ups and  downs.  Although the national unions in the 
Federal  Republic of Germany  remain responsible  for agreements,  it was  a 
statement  by.  Mr  Vetter,  chairman of the DGB  {G~rman federation·of unions) 
which laid down  the policy of wage  restraints in 1976.  Inversely,  it is· 
because the confederations had  and  still have  so much  authority that Denmark 
and  the Netherlands have  found  it easier to define their overall objectives. 
We  have already mentioned the national agreements  (inter-trade outline 
agreements)  in Ireland. 
Generally,  however,  this centralization of power  within employers'  and 
employees'  trade associations is a  response to  the activities of the public 
authorities.  It goes hand  in hand  with a  shift  from  bipartism to tripartism. 
With  more  or less difficulty,  and  on  a  more  or less wide  scale depending on 
earlier national  custom  (cf.  1.2.),  the  governments  are now  playing_a larger 
role in determining wages.  In some  cases it seems  to be  temporary or occasional 
in Belgium,  the intervention in 1976  and  1977  has not  been repeated and  was 
regarded as an exception.  In Denmark,  the voting of an ad hoc  law in 1975  is 
obviously not  intended to set a  new  pattern.  In Italy,  government  intervention 
to freeze part of the increase in the highest  earnings terminated in April  1978; 
the introduction of a  change  in the cost of living index did not mean  that the 
sliding scale was  abolished.  But,  although such government  action provokes 
strong reactions often followed  by  withdrawal,  it would  seem  that the trend 
is deep-rooted. 
The  channels of intervention are extremely varied and  the principles on 
which they are based differ according to country;  yet these government  measures 
can be divided into three categories  :  'statements of principle,  the establishment 
of specific directives,  and  effective government  control of wage  trends'.  (1) 
The  first  category,  which most  economists consider as at most  a  preliminary 
to a  genuine incomes  policy,  is nevertheless the one  chosen in the Federal 
Republic of Germany.  Concerted action,  in which  the government  representatives, 
the two  sides of industry,  the Federal  Bank  and  various experts  jointly examine 
a  report  on  the state of the economy  and  future  prospects is not  the same  as a 
decision-making meeting.  Its object is 'to obtain the voluntary co-operation of 
all interested parties in order duly to  combine  stability and  development  by 
1.  FOllowing the analysis presented in the ILO  volume  quoted earlier, 
Collective Bargaining  ••.•  , pp.' 171  ff. 
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Thus  it fully respects the independence of the two  sides of industry,  which 
the unions and  employers uphold  so  strongly. 
It is understandable why  in principle concerted action does not  cover more 
than general matters  (we  should note that the DGB  and  the  BOA  have  no  authority 
over their respective federations and  could not  therefore impose their conclusions 
on  them  even if they so  wished).  Yet,  the fact  that the Federal  Bank  and  the 
government  announced  an average rate of wage  increases,  wage  drift included 
(7.5  ~), in 1977  as  'what  corresponded most  closely to the overall  economic 
situation and  to medium-term  needs'  and  that the Federal  Bank  criticized some 
agreements because they exceeded this rate, makes  one  inclined to think that 
the crisis forced the government  to take a  new  step, moving  from  statements 
of principle to directives,  although they remain overall directives not  aimed 
at any one  branch in particular.  This might  be  one of the reasons why  this 
method  of concertation is no  longer applied. 
We  must  realize how  original this step is in relation to what  happens  in 
most  other Community  countries where  the public authorities do  not try to 
intervene directly in the negotiations  (termination of the concerted action 
does not  invalidate this principle). 
In most  other countries the situation lies between directives and  control. 
The  real differences between them  are mainly in the manner  in which the 
directives are applied and  the decisions administered,  that is to say in the 
extent to which the two  sides of industry are associated in the government 
policy. 
It is practically impossible for the government  to ignore them  entirely. 
Even  in the case of the French Barre Plan,  during its first phase  (blocking 
prices and  wages  for three months)  or the second  phase  (limiting wage  increases 
to the increases in the cost of living for 1977),  the unions and  employers were 
both consulted  (even if some  of the former assert they were  not  listened to 
and  are openly trying to oppose the plan).  In this case,  however,  we  have 
reached the lowest  possible level of association  :  not  only was  no  agreement 
reached,  but  apart  from  minor aspects (limiting rises in high incomes)  the 
government  decisions were  not  formally voted in Parliament  (on the other 
hand,  it was  the Danish Parliament that voted the price freeze  in 1978  and 
its extension for three months  in February 1979).  Although  they take the form 
of a  directive,  the control methods are important  because for the undertakings 
they involve price controls. 
At  the other extreme  we  have  incomes  policy measures which are agreed, 
either between unions and  government  (the social contract in the UK),  or 
between the two  sides of undustry,  although in fact  they are negotiated 
between three partners because linked to reciprocal  concessions offered by 
1•  Joint  statement  by the participants in the meeting of 12  October  1970, 
quoted  by  Hans  Reichel,  ibid.  p.  196 
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case of the Irish national agreements and  the  1973  'central agreement'  in 
the Netherlands.  Or  one  can have a  complex  combination of agreement  and 
legislation, of decisions by  the two  sides of industry and  Parliament,  as 
happened  in Denmark  in 1976. 
Quite often,  however,  and  sometimes  in the  same  countries,  no  agreement 
could be  reached and  those concerned  had  to resort to a  government  decision, 
authoritarian in form  but  taking some  account  of the points of agreement 
already reached during the bargaining.  This occurred in the Netherlands,  after 
1973,  with the  'authorizing law'  of 1974  by  which the government  can regulate 
wages,  and  the  1976  decision;  in Denmark  when  the  employers rejected the 
mediation proposal  in 1975;  in Belgium after the breakdown  of the 1975  and 
1976  negotiations.  The  last case illustrates the full  range of possibilities 
although the two  sides of undustry separated in  1976  without  reaching any 
agreement  at  confederal  level,  they adopted a  fairly general  statement of 
intent on the objectives to be achieved which was  regarded as meaning that 
this matter was  now  entrusted to the branches.  So  the government  refrained 
from  extending the law of March  1976  and  put  its trust in the bargaining 
process,  on  the basis of a  list of points  (and  while retaining the possibility 
of control).  (In fact,  the government  still had  much  influence on  the 
undertakings by  controlling prices,  and  it had  specified that any  increase 
in real wages  beyond  the sliding scale limits would  not  be regarded as 
justifying a  price review.) 
As  regards methods  of ensuring compliance with these directives,  to a  very 
large extent this is best  ensured  by  the two  sides of industry when  the most 
difficult measures,  those  concerning wage  restraints, are included in their 
agreement.  In 1976  it was  the Trades Union  Council  which  brought  the seamen's 
union back within the terms of the contract  signed with the Labour  Government. 
The  Employers-Labour Conference in Ireland which discusses national agreements 
also acts as the intermediary and  arbiter in any disputes which might  arise 
when  these agreements are written into branch contracts.  In Denmark  the 10 
and  DA  are responsible for keeping wage  increases for  1976-1978  within the 
annual  limit of 2  %. 
Even  where  there is no  agreement  as  such,  the effectiveness of the decisions 
is largely a  question of the discipline shown  by the two  sides of industry. 
This is certainly the case in Belgium.  Even  in France,  and  in spite of the 
open opposition of the CGT  and  CFDT,  the Barre Plan is now  being applied (it 
is too  soon to know  how  strictly) thanks to the  support of the employers and 
a  section of the union movement  (no  doubt  one  should also add  the support  of 
part of the general  public).  This  sense of discipline can vary according to 
country (in spite of the change of political climate,  it is particularly 
strict in the Netherlands)  and  is rarely entirely absent. 
Naturally,  the government  also has its own  means  of exerting pressure. 
The  most  direct methods  are not  necessarily the most  efficient.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany,  the very strict limitation of the money  supply is one 
example  and  the two  sides of industry realized that with such constraints 
any  excessive wage  increase would  very soon  have adverse effects on  employment. 
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by  undertakings,  especially large undertakings.  The  tax system,  (eg taxes on 
wage  increases) also enables the government  to  intervene specifically (of 
course it intervenes in general to determine available revenue).  Lastly,  we 
have already listed all the measures relating to minimum  wages,  the sliding 
scale,  social security payments,  etc. 
Nevertheless,  there are limits to these methods of control  (and  pressure), 
which  emerge  gradually.  We  shall  come  to them  later. 
1.2.3.2  Content  of the policies 
As  we  have  noted,  most  government  measures  are more  in the nature of complex 
programmes  of action to deal with an urgent  situation than medium  or long-term 
incomes  policies.  Their prime objective is to reduce a  rate of inflation 
regarded as excessive and  as a  threat to the trade balance and  to employment, 
that is to say to restrict the distribution of  incomes or at least available 
incomes.  Large-scale unemployment  complicates the issue by making it more 
difficult to find an economic  solution,  but  perhaps it also makes  it easier 
to offer concessions  (or hopes  thereof)  to the  employees. 
So  the prime aim,  as regards industrial relations, is to halt the wage 
increase,  in some  cases  by  deciding to freeze wages  (obviously only as a 
temporary measure  for a  few  months;  it was  applied in France,  and  on  several 
occasions  (again in 1979)  in Denmark  for example);  or by  strictly confining 
the increases to a  ceiling amount  as was  done  in the UK  (with the express 
intention of reducing real wages  in a  large number  of cases),  to the increase 
in the cost of living (France,  where  the sliding scale is used),  or to a  low 
rate (2% a  year in Denmark).  Earlier we  mentioned  several more  complex 
formulas  :  compulsory loans in the form  of taxes  (France);  freezing part of 
the increases which are paid in to a  credit institution (Italy) or to a  pension 
fund  (Denmark,  Belgium);  50 %  tax on  wage  increases allocated to an early 
retirement  fund  (Belgian law of March  1976).  The  methods are very varied,  in 
response to social sensitivities,  the political balance or calculations of 
the length and  outlook of the crisis. 
Where  a  contract, or quasi-contract  exists,  this is a  bitter pill for the 
employees  to  swallow.  In exchange they are generally offered a  complex whole, 
a  package deal of very varied elements. 
Firstly there is the attempt  to equalize or redistribute incomes,  at least 
among  employees.  The  accepted wage  increase may  be flat-rate or degressive or 
a  combination of the two.  The  sliding scale may  be applied with degressive 
effect.  The  lowest  wages  can be  p~shed up  by  raising the guaranteed minimum 
wage.  Certain tax reliefs can be given (the UK)  or subsidies introduced to 
lower food  prices (Ireland) or particular price categories (France).  Social 
security contributions can be reduced or taken over by  the state (Denmark). 
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will not  be the only ones affected and  that all the economic  groups will have 
to make  sacrifices.  Other  incomes will also be  circumscribed or controlled. 
Prices will  be  controlled or restrained.  This objective is surely the most 
natural  one  :  the best  concession for an anti-inflationary policy is clearly 
one  tha·t  halts or inhibits inflation. 
The  third objective is probably the most  important  one,  but also the most 
difficult to  combine with  anti~inflation measures  :  to restore the employment 
market.  Employees  who  are convinced that temporary restrictions will  improve 
the employment  situation are more  likely to accept  such measures.  The  difficulty 
is to find efficient measures which have  no  inflationary effects.  That  is wny 
specific subsidies for depressed  sectors (building),  reorganization or 
restructuring of loans  (small  and  medium-sized  undertakings)  and  expenditure 
on  improving the working environment  were  increased.  In most  cases the results 
are slow and it will  become  more  and  more  difficult to make  the proposals 
seem  convincing. 
The  employees  (and  to  some  extent the employers too)  may  also hope  that 
these responses to the economic  situation will  become  part of a  more  long-term 
industrial and  social policy.  Attempts are being made  in several  countries to 
bring workers and  employees  closer together or to  improve  the situation of 
manual  workers.  But  in both cases the restraints on  wage  increases make  it 
very difficult to achieve much  progress. 
Lastly,  in some  cases the unions take this opportunity to try to obtain 
the legislation or measures they want.  In Denmark,  LO  wants a  bill passed on 
the employees'  investment  fund  (a project analogous to the Swedish one),  a 
very ambitious bill because it would  finally put  a  large part of private 
companies'  capital  in the hands of the employees and  their representatives. 
The  1976  law  on  co-management  in the Federal  Republic of Germany  can be 
regarded as a  reciprocal concession for the wage  and  salary restraints 
accepted  by  the unions (it is, of course,  also  the result of determined 
efforts by  the trade unions  since  1952,  public discussion described in the 
Biedenkopf report,  and  general political developments).  On  the other hand, 
the lack of such reciprocal  concessions  (in any  case,  wage-earners' 
disappointment  in this respect) is perhaps one  of the reasons for social 
unrest  in Italy. 
1.2.4  Closing the wage  gap 
In earlier paragraphs we  pointed on  several  occasions to the equalizing 
tendency of spontaneous reactions to  inflation and  of the policies applied 
tp remedy  it. The  historical precedent of the First World  War  in Europe tends 
in the same  direction.  For closing the wage  gap  is a  major  preoccupation of 
our society.  Is it then useful  even to ask whether the gap  is closing and  is 
the reply not  perhaps  self-evident  ? 
28 Certainly it is for the immediate  future,  but  perhaps not  permanently. 
The  inflation of the First World  War  went  hand  in hand  with a  shortage of 
labour  (more  generally,  this has occurred during most  periods of rising 
inflation).  Today,  however,  inflation goes hand  in hand  with large-scale 
unemployment.  Will  the effects be \he  same  in the end  ? 
In fact it has in no  way  been demonstrated  either in France,  Italy or the 
UK  that the legal or contractual minimum  wages  apply to everyone without 
exception.  Even  in a  period of full  employment  they apply only partially; 
there can and  do  remain  'pockets'  of less-favoured workers,  occupational, 
geographic or ethnic pockets.  But  in times of high unemployment,  how  can 
one  be sure that the adjustments to the cost of living will apply to everyone  ? 
In principle the compulsory minimum  levels cover everyone. 
But  in fact their limits coincide with the limits in the influence of the 
industrial inspectors and  the unions.  Below  a  certain size of undertaking, 
and  particularly if the branch is widely dispersed in general,  are infringements 
still apparent,? If there are few  jobs,  will the interested parties disclose 
infringements ?  In France,  statistics show  a  narrowing gap  since 1973.  In 
Italy they show  that the great  egalitarian drive has brought  the professional 
categories within the branches,  and  the branches among  themselves,  closer 
together.  But  the difference between regions and,  even more  important,  between 
sizes of undertakings,  has remained  intact  so  that one  might  be  tempted  today 
to  see a  major split of the economy  into two  more  or less separate sectors 
(cf.  1.1.5.2). 
The  British system of wage  councils can leave very large gaps,  and  in any 
case it does not  seem  much  more  effective,  for the  same  reasons (it should be 
pointed out again that it covers more  than three million employees).  We  have 
already mentioned the problems of sub-contracting and  homeworking  in Italy. 
There too,  it is difficult to apply legislation and  generally there is no 
union available.  The  negative effects of equalizing measures,  namely  skimming 
off high wages,  have  a  good  chance of being applied,  with the reservations we 
shall discuss below.  The  positive effects will  certainly apply for a  majority 
of those concerned.  But  the question is how  many  people will be left out  and 
find their situation worsening. 
If we  include the unemployed,  at least those who  are paid reduced rates 
or who,  over a  period of time,  have moved  into  a  lower category of payment, 
the group of least-favoured workers threatens to be not  only large but  on 
the increase. 
So  'low wages'  are most  likely to remain a  topical  issue. 
Inversely,  and  still for the same  reasons,  namely  the employment  market 
situation,  how  can one  be sure that in time the  highest wages  and  salaries 
will be reduced  ?  Certainly we  must  acknowledge  that  serious attempts have 
been made  to reduce the wage  differential  :  in Italy,  for example,  by 
simplifying the occupational classifications and reducing the number  of 
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workers,  employees,  technical and  supervisory staff closer together in a  single 
wage  structure and  to make  the various categories overlap.  But  in the medium 
term it seems  possible that a  counter-offensive may  be  launched to distribute 
them  widely again. 
After almost  three years of the social contract this is what  appears to 
be  happening in the UK.  After the freeze  (for example,  with a  ceiling of £6 
a  week  for all) came  the search for new  differences.  In Italy, at a  moment 
when  the flood of union conquests has reached full tide and  may  be  receding, 
associations of categories are reappearing,  such as independent  unions and 
small  groups.  In Belgium  people are wondering whether the modest  expansion of 
localized bargaining is not  counteracting the attempts to achieve solidarity. 
Such  a  trend would  not  be  illogical.  In an  economic  climate of high 
unemployment  it would  certainly not  be  surprising for categories which are 
strong on  the labour market  to find a  means  of asserting themselves and  their 
advantages.  In the fairly short  term it is indeed possible that the differential 
will widen  again,  at least for  some  categories. 
The  term  'strong categories'  must  be defined,  in case they should prove to 
be the same  as the traditional categories.  For  example,  in the fairly short 
term the excessive number  of graduates may  reduce the privileges of these 
categories of employee.  B,y  contrast,  skilled workers,  because not many  have 
the required qualifications or because access to their trade is very strictly 
controlled,  may  improve their positions.  A high rate of inflation and  a  high 
rate of unemployment  produce all the conditions for very rapid changes  in 
respective situations. 
In both cases,  we  are unlikely to  see any uniformity in the near future. 
We  shall not  attempt  to ask what  will happen to the civil servants who 
traditionally suffer from  inflation and benefit  from  the opposite trend.  In 
several  countries we  have  already noted their present privileged position, 
with security of employment  and  all the advantages this may  represent in the 
bargaining process.  Inversely,  in the eyes of the private individUal,  they 
must  act as an example.  It is also clear that where  force plays a  stronger 
role,  a  major part of the public sector (electricity and  coal,  in the case 
of national undertakings)  has a  redoubtable bargaining power.  All  in all, 
however,  it is difficult to draw  any conclusions,  especially as regards the 
future.  For in this context the public employer  retains a  considerable margin 
of freedom  (economically greater than that of a  private employer)  and,  above 
all, his decisions are likely to be based less on  the state of the market  than 
on  internal political considerations.  It is not  very wise to attempt  predictions 
in this field. 
1.2.5  Wages  and  output 
It is a  commonplace  that in all industrial  countries wages  are now  only 
30 partially the reward for work  and  output.  Recent  tendencies  seem  to have 
reinforced this dissociation and  surely the best  example  is the new  unemployment 
benefits which give the recipient  the equivalent  of his wages  without  his 
actually working. 
For industrial workers,  payment  by  results in its various forms  seems  on 
the whole  to be on  the wane.  In Italy,  the systematic offensive action of the 
unions met  with success and  only faint  traces of this system remain.  In the 
UK  this system was  regarded after the war  as being inflationist because it 
promoted wage  drifts within undertakings and  as  having provoked  a  number  of 
savage strikes because payment  by  results was  negotiated in the establishment 
by  the shop  stewards  (who  often preferred it for that reason).  Payment  by 
results has declined most  in those industries where it was  most  widespread, 
such as coal mining,  engineering,  cars,  dockyards.  It is increasing,  however, 
in light  industry and  the services.  In France it has become  less frequent  and 
an inter-trade agreement  of 17  March  1975  notes this,  welcomes  it and  hopes 
the trend will continue.  In Luxembourg  the  change  to the  system of monthly 
payment,  (ie to salaried status)  has  speeded  up  the replacement  in the iron 
and  steel industry of payment  by  results by  fixed  payments  (an overall 
production bonus is still paid to all workers).  Belgium is negotiating the 
abolition of payment  by  results in metal-working.  Does  that mean  this system 
is now  a  dead letter ? 
The  Federal  Republic of Germany  seems  to be  moving  in a  quite opposite 
direction.  The  principle of performance  (Leistung)  is applied there,  especially 
in collective agreements which  recognize not  only grades of skills but  also 
the dependence of wages  on activity (Tatigkeit),  ie the amount  of work  provided 
(endorsed,  for instance by piece-rate payment  or incentive payment)  and its 
quality.  Furthermore,  there is also a  tendency,  contrary to that in Italy 
and  France,  to analyse and  evaluate  jobs and  to diversify wage  categories. 
Why  such a  striking difference  ? 
This may  be due  in part to historical circumstances.  Payment  by results 
may  have  been an overworked  system during the fever of industrialization in 
France and  Italy,  which would  expla~n the current reaction against it. But 
the reasons in the Federal  Republic of Germany  would  be different. 
Looking at the subject more  generally (for payment  by results is a  system 
practically reserved to workshops,  and it represents a  specific kind of link 
between labour and  production),  the opposition  looks much  less clear. 
The  links between wages  (or various wage  benefits)  and  output  have not 
tended to weaken  in most  countries;  in fact  the  contrary is true.  The  example 
of the British productivity agreements explains the good  and  bad  reasons why. 
The  good  reasons are that during a  period of inflation wage  increases linked 
to a  productivity rise are not  inflationary and  may  therefore be  encouraged. 
The  bad reasons are that productivity agreements have  been used as a  means  of 
avoiding wages  freezes,  a  process by  which the  two  parties escape from  outside 
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is very likely that  in the present  economic  and  social  situation these reasons 
will both remain valid.  And  wage  restraints will not  survive many  years before 
provoking reactions from  those concerned. 
More  generally the  'efficiency principle'  is being extended  even  where  it 
is not very easy to measure.  It is applied for civil servants in the Federal 
Republic of Germany,  and  in Italy,  too.  It seems  to have weighed  particularly 
heavily in the last fifteen years on  executive staff (what  the French call 
'cadres').  Very  generally,  in most  large undertakings,  the contract of loyalty 
by  which the executive offered unconditional  loyalty and  devotion in return 
for security of employment  and,  to a  certain degree,  of career,  has been 
replaced by  a  perfomance  contract where  the most  sophisticated methods  of 
analytical accounting and  management  by  objectives are used  so  that the 
employee  must  prove that he  is worth his pay.  This pressure is often resented 
strongly in spite of the major benefits obtained by  the executive employees. 
Nothing in the economic  situation is likely to  ease this situation. 
It may  seem  symptomatic  in this context that discussions are taking place 
in Italy on  a  wage  reform designed to reduce the share of indirect wages  and 
increase the share of direct wages,  and  also to  reduce manpower  costs and 
increase the portion of wages  that is negotiable - a  reform which  is apparently 
about  to be  implemented.  It is difficult to  see  how  this can be  achieved without 
linking wages  to productivity. 
It is unlikely that France and  Italy will once again see the development 
of the traditional  forms  of payment  by  results,  particularly in its more 
mechanical  and  individual aspects.  On  the other hand,  it is very likely that 
the earnings/performance relationship is likely to  be  emphasized  in the 
economy  in the next  few  years  :  more  flexible and more  general definitions 
of efficiency may  evolve,  together with better means  of measuring it. In 
other words,  this development  is linked with changes  in work  organization. 
But  it is most  likely that the links between wages  and  output,  in various 
forms,  will tighten and  not  weaken  in the coming years. 
1.2.6  The  new  trends 
At  the  end  of the  1960s  and  the beginning of the 1970s quite a  number  of 
European  countries experienced a  wage  explosion backed  b,y  strong pressure 
from  the employees  themselves,  acting either branch by  branch or undertaking 
by  undertaking,  which  overthrew all the established systems and  rules 
(Netherlands,  Italy,  the UK).  The  crisis led to a  radical  change  in economic 
trends by  bringing about  a  much  closer link between the risk of inflation 
and  of unemployment.  This accordingly gave  new  urgency to the need  for an 
incomes  policy,  whether  involving short-term economic  action,  a  complex  plan 
to deal  with the requirements of economic  balance and  also social balance, 
or consistent medium  or long-term planning. 
As  regards the changes which the development  of incomes  policies brought 
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decision-making,  with the national bodies and  above all the inter-trade 
associations acqUiring more  say  (often the deciding word).  Equally clearly, 
they involved much  heavier and  often much  more  authoritarian government 
action to guide,  arbitrate and  even replace bargaining and  exercise the 
necessary supervision.  But  what  are the implications of these changes and 
do  they not  signify a  return to the long-term trend,  interrupted by  the 
1968-1972  social crisis,  towards  stronger and  more  centralized organizations 
and  away  from  bipartite towards tripartite bargaining ? 
This would  be too simple an assertion.  Many  governments are deliberately 
trying to limit their intervention in wage  matters.  Moreover,  the habit 
acquired in several countries of holding more  or less informal discussions 
within the undertaking will not disappear overnight.  Above  all,  such an 
assertion would  conceal  the real problems  involved. 
1.2.6.1  Political discussion 
The  first problem is a  very obvious one  :  the more  an  incomes  policy is 
confined merely to freezing wages,  the less acceptable it is to the employees 
(and the less one  can count  on  their support  or at least acceptance).  But  the 
more  complex it is, the more  fair rewards it incl•dea,  the more  action to 
combat  low  wages  or to control other incomes,  the more  attempts it makes  to 
create employment,  the more  it will then lend itself to discussion- to an 
overall discussion relating to long-term objectives as well  as to methods 
and  to the importance to be attributed to the various objectives (incentives 
to undertakings that create employment,  improvement  of employees'  guarantees). 
In a  word,  it should be  a  political discussion,  a  model  of the discussions 
and  controversies which  normally occur in a  democratic country not  just durtng 
electoral campaigns  but  in the context of all major legislative and  government 
policy decisions.  So  it is quite natural and  very justifiable to invite the 
two  sides of industry to accept  a  'contract'  or a  balanced programme;  but 
this also means  inviting them  to shift the discussion of wages  not  only from 
the trade or occupation concerned  to the national  scale but  from  the occupational 
field to the political domain. 
Consequently,  the discussion does not  change  just in scale but  also in 
content.  When  the wages  of a  branch or even of an undertaking are discussed, 
the two  parties may  well accept  the objective economic  constraints. 
The  uncertain nature of balance sheets and  the even greater uncertainty 
of forecasting leave much  room  for discussions,  but  they have  their limits. 
Moreover,  if the disagreement  is irreparable,  the means  of pressure that 
can be  employed  are known  and limited. ·B.y  contrast,  an  incomes  policy programme, 
whatever the qualifications of the experts who  have  drafted it and  whatever 
its technical virtues, is by  definition a  complex and  debatable proposal, 
not  only because it wagers  on  an uncertain future but  above all because the 
extent to which it is fair and  the position it takes vis-a-vis the future 
are a  response  ~o the pressures of various interests and  to current opinion 
rather than irrefutable technical  solutions.  In an  emergency  the two  sides 
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emergency  can equally well  exacerbate the differences of conviction,  principle 
and  doctrine.  If in a  given country the majority and  the opposition do  not 
agree on  a  programme,  it will  be more  difficult  for the two  sides of industry 
to accept it. Since we  are now  in the political field,  it is inevitable that 
the discussion will  be political and  that  in each country it will take on 
the  same  form  and  intensity as the usual political debate.  The  countries where 
doctrines lie furthest  apart  and  the discussion is most  lively are also those 
where  it is most  difficult to agree upon  an  incomes policy and  where  this 
policy is most  open  to discussion. 
The  result is obvious  :  the trade associations acquire certain responsibilities 
in general  political life, whether they wish it or not,  and  become  political 
forces,  independent  or not,  depending on  their party ties.  For  several years 
there was  a  tendency among  unions,  whether Socialist by  origin or family, 
Communist,  Christian or Liberal,  to  stand apart  from  the parties.  A discussion 
of this kind necessarily brings them  closer to  the parties,  even  in the area 
which belongs par excellence to the unions,  that of wages.  In fact,  either 
the trade associations  'bargain'  directly with the government  on  the proposed 
programme  - and  paradoxically this means  that the reliefs on direct taxation 
or VAT  which are a  part of it, like the subsidies to the economy,  ie the 
resources and  expenditure of the national  budgets,  are decided by  the government 
and  the two  sides of industry before Parliament  ratifies them  - or the political 
parties,  both those in the majority and  those in opposition,  play on the  sympathy 
they have  in the trade associations to assume  the role of arbitrators or guides. 
Or  again,  and  this is more  likely,  a  mixture of the two  will occur.  But  this 
will change the real method  of operation of the  institutions and  affect the 
position of the unions in the political system. 
1.2.6.2  The  organizational  cost of incomes  policies 
It has often been pointed out  that  incomes  policies are generally only 
temporarily effective and  that their effectiveness declines rapidly.  With the 
passage of time,  issues that have not  been settled. properly seem  to become 
more  problematic,  either because the system adopted,  efficient in its simplicity, 
leaves too many  injustices,  or because it becomes  so  complex as to be ineffectual 
by trying to take every individual  case into account.  Once  the implementation 
of the directives is controlled,  they are eroded rapidly (the exceptional  case  o' the longevity of the incomes  policy in the Netherlands  seems  due  to a 
combination of exceptional factors). 
But  why  this erosion ?  Once  a  stand has been taken,  that is to  say once 
the discussions on doctrine and  political orientation have  been settled,  why 
can the bargain made  not  be kept at all levels,  for example  that of wage 
restraints in exchange  for selective employment  measures ?  Especially if the 
discussions have  been  conducted well,  the bargain will be  advantageous for 
all. Everyone has an interest in averting possible disaster.  Why,  once the 
agreement  has been reached,  is it so  difficult  to keep to it ? 
Even  leaving aside the fact,  which  in practice is very  important  and  often 
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every opportunity.,  the reason for the difficulties is simple.  Even  allowing 
that the body  of employees  has an interest in wage  restraint  (just as the 
body  of employers may  have  an interest in credit control),  none  of the 
employees  (or employers)  and,  what  is even more  serious,  none  of the groups 
of employees,  whether categories,  undertakings,  branches or regions  (or 
groups of employers)  has an interest in the restraint of his wages  (restriction 
of his credits).  A healthy currency,  balanced trade or  ev~a satisfactory 
emploJment  level are collective goods  in the sense in which Mancur  Olson  has 
defined this term  :  accessible to all once  created.  The  community  has an 
interest in producing the collective good.  But  this is not  true of any of 
the individuals or smaller groups that make  it up.  Its usefulness,  its 
indispensable nature,  may  be  apparent  to all.  But  the possibility of taking 
effective action to produce it is reserved to fairly large-scale bodies;  in 
the field of incomes  policy,  it is reserved to  the confederal trade associations 
and  the political authorities. 
If the actions of individuals or splinter groups are to contribute to the 
production of this collective good,  there is a  need  for strict internal 
discipline and  strong national  cohesion.  This discipline may  be based on 
constraint or on allegiance.  But  this allegiance of individuals and  groups 
is so  contrary to the dictates of their own  interests that it is likely to 
exist only in exceptional  cases,  and  in any  case,  it is not  likely to be 
lasting (the importance and  relevance of calculating one's own  interests 
needs no  further demonstration when  it is a  question of incomes).  It is 
possible to acquire this sense of allegiance in emergency or dramatic 
situations but it is dufficult to maintain it on an everyday basis. 
In other words,  the controls necessary for  the production of this collective 
good  which  is an incomes  policy (always assuming it is recognized as a 
collective good)  are successful in the early stages insofar as they are backed 
by feeling and  conviction.  They  then become  eroded  because the emotion fades 
and  conviction becomes  weaker  in face of the constant  pressure of individual 
interests.  The  public authorities must  make  even greater efforts to maintain 
their positions,  and  in addition the organizations themselves are then obliged 
continually to start afresh,  in the face of constant adverse pressure,  on  the 
operation  ~o transform individual  interests into collective interests and 
collective interests into the general  interest.  The  organizational cost of 
this endeavour is a  considerable one. 
Furthermore,  the pressure is not  just constant, it is also a  growing one. 
If there are any good  reasons for believing that collective bargaining is an 
efficient means  of determining wages,  these are,  in the main,  that this is a 
method  which decentralizes decision-making.  Very centralized decision-making 
would  forfeit the main  advantage of this method,  namely  the possibility of 
reacting to specific problems  concerning  jobs,  workshops,  categories,  work 
places,  in fact the events and  repercussions of local  economic  life.  Tb 
eliminate or greatly reduce these micro-decisions would  of course bring 
further insoluble or poorly resolved problems,  whether it is a  question of 
changes on the market,  inequalities to be  corrected,  accidental  del~s to 
be made  up  or recruitment requirements;  it would  bring further disputes 
about  injustices (or at least what  are felt to  be  such by  those concerned) 
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Here  again the organizations can do  much  to  reduce the disputes.  And  they 
will  succeed all the better if they leave a  greater margin for micro-decisions 
(although,  of course,  the more  satisfactory the overall contract was  for the 
employees,  the more  this margin will  be reduced.  Inversely,  the wider this 
margin is extended,  the less the overall  contract will  be applied.)  They  will 
often have to arbitrate on  small  issues and  ensure that the solution does not 
deviate too much  from  the norm.  This arbitrating and  supervisory function 
demands  a  great deal of authority.  It requires  a  considerable power  of 
explanation and  conviction on  the part of organizations with free membership, 
so  that the collective interests will  continue  to  predominate.  So,  fer the 
same  reasons as before,  the organizational  cost  is high. 
It must  not  be  forgotten that the unemployment  which  accompanies  inflation 
makes  it more  difficult for special interest groups to  exert pressure and  thus 
favours the extension of controls.  But  this is only true in overall terms.  It 
is probable that  even  in the absence of the general  pressure of a  shortage of 
manpower~  some  categories of employees will remain weaker  than others (of.  1.2.4) 
and  that after a  certain period of submitting to discipline they will use the 
means  available to them  to defend their interests.  So  the pressure will be 
spread more  unequally and  focus  on  a  small  number  of issues.  But  this will 
not make  it any easier to resist,  and  insofar as there is any resistance, it 
will be more  difficult to make  these concessions accepted equitably.  So  they 
will threaten the balance of the programme  even  more. 
1.3  The  quality of working life 
Tb  group a  series of claims and  bargaining issues under the heading 
'quality of working life' is surely  just a  question of following the fashion 
and  attaching a  new  label to old problems  ?  Does  it designate a  well-defined 
or new  area ?  Although the answer  to these two  questions is no,  we  shall 
attempt  to  show  that  something fundamentally  new  is involved. 
A first·indication of this is that most  countries have  invented new  terms 
to designate this group of problems  :  improving the work1ng  environment  in 
Scandinavia,  humanization of work  in the Federal Republic of Germany,  work 
structuring (and variants thereof)  in the UK  and the Netherlands,  working 
atmosphere and  organization in Italy,  working conditions in France.  Although 
these terms certainly do  not mean  the same  (rather,  they  show  the variety 
of objectives),  at  least they have  in common  that they are new  terms in 
the negotiating vocabulary. 
It is quite evident  today that the area is poorly defined.  It has  expanded 
gradually by its own  internal logic, until it now  encompasses practically 
everything except  wages  and  employment  (and  even there we  shall  see that 
36 the borders are imprecise).  It includes not  only the material  conditions of 
performing work  (effort 'and  fatigue,  in terms of both dynamic  and  posture, 
temperature,  ventilation,  noise,  dust,  in short  everything to do  with 
physiological  comfort  or discomfort),  but also health and  safety at work  in 
the classic sense of the term.  Fbr how  can one  speak of the ergonomic 
adjustment  of a  job without also  examining questions of the elimination of 
toxic vapours or protection against accidents  ?  It includes not  only the 
interest of the work,  its psychological and  occupational content  (whether 
the  job is repetitive or parcelled out,  monotonuos  or varied and  stimulating, 
the tension and mental  effort  involved),  but also the worker's opportunities 
to use his knowledge  and abilities, to learn something,  his prospects of 
acquiring a  higher qualification and  being promoted,  ie of entering into a 
career,  in short  the whole gamut  of working life.  The  researchers at the 
Tavistock Institute did not  forget  this when  they defined the criteria of an 
acceptable  job.  Naturally,  it also  includes working hours and  their distribution 
(especially shift work  and  night work)  and  the degree of flexibility involved. 
Several  countries (Italy,  France)  would  not  hesitate also to include  job 
evaluation,  which of course reflects decisions on the content  of  jobs,  on 
the criteria according to which  they are assessed and,  in the end,  on  the 
whole  work  organization.  Many  countries would  also include the status 
assigned to various  jobs or categories.  The  upgrading of manual  work  and 
payment  by  the month,  that is to say the co-ordination or fusion of the 
•tatus of workers and  employees,  also affect the quality of working life in 
the deepest  sense of the term.  Perhaps even wages  can be included,  for it 
is difficult to talk of the quality of working_ life without  considering wage 
forms,  especially payment  by results,  wage  drifts or the question whether a 
wage  rate belongs to the man  or to the  job.  The  reduction of working hours 
is surely a  claim which generally also includes maintenance of the overall 
wage  rate,  ie an increase in hourly rates.  The  actual wage  level is surely 
the primary source of the worker's social status and  individual  independence, 
and  the protection of this income  is of decisive  importance to his dignity. 
To  make  a  distinction between qualitative and  quantitative elements was  a 
good  way  of condemning  the now  disputed practice of making up  for arduous or 
dangerous work  by  paying a  bonus  and more  generally a  way  of underlining the 
importance of the new  claims being made.  But  on  the other hand  it is not  a 
very useful  way  of defining an area.  'Qualitative'  means  everything which is 
directly felt and  experienced by  those  concerned  and  giving priority to the 
'qualitative'  aspects means  giving priority to their points of view.  The 
quality of working life, in this sense,  ia a  good  formula  because it places 
less emphasis  on  the reciprocal  concessions of a  bargain  (the conditions for 
selling labour)  than on the irreducible character of personal  experience. 
This makes  it easier to reply to our  second  question.  Of  course none  of 
these areas is a  recent discovery.  Ever  since employees have  existed  (no  doubt 
one  should say,  since dependent  labour has  existed)  they have  feared  long hours, 
strict discipline and  the arbitrary decisions of the managers.  It is not  the 
new  left that  invented the objections to payment  by results, to night work  or 
to assistant managers.  Since the very inception of the labour movement,  the 
conditions of industrial organization (including the independence and  autonomy 
of skilled workers)  have been a  focus of conflict.  Yet  there has been  some 
change.  At  first,  no  doubt,  this was  ~ecause these issues have  become  more 
important  in the scale of claims.  Workers  are more  reluctant to accept  the 
usual constraints of work  automatically,  either because these constraints 
have worsened  (concentration,  responsibility and  rhythm  of work)  or because 
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the w9rking  'environment'  means  demanding  a  wider-scale change  than the mere 
improvement  of safety and  health.  But  it is also  because the way  in which 
these issues arise is relatively new  :  in Belgium,  France and  Italy,  we  find 
works  conflicts on  safety,  the rhythm  of work,  the classification of less 
skilled workers or working hours,  which have  forced the employers,  whether 
individually or as a  body,  and  sometimes  even the unions,  to  look at these 
issues again and  reflect upon  them.  Furthermore,  these disputes have often 
begun  within small  working parties,  small  teams  sharing the  same  situation, 
obstinately resolved to find a  solution to their  small  problem,  who  refuse 
to delegate it or to drown  it in some  vast  collective arrangement.  As  the 
British researchers were  the first to realize,  the working party has thus 
become  a  full  protagonist  in industrial relations.  The  fact  that this is 
where disputes originate - which  explains why  these claims were  sometimes 
encouraged  by  small  groups from  the  'spontanist'  new  left- also  explains 
the ~ore radical reconsideration of the  'scientific' management  and  its 
traditional  solutions,  whether it is a  question of the allocation of tasks, 
pay or  job superivsion (often radical  enough  to  inspire the technicians and 
organizers to  seek ingenious solutions).  If 'qualitative' means  the resolve 
to start from  the direct  experience of those  involved and  the refusal to 
dismiss this in favour of economic  logic,  then the term  is justified.  But 
this means  that it defines not  an area but  a  procedure. 
If the unity and  novelty of this problem lie in the fact  that a  procedure 
is involved,  it becomes  easier to understand the variations found  in the 
various countries.  The  discussion on  job evaluation in Italy which originated 
from  grass-roots pressures and  came  to a  peak after the  'hot autumn'  is a 
direct offspring of the movement  which  led to the creation of worker delegates, 
ie direct and  unitary representation of the workshop  or team,  and  to those 
concerned dealing directly with their own  problems.  There is no  reason why 
job evaluation should be the same  in the Federal  Republic of Germany.  The  UK 
seems  to stand very much  on  its own  in this movement,  at least as regards the 
unions.  But  it is also the country where  skilled workers  have  managed  best  to 
retain their privileges,  above all that of organizing work  according to their 
own  traditions,  to custom  and  practice.  The  Federal Republic of Germany  found 
it less difficult than others to take account  of these new  problems.  Perhaps 
this is because its works  councils and  the co-management  of internal working 
conditions gives it an efficient  channel  of expression,  which was  further 
improved  by  the law of 1972. 
1.3.2  The  forms  and  channels o£  discussion 
Through  what  institutions and  by  what  legal means  can the two  sides of 
industry act  in this area ?  Naturally this will  vary according to the issue 
in question.  It is easier to forbid the use of trichlorethylene in a  solvent 
(and to enforce compliance with this veto)  than monotony  in a  job.  In the 
first case,  the matter can be efficiently settled by  regulationj  in the  second, 
this would  be  a  derisory method  and  any  statement of principle would  merely 
be  an appeal  to the initiative of those concerned.  Between  these two  extremes 
we  find  intermediate cases,  where  it is possible to establish a  standard or 
a  rule but where  the main  aim  is to bring about  a  change  in the decision-
making criteria and  in the procedures. 
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not  by  dealing with the traditional issues in their usual  form  (safety,  adjustment 
of jobs,  job qualifications and  evaluation,  etc), but  in terms of the channels 
of discussion used.  B,y  surveying well-tried methods  and  those which are legally 
simplest  and  also the more  recent methods  which  are more difficult to classif,y, 
we  will  show  whether the procedure of moving  from  below upwards  which  we  have 
attempted to describe,  the increasing claims of groups of operatives,  whether 
skilled or not,  to control the daily performance  and  conditions of their work, 
is in any  way  new. 
1.3.2.1  Standards and  rules 
Safety and  hygiene have traditionally been regulated.  It is forbidden to 
use dangerous machinery or apparatus  (prior examination or authorization of 
new  machinery is required},  toxic products must  be  eliminated and  the  standards 
of maximum  permissible concentration of dangerous products defined,  as must 
procedural  standards and  standards on  the dimensions of entrances and  exits. 
The  list is very  l~ng and  in spite of its inadequacies and  the discussions 
to which it gives rise, it shows  that great  progress has been made  in the 
protection of workers.  These  standards are generally endorsed by  law and 
regulation and  sometimes  originated and  developed  from  negotiation.  The 
first safety rules were  a  result of industrial custom  (eg among  the miners) 
and  in a  country such as Italy,  collective branch and  company  bargaining was 
perhaps the main  factor that  brought  an  improvement  in health conditions. 
Moreover,  even where  the rules originate mainly  from  state action,  there 
exists a  strong parity device,  taking various forms  but  usually that of 
safety and  health committees,  which  examine  the  causes of accidents,  sickness 
or concern,  ensure the application of the rules in workshops  and  suggest 
improvements  in the rules and  their application.  Backed  up  nearly everywhere 
by  public inspection and  industrial medical  services,  the rules have  provided 
a  model  for intervention in working conditions  (although it seems  to be the 
relative weakness of these services which  reduced the effectiveness of negotiated 
rules in Italy.  Perhaps regional action will make  up  for this in the future). 
Perhaps,  after making the necessary adjustments,  one  could  extend this 
model  to  cover questions which do  not  relate specifically to safety and  health 
(although the distinction is not  always  a  very strict one).  Fbr  example,  it 
could cover noise and  temperature which are easy to measure  (noise charts 
could be  introduced in workshops defining the areas most  seriously affected), 
or ventilation.  Or  ergonomic  standards could be  proposed  for the various  jobs, 
to measure  the physiological cost of the work  (the mental  burden is also 
beginning to be  measured).  Precise rules could be introduced to forbid work 
in postures which are tiring and  have  harmful  long-term effects.  Large· 
undertakings have  prepared handbooks  on  the requirements to be observed in 
certain  jobs and  on  the rules to be  observed by  the  'recipient'. University 
and  industrial laboratories and  research offices have made  a  major effort 
for  some  time  now  to draw up  further practical rules.  The  Federal Republic 
of Germany  can draw  on  the support  bf two  research institutes, the Council 
for Economic  Rationalization  (RKW)  and  the Association for Industrial Research 
(REFA)  which both have a  good  reputation for scientific impartiality and  with 
which the two  parties have  close links.  They  have sufficient authorit7 for 
the collective agreements to refer to their views at times.  So  to what  extent 
39 will  ergonomic  standards be codified in fUture  on the model  of the safety and 
health rules and  include standards of psychologically acceptable and  humanly 
satisfying work  ?  The  German  law which  requires  'the application of the lessons 
of science'  in industrial organization seems  to  point the way. 
There is no  doubt  of the utility and  importance of improving our knowledge 
of work,  and  drawing the appropriate conclusions and  lessons from  this.  In 
most  countries considerable applied scientific research has been undertaken 
(Work  Research Unit  in the UK,  special  programme  of the General Delegation 
of Scientific and  Technical Research and  National  Agency  for the Improvement 
of Working  conditions in France,  tests and  research undertaken in Belgium 
(Belgian Office for Productivity,  today replaced  by the Office for the 
Improvement  of Working Conditions),  in Denmark  and the Netherlands and  in the 
European Institute in Dublin) with university researchers and  industrial 
authorities working closely together.  And  in every country there are attempts 
on the basis of the knowledge  acquired to find means  of analysing the situation 
and  channels for action for use by  methods  study departments,  engineering 
departments,  technical  services and  unions and  to disseminate them  through 
small-scale training courses (often by  introducing this subject  into the 
curriculum of technical  and  engineering schools). 
Lastly,  no-one would  dispute that much·remains to be done·tc bring'the 
working environment,  as stated in the 1975  Danish law,  'in line with the 
technical  and  social trend'.  In nearly every case,  too,  the safety laws have 
been tightened up  and  revised  (Health and  Safety at Work  Act,  UK,  1973;  law 
of December  1973  on  working conditions and  of December  1976  on  accidents in 
France;  law of 23  December  1975  in Denmark),  generally in order to offer 
further possibilities of regulation and  to specify where  the responsibility 
lies. 
But  perhaps the only or even the main  object  of the research and  the 
attempt  to formulate practical  conclusions is not  just to establish rules. 
There are very practical reasons for doubting this.  However  devoted to 
duty the industrial inspectors may  be  (and  however great the attempt  to 
increase their numbers  and  their means  of action)  and  however  great the 
vigilance of the unions,  there is often a  wide  gap,  which  no~doubt varies 
from  country to country,  between the provisions of the law and  its effective 
implementation.  Certainly this is because there are no  adequate means  of 
control,  but  perhaps it is also because there are limits to the effectiveness 
of a  regulation  :  it can be too  lengthy,  too detailed,  it may  paralyse itself 
by  being inapplicable or at least unassimilable.  Even  the safety specialists 
of today consider it more  important  to  choose good  'market  opportunities' 
than to proliferate regulations in all directions. 
In any  case the pace of technological  change  is so  rapid that regulations 
can only  lag behind.  A regulation necessarily takes time because of the 
responsibilities involved.  How  could it keep  up  with the constant  creation 
of new  processes,  new  machines  (a minor  adjustment  to a  machine  can entirely 
change  the safety conditions)  ?  This applies even more  to  new  products,  new 
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of products and machinery tend to be classified according to the dangers they 
involve after the accident  has happened.  So  it would  be more  useful to regulate 
the procedures for  introducing new  machines,  the methods  of designation 
(labelling) and,  even more,  the activity of those who  produce these new  tools 
or substances.  But  rules on procedures to be  followed are not  so  strict and 
are not  even of quite the  same  nature as traditional regulations.  So  what  can 
one do  in the case of a  product  that is as ephemeral  and as varied as a  job ? 
Every day,  the foremen  and  the methods  study departments are making and 
adjusting jobs.  How  can regulations keep up  with this activity ? 
Lastly,  even  in the area of safety,  one  can  see the limitations of 
classifying dangerous products and  machinery,  in cases where  sufficient 
progress in this direction has been made.  A major and  now  increasing part of 
the danger is due  not  to an isolated cause but to a  complex or combination 
of causes  :  to the conjunction of two  activities, the coincidence of two 
individually insignificant defects, the unexpected changeover from  one 
situation to another.  Systems analysis may  enable one  to take action with 
respect to these complex  causes.  But  such action is much  more  difficult to 
regulate.  This is even more  true in the case of a  job where  the accumulation 
of requirements,  each of which may  be  very acceptable in itself, can produce 
an  intolerable whole,  where data as fragile and  elusive as the style or method 
of giving an order can be enough  to change the meaning of output  control or 
efficiency requirements. 
It is as a  result of this that the idea of discretionary action has 
developed in safety matters.  It is the responsibility of the industrial 
inspector in some  countries (France),  the union delegate or the safety 
delegate  elsewhere,  who  have  the power  to stop production if they consider 
the overall  situation dangerous,  even if no  specific rule is violated. 
Once  again,  no  one  wants to question the use of regulations as  such. 
But  it is doubtful  today whether the main  trends  in the humanization of work 
can follow this model.  Certainly,  practical rules for action and  advice to 
the decision-making body  are useful.  But  strict vetoes and  requirements are 
perhaps of value only in certain areas. 
Discussion has begun  on·  the dimension of these areas and  the use that 
should be made  of scientific data extracted in laboratories or the evaluations 
of experts.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  perhaps as a  result of old-
established custom,  unions and  employers attach the greatest  importance to 
the opinion of experts.  Noise charts are prepared,  jobs are registered 
according to the degree of noise to which the worker is subjected and  limits 
are established.  So  the specialists play the central role.  At  the other extreme, 
the Italian unions have  estabiished a  quite different doctrine for the ambiente 
di lavoro,  the working  environment  ..  They  can call upon  specialists (and  they 
welcome  the fact  that the  1970  law  on  the status of workers gives the employees' 
representatives the right to do  so),  but  the direct  rep~esentatives of the 
employees may  not delegate to anyone,  whether  joint works  committee  or  'neutral' 
experts,  the power  to evaluate,  judge and  supervise working conditions.  When 
one  remembers  that these representatives are elected by  workshop  (or homogeneous 
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there is close contact  between principals and  agents it is easier to  see the 
difference.  Quite logically,  the Italian unions  consistently distrust statistical 
norms.  They  do  not  dispute that there should  be  maximum  limits which must  not 
be  exceeded~  but  an the other hand  they do  dispute the fact  that it is sufficient 
to observe these maximum  limits. Details apart,  this is also the position of 
two  of the French confederations and  is reflected in their refusal to  sign the 
inter-trade agreement  of 17  March  1975  because it referred formally to the 
measurement  of work  loads and  the consulting of experts. 
The  divergence is not  total.  The  German  unions have  not  ceded their 
decision-making power  to the experts.  The  Italian.unions know  that their action 
will  not  be  successful without  a  network of research institutes.  The  French 
unions,  unanimously this time,  have  encouraged  and  even called for research 
and  the training of specialists.  But  the difference in procedure remains 
evident  :  one  is based  on  the observance of strict standards,  which  enables 
it to settle disputes by  calling on  experts;  the  other trusts in the overall 
judgement  and  pressure of those  involved,  giving them  the most  active role. 
1.3.2.2  The  'packaging'  of decisions 
Since it is difficult to  embody  the various criteria of a  'good'  job in 
a  single set  of rules,  if only because  job evaluation is to  some  extent 
subjective and  those concerned have  some  justification in thinking that  a 
good  job is a  job they consider good,  action must  be taken at the level of 
the decision which creates the  job and,  more  generally,  all the plant  and 
the organization.  This can be done directly  (as  we  shall  see  in the next 
paragraph)  or indirectly by  acting on the conditions governing this decision 
and  its 'packaging'  (to adopt  a  neologism which  has  had  some  success among 
Italian unions). 
This is the main  purpose of conferences and  exchanges of view between 
specialists and  the two  sides of industry.  In the UK,  Belgium  (the Commissariat 
for the promotion of industry),  the Federal  Republic of Germany  and  France, 
conferences and  talks have  been  organized  so that the researchers and 
practitioners of industrial relations can  exchange  information on  current 
experience and  possible paths for the future and  consider them  jointly 
(sometimes the talks have  even  been at  international level  like those held in 
France between French union leaders and  experts  and  the German  and  Italian 
unionists).  Generally the public authorities have  supported and  encouraged 
this kind of meeting,  considering that  the spread of information and  open 
discussion were  probably the best  way  of influencing company  policies.  The 
long and  laborious preparation of the 1975  law in Denmark  served the same 
ends.  In France the "Organisation nationale des  employeurs"  devoted its 1977 
meeting to the  improvement  of working conditions,  listing a  long catalogue 
of achievements,  and  thus did much  for its public  image  (perhaps this was 
also an opportunity to  convince the hesitaters in their own  ranks). 
The  development  of training schemes  which we  mentioned  above  has the 
same  effect  but  acts at more  varied levels of decision-making.  After management 
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of engineers,  methods  study technicians,  foremen  and unionists  (and,  of course, 
the development  of training methods  and  tools). 
Some  texts,  whether legislation or agreements,  set  out  general principles 
and  their objectives even if they do  not  specify the means  of achieving them 
(or the penalties to  be  imposed  on  anyone  who  does  not  observe them).  These 
statements of principle are more  than exhortations;  they attempt  to outline a 
policy,  either joint or tripartite.  So  they leave much  to the initiative of 
those concerned,  especially in the undertakings.  The  1975  Danish  law  is of 
this kind and  calls upon  the undertakings themselves to take action and,  of 
course,  on  the  joint councils which it sets up  (we  shall return to this point). 
The  main  objective of the French law of December  1973  was  to set up  a  public 
Agency  responsabile for these questions.  The  inter-trade agreement  of 17.3.1975 
although it includes  some  immediately applicable  clauses,  is of importance 
mainly because of the principles it sets out  and  the policies it defines for 
the branches and  undertakings.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  legislation 
and  collective agreements give little place to these aspects,  perhaps because 
they are already implicitly asserted in the institutions within which the two 
sides of industry work  together. 
Branch negotiations can also play a  part here,  firstly,  in order to settle 
those matters which  can be settled at  branch level,  such as the reduction of 
working hours,  the working conditions of pregnant  women  or shift work.  Although 
it is a  national industrial agreement,  special mention must  be made  of the 
Belgian agreement  which governs the reception of a  new  employee  in the 
undertaking.  The  sectoral  joint committees must  specify the procedures for 
this,  but  the employer is also obliged to provide the new  recruit with any 
information which enables him  to settle in in the undertaking.  Clauses of 
this kind exist  everywhere  to  some  extent and  others,  relating more  specifically 
to the  jobs in question,  exist in the Federal  Republic of Germany,  Be}gium 
and  France (in this case,  concerning the implementation of the inter-trade 
agreement).  But  branch agreements  can also be designed to  'package'  the 
undertakings'  decisions.  The  case of job evaluation is a  good  illustration. 
Discussion of job evaluation in a  branch where the organization is fairly 
stable and  required qualifications are well defined  comes  to little more  than 
a  discussion of wages;  the main  purpose is to establish fairly the difference 
between a  skilled worker and  an unskilled worker,  between an  employee  and  a 
foreman.  But  in cases where  the organization is less stable, this discussion 
may  serve as an opportunity to re-examine the qualifications themselves,  that 
is to  say the criteria of qualification,  the hierarchy of jobs,  the career 
prospects of the worker.  Some  French agreements,  such as those in the metals 
sector,  show  the rather novel  intention of bringing the manual  and  non-manual 
sectors closer together  (by overlapping indices)  and  placing everyone  (except 
the executive staff) on  the same  grid,  which is expected to bring the categories 
closer together.  The  most  interesting case is that of the Italian agreements. 
Beginning with the engineering agreement,  analogous provisions spread to most 
other branches  :  a  single scale (excluding the dirigenti or senior executive 
staff),  a  marked  reduction in the number  of qualification and  wage  ratios, 
abolition of line differentials.  Other principles have  been added  to these 
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but  to the person;  so the individual must  be assured of a  'career'.  For the 
three lowest  steps,  there is an automatic rise in category with seniority 
(regardless of seniority payments as  such and  in principle accompanied  by a 
change of qualification),  followed  by  non-automatic promotion,  ie promotion 
on the basis of genuine occupational  advancement.  Parallel to this,  a  complete 
re-examination has been made  of the distinction between ranks in the public 
sector,  and of the breakdown of grades,  in order to make  job evaluations more 
realistic and  align them  with real functions and  responsibilities. 
The  aims of this enterprise are clear  :  it is an indirect attempt at a 
thorough reorganization of work.  Since the employer pays the man  and  not  the 
post,  he  no  longer has an interest in increasing the number  of unskilled posts. 
Since the worker gains qualifications with seniority,  the employer is driven 
to create more  complex,  'rich'  and qualified posts.  If the hierarchy is called 
into question again,  he will  be  led to relax it and  to  eliminate any authoritarian 
controls.  So  a  whole  system of organization based on  enriching the nature of 
the work,  increased autonomy  and  the organization of occupational  careers is 
implicit in  job evaluation.  This  is all the more  true if one includes the 
effects of a  number  of measures  such as the suppression or reduction of pay 
by results,  the easing of the work  load and  activities or the introduction of 
compulsory breaks. 
If one asks how  far this objective has been attained,  one  would  have  to 
answer cautiously.  For it seems  that  in the public sector,  ie where it seemed 
most  necessary,  there is only hesitant  progress.  More  precisely,  attempts have 
been made  at  changes,  but  they are  just as likely to  enable the undertakings 
to regain the initiative and  loosen the contractual  controls. 
So  the  'packaging'  thus achieved may  not  be  sufficient. Direct action on 
the decision-making remains essential. 
1.3.2.3  Decision sharing 
In nearly all the countries,  laws and  agreements have  introduced or 
strengthened the consultative bodies on  safety and  on the material  conditions 
of industry in the  form  of elected councils and  union representation (the UK) 
and have  increased their powers.  In some  cases they are specialized bodies 
(health and  safety councils in France and  Belgium,  committees for the 
improvement  of working conditions in France,  company  or branch safety councils 
in Denmark,  safety delegates in the UK)  while in others special duties are 
assigned to general  representative bodies,  whether unions  (consigli di  fabbrio$, 
factory  councils,  in Italy) or not  (Betriebsrat,  works  council,  in the Federal 
Republic of Germany). 
The  powers  they hold  vary a  great deal  :  co-management  in the Federal 
Republic of Germany  with the right of appeal  if the dispute persists but  with 
no  right of strike; detailed information and  consultation in Belgium  and  France, 
but  with the right of veto on  some  issues  (France  :  variable working hours and 
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case,  as in France,  disagreement  may  easily lead  to open  conflict). Moreover, 
there are various channels of intervention available in cases of immediate 
danger. 
So  the term consultative which we  used in the beginning is inexact in 
practice.  Although,  apart  from  Italy and  the UK,  there is no  real  joint 
negotiation,  the procedure generally involves much  more  than a  mere  exchange 
of views.  Rather it is negotiation not  endorsed  by  an agreement,  a  procedure 
whereby  the decision taken by  the management  is opened  to criticiSm and  often 
gradually revised. 
Are  the usual  forms  of representation perfectly suited to this ?  This is 
doubtful  when  the question is one  of the organization and material  conditions 
of work.  At  the very least, the elected delegates,  even if they have  a  good 
knowledge  of their undertaking,  will need more  advanced  training and  additional 
free time to collect the necessary information.  But  in many  cases,  even where 
the technology is in no  way  a  mystery,  it is the workers themselves who  have 
most  of the useful  information as a  result of years of daily experience and 
who  know  the real criteria of  judgement.  Often they know  more  than anyone  else 
what  makes  a  job arduous or exhausting and  what  could relieve it (although 
obviously they do  not  have  enough medical  and  technological  knowledge  to be 
able to appreciate the risks involved and  offer suitable solutions).  Direct 
consultation is therefore often both useful  and  effective.  Union  organizations 
have demanded  it in the form  of 'direct consultation at work'  (Confederation 
of Christian unions,  Belgium)  and  the  'employees'  right of direct expression' 
(Democratic  Industrial Confederation in France.  The  term was  also used  in the 
report of the committee  on  company  reform chaired by  Pierre Sudreau). 
It is in no  way  extraordinary or contrary to  the usual  rules of sound 
management  that the  forema~ or head  clerk should  carefully note the opinion 
and  suggestions of his subordinates on  the way  in which their work  is organized 
and  the working process,  that he  should give great weight  to this and  attempt 
to  embody  their views  in his decisions.  But  to regard the direct  expression 
of the employees  on  their work  as a  right raises other problems  :  what  are 
the limits to this right and  what  penalties are  involved  ?  To  what  extent  can 
it be reconciled with staff representation by  delegates,  whether union delegates 
or not  ?  What  is the true domain  of this  'direct democracy'  and  how  far can it 
be reconciled with  'representative democracy'  ?  Surely this raises a  new  problem 
for those who  believe in industrial democracy  ? 
In any  case,  decision-making on  the organization of work  must  be  shared 
today.  It is not  an  equal  participation,  certainly,  for  even where  the word 
co-decision is used,  the initial and  final decision are not  shared equally. 
But  there is a  sharing of the decision itself and  not  just the assertion of 
a  few  prior rules or control of some  of the results.  So  to a  large extent 
this is certainly a  new  procedure and  at any rate one which differs greatly 
from  the usual  form  of collective bargaining both as regards its principles 
and  the responsibilities it implies. 
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more  of the heads of undertakings and  unionists,  the  experiments in the area 
of enlarging,  enriching and  restructuring jobs,  of semi-autonomous working 
parties,  humanization of work  and  'self-organization'  now  seem  to be marking 
time.  The  known  cases have  been  studied with care and  the information 
disseminated.  Perhaps  Ireland,  where  interest is keener than ever,  is an 
exception.  But  in none  o~ the other countries has the movement  expanded or 
become  general.  However,  it is.much more  difficult to  say to what  extent 
the habits of those who  create  jobs,  of the foremen  or methods  study men, 
have  changed  and  to what  extent their criteria of judgement  and  their rules 
of action have  changed - a  change  which may  appear more  modest  but  which all 
in all is very  important.  Certainly such  changes  must  not  be underestimated. 
But  although we  have  few  methods  of assessing them,  it is certain that the 
general  feeling is one  of disullusionment;  there has been very little evidence 
of any  overthrowing of socio-technical  systems. 
Why  this apparent retreat after the great wave  of interest and  even 
enthusiasm  ?  Some  of the reasons are  easy to see.  Firstly,  perhaps,  people 
wanted  to put  the cart before the horse;  before  speaking of enrichment  or 
autonomy  it might  have  been better to start by  reconsidering the arduousness, 
work  load,  fatigue or danger of a  job.  And  perhaps it was  not  very sensible 
to  condemn  Taylorism or the excesses of 'scientific management'  at a  time 
when  millions of jobs suffered more  from  lack of organization and  when,  in 
several branches,  organization was  still at its most  rudimentary.  If accidents 
and,  more  generally,  safety problems  provoked  so  muclj  strong feeling,  surely 
this was  also because there was  too  strong a  contrast between what  the 
behavioural psychologists described and  what  hundreds of thousands of workers 
actually experienced.  What  happens  in large undertakings,  especially in oil 
companies,  cannot  necessarily be transposed to the world of small  shops or 
building sites. 
Secondly,  the cr1s1s radically changed  the situation.  Employees  have  not 
stopped wanting a  good  job,  but  today they think first of a  job as such. 
Similarly,  the head of an establishment  would  find it quite difficult to 
introduce a  system. of consultation on the improvement  of working conditions 
and  the adjustment  of jobs at a  time when  he was  perhaps preparing to reduce 
his staff and  even dismiss  some  of them.  Moreover,  would  not  any  attempt at 
job adjustment  or even  new  plant arouse  suspicions that his main  aim  was  to 
save on  labour  ? 
Lastly,  the slowdown  of growth,  the poor  economic  climate-and the tightening 
of credit facilities have  made  investment  in new  plant more  rare and  ~ore 
difficult.  When  the change  was  rapid and  general,  people embarked  on it more 
readily.  Now  there are fewer  opportunities to do  so. 
But  good  as these reasons are,  they may  not  be the full  explanation.  More 
than one undertaking has argued the contrary.  Since investment is more  moderate 
and more  rare,  this is a  further reason to attend to working conditions. 
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take the  jobs they had  given up,  say in the puilding or car industry,  it is 
essential to transform these  jobs and  make  them  more  attractive.  Resources 
are scarse  :  surely it is possible to discover a  treasure-house of professional 
ingenuity,  intelligence and  thus productivity,  by methods  which give more 
priority to initiative and  self-supervision ?  It  has  become  less easy to 
settle every  small difficulty simply by  increasing wages  :  is it not  reasonable 
then to try to reduce dissatisfactions and  nuisances ?  Safety is the main 
priority.  Can  it be  ensured today without  the active participation of the 
workers  ?  Thus  there are many  reasons to continue acting along these lines, 
and  however  serious and  well-founded the difficulties of circumstance or 
economic  trend,  they alone  cannot  explain the hesitation. 
In our view the difficulties lie in the very  nature of the discussion 
and the responsibilities it implies. 
As  in the case of jobs,  the intervention of employees in the organization 
of the work  does not  relate to a  posteriori control of what  has been decided 
but  to claims a  priori participation.  The  safety  specialists have  stressed 
this enough  :  a  safe installation is one where  thought  has been given to 
safety from  the outset.  The  ergonomists  say the  same  :  whatever the utility 
of ergonomics of correction,  ergonomics at the planning stage is much  more 
effective and  much  less costly.  This becomes  even clearer when  it is a 
question of  job content  and  qualification  :  a  'good'  allocation of tasks 
goes hand  in hand  with the choice of plant  and  is linked to an overall choice 
concerning the organization.  The  criteria for the  'manufacture'  of  jobs do 
not  operate in isolation  (and  can hardly be  corrected on  a  case by  case basis); 
they are part of a  system.  What  must  be modified  is the policies,  the choices 
and the decisions. 
It is always difficult to  share in decision-making which is central to 
the employer's responsibilities,  whether in connection with the creation or 
abolition of a  job or organization of the work.  But  in the  second  case the 
difficulty may  be greater because the decision to be shared concerns the 
day to day relations between management  (and its representatives)  and  workers 
allocation of tasks,  distribution of controls,  levels of authority,  in short 
all the elements of life in common. 
So  it is easy to understand why  those  concerned hesitate to take this 
path.  Each  country translates these difficulties into its own  language.  In the 
Federal  Republic of Germany  there is a  tendency to  say that the humanization 
of work  is not  so much  a  question of laws and  agreements,  for the time being 
at least, as of the  'autonomy of the undertaking'  -which clearly indicates 
the area of the decision to  be  shared.  The  German  unions have  linked this 
issue to that of the control of investments and  democracy  within the undertaking, 
ie to the two  aspects of co-management.  This certainly did not  make  it an 
easier issue to settle but  did show  its scale. 
The  unions most  reluctant to take this path are those which believe most 
profoundly in the virtues of bargaining and dispute.  The  British unions are 
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the craftsmen,  traditionally control an  important part of their work,  but 
also because a  re-division of tasks could encroach on  the area occupied by 
the crafts (or the territory of the foreman  who  is often a  member  of the 
employees'  union).  If the management  took a  step of this kind it would 
provoke distrust because it could be a  means  of reducing absenteeism and 
raising productivity at  low  cost.  And  in any case,  any  enrichment  in the 
content of a  job should also bring an  increase in pay.  Although they agreed 
to participate in the Tripartite Steering Group  which  prepared the Work 
Research Unit's research programme,  they did their best to reduce the 
programme,  at least those areas that  concerned  them,  to the classic subjects 
and  procedures of industrial relations. 
Although analysing the question much  more  boldly,  the Italian unions have 
also remained  very cautious.  While  claiming that  negotiation gave  an  impetus 
to the transformation of work,  they will not  really take responsibility for 
this,  since it might  lead to co-management  which  would  be  impossible to 
justify to their members,  without  having any real means  of controlling the 
outcome. 
The  philosophy of the French unions has elements of both these attitudes. 
It is equally easy to understand the employers'  hesitations.  Although 
they have the main  power  of initiative,  the organizational  changes to be 
considered would  obviously cost  a  substantial  (and not  easily calculable) 
amount  in the short  term and,  above all, have major longer-term consequences. 
To  change  the controls and  revise the system of hierarchy would  affect the 
entire edifice of company  power.  And  why  undertake  such an adventure if their 
official partners were  not  really demanding it ?  All  in all, the issue is not 
productivity,  efficiency or  job satisfaction,  however  important  each aspect 
is, but  control over the future.  Those  who  took the road of reform did it 
less to  improve  their profitability or popularity than to take up  what  looked 
like a  challenge,  distant yet  inevitable.  The  caution and  reserve may  be due 
to similar reasons to the above. 
In order to interpret these attitudes properly and  understand the difference 
between these three countries and  the Federal  Republic of Germany  and Denmark, 
perhaps one  should also point  out  that  in a  number  of branches it is the 
'long-nurtured low  trust relations'  fed  by  tradition and  experience that 
represent the main  obstacle.  And  this cannot  be  overcome  simply by a  show 
of good  will. 
Lastly,  the facilities  (and  sometimes demands)  for direct  expression 
produce a  further difficulty.  Undertakings are usually so  equipped that the 
superiors can listen to their subordinates.  But  any active participation by 
the latter in the adjustment  of working conditions risks putting into question 
not  only the top management  but  the whole  working framework.  In the internal 
strategies encouraged  by  the current  structures,  few  management  staff have 
any  interest  in promoting  ~uch changes.  Conversely,  if the unions,  which are 
founded  on  voluntary membership  and  the rule of democracy,  can  in principle 
48 easily widen the scope of consultation,  they also measure the investment of 
time and  resources required to achieve this and  the overthrow of structures 
it would  require,  both as regards the operation of the union itself and  that 
of the representative unions.  Neither side can make  the necessary changes  in 
organization  rapidly~ Naturally, all the forces  (and excellent reasons)  which 
push in the other direction,  towards the centralization of decision-making 
and  responsibilities,  do  not  make  it any easier. 
So  there remains a  long road to travel and  the end  not  in sight. 
1.4  Adjusting working hours 
Everything connected with the adjustment  of working hours is clearly an 
essential part of the quality of working life.  We  are dealing with it 
separately for convenience  sake,  because it is one of the most  traditional 
subjects of bargaining and  also and  above all because•it  lends itself very· 
well  to bargaining in the strict sense of the term and  to centralized 
decision-making.  So  it deserves to be considered apart. 
Whether it is a  question of the length of the working week,  holidays or 
retirement age,  the main demand  of the unions until  1974  was  to reduce the 
fatigue and  work  load of the workers and  to promote personal development. 
So  free time was  demanded  for reasons of well-being,  which  was  also a  means 
of utilizing the rise in productivity.  Since the crisis,  the demands  and 
objectives have  changed  somewhat,  coming  back to  preoccupations which were 
widespread at the time of the 1930s crisis but  forgotten since.  A reduction 
of working hours and  lowering the age of retirement  have  become  means  of 
redistributing employment  and  giving jobs to the unemployed.  Tb  the social 
justifications have  now  been added  economic  justifications. 
Immediately after the Second  World  War,  the  need  for reconstruction  (and 
the low  wage  level)  led to  long working hours.  These working hours have  been 
reduced substantially everywhere,  generally as a  result of collective bargaining 
although the law has often also contributed to the trend. 
The  trend has been most  rapid in the Federal  Republic of Germany  where 
92  %  of employees did not  work  more  than a  40-hour week  in 1976,  and  most 
sudden  in Italy where  working hours dropped  from  48  to 40 in the fifteen 
years from  1959  to  1973  (they actually dropped  from  44  to 40 hours in the 
seven years  1966-1973).  In Belgium  a  national  industrial agreement  made  the 
40-hour week  general as from  1  January  1976  and  this limit was  confirmed by 
law of 20 July 1978.  In Denmark  the  1973  conciliation pact  achieved the same 
result in December  1974.  France has moved  rather more  slowly,  since collective 
bargaining in this area was  not  really effective until after 1968.  In general 
it is expected that 40 hours will be  achieved  in 1980.  The  UK  has established 
a  basic 40-hour week  in most  agreements  for manual  workers  (employees frequently 
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In Luxembourg,  agreements  and  laws  have  reduced  the week  from  48  to 40 hours 
over a  period of 20 years. 
But  does this 40-hour week  which  has  been obtained for the majority 
represent  a  threshold which will not  be  crossed  ?  On  the contrary,  there are 
increasingly numerous  attempts to break  throt~h this  'wall'.  In Italy,  the 
working hours of civil servants have dropped to  38  and  36  hours in some  cases. 
B,y  the same  1973  Danish agreement,  those working  in two  or three shifts have 
been granted two  hours of  'freedom',  which puts their real working hours at 
38.  The  Belgian unions are calling for a  gradual  general-reduction to 36  hours, 
although for the time being the employers are refusing this.  Some  branches have 
paved  the way,  however,  such as electricity,  banks and  insurance companies 
(36 hours),  dockers  (36  hours  15  minutes).  But  in every case this was  done 
mainly to  save or create  jobs.  In Italy company  agreements have  exploited the 
movement  towards  semi-continuous shift work  by  demanding a  36-hour week  in 
compensation  (six days of six hours;  four shifts of six hours a  day).  Despite 
a  strike lasting more  than six weeks  (November  1978 to January 1979)  particularly 
in North Rhine-Westphalia,  the German  metal  workers failed to obtain a  35-hour 
week.  The  United  Kingdom  trade unions have tried without  success to launch 
a  concerted European movement  for a  35-hour week.  This demand  has also been 
repeatedly put  forward  in 1978  in Italy and  France.  Will  a  coordinated 
offensive be achieved  ? 
Yet  some  ambiguity may  remain,  for the agreements may  lay down  a  fairly 
strict limit,  a  maximum  (eg Denmark),  a  rule to  which  exceptions are possible, 
or a  basic timetable.  How  then  should overtime be regulated  ?  In the UK,  in 
spite of the declared intentions of the TUC,  major unions and  employers to 
reduce overtime,  it has remained remarkably stable for manual  workers  (from 
five to six hours a  week  on  average for workers).  It varies little with the 
economic  cycle and  appears to be more  of a  tradition which offers employees 
extra pay which they  can quite freely choose to  obtain or not  according to 
their needs  (and,  of course,  which  involves more  flexibility and  probably 
less expense to the employers than recruiting new  staff).  Elsewhere,  the 
rules are more  crude  :  the Italian agreements tend towards an annual  maximum, 
for  example  150 hours per head per year in engineering or 100 hours  in oil 
companies  (1975).  These quotas fell rapidly in recent years but  seem  to have 
come  to a  standstill now.  In Belgium,  a  national  industrial agreement  advises 
against  overtime and  obliges the employer  who  allows it to  inform the 
administration and  employment  services thereof.  B,y  the law of 1976,  which 
will be  implemented  on  the basis of collective bargaining,  France  invented 
an original method  of automatic reduction  :  it makes  it compulsory to compensate 
overtime hours worked  by additional  paid leave.  Experience will  show  whether 
this ingenious provision is efficient. 
Several  problems  remain 
1.  It is easy to understand the need  for laying down  fairly strict rules. 
otherwise,  as shown  by the case of the UK,  the basic hours indicate only the 
moment  after which  the hourly rate increases.  But  conversely,  the employers 
have good  reason to fear  excessively strict timetables.  Naturally,  ad hoc 
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working hours,  that is to say,  to reduce working  hours rather than the number 
of employees  (for the contractual maximum  is also a  minimum).  But  the procedure 
can be  a  difficult one. 
As  a  method  of reconciling overall  control with momentary  flexibility 
employers have  proposed that agreement  should be  reached  on  an annual  total 
with some  range of flexibility in the distribution over the year  (provided, 
of course,  certain limits are observed).  Hitherto the unions have greeted 
this with reservations,  except  for the real  seasonal  industries.  Negotiations 
were,  however,  opened  on  this question in France  in 1978  (the  formula also 
has the advantage of putting a  clear choice between a  reduced working week 
and  longer paid holidays). 
2.  In most  large towns,  the time taken to travel from  home  to work  is 
tending to increase and  to absorb a  considerable  amount  of the working time 
saved.  In order to arrest this trend the unions  have  suggested that the employer 
should pay a  total time of availability (work+ travel).  But  this proposal  has 
encountered serious objections.  If applied individually, it would  discourage 
the recruitment  of staff whose  homes  are furthest  from  the place of work,  with 
consequences which would  no  doubt  be adverse for  the employees  concerned  (and 
particularly for the most  recent arrivals who  often live on  the outskirts). 
If an overall  compensation was  paid it might  encourage distant travel.  A 
formula remains to be found  (probably with the help of the public authorities). 
But  this issue makes  it easier to understand why  the area of concern to the 
unions tends to go  beyond  the narrower confines of working life, which  can 
pose difficult problems of organization and  methods  of action. 
3.  The  most  difficult question of all, in the present  economic  cycle,  is 
the effects of reduced working hours on  employment.  On  the one  hand  it is 
certain that this reduction does not  entail an equivalent drop  in production. 
If the hours range  from  44  to 40,  lost production would  be  no  more  than 50 % 
on  average  (the figure would  probably rise if the hours were  further reduced). 
So  this would  not  create an equivalent  and  immediate demand  for  employment. 
In the longer term,  one  can obviously no  longer reason as though the number 
of jobs was  fixed.  The  employers argue that  since it would  be  necessary to 
increase basic wages  so  that total wages  did not  fall, retail prices would  be 
affected and  the number  of outlets would  therefore be reduced.  At  any rate, 
what  is certain is that in the end  the most  important  consideration is the 
effect  on  investment  and  demand. 
There has been a  general  increase in shift work  (two  teams which work  in 
relays every day and  stop at night,  three or four teams  working in relay day 
and  night with a  break at the end  of the work,  continuous work,  ie which does 
not  stop on Saturday or Sunday,  or in four,  five  or six teams).  Sometimes it 
is based on technical requirements  (a blast furnace or glass furnace  cannot 
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difficult to pay off a  computer working eight  hours a  day),  often on  a  mixture 
of the two  which is difficult to disentangle.  The  unions,  which are more  liable 
to accept  the constraints of the trade,  accept  technical requirements.  The 
employers  stand by  the economic  requirements. 
In France and  Italy,  and  to a  lesser extent  in the UK,  the unions have 
launched a  major campaign against  shift work,  especially night  shifts.  The 
matter had  been  studied for a  long time but  in recent years these studies 
have aroused greater social  concern.  The  physiological  cost of night  work 
was  assessed,  as was  the difficulty of making up  for the fatigue by  sleeping 
in the daytime in lodgings that  were  too  small or badly  soundproofed,  the 
lack of transport,  and also the social  cost  Of  shift work,  which restricts 
family life and  makes  it very difficult to pursue any civic or leisure 
activity collectively or consistently and  practically makes  it impossible 
to follow any vocational  training.  Even  in very large towns  which  provide 
more  facilities during off-peak hours,  shift work  is a  strong factor of 
social isolation. 
This condemnation and  this campaign were nurtured by  company  disputes on 
working hours which  confirmed that the constraints were  becoming more  obvious 
and  less tolerable.  What  is felt most  is probably the social deprivation, 
either because those concerned  find it difficult to measure the long-term 
burden of accumulated  fatigue themselves or because they have grown  to accept 
it out of habit  :  rebels have more  often demanded  free Saturdays  (Michelin, 
December  1977  in France)  than an overall reduction in working hours. 
On  the other hand,  the threat of reductions in employment  triggered claims 
for the introduction of five,  or even six shifts  :  in Lorraine and  the north 
of France,  early in 1979  iron and  steelworkers saw  this as a  way  of reducing 
the number  of dismissals planned up  to 1980. 
The  result of this movement  was  additional regulations in  some  countries 
in order to make  new  decisions on  this matter subject to  joint examination, 
prohibit certain formulas,  increase medical  supervision and  improve  accomodation 
for shift workers.  It is too  early to assess the effects. Moreover,  the 
undertakings made  an effort to  improve  the organization  :  one  can reduce the 
number  of night-shift workers  by  retaining only those operations which  are 
quite essential,  reduce the length of the night  shift  (provided there are 
sufficient teams),  find better systems of rotation,  limit the number  of years 
during which  shift work  is allowed  and  organize additional training and 
reclassification.  It is far too  early to  judge the implications of these 
measures. 
But  above all it should  be  asked whether the  economic  downward  t~end has 
not made  the reasons which  led to··the expansion  of shift .work  even more 
compelling.  If the·~apital equipment  can be paid off more-easily and  becomes 
more  productive,  this creates more  jobs for the  same  investment.  During the 
present crisis these arguments are likely to weigh very heavily.  In Italy, 
where  the crisis is particularly acute,  the unions are hesitating and  making 
major concessions  :  in return for shorter working hours,  they are allowing 
shift work  in the textile industry in order to facilitate the modernization 
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the employers'  right to demand  shift work.  But  this was  done  only after much 
discussion and  hesitation and  usually in cases where  the crisis is most  serious 
(it was  allowed more  willingly in the south than the north and  for textiles 
than for more  prosperous branches).  Yet  this flexibility is significant. 
The  need  to create  jobs,  livelier competition and  the stresses of industrial 
reorganization will not,  however,  lead to an  end  of shift work.  Although its 
reduction or profound readjustment  remain an objective of the social policy 
both of governments and  the two  sides of industry,  this goes against all the 
economic  forces.  Collective bargaining may  well  occupy a  secondary place beside 
legislation in this case. 
Flexible working hours which  leave the employees  a  margin of freedom  to 
decide their working hours provided they perform  the required total number 
and all work  during a  specific stretch were  very clearly a  procedure introduced 
by the employers.  It seems  almost  exclusively to  concern office workers and 
even  so,  for the time being it only involves a  small fraction of them  {between 
5%  and  10% perhaps).  In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  where  the idea was 
first  launched,  it is thought  that its influence is now  spreading more  slowly 
and  that the limits will  soon  have  been reached. 
Although flexitime can be introduced only with caution and  after prior 
consultation,  so  far it has not  been a  matter for collective bargaining in 
the Federal  Republic of Germany,  which together with Switzerland is generally 
considered the pioneer and  where  most  of the discussions took place in the 
discreet atmosphere of works  councils,  or in Belgium  where  the two  sides of 
industry discussed it in the  'Conseil national du Travail'  but did not  consider 
it advisable to  support it by agreement  or legislation,  or in Denmark  where 
it is not mentioned  in the collective agreements,  or in France where  the 
problems it involves were  examined  in tripartite research committees chaired 
by  a  senior official and  where  the matter is mentioned but  not  really discussed 
in the inter-trade agreement  of 17  March  1975  and where  the law  (27  December 
1973)  requires the prior agreement  of the works  council.  Only  in the UK  has 
the civil  service national negotiating body  decided,  after a  series of formal 
experiments over several years,  to adopt  it for  the body  of civil servants 
thanks to the enthusiasm of some  unions. 
Apart  from  this exception,  unions have  shown  strong reservations as a 
whole.  They  do  not  usually dispute that the great majority of employees 
appreciate the freedom  it gives them.  But  the unionists list a  number  of 
technical objections  :  in these conditions will  it always  be easy to control 
working hours ?  Will  they not  to  some  extent fall outside the area of 
collective bargaining ?  Will  it be possible to defer overtime hours from 
one week  to another ?  The  minor  freedoms  of absence authorized hitherto 
will  now  be the responsibility of the employee.  Will  flexitime not restore 
or reinforce the system of clocking in ?  Is it not  being introduced so  that 
the employees will  be less aware  of the reduction in working hours  ?  Will 
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file or holding meetings  ? 
Behind these specific reasons,  which are certainly valid,  lies a  more 
general  preoccupation.  Is flexitime not  a  means  of shifting questions of 
working hours  from  the sphere of collective action to that of individual 
arrangements and  will it not  therefore have  the overall  effect of weakening 
the sense of community  and  unionism as a  whole  ? 
Be}gium  took a  new  step by  introducing in some  sectors,  such as banking, 
the right to adjust  working hours for family reasons,  that is to say,  the 
right  to unpaid  absence for  compelling family  reasons.  Other countries have 
adopted  similar practices for the  same  branch. 
The  trend towards part-time employment  and  the measures  (mainly statutory) 
taken to facilitate it could  be regarded as another attempt  to adjust  working 
hours  in order to cut  them  to the measure of the  employees'  needs.  At  least 
this is what  has been argued,  not  without  justification since part-time work 
is on  the increase in all the industrialized countries.  Yet  one  should not 
forget  that its primary  justification lay in the  requirements of the branch 
(or,  one  could  say,  of the consumer),  for  example  in trades,  catering and 
hotels or health services.  But  it is true that it has often enabled  employed 
women  to go  to work  while also fulfilling their traditional  family 
responsibilities,  which  explains why  part-time work  has  increased particularly 
in industries employing mainly women. 
Here again,  the unions  express reservations.  This is not  because they 
wish to oppose what  is now  a  widespread practice  (18% of employees  in the 
UK  work  fewer  than 30 hours a  week;  seven out of eight are women).  But  they 
are reluctant to  encourage it in Italy,  Belgium,  France or the UK,  because 
it might  contribute to downgrading women's  work,  exert  pressure on  the 
advantages  (or wages)  of full-time workers and  (for the feminists)  widen 
the traditional division  (and  inequality) of tasks between men  and  women. 
Unemployment  certainly adds an  element  of risk to the use of this new 
'labour source'  both for those who  are  employed  and  for those newly 
arriving on  the labour market. 
Paid leave has been  extended  by  means  of collective bargaining,  although 
this is often supplemented or rather consolidated by  law.  There are substantial 
differences from  one  country to another  :  Luxembourg  and  France started early, 
the UK  a  little later (34 %  of workers had  four  weeks  holiday in 1976;  among 
employees,  60% of men  and  40% of women).  But  now  the majority have  four 
weeks  (by law in France  since 1969.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany  53  % 
of employees  have at least four weeks;  Luxembourg will  introduce five weeks 
for  everyone in 1979)  and  holiday pay is becoming general. 
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In other respects,  the progress is of a  more  diffuse nature. 
In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  additional holiday entitlement  is 
largely based on  age and  seniority (but  the limit  comes  early since the 
maximum  number  of days is generally reached at  35  years of age).  In the UK, 
the pressure  comes  from  the white-collar employees,  with whom  the manual 
workers have  alm~st caught  up  as regards what  was  one  of their privileges 
and  'perks'.  In Italy,  however,  the differences between workers and  employees 
have  been eliminated by  the agreements  (both now  have  four weeks)  as have the 
privileges of seniority (except  for an additional week  for workers of advanced 
age).  In France,  several branches have  taken a  first  step in this direction; 
moreover,  an additional week  is planned for the youngest  employees;  but  since 
November  1977  negotiations have  begun  on  making  the fifth week  generally 
applicable. 
The  most  important  long-term choice is no  doubt  the one that has been 
discussed least,  in public at least,  namely  the choice between reducing the 
working week  and  extending holidays.  The  Federal  Republic of Germany  gave 
priority to the first alternative,  France to the  second.  Even  if today they 
are very close again,  a  difference remains.  And  the result is far from  the 
same  in spite of involving the same  economic  cost  (if indeed it has been 
calculated at all). 
Lastly,  it is worth noting that  some  undertakings which were  in difficulties, 
in Belgium,  France,  Italy and  elsewhere,  found  extending unpaid  leave a  more 
acceptable form  of redundancy  (sometimes by  agreement  with the unions). 
Pension schemes  were  established by  law  in all the nine countries a  long 
time ago.  Often they were  adapted or profoundly altered after the Second  World 
War.  Since then,  however,  they have very frequently been  supplemented by'further 
schemes,  introduced by  law or negotiation.  The  rise in the percentage of old 
people in the population,  the increasingly widespread demand  for providing 
senior citizens with an adequate  living standard and  the trend among  younger 
people to provide for their future  security have  made  retirement  conditions 
one of the most  widely debated and topical of issues.  Several  opinion polls 
show  that it is one of the main  preoccupation of white-collar employees.  No 
doubt  the uncertainty born of the crisis further  increases the need  for 
security and  guarantees. 
The  main  body  of pension schemes  was  introduced by  law.  Indeed,  the reasons 
for resorting to legislation here  ar~ so  strong that the only surprise is the 
area left to collective bargaining,  The  law is the best  way  to make  contributions 
to pension  schemes  compulsory and  to cover everyone,  thus placing the  system on 
an adequate numerical basis.  B,y  contrast,  a  branch,  category or even  company 
scheme  is subject to the fluctuations of the population structure or of the 
economic  situation of the branch. 
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introduced which in the first case at least are based on  a  complex  system 
of hierarchical agreements  (inter-trade outline agreements,  branch agreements, 
company  agreements).  In France the supplementary  schemes  for civil servants 
are mutual  insurance  schemes.  In particular,  one  should note the  schemes  to 
cover specific categories,  executive staff,  foremen or technicians,  which 
have paved  the way  for  joint institutions.  In the UK  the unions have  shown 
a  belated interest in the retirement  schemes  set  up  (outside the statutory 
scheme)  by various eompanies and  which display a  wide variety of formulas 
and rates.  Stimulated by  the Social Security Pensions Act  of 1975  and  the 
development  of white-collar workers'  unions,  that is to  say of a  category 
that is traditionally more  interested in protective institutions,  they have 
now  begun to exploit this vast bargaining area. 
Yet  generally it is the law which has taken the action.  In Denmark,  for 
example,  in 1964  the law  supplemented the usual  scheme  by  a  supplementary 
pension scheme  (the  'labour market'  pension scheme)  to be administered and 
run by  joint bodies.  In Italy no  new  scheme  was  created by  law,  but  the two 
sides of industry and  in particular the unions have made  great efforts to 
persuade the public authorities ot  improve  the statutory system  (basing 
pensions on the best  earning years and  indexing it to the cost of living, 
for example)  since inflation was  gradually eroding the private  schemes, 
especially company  schemes,  which were usually based on  savings.  In the 
Federal  Republic of Germany  there has usually been little roo~ for collective 
bargaining beside the statutory system and  the supplementary company  schemes 
(with an insurance fund). 
Two  opposite and  complementary  schemes  often coexist,  a  flat-rate pension 
scheme  for all to give minimum  protection and  an  earnings-related scheme,  ie 
related to contributions.  The  UK  and  the Netherlands started with the first 
system and  then added  the  second,  which  leaves much  room  for branch or category 
action.  In Belgium  and  France the earnings-related pension  system was  applied 
from  the start, although supplementary schemes  have made  wider differentials 
possible. 
The  economic  crisis gave  new  impetus to pension schemes.  One  way  to  'mop 
up'  unemployment  seemed  to be to  lower the retirement  age  in order to  'make 
room'.  It seemed  more  reasonable to pay for the  retirement of men  and  women 
aged  60 than for the inactivity of those aged  20.  Surely,  a  young  labour 
force,  probably better trained,  would  help towards the necessary industrial 
redevelopment  ? 
Usually the system of early retirement  seems  to have been applied only 
locally.  An  undertaking or a  branch in difficulties could resort to it to 
reduce its staff complement  without dismissals.  In France,  the Lorraine iron 
and  steel  industry embodied  this in  ~n agreement  as early as 1967.  Some 
undertakings have done it in Italy,  Denmark  and  Belgium.  The  Federal  Republic 
of Germany  is planning to provide for it in collective agreements.  But  in all 
these cases,  quite apart  from  being a  measure  justified by  an  emergency 
situation,  early retirement  was  also a  means  among  others (eg transfers from 
one  undertaking to another,  further training and  retraining) of settling 
staffing problems. 
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years while the normal  retirement  age  remains  65  years.  The  difficulties in 
the iron and  steel industry have  led to a  further step being taken  :  early 
in  1979  it was  proposed to lower the retirement  age  in certain cases to  54 
(this  ,  it is true,  would  apply to those engaged  in traditionally arduous 
workj. 
There has also been a  tendency to interpret  the prov1s1ons authorizing 
early retirement  in cases of illness or invalidity (age  60  years in Denmark) 
more  and  more  widely or to add  other entitlements  :  arduous work  (English 
coal miners claim this for retirement at  60  years) or, as introduced by  law 
in France in 1976,  assembly-line work,  work  in bad weather or,  for women,  the 
fact  of having three children.  So  far as we  know  the employees  have  not  rushed 
to make  use of the opportunities thus offered them  (for instance by  the French 
law of 1976),  yet this represents a  major  increase in rights. 
Belgium  and  France have  gone  further,  firstly by  introducing the possibility 
of early retirement  from  the age of 60  years for  anyone  who,  by that age,  has 
been a  victim of dismissal  and  found  it difficult to  find  another  job  (technically 
this  'pre-retirement'  scheme  took the form  of supplementary unemployment  benefits, 
financed  in France by a  fund  (1972  agreement),  in Belgium  by the employer,  aided 
by  a  fUnd  if he is unable to finance it himself  (national  industrial agreement 
of 1974).  The  next  step was  to offer retirement  at age 60  to all those who 
wished it, with a  supplementary pension until the age which  entitled them  to 
the full rate,  provided they did not  accept other employment.  Thus  in Belgium 
the law established  'pre-pension'  'a la carte'  - although it also obliges the 
employer to replace the retired worker.  The  French  1977  inter-trade agreement 
sets as sole condition (other than sufficient  seniority in the  job)  that the 
retired person must  not  take another  job. 
It is very likely,  especially in the French  case,  that with time the various 
conditions and  restrictions will gradually be  eliminated and  that it will  be 
decided to advance retirement  age to 60  (or rather,  considerably to  improve 
the pension rate entitlement at  60  years). 
When  can or should one retire ?  And,  of course,  at what  rate ?  Obviously 
it would  hardly be reasonable  for the rate not  to vary according to age.  Those 
who  work  longer should  be offered a  better pension,  both out  of fairness and 
as  sound  actuarial method.  But  when,  as with the French social  security,  the 
pension rate doubles between the ages of 60  and  65,  this is not  just the 
outcome  of actuarial  calculations but  an attempt  at dissuasion.  Moreover,  the 
absolute amount  is the most  important  one  :  25  %  of earnings  (below a  certain 
ceiling),  as is the case at 60 years under  the French  general  scheme,  offers 
little incentive to retire. 
These reservations must  be borne  in mind  when  we  compare  'normal'  retirement 
ages  (ie compulsory retirement age or that at  which the pension rate becomes 
more  acceptable)  :  65  years for men,  60  years for women,  except  in Italy 
(60  years and  55  years) (1)  an~ Denmark  (67  years and  62  years for  single 
(1)  In Italy,  the December  1977  law,  now  offers women  the option of retiring 
at  55  or 60. 
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least  favourable  conditions. 
Indeed  a  better conclusion would  be that  today the problem is no  longer 
specifically one of retirement  age  but  rather one  of the conditions which 
can widen  the area of choice of those  concerned,  the conditions governing 
pension rates,  the circumstances allowing workers  to retire before the 
usual  age  and  the compulsory retirement  age. 
Flexibility is probably the best  solution to  this last issue.  France wanted 
to reduce  the final  working date of senior officials (especially university 
teachers)  from  70 to  65  years.  But  there was  so  much  resistance that the 
reform,  which was  to be made  in stages,  stopped at 68  years.  The  Danish 
rules  seem  the most  flexible  :  a  civil servant is entitled to retire as 
from  the age of 60 years;  he  is obliged to retire at  70.  The  introduction 
of gradual  retirement  schemes  (ie the gradual  easing of the work  load at the 
end  of working life,  under consideration in the Netherlands and  several  other 
countries),  would  also  produce  less rigid schemes. 
On  the other hand,  the pension rates for earlier retirement must  not  be 
low  and  the reasons for early retirement at  improved  rates must  be defined 
fairly widely  so  that  the decision is largely up  to the person concerned. 
Improving access to earlier retirement  (in short,  bringing forward  the 
retirement  age)  would  certainly respond to a  very general  concern.  But  can one 
be  sure that  the great majority would  immediately make  use of this possibility ? 
The  experts are discussing this and  express strong hesitations.  One  would  have 
to  observe closely the experiences of Belgium  and  France.  Certainly,  the economic 
situation will  not  allow one to apply the lessons  too generally;  it is very 
likely that the anxieties created  by  the crisis will dissuade  some  employees 
from  retiring if they may  not  pursue any  additional activity.  When  times are 
uncertain,  people are not  eager to give up  all possibility of working.  But  in 
spite of this reservation,  the  experiments will  be  extremely instructive.  The 
first  information,  relating to France,  seems  to  show  that this deal  is acceptable 
to a  not  insignificant  though still rather  small  number. 
The  security of obtaining a  guaranteed pension if he is overcome  by fatigue, 
ages  sooner than he  should or loses his strength remains  a  basic assurance to 
the worker.  But  inversely,  there  seems  to  be  an  increasing number  who  find  in 
their working life not  only human  contact,  exchanges of views and  their social 
identity but  also a  centre of interest  and  satisfaction.  The  reluctance to 
stop working,  in a  population that is better cared for and better instructed, 
may  weigh  more  heavily than age or fatigue  Although work  obviously involves 
stresses and  strains,  it is possible that  the years to  come  will bring a  major 
change  :  a  majority of employees may  wish to  prolong their working life as much 
as possible,  provided they are offered honourable  terms of departure at the end 
and  the burdens and  responsibilities are  eased. 
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The  trend towards  continuous training,  with the dual  aim  of gaining more 
control over the labour market  and  offering more  equitable promotion prospects 
is one of the major social  phenomena  of the last  ten or fifteen years.  We  shall 
not  attempt  a  comparative assessment  of the expenditure  involved,  forms of 
financing,  number  and  breakdown of trainees or aims and  efficiency of training, 
for this has already been done.  Our  object will  simply be to assess  the role 
of collective bargaining. 
All·in all, it is modest. _It  is important  in  only two  countries:  France_where 
the points of agreement  between the two  sides of industry are set  out  in the 
inter-trade agreement  of 10 July 1970- although this agreemept  is also backed 
by  several  laws,  dated  1966,  1968  and  1971;  and  Italy where  the most  important 
provisions  seem  to be  embodied  in branch agreements  (above all the engineering 
agreement  of 1973).  They  were  extended to all activities,  including the public 
sector  (most  often,  the entitlement was  for up  to  250 hours training). 
In other cases the two  sides of industry and  their agreements  have clearly 
played a  secondary role in relation to legislation.  In Belgium  the  law of 
10 April  1973  entitles workers to paid  leave for training purposes.  The 
branch  joint  committees lay down  the conditions for the use and  breakdown 
of the hours credited for this.  Some  (large stores,  building trade)  have set 
up  vocational  training funds.  But  there are no  real collective agreements on 
the principle of training.  In Denmark  the  'labour market'  training schemes 
were  set  up  by  law;  they include specialized training (1960 law),  further 
training for  skilled workers  (1966)  and  retraining (1969).  Administrative 
responsibility lies with the two  sides of industry. 
In  some  cases,  in fact,  there is practically  no  collective bargaining at 
all.  In the UK  the crafts unions  regarded the Training Services Agency  which 
set  up  retraining schemes  with  some  suspicion.  In the Federal  Republic of 
Germany,  aside from  measures to  promote  training leave,  paid or not,  there 
is little scope for agreements  beside the laws  (especially the  Lander  laws) 
and  supplementary provisions made  by  the undertakings. 
It is easier to understand  these differences  when  one  remembers  the special 
nature of negotiation on  further training where it takes place at all. 
As  illustrated by  the  1970 inter-trade agreement  in France,  the main 
function of negotiation is to provide a  general  framework  for the decisions 
taken by  those  concerned  and  the undertakings.  Naturally,  this agreement 
established well-defined rights  (as do  the Italian branch agreements)  :  the 
right  to paid leave and  the limitations to the exercise of this right.  But 
it goes much  further and  jointly lays down  the main lines of a  common  policy 
to guide'the branch agreements and-company  planning.  It regUlates relations 
with the public authorities,  plans the use of available resources and  calls 
for others.  Although the agreement  is joint,  the  negotiation is in fact 
tripartite.  The  1970 agreement  resolves  some  of the problems of the application 
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make  financing compulsory).  In its capacity of outline agreement,  statement 
of principle setting out  a  policy,  and tripartite arrangement,  this agreement 
is in fact  quasi-legislation by delegation,  or, if you  like,  a  contribution 
by  the two  sides of industry to the regulation of an area of public interest. 
This makes it easy to understand why  a  law,  prepared for by adequate 
consultation,  can fulfil the  same  needs  (although there would  evidently be 
advantages  in proceeding by agreement). 
The  second  function of negotiation is of course to define the obligations 
and  organization of the branch.  This does not  involve any  new  procedures 
(Belgium,  France,  Italy).  At  most  one  can note the existence in France of 
standing joint  committees,  regional  and  branch,  which are responsible for 
following up  training and  employment~ Although they are not  found  everywhere 
and their operation has given rise to strong criticism,  they are an  important 
institution. 
The  third function relates to the other  extreme,  to the employers'  and 
employees'  decisions and  more  specifically to the decisions of the undertaking, 
which can be incorporated in a  training plan.  Here the  1971  law  in France 
requires consultation of the works  council  (a 1976  clause to the  1970  agreement 
lays down  the detailed rules of this consultation).  Although the policy is 
based  on  an agreement,  the method  is perhaps  not  very different  from  that  in 
the Federal Republic of Germany  which makes  the works  council  responsible for 
examining training matters.  It would  perhaps be different if the French unions 
obtained their wish that  any  disagreement  in the works  council  should mean  a 
suspension of the plan which  would  become  a  negotiating issue between  employer 
and  union.  But  hitherto this remains a  wish.  And  even if it were  satisfied, 
it might  not  radically change the situation;  it would  be more  likely that 
both sides would  do  their best  to  ensure that  the  council  remained  respbnsible. 
So  the form  of negotiation is very varied.  Its most  classic form  is the 
branch agreement.  But  the statements of principle which guide the negotiation 
and  the consultations with the undertaking which  follow it give the two  sides 
of industry different  roles to  play.  And,  of course,  if such a  policy is to 
be  implemented  efficiently,  this will  be a  question primarily of the efficiency 
and  quality of the consultations.  In fact  such consultations are very  similar 
to negotiations and  only differ by  omission,  ie when,  as frequently  seems  to 
be the case,  the lack of-interest of the staff or  lack of training of its 
representatives makes  it almost  impossible to  examine  the plan seriously. 
Perhaps this suggests a  basic opposition between the points of view of the 
two  sides.  Although it is apparent  that the opposition of interests is not  at 
all of the  same  kind  here as in the case of wages,  there are striking similarities, 
from  one  country to  another,  in the points of friction.  In Belgium  the two  sides 
have  not  managed  to agree on  a  statement  of general  objectives because the unions 
thought  the employers were  too  exclusively concerned with training linked to the 
~mmediate interests of the undertaking.  In Italy,  where  the unions have most  power 
of choice of the training schemes  authorized by  the agreements,  they have mainly 
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training as  such.  The  same  differences of direction appear  in France.  Of 
course there is no  reason why  the employers  should  not  consider only their 
short-term interests.  Nor  does anyone  pretend  in practice that  training is 
better the more  disinterested it is.  The  differences of direction leave a 
good  margin for agreement  and  action. 
How  is a  balance reached  between  the two  sides  ?  The  share of each in 
formulating the guidelines for training reflects the general  balance of 
forces which  is clearly not  the  same  in Belgium  and Denmark  on  the one  hand 
and  France  on  the other.  Moreover  there are good  reasons  why  the employers' 
views  should  weigh  more  heavily.  Firstly, this is because it was  often the 
employers  who  took the initiative a  long time  ago,  at  least  in the large 
undertakings  (and  in the trade associations which  often have  a  long-standing 
honours list of training schemes).  Secondly,  and  above all,  it is because  a 
good  training scheme,  even if it assigns a  fair  share  +,o  general  training 
with formulas  to  increase the  employees'  independence,  must  offer the trainees 
short-term prospects of increased responsibility ann  improvement  of their 
situtation  that is to  say promotion  prospects.  This is a  company  decision, 
linked to the prospects this company  can offer and  to its opportunities on 
the market.  So  this is the usual  ground  of the employer rather than the union 
or the staff representatives. 
It also happens,  as happened  in France,  either that  the unionists may 
regard  further training as a  long-term objective,  placing faith in its 
long-term effects rather than attempting to control the  immediate  situation, 
or that they  show  growing  scepticism about  the efficiency of the  joint 
mechanism  which  structures and  controls it.  In the absence of any  strong 
pressure on  the part of those concerned or of a  dynamic  to gradually arouse 
their interest,  how  can the unions assert  themselves vis-a-vis the employers, 
in particular,  within the undertaking ? 
The  two  objectives most  often set  for further  training,  that of a  better 
control of the  employment  market  and  that of offering more  equal  opportunities 
can surely conflict at  times,  or at  least diverge.  Obviously it is not  the 
same  thing to begin by  dealing with the needs of redeployment  or saving  jobs 
as it is to construct training methods  which will  allow,  in the medium  or 
long term,  major  changes of category or promotion.  The  need  to  link training 
to vocational  objective in order to determine the  scale of requirements,  the 
fact  that it is usually the  employer  who  takes the initiative and  lastly,  the 
pressures of the short-term economic  trend evidently speak in favour of the 
first type of objectives.  In Denmark,  the downhill  economic  trend has  increased 
the demand  for training (the 1971-73  labour  shortage had  reduced  it~.  Sometimes, 
training was  designed  for very  short-term objectives,  in order to give employees 
the expectation of a  new  job or enable young  people not  to enter the  labour 
market  immediately  (the French unions  ironically  spoke of  'parking'  training). 
However,  apart  from  actual abuses,  of which there do  not  seem  to  be many,  the 
use of training to respond  to the most  urgent  needs  probably has the overall 
effect of reducing inequalities or at  any rate preventing them  from  increasing. 
The  effects on  social mobility as  such are much  more  uncertain.  Most  of the 
effort  seems  to have  been directed at maintenance  and  improvement  of knowledge 
rather than social advancement. 
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school  system offers little opportunity of technical or vocational training. 
Further training mobilizes a  large number  of teachers,  makes  it necessary to 
set up  or adapt  a  whole training apparatus and,  as regards both the recognition 
of training courses and their orientation,  gives  the two  sides of industry 
some  decision-making power.  The  effect of these new  factors on  the  school 
system as a  whole  may  be far  from  negligible.  At  a  time when  training for 
working life is being re-examined  (the new  Danish  law of 1972  and  1976  on 
basic vocational  training,  which,  after a  period  of five years,  totally 
replaces the former  apprenticeship  system,  is a  good  exampl~), both in 
order to rectify the  serious  imbalances of supply  and  demand  on  the labour 
market  and  in order to give less weight  to the economic  trend than to 
foreseeable  changes  in industrial  and  economic  structure,  the two  sides, 
ie,  employees'  unions and  employers'  trade associations,  perhaps have more 
to  say than ever before;  recent  experience can provide them  with valuable 
information and  additional authority  (even in a  country like the Federal 
Republic of Germany  where  the link between vocational training and  the 
undertaking is still very close). 
1.6  Inequalities and disparities 
The  inequalities or disparities between men  and women,  manual  and  non-
manual  workers or undertakings of different  size are less a  traditional 
bargaining object  (except  in the limited  sense,  which we  examined  earlier, 
of  job evaluation and  the wage  rates connected with them)  than a  problem 
that arises from  time to time  by its very nature.  Although collective 
bargaining is attempting in some  respects to bring certain working 
conditions outside direct market  control,  for instance by  eliminating 
or reducing the ability of undertakings to  compete on wages,  in order 
to attain its ends it makes  use of power  relations where,  of course,  the 
labour market  situation has a  strong influence.  Especially when  a  major 
place is given to decentralized bargaining or the  (more  or less negotiated) 
decision-making of the undertaking,  collective bargaining can  endorse or 
even  increase the inequalities between the providers of work.  Historically 
one  of the major problems of the union movement  has been the division 
between  skilled labour and _unskilled  labour  (in some  cases,  between craft 
solidarity and  industrial solidarity) and  how  to  co-ordinate the two 
situations and  the two  forms. 
This problem  has  not  disappeared,  as  shown  by  the discussions on  job 
evaluations and  the chain of command  and  the strikes on  issues specific to 
unskilled workers.  But  others have  also appeared,  which overlap only slightly 
inequalities between  immigrants and  nationals,  women  and men,  manual  and 
non-manual  workers.  One  of the hopes of industrialization and  growth was  that 
economic  development  would  automatically erode the differences,  or at least 
make  them  less blatant,  and  that the free play of negotiation,  backed by 
this economic  trend~ would  do  the rest.  This hope  has been fulfilled in part, 
especially with the considerable increase in social guarantees and  more 
generally of social transfers.  But  it has been fulfilled only in part,  for 
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social handicap  prevents from  maintaining their position at  a  time of sterner 
competition,  some  differences have  proved difficult to eradicate.  Only  by 
deliberate specific action can any  changes occur. 
In some  cases the problem  is even more  serious.  Not  only are there no 
automatic correcting mechanisms  but  vicious circles appear which make  any 
intervention or correction difficult.  It is not  surprising that the last 
arrivals on  the labour market,  the recent  immigrants,  especially if they 
also have little general  training or vocational qualification,  tend  to 
occupy  the least  skilled,  most  difficult  and  dangerous and  the least 
well-paid  jobs.  But  if circumstances are  such that there are only very 
limited chances of acquiring a  qualification or gaining better employment 
(because the number  of immigrants  increases,  because the urgent  need  to 
earn their living prevents them  from  following a  training course,  because 
of certain barriers,  institutional or not),  a  vicious circle will appear, 
separating the two  labour markets.  The  existence of a  work  force which 
'contents itself' with such  jobs perpetuates their existence;  because they 
remain outside the first  labour market,  they may  reamin  badly paid,  in 
difficult and  dangerous  jobs.  In  some  cases,  un~avourable living conditions 
(accommodation,  transport,  food,  forced  savings to  send  money  home)  reinforce 
this vicious circle.  But  in all cases fragmentary  measures are no  longer 
enough.  It is the whole  interconnected  system that must  be attacked and 
corrected. 
Our  example  is certainly too  simple and  only has  schematic value.  The 
earliest  immigrants,  in France as in the  UK,  are  extricating themselves  from 
the vicious circle in large numbers.  The  divide between the two  markets is 
not  total.  Immigration policy has  corrected  some  of the most  flagrant  abuses 
of the  'sleep merchants'  and  'men  ferriers'.  But  the wider the cultural 
distance between  immigrants and  nationals,  the closer we  come  to the model 
outlined above. 
The  problem of immigration -is probably about  to  change radically since 
the great  wave  of immigration into the Europe  of the Nine  has  come  to an  end 
with the economic  crisis.  The  balance of this movement  has become  negative 
or at least nil  everywhere  now.  As  a  result,  one  may  except  an  end  to the 
vicious circle,  bu~ for the fact  that unemployment  hits the weaker categories 
particularly hard,  which means,  in many  countries,  the  immigrants. 
But  above all, analogous mechanisms  are appearing in other cases too  and 
the  same  conclusions must  be drawn  from  them.  In all the countries of Europe, 
women  are becoming more  sensitive to the inequalities of which  they were  the 
victims.  Here again,  there is a  vicious circle.  Women  are paid less because 
they occupy less qualified posts;  but  these posts are traditionally reserved 
to  them  to the extent  that  employers and  workmates  (and  sometimes the women 
concerned themselves)  regard as particularly  'feminine'  the skills they demand 
(dexterity,  care,  quite simply the capacity to tolerate boredom  and  the absence 
of ambition).  This reinforces the circle.  The  situation is even clearer if 
one  considers not  the distribution of  jobs by  sex but  career.  Women  have a 
shorter working life than men  (although it is lengthening rapidly)  with more 
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for children and  domestic work.  So  they are offered less promotion,  less 
responsibility and  less chance of asserting themselves,  less further training. 
Because they are less qualified and  have  fewer responsibilities they are absent 
more  often and  are less reluctant  to give up  their work.  The  circle is thus 
complete.  The  situation can also  be  complicated by other factors  :  since girls 
have  fewer  opportunities in working life, their parents will give them  less 
training,  especially technical  or vocational training,  or training less likely 
to  lead to a  job (in secondary education,  girls take subjects which have  fewer 
job outlets) or more  traditionally feminine training,  even if it does not  lead 
to anything  (sewing,  hairdressing,  etc).  Similarly,  since they  'have no  ambition' 
(ie have interiorized these stresses), women  will  prefer to  choose  shorter 
working hours,  smaller undertakings - where  they will of course be less well 
paid and  more  liable to unemployment. 
Again  we  are simplifying.  Developments  in the  school  system are enabling 
an  increasing number  of women  to  take up qualified  jobs.  In the professions, 
the managerial  jobs and  technology,  the number  of women  is increasing faster 
than that of men.  It was  found  in Denmark  that  women  were  invading traditionally 
masculine domains,  such as soldering,  engineering or truck driving.  This means 
that minor corrections are occurring and  the growing pressure and  discontent 
of the feminine  population can be  explained more  by  their entry en  masse  into 
the working population and their heightened aspirations than by  the worsening 
or even unchanging nature of the situation.  This model  at  least has the value, 
like the preceding one,  of showing the  'systemic'  nature of the difficulties. 
For not  only does any  cut  in male privileges provoke resistance and  repercussions 
(male  backlash),  but  many  elements of the situation promote  and  apparently 
even  justify this resistance. 
Although it is less fundamental  in our society,  the opposition between 
manual  and  non-manual  workers is due  in part to mechanisms of the  same  kind. 
Here  the corrective mechanisms  were  applied earlier :  the shortage of manpower 
in the early  1970s  was  in many  cases a  sign of disaffection towards manual 
labour,  a  disaffection which  it must  be admitted  was  founded  on  good  reasons 
in some  countries  :  difference of wages  (France,  Italy),  of stress (eg output 
the Federal  Republic of Germany),  of advantages  (leave,  social  security, 
protection against  dismissal)  (Belgium).  In the light of this list, it is 
not  difficult to  imagine the correctives that  could be applied.  Because of 
the cost,  their application is a  different matter.  But  in this case too there 
is not  only resistance on  the part of the privileged workers against  losing 
their privileges  (even if only by  sharing them  with others)  but  also the 
'revenge of the system'  :  the increasingly rigid  classification of jobs 
makes  it easier for  small  groups of white-collar workers to recover the 
advantage  (Italy). 
Noting the  existence of these  v~clous circles is no  proof that it is 
impossible to take action but only a  means  of drawing attention to the 
necessary ways  and  means  of doing  so  and  to the role that  can be  played 
by  bargaining. 
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labour market  (or markets),  any  correcting policy can only come  from  fairly 
high up  :  the public authorities,  in the name  of the general  interest; or 
the two  sides of industry,  but at top  level,  where the  long-term dangers 
can be measured  and where all the effects of the dispersed decisions be 
assessed. 
The  impetus of the Community  and  ILO  directives on  equal  pay and  equal 
opportunities at work  for men  and  women  was  reinforced either by  legislation, 
inter-trade agreements or the two  together.  In France the  1972  law  satisfied 
a  movement  of opinion rather than initiating it.  In the Federal  Republic of 
Germany,  the tribunals tried to  eliminate discrimination on  the basis of 
constitutional provisions.  In the UK  the  1970 act  was  formally  backed by  the 
employers and  the TUC.  Belgium preferred a  national  industrial agreement, 
ratified by  royal  decree,  in order closely to associate the two  sides of 
industry.  The  law  of 20 July 1978 later confirmed  the agreement.  In Denmark 
the  1973  inter-trade agreement  was  the decisive step.  In Italy branch 
negotiation was  encouraged partly by  the  1960 inter-trade agreement,  partly 
by  the  1969  law and  action by the tribunals. 
The  same  applies to the change to salaried status.  In France,  branch 
negotiation was  encouraged and  backed  by a  political measure,  accepted in 
a  joint declaration by  the confederations.  In Italy the initiative came 
from  the top level of the union organizations after 1968.  Rivalry between 
blue-collar and white-collar unions  seems  to have  played a  more  direct part 
in the UK  where  the development  of white-collar unionism  showed  the manual 
workers'  unions  new  objectives (or at least new  levels of aspiration),  or 
in the Federal  Republic of Germany  where  the rivalry between DGB  and  DAG 
(employees'  confederation)  has become  more  acute,  particularly as a  result 
of the endeavours of the union of public services  and  transport  (OTV)  to 
co-ordinate pay levels. 
Lastly,  the attempt  to reduce the gap between  immigrants and  nationals 
was  very centralized in the beginning and  often based on  legislation (1968 
Race  Relations Act  in the UK). 
It is clear that a  central  impetus is necessary.  Branch  and  particularly 
company  negotiation alone would  no  doubt  have  had  very limited  results~  On 
the other hand  they are an essential  stage.  How  have they functioned  ? 
Branch negotiation has worked  fairly well  for  the most  easy issue,  that 
of paying monthly salaries (within certain limits,  for in no  respect  has it 
dealt with the special  situations of the higher categories,  whatever their 
definition,  which differs greatly according to country  (cadres,  dirigenti or 
executives).  The  manual  workers'  union had  sufficient power  and  the resistance 
of the white-collar unions  (sometimes distinct  from  the former  as in Belgium 
and  signing separate agreements)  has  been very limited.  The  rapprochement  and 
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and  Italy,  based  on  branch agreements  (the French  inter-trade agreement  of 
14  December  1977  and  the  law of 21  December  which  immediately gave it general 
application only represented the legal  framework).  Belgium  had  to try to 
co-ordinate separate agreements  (and  sometimes their dates)  and  major 
differences remain.  The  differences as regards  sickness and  accident benefits 
were  abolished by the inter-trade collective agreement  of 1970.  On  the other 
hand,  severance pay still differs greatly in spite of the inter-trade agreement 
on  social planning of 1973.  Overall monthly payment  agreements have  been  signed 
in some  branches  (foundry-work,  large stores).  Similarly,  in Italy,  in spite 
of the rapid rise in importance of this issue in branch negotiations 
(equalization of paid  leave,  sickness and  accident benefits) there are still 
differences as regards seniority bonuses and  severance pay.  The  standardization 
of these measures will  require  some  sacrifices.  The  monthly  payment  agreement 
in the iron and  steel  industry in Luxembourg still contains the  same  kinds 
of limitations at present. 
As  regards  equal  pay  and  equal  opportunities  for men  and  women,  the 
situation is more  complex.  Certainly the action taken by  the tribunals in 
response to  individual grievances,  jointly with branch negotiation,  has purged 
the agreements of any discriminatory clauses or separate classifications and 
thus eliminated  some  differences.  However,  reservations must  be  expressed here. 
In Denmark,  the pay of women  rose to  80 %  of that  of unskilled men  in 1968  and 
to 90 %  in 1975.  But  the alignment  was  partly due  to the equalizing effects of 
the "corrected" sliding scale.  In Italy,  women's  earnings had  risen from  67  % 
of men's earnings in 1967  to  77  %  in 1974.  Since  1975,  the flat rate increases 
under the sliding scale have  confirmed this trend.  In France,  detailed examination 
of the implementation of the  1972  law has  shown  it to  be very disappointing. 
In the Federal  Republic of Germany  and  the UK,  unions and  employers  have 
sometimes  joined forces to try to  find definitions of  'feminine'  jobs which 
also  comply with the  law  (in the UK  the differences appear particularly marked 
because in 1970  women's  pay was  50%  of that of men;  in 1975  the percentage 
was  64  %).  But  the most  significant differences are not  due to the basic rates, 
which are often identical,  but  to overtime,  allowances  for shift work,  and 
particularly  job classification and  promotion. 
Moving  from  the  same  wages  for the  same  job to equal  pay is in effect a 
move  from  what  is verifiable (provided the verifiers act  in good  faith and 
with knowledge  of the industry)  to  something much  less so.  Apart  from  cases 
of flagrant  injustice  (and there will always be  someone  to note these),  how 
can one  ensure  equal  pay  ?  It is easy to verify from  overall results that 
that it is not  equal.  But  how  should  one measure,  in a  specific case,  that 
which pertains to the  job as  such,  and  over which  the decision-maker has 
little control  (a man  will be accepted more  easily for a  certain responsibility 
or the male  candidate has  shown  more  devotion to  the task and  has more  experience) 
and  that  which reflects his own  judgements  ?  Or  should one  perhaps set quotas  ? 
The  union confederations often militate actively for equality and  most  of 
their national  unions  follow suit.  But  there may  be patent  unwillingness on 
the shop  floor;  the unwillingness of the  shop  stewards and  members  of the 
Betriebsrat reflects that of the body  of the workers. 
66 Concern  has often been  expressed at the  low  proportion of women  in unions. 
A British survey found  71  permanent  women  as against 2259  men.  In Belgium, 
women  are virtually absent  from  the  joint committees.  Although women, 
participating more  in working life,  have  entered  the union movement  in vast 
numbers  (in the UK  the number  of unionized manual  workers  has fallen by  6.8 %; 
the number  of unionized women_workers  has risen by 58%;  the number  of unionized 
white-collar workers has multiplied by  three in the last  30 years);  they are 
still poorly represented. 
But  it is probably here that they have the best  prospects for the future. 
The  pressure of women  in the union movement  is the best means  of strengthening 
the role of negotiation and  making it efficient,  not  only in the context  of 
equal  wages  and  salaries but  also of adjusted working hours,  arrangements for 
pregnant  women  (like the very  simple arrangement  enabling them  to leave work 
a  quarter of an  hour earlier to get  home  before the rush hour),  longer maternity 
(and  paternity)  leave,  nurseries,  special training conditions,  special conditions 
for refresher courses and  promotion.  In Belgium,  the  UK  and  France,  'women's 
strikes' attracted  some  attention.  They  generally received warm  backing from 
the national unions (if not  always  from  the local  people)  and  showed  that a 
new  force  had  emerged. 
The  same  measures would  also make  it possible to rectify the inequalities 
embodied  in social legislation,  such as replacing the  simple wage  system  by 
an allowance for baby-sitting {which  does  not  discourage women  working). 
In the main,  the  same  reasoning would  apply for  immigrant  workers. 
We  have  not  attempted to discuss all the major sources of inequality at 
work.  Regional  differences,  which are insignificant in the UK  and  in the 
Federal Republic of Germany  and  more  marked  in France and  above all in Italy, 
may  also give rise to vicious circles,  but  they do  not  really pertain to 
collective bargaining because they are essentially economic.  Although Italy 
and  France abolished area abatements after 1968,  this was  largely the result 
of regional  infrastructure measures  (and the effects of this standardization 
were modest  although not  negligible).  Degressive  scales for young  employees 
have  been reduced or abolished in Belgium,  Italy,  France and  Denmark  (although 
in the latter case the differences remain  large,  especially for apprentices). 
This equity measure may·  even  have made  the recruitment of young people more 
difficult.  That  is a  point  worth considering at a  time when  several  governments 
are offering the employers tax and  social contribution reliefs to recruit young 
unemployed  persons.  Lastly,  the protection of the handicapped is a  question of 
major social  importance.  In Belgium  for  example,  the statutory obligation to 
employ  handicapped  people is combined  with the authorization for the employer 
to pay  them  wages  below the agreed rates,  a  public fund  paying the supplementary 
amount  so  that the handicapped will receive normal  wages  (national collective 
agreement  of 15  October  1975  and  ensuing regulations). 
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important,  require decentralized agencies to back up  the central  impetus and 
which have  to combat  existing imbalances. 
What  is the effect of the changing economic  trend on  immigrants and 
nationals,  manual  and  non-manual  workers,  men  and  women  ?  Logically it should 
be adverse for the weakest  on  the labour market,  unless the public authorities 
or social groups take compensating measures.  But  even  if recent  immigrants 
fall within this category,.it is not  certain that  the other two  less-favoured 
groups do. 
As  we  said with respect  to wages,  the definition of the  strong and  weak 
members  on  the current  labour market,  which is regaining its full  importance 
after thirty years of full  employment,  may  no  longer be  the  same.  In the case 
of manual  workers,  although the traditional trades are likely to give them 
few  privileges  (except  repair work  and  crafts), many  engineering trades and 
many  skills (which are less easy to transfer)  in the chemical  and  oil  sector 
can  stand up  well  to  competition,  whereas occupations requiring diplomas of 
ability may  find it less easy to do  so. 
As  regards women,  the reason it is likely that the economic  trend will 
not  act against  them  is quite different  and  lies in the scale and  breadth 
of the women's  movement.  Although real feminist  groups are a  very  small 
minority,  women's  awareness of the issues involved is becoming  increasingly 
acute and  general.  It is difficult in the long run to resist a  movement 
which  encompasses more  than half the electorate. 
But  as this case illustrates  ,  articles of law or clauses of agreements 
will  not  cover all these issues.  Some  of the vicious circles we  condemned 
are based  on  attitudes and  convictions inherent  in working relationships 
and  also  in personal  relationships,  friendships,  family or political life. 
The  present transformation of social morality is not  a  question of decrees 
(it is a  result rather that  can be measured  in law  :  laws on marriage, 
abortion and  contraception or the law introducing co-educational  schooling). 
Do  the two  sides of industry have a  part to play in this task ?  The 
undertakings will  necessarily play a  part  by  the measures they take.  (Will 
a  married worker  be  authori~ed to  absent  himself  because his child is ill ? 
Will  a  woman  readily be appointed head  of division  ?)  No  doubt  the union 
organizations will also play their part.  Although there is a  strong male 
predominance  in all of them,  they may  need  to keep  in contact with this 
major social movement  and  show  a  degree of conviction and  militancy.  This 
objective is more  important  in Italy and  France or Belgium  than in the 
Federal  Republic of Germany,  but  every European union movement  needs to 
show  a  certain amount  of devotion to the cause and  good  faith. 
Although the context  is not  the  same,  the same  reasoning could  be applied 
to the approximation of manual  and  non-manual  workers.  Leaving aside wage 
and  statutory measures,  they represent  two  very distinct and  sometimes 
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if there is to be  any  ~ity. This involves the relationship of trust and 
delegation which traditionally links employer  and  employees,  and  the 
relationship of distrust and  supervision which traditionally links employer 
and manual  workers.  Even  if this opposition is excessive today,  in both 
senses of the word,  at least it shows  to what  point reactions of trust or 
distrust are implicit in both cases and  have their own  logic. 
Here  again we  have  reached the borderline of what  can  be covered by 
collective bargaining.  But  whether they want  or not,  the two  sides bf 
industry are the faithful  or unfaithful  interpreters of social relations 
and  not  just its legislators.  Although the contract is their main  raison 
d'etre and  objective,  the ways  in which they adjust  social relations go 
far beyond  matters that are inscribed in contracts. 
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None  of the nine European  countries has  experienced any  profound  changes 
in its representative organizations of employers  and  employees  :  little has 
resulted  from  rapprochements  between rival unions  so  far and  the changes of 
statute or direction have  not  caused any  real  change.  As  a  whole, 
transformations of organization have  been modest.  We  shall underline the 
changes.  But  first  of all we  must  stress the great  stability of these 
institutions. 
On  the other hand,  during these thirty years of growth,  and  perhaps more 
obviously in the last ten years,  there have  been  profound  changes  in the 
working population and  perhaps  even more  so  in respective positions and 
powers  and  in relations.  The  change  in beliefs and  philosophies is perhaps 
even more  radical  :_up to the end  of the  1960s,  the various  forms  of economic 
development  (by  leading to better living standards,  furthering social  justice, 
promoting modernization or making it possible to  keep  up  with international 
competition)  had,  despite diverging interests and  conflicting outlooks, 
provided  common  ground  for understanding and,  more  important,  a  source of 
common  conviction.  This  conviction found  expression in the fervent  belief 
in planning in France,  social  planning in Belgium,  the  social market  economy 
in the Federal Republic.  The  emergence of new  problems and  sharpening conflicts 
of interest  have  reduced this common  ground.  Doubts regarding the benefits of 
growth have undermined  the conviction;  the re-emergence of unemployment  and 
the crisis have  put  an  end  to the  economic  conditions which  fostered it. 
In most  countries radical minorities have developed or made  themselves 
heard.  Some  of the large trade unions have  stiffened their positions and 
stand aloof from  the  common  commitments  (some  have reverted  to their 
traditional attitude of opposition).  The  new  militancy has  spread to  new 
ground;  often it has overturned doctrines.  The  Marxism  of the CGIL  now 
barely resembles the traditional orthodox approach  (for example,  with 
reference to work  organization or the trade unions'  role).  The  trade 
unions  in the United  Kingdom  and  the  FGTB  have  rediscovered a  more 
vigorous  socialism.  The  Christian trade unions in Belgium  and  France 
have  shifted to the left (in the case of the French CFDT  the change 
was  abrupt,  mainly as a  result of the  shock of 1968).  One  of the more 
frequently quoted  examples of this reversal of prevailing ideas was  the 
transition in the Netherlands  (perhaps not  total  or irreversible)  from 
a  harmonious  conception to a  conflictual  conception of relations. 
Similarly,  liberalism,  often somewhat  lethargic or purely defensive, 
has again become  a  living conviction of employers  (the change is particularly 
remarkable  in France).  It has been the inspiration of a  social policy that 
has been vigorous at  times and  at  times has taken the offensive. 
Lastly,  these  changes in industrial relations have  had  a  corresponding 
impact  on  political life, where the passage has been more  difficult and 
rougher,  due  not  only to the economic  crisis, but  also to the increasing 
tendency for programmes  and doctrines to conflict  compared  with the  1960s 
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political forces to  scatter (the Netherlands provides a  good  example). 
These  changes are not  without  cause.  They  stem  from  changed attitudes 
and  means  of action,  and  above all from  changes  in the participants 
themselves. 
2.1  The  emergence of new  parties 
Although there are still fairly wide  economic  and  social differences 
between the nine EEC  Member  States as regards gross national product  per 
capita or the distribution of the working population among  the large 
sectors and  even more  among  the branches,  the trends in the latter are 
very similar.  Without  attempting any detailed comparison,  which  we  are 
not  qualified to do,  we  nay  note  several major features in common,  such 
as the fall  in agricultural workers,  whether  landowners,  farmers or 
employees,  which is of course all the more  striking in countries where 
this population had  remained  large  (France,  Italy and  Ireland);  or more 
generally the fall  in the number  of self-employed  workers,  as a  result of 
the fall  in the agricultural  population,  and  in the number  of craftsmen, 
traders and  small  industrialists,  following mergers of undertakings.  This 
has resulted in a  rise in the number  of employees.  Some  of the new  employees 
are the product  of the flight  from  rural areas (especially in France and 
Italy),  immigration,  from  ever more  distant places until its stoppage in 
1973-74,  and  the increasing employment  of women,  which was  particularly 
rapid recently  (Denmark,  the UK  and  France in particular).  The  breakdown 
of these employees  by  socio-occupational categories shows  a  slow or nil 
(percentage)  increase of manual  workers and  the gradual dominance  of 
non-manual  workers  (as a  result of the trend in the tertiary sector and 
perhaps especially the public sector but  also of the growing proportion 
of non-manual  workers  in the secondary  industries).  Here  the most  rapid 
increase has not  been among  the categories of employees  (in the trades 
and  above all office workers)  but  among  the skilled or highly skilled 
categories of technicians and middle or senior executive staff.  Among 
manual  workers,  the breakdown· by  qualification has not  changed  radically 
in spite of the decline of certain traditional trades and  the growth 
of industries employing fairly unskilled manpower  (electronics and 
domestic  equipment);  and  although geographical decentralization has  sent 
more  factories  employing unskilled workers than methods  study departments 
into the small  communes,  the empty  space left by  the fall  in unskilled 
labour has been occupied almost  fully by  semi-skilled or skilled labour, 
often mainly the latter. 
The  changes are profound.  Even  in a  country which gave great protection 
to agriculture like France,  middle and  senior executive staff are now  (1975) 
more  numerous  than peasants.  The  te~tiary sector is gaining more  and  more 
ground  in relation to the secondary.  The  level of education has risen and 
the proportion of university students has risen particularly quickly. 
What  consequences  can be drawn  from  this familiar picture,  which  we  are 
describing pro memoria,  for the parties to collective bargaining ? 
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economists with remarkable precision.  There was  no  lack of analysts to  study 
this situation and,  on  the basis of factual  observations,  to foretell the 
overthrow,  transformation or disappearance of the  working class in the 
accepted  sense of the term and  of the class-consciousness which  lay at the 
roots of the unionist  movement  in Europe.  But  however  important  the changes 
now  appear - we  will  come  back to this point  - all in all the opposite 
impression  seems  to  emerge  :  the massive rise in living standards,  the 
profound  changes  in employment  and  training have  only partially changed 
the workers'  modes  of expression and  organization. 
The  idea of a  •new  working class', which  in France had  a  real  influence 
on  union and  political life,  presumed  that  technical  changes,  especially 
those grouped under the term  automation,  would  increase the skills of the 
workers  concerned and  bring them  closer in line with the technicians and 
executives.  Moreover,  since these skills were less transferable,  there 
would  be greater integration within the undertaking,  which would  encourage 
workplace  solidarity rather than solidarity among  categories.  The  privileged 
workers in automation could thus become  the avant  garde of the working classes 
and  pave the way  for new  union action  (workplace  action,  interest  in management). 
The  great  wave  of disputes starting in  1968  largely refuted this 
interpretation.  The  case of Italy shows  this very  clearly  :  the various 
parties involved  in the  'hot  autumn'  were  not  the  'new  professionals'  of 
the key  sectors but  semi-skilled workers  from  the  large mass  industries 
such as cars and  engineering.  Young,  often better informed  than in the 
past  (if only because of the extension of compulsory  schooling),  they 
were  nevertheless  in no  way  a  privileged class.  They  played a  central 
part  in the disputes and  strikes because they were well  placed to do  so 
and  held a  central,  strategic position in production  (the prof.essionals 
who  joined them  often played a  supporting and  balancing role because their 
position was  quite different).  Alliances with technicians and  executives 
were neither very widespread  nor of any  great  strategic importance. 
The  same  conclusions must  be drawn  even  from  a  detailed analysis of the 
1968 crisis in France  (which  is not  to say that different  problems did not 
arise,  as we  pointed out  in the first  section). 
One  hesitates far more  today to  speak of automation  en  bloc,  as though 
the transfer machine  in car production,  the continuous  flow production of 
glass,  the numerical  control of machine  tools,  self-supervision or feedback 
mechanisms  or the  introduction of computers all had the  same  effects on 
employment,  the work  load and  qualifications. 
However,  in the UK  the improvement  in working conditions,  social  security 
and  the rise in the standard of living popularized the idea of the emergence 
of a  new  working class,  a  class that  had  become  more  bourgeois as a  result 
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the extent of becoming assimilated with the middle class of white-collar 
employees and  clerical staff.  Here  again a  careful  examination of reality 
has made  this simplified picture look questionable.  The  prosperous English 
workers in the new  towns  and  expanding firms,  who  ear.n  high wages,  have  in 
fact  changed.  They  are less bound  by traditional  craft and  industrial 
solidarities.  The  working  environment  has become  less of a  living environment. 
Family life and  private life have become  more  central  concerns  (together with 
the forms of consumerism they promote).  But  these workers  have not  become 
petty bourgeois.  When  they buy their house they do  not  stop voting Labour 
(at least,  not  necessarily,  but  the result may  be different if they buy  a 
house in a  middle-class district).  They  look upon  their work  not  as a  career 
but as an  economic  necessity and  take the same  pragmatic view  (which  produces 
in them  a  very distant attitude towards both the undertaking and their immediate 
superiors) of unionism,  though this does not  entail a  fall  in union membership. 
Although their concept  of the class system places  them  within the vast  category 
which they call the middle class,  which  includes all but  the very poor and  the 
very privileged,  they have given  evidence of some  inherent militancy since 1969, 
if only to protect their wages,  individually or as a  body;  lacking revolutionary 
convictions and  class solidarity,  they become  keenly aware  of their interests 
as a  category. 
So  it would  be quite wrong to regard these semi-skilled workers  (specialized 
workers in France)  as a  marginal  group which is in every way  inferior as regards 
wages,  working conditions and  insecurity.  We  shall return later to the movements 
specific to the least-favoured categories.  The  mass of semi-skilled workers 
played a  major role in the big disputes not  because it is a  marginal  group  (as 
the Italian example  has  shown)  but  because it has  e  central role in the production 
process and  in the changes in social life.  It is true that as a  whole  it is more 
affected than others by  the stresses of organization and  has a  need  for collective 
action.  But  what  is new,  apart  from  their numbers,  is that these workers have had 
an opportunity to express and  press their claims. 
Today  the workers  surely have  something other  to  lose than their chains. 
Poverty is no  longer the main  motive  force behind  their claims.  So  to  some 
extent  the oppositions have  become  less violent  and  other demands  are being 
put  forward as a  result of the  comparison of their earnings with those of 
more  prosperous categories.  They  now  protest against  the parcelling out  of 
production and  tasks,  against  the lack of prospects and  insecurity.  Sometimes 
even their sense of solidarity seems  to  have  become  more  fragile  :  the worker 
gives his support  to his occupation rather than to his class.  But  it is 
questionable whether the basic class consciousness has  changed  a  great deal, 
or the sense of being one of the least well off,  one  of those who  carries 
the burden of daily production  (and  has no  subordinate to  whom  to delegate) 
and  perhaps above all the feeling of being one  of those who  is told what  to 
do  and  for whom  decisions are made  from  above. 
This  sense of class has  in fact  become  more  commonplace;  it has  spread 
from  the workshop  to the office and  now  also covers the middle-grade 
categories who  have often taken over more  than  just its vocabulary and 
attitudes.  The  unions  no  longer  include only manual  labour  (this has  been 
true for fifty years in  some  countries such as France)  but  also workers of 
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sense of opposition and  combat  which  they  inherited from  the traditional 
labour movement,  to different  degrees depending on country yet  with great 
similarities in every political group  and  negotiating system.  The  question 
is  :  do  the unions  hark back  to this tradition for reasons of identity,  or 
at  any  rate deep-rooted affinities,  or for practical reasons  (because it 
affirms "the  organizations'  continuity and  is a vigorous  expression of 
opposition)  ?  With  the growing numbers  of white-collar workers among  wage 
earners,  and  the  improvement  in skills and,  even  more,  in educational  levels, 
this is a  question that  needs  to  be  answered. 
The  undeniable  rapprochement  between workers  and  employees  which  is 
reflected in the  shift to monthly  payment  is not,  therefore,  a  fusion of 
the two  groups.  As  we  said before,  very  profound  changes  v10uld  have  to occur 
before the  social relations of a  workshop  become  the  same  as those of an 
office.  So  there is stilJ  a  great deal  of stability in the workers'  methods 
of action. 
But  this stability must  not  conceal  the advent  on  the  scene,  often at 
the very  forefront,  of categories others than the  workers of private industry. 
Public  sector unions  are not  a  recent  phenomenon  in Europe,  in spite of 
the great  differences  in legislation.  In France,  after the great  depression, 
the CGT  of 1930  started as an  organization of civil  servants and  state 
employees.  After the war,  trade unionism  spread to cover state and  local 
authority employees  (the  same  applies outside Europe).  Moreover,  the 
establishment  of a  public  industrial  sector,  of varying  importance 
depending on  the  country,  gave trade unionism a  further field of action. 
Lastly,  some  categories of officials,  such as teachers,  have greatly 
increased in numbers  and  have  organized themselves  on  a  massive  scale. 
In the  UK,  with an  average trade union membership  of 50%  for  employees 
as a  whole,  the rate is 85%  in the public sector.  In Italy,  the rate of 
trade union  membership  in the public sector is estimated at  56  to  57  %, 
slightly higher than  in the private sector.  In France,  the first national 
trade union  (or federation as it is called there)  is the national  education 
federation,  with more  members  than the three metal-workers'  federations 
together.  Next  in line are the railways,  the Electricite de  France  and 
the mines.  In Denmark,  negotiation has  become  such an  important  element 
that more  employees  are bound  to the state by  collective agreement  than 
actual  civil  servants. 
The  job security of the public sector has become  a  much  envied privilege 
since 1974.  It gives more  power  to union action,  which has no  doubt  also 
been  favoured  by  the attitude of the public authorities.  In the UK  or France 
after the Second  World  War  is was  most  unlikely that the nationalized 
undertakings would  not  point  the way  as regards  compliance with the right 
of association and  joint consultation. 
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times of crisis,  although they are certainly protected against  unemployment 
and their employer is not  faced with difficulties at  the end  of the month. 
They  can also be regarded as  examples  for the policy of wage  restraints. 
But  in fact  their practical privileges do  not  necessarily match their 
apparent  powers. 
Trade unionism has also  spread to private sector employees,  although 
seldom to the  same  degree.  Strikes have  occurred  in banks,  insurance 
companies  and  large stores in Belgium  and  France.  In the  UK  27 %  of 
private employees are unionized.  In Ireland they represent  30 %  of total 
union membership.  In the Federal  Republic  of Germany  they are  so  numerically 
important  that  relations between DGB  and  DAG  (employees'  union)  have  become 
very tense and  employers  sometimes  find  themselves obliged to negotiate 
separately with each of them  (although the outcome  of the negotiations 
hardly differs).  In Italy a  number  of employees,  mainly those whose 
privileges were at risk,  took part  in the 1968-1970  strikes. 
A cr1s1s can intensify the claims of employees'  unions,  whose  privileges 
and differences are threatened by  monthly payment  and  by  the emergency 
measures taken to  combat  inflation.  In Belgium  the employees'  unions,  which 
are a  separate organization negotiating separate collective agreements, 
refused to accept  redundancy {to which the workers were  subject) or to give 
up  their very high severance pay. 
Even  more  important  for the future of negotiation is the extension of 
unionism to the most  highly skilled employees,  to designers,  technicians, 
engineers and  administrative staff.  The  trend is the  same  .everywhere 
although the results may  differ quite widely.  In the Federal  Republic of 
Germany  the senior executive staff (leitende Angestellte) are on  the board 
of directors.  At  a  lower level,  the unions are also trying to  include in 
their ranks the middle management  staff,  who  were  hitherto considered 
outside the  scope of agreements,  and  to represent  them  in their negotiations. 
In Belgium and  Luxembourg  only a  minority of executive staff belongs to the 
'workers''  unions;  in Belgium  the employers  have  not  accepted them  as 
representative of these categories,  except  the banks.  On  the other hand, 
a  large number  of them  belong to  independent  associations of categories. 
In spite of the reluctance of the Belgian unions,  some  undertakings there 
have  established executive staff committees in which  executive staff 
participate in the management  of the undertaking but where  they can also 
discuss their own  problems  (the  'Federation des  Industries belges'  has 
recommended  that this system  should be applied generally). 
In other cases a  certain number  of executive  staff (1)  are members  of 
(1)  The  definition of this term varies considerably from  one  country to another. 
Leitende Angestellte in Germany,  dirigenti in Italy mean  senior executive 
staff.  In Denmark,  the definition depends  on  the university degree.  In 
France,  the notion of executive staff is particularly broad  since it covers 
supervisory staff and  highly skilled specialists with no  responsibility for 
others  (the  CGC  in fact  intends to organize  even senior salaried employees). 
75 associations,  whether or not  called unions,  specific to their  jobs.  In France 
a  general  confederation of executive staff negotiates alongside the executives' 
unions of the workers'  confederations.  In the Netherlands an association of 
senior executive staff takes part  in branch negotiations and  the committee 
of middle and  senior executives,  although not  belonging to the  'Fondation 
du  Travail'  (Labour Foundation),  takes part  in the discussions between the 
foundation and  the governments  and  is represented  on  the Economic  and  Social 
Committee.  In Denmark  associations of graduate  executive staff,  independent 
from  the 10 union  confederation,  have  been  set  up  and  have  federated  (doctors, 
engineers,  la~zyers,  economists)  to negotiate  jointly,  especially vis-a-vis 
their state employer.  In addition,  three associations of executive staff, 
foremen  and  technicians are negotiating an  outline agreement  with the employers' 
organization.  In Italy some  eocecutive  staff have  traditionally belonged to 
the trade union movement.  They  have  shown  new  interest  in organizing themselves 
after suffering intensely from  the disputes of 1970  and  after.  They  have  set 
up  independent  groups  which are not  in principle unions but  which concentrate 
more  and  more  on defending their category of  job,  and  the confederations are 
seeking  common  issues with them. 
In the  UK  too,  the union movement  has  spread  to  technical  and  executive 
. ~taff, taking various  forms.  There are  scientif:ic  and  technical  staff unions 
(The  Association of Scientific,  Technical  and Managerial  Staffs increased 
its membership  2.5 times between  1968  and  1974);  then there are the  large-~cale 
l'lOrkers'  unions which  have  set  up  subsidiaries for these  employees  (the 
Amalgamated  Union  of Engineering Norkers  set  up  the Technical  and  Allied Staffs); 
lastly,  special  sections have  been  set  up  for the  new  categories within the 
union,  whether as  part of general  unions  (TGWU),  industrial unions  (Iron and 
Steel  Trades Confederation)  or sectoral  unions  (Union of Shop  Distributive 
and  Al J i eel  Harkers). 
Some  of these organizationc have  a  large membership,  but  they also  have 
an  importance that  goes  beyond  their numerical  membership  and  lies :in  the 
strategic pos:i tion they occupy  and  the pm·Jers  they ho} d,  The  big unions are 
in fact  trying to  c=tt-tract  technical  and  executive  staff everywhere  and  these 
often  pla;y  an  important  ro] e  in the pub1 i c  discussions and  debates. 
Generall;l,  the unicms  of  emrJo;yees  ani  technical  and  executive staff are 
modern.te  and  h;we  rather r1.ifferent  customs  and  objectives from  the workers' 
unions.  In  the  UK  it was  the white-collar workers  who  aroused  nevv  interest 
in  pension  schemes,  a  field which  had  previm.wly  often been  neglected.  It 
is partly their exampJe  that  hrts  :intensified  employees'  concern with career 
prospects and  possible euarantees.  Often  too it is a  question of defending 
established  positions and  priv:ileger,  (this attitude :is  not  unknown  among 
crafts unions  either,  though). 
The  methods used are not  the  same  The  situation has  to  be very critical 
before the  executive staff will  consider going on  strike and  they will  always 
attach a  different  importance to  personal  discussion. 
In  some  cases,  however,  small  groups readily adopt  extreme  ideas and 
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in Belgium,  Ireland  and  France.  It is true that  words like  'radical'  may  go 
hand  in hand  with the defence of privileges, yet  one  cannot  dismiss the 
phenomenon  of the emergence  of extremist  movements  among  skilled and  highly 
skilled employees. 
No  doubt  it should  be linked to the development  of occupations requiring 
high qualifications but  situated at  one  remove  from  the direct responsibilities 
of the undertaking  (production,  marketing,  finance)  such as consultancy bureaux 
or laboratories,  or teaching and  social and  cultural activities.  A large number 
of graduates working in new  fields remain unaffected by the traditional workplace 
opposition between those who  giye orders and  those who  carry them  out.  These 
managers  cannot  be managed. 
Perhaps  one  could generalize and  assert  thet  the unease  among  executive 
staff which  emerges at  times during the discussions and disputes,  and  which 
has  been  studied in great detail,  is merely the forerunner of a  general 
movement  of opposition on  the part  of this category to management.  Yet  the 
facts  suggest  that it is more  a  problem  of organization than of social class. 
Just as the existence of radical  technical  and  executive staff can be 
explained by  their position in the organization of the undertaking (or the 
social organization),  the unease of the executive  staff is more  a  result of 
difficulties in adapting to the new  role of the executive,  to a  new  set of 
obligations, duties and  rewards  which  takes away  their traditional security 
and  subjects them  to the disciplines of efficiency and  output.  This does not 
mean  that the change  is not  just as serious and  important.  It simply means 
that it cannot  be explained merely  in terms of alignment  to workers'  or 
employers'  positions.  Even  when  it takes radical  forms,  one must  look for 
the new  elements these  forms  reveal  rather than trying them  to old conflicts. 
2.1.3.1  The  least-favoured categories 
In the UK,  Italy,  Belgium  and  France the disputes during the prosperous 
years of 1968  to  1973  were  often led by  groups which although not  outside 
the union movement  played only a  modest  role in it. They  contributed or 
consolidated but  they did not  press their own  claims.  This was  the case of 
the strikes of immigrants  in protest against their working conditions,  of 
unskilled workers  in general  demanding,  under the  heading of job evaluation, 
a  wage  rise and  recognition of their role,  or of women  subjected both to 
the stresses of output  and  to their position in a  male-dominated  society. 
These  strikes often proved particularly hard-hitting because they came 
from  the rank and  file who  were  often very  inexperienced  in the area of 
social conflict  and  therefore used  unusual  and  often unofficial methods. 
The  union organizations were  only very rarely called to account  for this, 
but  often they  needed  to revise their ideas in order to understand these 
aims  and  make  room  for  them  on  their platform. 
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be  no  more  than significant  incidents in the  spread of unionism to the new 
industrialized strata.  Because of the labour  shortage they could occur 
without  necessitating a  major effort of collective discipline.  With  the 
crisis,  however,  they may  take on more  habitual  forms. 
Yet  some  of these disputes pose a  rather novel  problem to the unionists 
when  the categories involved are bound  by  a  sense of solidarity which goes 
beyond  that of the working world  and  to  some  extent  stands in competition 
with union  solidarity. 
2.1.3.2  Rival  solidarities 
The  first  case in point  is that of foreign workers.  Immigrants,  especially 
recent  immigrants,  do  not  suffer only from  the difficulties and  pressure~~ 
of lower wages.  Special rules govern their work  and their stay in the country. 
Moreover,  on arrival  they may  not  know  the language,  culture or customs. 
Lastly,  for these and  other reasons,  they are often regarded  by  at  least 
some  of the nationals as having a  lower  social  status (this attitude is 
generally called racism and  its major  form  of expression is not  necessarily 
the most  violent or spectacular one). 
So  in addition to the usual  worries of fairly unskilled and  badly paid 
workers,  they also have  special  needs  in common  with other immigrants of 
the same  origin and  not  with their workmates,  eg  accommodation,  food, 
residence permit  and  work  permit,  learning the language,  the practice of 
their own  religion,  schooling for their children.  The  union often responds 
to these needs,  but  this means  that it must  diversify its services and 
sometimes its organization,  setting up  special  sections.  Nationality-based 
associations will  emerge  of their own  accord  and  the union will  have  to 
find ways  of co-operating with them  and  sharing their duties,  which is 
often difficult.  The  solidarity between  employees  should  remain the primary 
solidarity;  but  this is an objective and  not  a  datum  of the situation. 
In a  different  way  the  same  applies to the problems of women.  Working 
women  have the same  problems as all employees,  but  they also  have  others 
which go  much  further than those of working life although intimately linked 
to them.  For  instance,  the division of domestic  tasks is a  major  element  of 
their daily workload  and  plays a  major part  in everyday working life as it 
does during strikes.  If sexism is defined as assigning women  an inferior 
status,  sexism is at least as widespread as racism.  We  pointed to the 
vicious circles of this  'inferiority'  earlier· on.  What  is new  is that  they 
are now  tolerated less and  less and  that  women  are feeling them  and  protesting 
against  them  increasingly often. 
Can  the unions respond to this situation  ? 
Firstly,  the unions were  originally a  male movement  (and  men  regarded 
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services of the craftsmen);  surely militancy was  reserved to men  as one 
of the noble  functions in the world of those who  act  ?  As  we  have  seen, 
union responsibilities are reserved to men  almost  everywhere  (especially, 
as can be  seen in Belgium,  the higher they rise in the hierarchy of these 
responsibilities- but  no  doubt  this is true everywhere).  The  proportion 
of unionized women  has risen markedly  in the UK  and  in Denmark,  but it 
generally remains  below the proportion of working  women.  In  some  countries 
such as Italy,  there are few  working women  or women  union members,  especially 
the latter.  In the wave  of disputes and  negotiations in 1968-1970,  little 
place was  given to women  and their claims. 
In any  case there is no  reason why  'sexism'  should  not  occur as widely 
among  employees as among  the rest  of the population  (even,  to  some  degree, 
among  the militants). 
In recent years women  have  entered working life at an ever accelerating 
rate.  In Denmark  they made  up  29 %  of the total on  1960;  by  1975  they made 
up  41  %.  In the UK,  where  the initial was  a  little higher  (30% in  1950), 
they now  make  up  40 %;  in Belgium,  35  %.  In France the  increase in the 
working population between  1968  and  1975  was  accounted  for  by  159  000 men 
and  1  384  000 women  (now  they make  up  more  than 38% of the total).  Italy 
still lags behind;  there women  make  up  a  large part of home  workers and, 
more  generally,  of workers  who  are not  covered by  any rules.  In every case, 
the great  increase in numbers  can be  explained  largely by  married  women 
remaining at work  or returning to work  (in Denmark  in 1960 less than 25  % 
of married  women  worked;  now  more  than  50% go  to  work). 
This was  followed  a  little later by  an  increase in  female  union membership. 
In Denmark  women  make  up  35  % of members  of the LO- as against  41  %  of the 
working population  (cf.  1.6.2). 
The  massive  entry of women  into working life was  doubtless helped  and 
encouraged  by  the economic  upswing of the late 1960s.  But  its scale is 
so  great that it cannot  be  explained merely by  economic  conditions.  Rather 
it reflects a  profound  change of attitudes (the attitudes of women  and, 
secondarily attitudes towards women)  and  social roles.  The  place of women 
in our society is changing.  To  use a  phrase that  has been a  little overworked 
in recent years,  this is not  an  economic  but  a  cultural  phenomenon. 
The  hesitancy and difficulties felt  by  the unions  in face of this new 
situation are,  therefore,  not  only a  result of their traditions and  the 
latent or open reserYations of the male  nucleus.  They  are also a  question 
of finding effective ways  and  means,  as we  pointed out  above.  A type of 
relationship cannot  be transformed  like a  rate of pay,  nor a  relationship 
which  penetrates all other social relationships  (like a  working relationship). 
The  difficulties are also due,  above all, to the  fact  that  the women's 
movement  and  the union movement  spring from  different  bases. 
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movements  even where  they have  looked  upon  their basic intentions with 
~ympathy.  For does  the discussion of household tasks,  sexuality or 
contraception,  not  divide the employees rather than unite them  against 
the employer,  disperse their activities instead of concentrating them  on 
realistic objectives ?  Should  women  be  organized  separately  (LO  in Denmark 
has a  union of female  workers);  should means  be  found  of grouping employed 
and  non-employed  (ie non-working)  women  together  ?  Are  committees on  women's 
problems within the unions  enough,  are non-union  feminist  groups acceptable  ? 
Does  giving priority to women's  difficulties not  put  workers  solidarity in 
second  place  ? 
There  is a.risk that this problem may  also  be  dissembled  behind  the 
Marxist-based  language  in which  attempts were made  in Italy and  France to 
reduce relations between men  and  women  to a  question of exploitation,  and 
behind the methods  of r·eassurance which  consist of working  'towards women's 
rights'  and  adding a  special  chapter to  the list of union claims.  For the 
unions  can neither refuse to  concern themselves with that  which motivates 
feminism  nor align themselves with it. The  major  movement  of social opposition 
which  is currently expressing itself is certainly unlikely to set  up  a  party 
or to  organize itself into an  interest group.  But  it will  surely influence 
the organized parties and  groups,  especially the unions. 
2.1.3.3  The  new  marginal  group  born of the crisis 
Keen  national  and  international  competition may  favour unprotected  forms 
of work,  especially in exposed  sectors and  those  which  a  new  international 
division of labour will bring into decline,  eg home  working,  undertakings 
on  the fringe of legislation.  As  a  result of the  low  job supply,  a  large 
number  of young  people ha.ve  at  best  to  suffer a  long wait  before entering 
work,  at worst  extended  unemploJ~ent and  temporary  jobs.  This hits young 
people who  have left  school  without  training or qualification most  severely, 
and  there are many  of them  everywhere.  Nor  does it spare recent  graduates. 
We  know  of no  study of the unemployed  who  have  exhausted their entitlements 
to  supplementary benefits or of those who  have given up  looking for a  job 
and  have been  struck off the working population list. 
These  new  marginal  groups,  born of the cr1s1s or enlarged by it, have 
attracted very different degrees of attention.  Italy has  paid most  concern 
to the first  group,  probably because it is most  numerous  there.  Government 
programmes  have  been  set  up  in most  countries for  young  people  seeking 
employment.  Much  less attention has  been devoted  to the long-term unemployed. 
In Italy and  France the unions have tried to  group the unemployed  together 
but this attempt  to provide them  with a  framework  for  expression and  action 
seems  to  have  had  only very limited results.  In the UK  it is mainly non-union 
groups which try to help them,  from  the left or the right  but  in either case 
usually  extreme.  In general  they remain without  much  organization. 
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rapidly)  without  any channels of expression or institutional  status raises 
very serious problems  in the long term,  in spite of the scale and  effectiveness 
of social  security payments  and  social  programmes  (especially unemployment 
benefits).  The  problems are not  equally apparent  in all countries but  they 
are likely to  be  important  in the future. 
The  world of the employers is not  yet  known  well.  What  is the distribution 
of opinions and  powers  behind the reassuring unity of the trade associations 
(the only exception to this unity is the Netherlands)  ?  What  was  the result 
of the great  economic  transformation of the last  thirty years for which of 
course the  employers  had  much  responsibility ?  What  effects has the recent 
crisis had  ?  We  know  only the general  picture. 
As  has been known  for a  long time,  the growth  and  stability of undertakings 
also  involves replacement  of the  employer  (the contractor,  or,  in the classical 
sense,  the owner  and  head of the undertaking)  by  employee  managers,  who  have 
higher certificates and  vocational qualifications,  whose  objectives are not 
so  much  immediate profits as long-term  success,  not  so  much  protection of 
the heritage as the development  of the undertaking,  not  so  much  control  as 
growth.  Obviously this picture is too  simplified,  the differences in motivation 
are not  so  clear-cut  and  the social effect of this replacement  is weakened 
by the fact  that  the new  managers are often the sons of the old bosses,  after 
graduating from  higher college,  and  that there is more  social  stability than 
one might  think. 
What  are the consequences of this change  for  negotiation ? 
1.  A.large undertaking is not  just a  larger undertaking but  above all an 
undertaking which has more  autonomy  vis-a-vis direct market  pressures, 
whether the pressures of the produce market  or of the labour market,  and 
one which  can therefore have its own  economic  and  social policy.  Of  course 
every undertaking is a  decision-making centre,  but  a  large undertaking has 
a  greater margin of freedom  here. 
So  the effect of the growth in size of undertakings and  the  increased 
number  of 'professional'  managers  in countries where the negotiation ie 
often conducted by  an  employers'  association must  be  to  strengthen .not 
only the influence but  also the intervention of the larger undertakings 
in the associations  (and,  more  generally,  in the  employers'  world),  and 
to give more  weight  to the undertakings'  own  policy in relation to the 
associations'  directives.  This does.not  necessarily mean  that the 
organization will  be weakened;  the general trend  in Western Europe is 
in the opposite direction and  some  large undertakings have contributed 
towards making their national associations more  active.  But  it does 
mean  that the distribution of decision-making powers must  change quite 
considerably. 
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countries where  company  headquarters are usually  located in the economic 
capital,  has also taken  some  of the autonomy  and  importance  from  the 
regional associations.  In France the large provincial units are now 
overshadowed  by  the establishments of subsidiaries of large undertakings. 
The  local  body of employers is in the minority,  at least as regards 
economic  importance.  The  major  social policy decisions are taken in the 
Paris headquarters.  However  great  the undertakings'  attempts to decentralize 
social decisions and  economic  management,  the local associations have 
restricted powers. 
To  what  extent  is this picture also true of Italy,  Belgium and the UK  ? 
3.  Thirdly,  the distinction between large,  medium-sized  and  small  undertakings 
has at times turned into a  genuine opposition,  fostered by  the crisis and  its 
emergencies.  In simple terms,  there is an opposition of social  environment 
between the higher middle class and  the provincial  lower m]ddle  class;  an 
opposition of origin,  training and  prospects between the cosmopolitan 
graduates and  the local  self-made men  and dignitaries;  an opposition of 
relations with the bureaucracy and  the public authorities.  On  the one  hand 
there are the men  who  come  from  the  ~arne  schools,  on  the other hand  the 
distrust of the self-made man  towards the state and its officials.  These 
oppositions are  sometimes reinforced by  the credit  squeeze,  price controls, 
monetary policy or the gloomy  market  outlook and  often crystallize in social 
problems.  The  'real bosses',  those who  own  and  direct,  accuse the  'technocrats' 
of the large undertakings of endangering their livelihood by  taking excessive 
measures or showing unpardonable tolerance.  The  association find it more  and 
more  difficult to deal  with both  ends of this chain. 
2.2  The  trade associations of employers  and  employees 
2.2.1.1  Structure 
Although neither  law nor practice prevents the individual  employer  from 
negotiating an agreement  or convention,  in Europe  it is usually the 
employers'  associations that  have acted as the main partners of the unions 
in negotiations.  It is true that  for the past  twenty years,  with the shift 
to bargaining at undertaking or plant  level more  importance  has been given 
to the role of management  and  their staff (in the  United  Kingdom  it has 
become  predominant)  and  associations have been left with the task of giving 
advice and  providing services and  coordination. 
Undertakings  can associate in order to  set  up  joint departments,  defend 
their interests before Parliament  and  the governments  in matters of taxes, 
customs duties or credit  (functions which we  shall call  'economic'  for the 
sake of simplicity).  They  can also associate as  employers  in order to 
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a  joint  social  policy or assert their point  of view before the legislator 
and  the public  inspectorates  ('social'  functions).  The  two  functions are 
sometimes  combined  in the primary  employers'  associations which generally 
group undertakings according to  industry whether  at  local  or national  level 
(often they then  set  up  a·specialized body  such as the  'social  committee' 
in the Federal Republic of Germany),  sometimes  they are separate. ~The same 
applies to the groupings by major branches  ('federations'  or unions). 
Lastly,  the two  functions are  sometimes  separate  in the national  inter-trade 
associations  (BDA  and  BDI  in the Federal  Republic  of Germany,  the same  in 
Ireland),  sometimes  combined  (Belgium,  Italy,  France- the UK  now  also belongs 
to this group  since the merger of the British FmpJ.oyers  Confederation,  the 
Federation of British Industry and  the National Manufacturers Association 
to  form  the Confederation of British Industry in  1965). 
The  coverage of the inter-trade employero'  associations varies.  Sometimes 
they cover the entire economy  except  agriculture  (Denmark,  France);  sometimes 
industry and  commerce  are separate (Italy,  the Federal  Republic  of Germany). 
Sometimes,  small  and  medium-size undertakings have  separate associations 
(Belgium  and  in a  more  ambiguous  l.·vay,  France).  The  public  sector undertakings 
generally remain apart  but  sometimes  they do  participate  (and  sometimes,  as 
in France,  they  join forces). 
The  employers'  associations have  the  same  general  structure  (which 
corresponds in its principles to that  of the  employees'  unions).  Primary 
company  groups  (by  small  branches,  ie by  product,  by market,  by  technology 
or by materials),  either federate  by  branch  (vertical organization,  eg 
metal-work,  textiles)  or by  locality or region  (horizontal  organization, 
eg  La.nd,  provincial  or departmental  association).  The  tvm  types of 
org~ation come  together in a  national  inter-trade association  (which 
we  shall  ca]l  'confederation'). 
Yet  their respective pol.vers  vary considerably. 
The  Employers'  Confederation  (DA)  in Denmark  has very substantial  powers. 
It negotiates and  signs  conventions,  decides on  any lock-outs and  administers 
the  employers'  entire social policy.  The  situation in Italy is very similar, 
in spite of its extremely different  social climate  There  the  'Confindustria' 
is responsable for defining the  employers'  economic  and  social policy,  for 
enshrining the broad  lines of this policy in inter-trade agreements and  very 
closely controlling the branch discussions  It has  been headed  by  some  of 
the major Italian leaders of industry.  In spite of the secession of the 
state-participation undertakings  in the late  1950s  (grouped  in two  federations, 
ASAP  for the oil and  chemical  industry,  Intersind  for the others) it directs 
the activities of the Italian employers well.  Similarly,  in the Netherlands, 
the central organizations with both private and  public responsibility very 
carefully vet  the branch decisions,  especially where~th~y relate'to  w~ges. 
At  the other extreme,  in Ireland,  there are several groupings,  by far 
the most  important  of which  in the private sector being the Federated Union 
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national wage  agreements  since 1970,  the employers'  delegation is a  coalition 
which,  as the Irish Employers'  Confederation includes the employers  in the 
construction industry,  in the electrical industry,  in printing,  state 
companies  and  local authorities and  the state itself as a  direct  employer 
of civil servants. 
Thus  the branches have very varying degrees of autonomy.  They  remain 
the dominant  force  in the UK,  the Federal  Republic of Germany,  Luxembourg 
and  France.  In France the branch unions which have more  money  and  more  human 
resources have traditionally had  pride of place whild the CNPF,  which was 
designed only as a  'committee',  is a  conciliation body  rather than an 
authority or decision-making force. 
2.2.1.2  The  increase in the  confedera~ions'  powers 
In the countries we  have  just mentioned,  the main  social policy decisions 
and main negotiating powers rest with the branch associations.  In Italy there 
is such an obvious need  for a  method  of flexible  supervision of the situations 
in the branches that  in spite of the predominance  of  'horizontal'  associations, 
the large federations have  set up autonomous  negotiating machinery.  In this 
way  the  'Federmeccanici'  and  the  'Federtessili'  have  achieved  some  independence 
vis-a-vis the Confindustria. 
Yet  the main  tendency is to  strenghten the powers of the confederations 
and,  more  generally,  of the horizontal associations.  At  times the pressures 
of the  incomes policy have made  it necessary to strengthen the central  powers, 
as in the UK  and  the Netherlands.  Sometimes it was  their concern about  social 
conflicts and  crises that  led  employers to give their central organization 
more  internal power  and  prestige,  formally to confer on it the responsibility 
for a  common  social policy and  entrust it with defending the undertaking 
vis-a-vis public opinion,  in contrast to the traditional attitude of 
discretion and  reserve.  This applies to the CNPF  and  its reform  in 1969  in 
France,  and  to the new  effectiveness of the Italian Confindustria.  In Belgium 
the long-term social  planning projects made  the constraints of consistent 
planning more  tangible and  resulted in improvements to the machinery 
(nevertheless,  the tradition of social  planning came  to an  end  in 1976). 
The  effects of the recent  crisis have  followed the same  lines as those 
of prosperity,  perhaps because both were  accompanied  by  inflation.  The 
crisis confirmed or reinforced the centralization of pay  negotiations  (or 
at least, as in the Federal  Republic of Germany,  gave more  weight  to those 
who  took part  in the concerted action).  Moreover,  as political discussions 
have  become  more  intense in France and  Italy,  the  employers'  confederations 
there have  assumed  an  increasingly important  role  in defending the undertaking 
and  its economic  liberalism. 
In many  cases,  the horizontal  associations  (regional or provincial)  have 
also acquired more  importance.  In Italy many  undertakings give full allegiance 
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contrary tends to occur).  These  unions may  acquire more  weight  with the 
autonomy  recently granted  to the regions,  and  their effectiveness is 
increasing with the creation 6f decentralized area unions.  In Belgium  the 
associations of very large regions  such as Flanders,  Wallonia and  Brussels 
are becoming more  independent  and  their policies are also  becoming more 
differentiated,  in line with the differences of economic  situation.  In 
France,  the CNPF  is seeking the more  direct  backing of the regional 
associations,  but  as a  result of company  mergers  the regional  establishments 
have to  follow the policy of the Parisian head  offices,  and  the regional 
units of the branch federations,  at  least of the major ones  (metal, 
construction)  remain more  powerful  centres of attraction. 
More  generally,  large-scale undertakings,  groups and  holdings  (to the 
extent that  they  have any  social reality outside their financial  unity) 
tend to  favour  confederations and  be against  decentralization.  Since they 
may  include undertakings and  establishments which  would  traditionally be 
classified as belonging to different  branches,  they are not  always at  home 
in a  purely occupational  framework.  They  may  therefore have  to deal  with 
a  large number  of different  unions  (Netherlands,  the UK).  Moreover,  if only 
as a  result of their size,  they can easily act at  top level.  Lastly,  even 
if their decentralized establishments try to participate in regional  life, 
they  cannot  have  the  same  autonomy  of decision as  a  local undertaking and 
are necessarily subject  to at  least  a  minimum  of co-ordination. 
2.2.1.3  Large  and  small  undertakings 
Because of the range of their activities and  because of their size,  the 
very large undertakings occupy  a  special place in the  employers'  organization. 
Some  like to  remain outside,  others  join it, although  sometimes with a  special 
status  (DA  in Denmark  has  157  associations - it is planned to group  them  more 
satisfactorily into  seven  large sectors - and  also  some  fifty individual 
members).  In Italy,  France  and  the UK  large undertakings  sometimes  not  only 
negotiate on  their own  account  and  take  steps which clearly distinguish them 
from  the others but  go  flatly against  the instructions of the  ~rganization. 
Affiliates of multinationals that  have  their head  office abroad are not 
very different  from  the major national  companies  in this respect.  They  too 
remain apart  from  the mass  of undertakings,  largely because they have  a 
different  outlook.  The  difference  simply becomes  wider if the decision-making 
centre is situated abroad  and  is therefore less sensitive to the national 
economic  trend.  In the United  Kingdom,  many  affiliates of North American 
companies  refused to  join employers'  associations  (they have  perhaps 
contributed to the development  of company  bargaining).  They  have today 
joined the ranks. 
Moreover,  the large undertakings have often formulated their own  specific 
social policy.  Groups  and  holdings often have general managers to co-ordinate 
this policy among  the undertakings in the group.  Although this is a  model  of 
functional  management,  with no  linear responsibility,  it requires a  considerable 
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'professionalization'  of these functions.  Management  of personnel,  social 
relations and  industrial relations  (human  relations) develops within the 
undertakings themselves,  with responsibility both for defining staff policy 
and dealing with the unions  (the UK,  Italy, France).  Because  these_ functions 
are becoming more  important,  they now  often occupy the very top rank of the 
hierarchy. 
Associations of personnel  officers are emerging and asserting their trade 
association status.  Universities and  colleges are organizing special training. 
This  increased autonomy  and  power  is widening the distance between large 
and  small  undertakings.  In fact  what  happens  is that  in the main  the employers' 
association becomes  an organization of services for the  small undertakings 
paid  (largely)  by  the big ones;  at best it acts as an area of compromise 
between  the activities of the one group  and  the caution of the other.  In 
times of crisis,  however,  this compromise  can  lead to  lack of action or 
decision.  The  tension between the big and  small  undertakings is stronger 
than ever today in many  employers'  associations. 
In Italy,  Confindustria has  set  up  special  committees for small-scale 
industry,  partly as a  means  of warding off the competition of the  'Confapi' 
(confederation of small undertakings).  In Belgium,  the Federation of 
Belgian  un~ertakings is faced with the emergence  of associations of small 
and medium-sized undertakings with their own  separate policies,  and the two 
groups disagree on  the financing of social  security,  the reception of 
employees  and  employment  policy (especially the organization of youth 
training schemes).  Since any national  collective agreement  within the 
national  labour council  cannot  be  signed unless the employers are 
unani~o~sly in favour,  this opposition has  considerable means  of 
exerting pressure.  In France the  CGPME  ('Confederation generale des 
petites et moyennes  entreprises - general  confederation of small  and 
medium-sized undertakings)  has  long since asserted its independence 
from  the CNPF  and  stood apart  from  it  •. Their disagreements relate to 
the rights of the unions  (the CGPME  is in the main hostile to any union 
action within the undertaking and  on  certain issues the  CNPF  only 
co-operates with it in a  rather forced manner),  employment  policy, 
especially protection against dismissal  (the large undertakings have 
agreed to maintain a  higher  employment  level than required by efficiency 
alone and  have  adopted  new  procedures to control  dismissal),  and  to a 
number  of other measures  (vocational training,  restructuring of  jobs). 
The  reluctance of the  small  and medium-sized  undertakings (PME)  to follow 
the  'big'  ones in their expensive follies is often a  response  to the unions' 
reluctance to admit  that there are two  weights and  t~o measures  (or two 
employment  sectors).  The  Italian confederations no  longer want  contract 
policy to  include  'allowances'  for the  small  and  medium-sized undertakings (PME). 
The  Belgian unions are willing to  join the state in making a  special effort 
to help these undertakings,  but  only  'in compliance with the social 
agreements'.  The  French unions paint  a  picture of a  'witch hunt'  and of 
shocking working and .safety conditions. 
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authorities must  make  great  efforts  (by means  of credits,  the  spread  of 
technology or training)  to  help  the large number  of small  contractors.  In 
France  nevl  formulas_are being tested to avoid the vicious circles of 
inferiority and  subsidization.  But  even  if they are successful,  these 
efforts will  erode the differences only very  slowly. 
In all three cases internal tensions have  made  the  confederation adopt 
more  intractable attitudes  (as regards  employment,  working hours or working 
conditions)  and  made  it more  difficult for negotiations to arrive at  a 
successful  outcome. 
This is no  new  problem  in the  emrloyers'  circles,  but  it has certainly 
worsened,  for  both structural and  short-term  economic  reasons. 
The  employees'  unions are associations to defend  certain interests. 
They  are also militant associations.  So  convictions and  doctrines are more 
important  there than  in the employers'  associatior.s  (where  economic  liberalism 
is often a  matter of course).  For this reason,  and  because their ties with 
the political parties and  movements  are more  frequent  and  closer,  they often 
display greater pluralism  (of course this pluralism can also be  based on  the 
difference between the groups represented rather than differences of opinion, 
although frequently the  t\·10  go  hand  in hand). 
Owing  partly to tradition and  partly to legislation and  common  practice, 
overall unionization rates vary considerably from  one  country to another  : 
the rates are very high in Belgium  and  Denmark,  fairly low  in France,  to 
give two  extreme  examples.  These differences  i.n  unionization rates not  only 
give rise to differences in resources and  power  but  can  also affect  the 
nature of an  institution  :  in an undertaking where  90%  of the staff are 
trade union members,  the elected works  council  is unlikely to be a  dangerous 
rival of the trade union  section.  Similarly,  the application of an agreement 
will  be  more difficult and  less rigorous where  the proportion of trade union 
members  is small. 
They  have the  same  overall  structure  :  the basic association is the 
union,  a  local rather than a  company  unit  (the second ·form  exists but  is 
rare in Europe).  The  unions are grouped  into national unions or federations 
('vertical'  groupings of workers  in the  same  industry or the same  trade) 
and  often into provincial or regional  unions~('horizontal' association).  The 
vertical  and  the horizontal associations unite in a  summit-association~ which 
for  simplicity we  will- call a  confederation in accordance with French and 
Italian usage.  Lastly,  the unions have representatives and officials in 
the undertakings. 
Yet  there are major differences amongst  European countries in the 
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of the various organs.  Changes  have  occurred in both in recent years and  it is 
these that  we  shall  emphasize. 
2.2.2.1  Breakdown  of national unions 
Which  employees  are covered by  an union  ?  What  are the criteria of the 
union's field of reference ?  Today  there are at least four different  types 
of group. 
The  first type,  which  is the most  familiar and  now  the most  widespread, 
is the industry-wide union.  It is found  no  doubt  at its most  rigid among 
German  unions.  There all the employees  of an undertaking,  whatever their 
special  skill, function or grade,  whether they are painters, mechanics or 
store-keepers,  production or maintenance workers,  manual  or non-manual 
workers,  belong to a  single union.  All the undertakings of a  same  branch 
are members  of the same  national union.  In all, the DGB  includes sixteen 
national unions of which  the largest,  I.G.  Metall,  has 2  600  000 members 
{out of a  total DGB  membership  of 7 400  000).  As  this example  shows,  an 
industry can be defined very broadly  :  metallurgy covers  some  dozen 
different branches of industry.  In the main,  the principle of industrial 
organization is the same  in 1-taly,.France and  Belgium  (and the metal-working 
branch is equally broad).  In the UK,  some  federations of unions, 
set up  to  enable the crafts unions to negotiate on an industry-wide basis, 
have  a  similarly broad  coverage,  although their basic organization is very 
different  (this is the case of the Amalgamated  Union  of Engineering Workers). 
But  even where  industry-based organization predominates,  there is often 
a  differentiation between manual  and  non-manual  unions.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany,  although employees  belong to  the DGB  unions,  a  smaller 
confederation of employees,  the DAG,  also exists.  In Belgium  and  Luxembourg, 
manual  workers and  white-collar workers  have  separate unions  (and  negotiate 
separately).  The  white-collar unions have  acquired great  importance in the 
UK  and  Ireland today between  30 %  and  35 %  of total union membership  in 
Ireland).  We  have already discussed the unions of technical  and  executive 
staff in detail.  The  change  to  salaried status seems  to have reinforced 
rather than reduced  these distinctions. 
Crafts unions are far from  having disappeared.  Not  only are they of great 
importance  in the UK  and  Ireland,  not  so  much  in terms of numbers  (18% of 
total union membership  in Ireland) as by  the often strategic position they 
occupy  and  the power  this gives them;  but  they also exist  elsewhere.  Several 
small  CGT  federations in France are in fact  crafts unions or incorporate crafts 
unions  (shipping,  dockers,  book-trade)  and,  again  in France,  all teachers are 
organized in crafts unions. 
Lastly,  the  'general'  unions,  linking several  industries on  a  rather loose 
logical basis,  occupy  a  central position in the UK  and  Ireland as a  result of 
their large numbers  and  their power.  Structured on the model  of its British 
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(it was  founded  12  years earlier),  the Irish Transport and  General  Workers 
Union  alone makes  up  one third of total union membership.  Perhaps one  should 
also mention in this context  the Danish union of specialized workers which 
by  itself makes  up  27  %of LO  membership. 
The  various ,combinations of these types of organization explain why 
sometimes  there are very few  national unions  (16  in the Federal  Republic 
of Germany),  sometimes many  (88  in Ireland,  59  in Denmark  until 1971). 
What  are the trends  ?  At  times there have  been huge  amalgamations as in 
the Netherlands where  the (Socialist)  NVV  has created a  federation of 
industrial workers,  another for the public sector and  one  for construction 
(the Catholic NKV  has done  the same  for industry and  construction). 
Similarly,  in France construction and  book-trade unions are reducing the 
number  of crafts unions. 
This can  sometimes  be done  by  trying to group  together the very small 
unions.  Thus  after 1971  the  LO  reduced the number  of its unions  from  59 
to 40 in 1976.  But  it still wants further,  genuine rationilization.  Ireland 
has enacted a  bill to facilitate amalgamation  (1975). 
But  where  there is amalgamation,  does this create industry-wide unions  ? 
In France the amalgamation  into a  federation of clothing,  textiles and 
leather is closer in type to a  general union than to an industry-wide union. 
The  grouping into large functional  federations which is taking place in the 
public sector in Italy is analogous to organization by  industry;  examples 
are at  school,  transport  and  (in process)  health and  social  services. 
B,y  contrast,  the maintenance or even  extension of unions of employees 
and  technical  and  executive staff is striking evidence of fragmentation. 
And  there are even  signs of the maintenance and  extension of independent 
unions,  of  'autonomous'  confederations covering a  specific category of 
job or body of officials or specialized skill  (train and  metro drivers in 
France).  In the Netherlands in 1975  the independent  unions accounted for 
almost  a  quarter of total union membership  (437  000)  (1). 
What  is striking,  in spite of the successful  attempts at mergers and 
the rational medium-term  planning is not the progress made  in 'rationalization' 
and  amalgamation.  Rather it is the extremely slow  pace of this progress and 
the scale of the movement  in the opposite direction.  It is unlikely that this 
can be  explained in terms of habit alone.  Certainly the weight  of tradition 
is very heav,y  in France,  Denmark  and  the UK.  But  this weight  is not  necessarily 
(1)  W.  Albeda,  'Changing industrial relations in the Netherlands',  Industrial 
Relations 16,  2,  May  1977.  We  borrowed much  material  from  this article 
and  from  that by  the  same  author in the BIT  volume  mentioned  earlier. 
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it is that gives a  group of wage-earners sufficient  solidarity to  set up  an 
association and  act  jointly.  Perhaps it is naive  to think that  'good' 
organization is necessarily that  which  corresponds to a  market  or product 
unit  and  perhaps one  should enquire how  the relevant  communities of collective 
action come  into being,  are maintained,  develop and  change. 
2.2.2.2  Basis and  organization 
Apart  from  the UK  where  the closed  shop  is recognized by  law and is an 
old-established union practice,  and  although this practice exists unofficially 
elsewhere too  (in France for the book  trade and dockers),  compulsory union 
membership  is not  the usual practice in Europe.  In  some  cases,  the high 
proportion of union membership  and  trade solidarity exerts a  strong moral 
pressure to  join.  In Belgium,  union members  may  ob~ain some  special advantages 
in return for their dues,  but  in most  of the other countries this is legally 
impossible or contrary to tradition.  It is more  often the case that the union 
offers its members  specific advantages  {strike fund,  legal advice,  miscellaneous 
services).  The  very high membership  rates {Belgium,  Denmark)  can probably be 
explained by  a  combination of various means  of recruiting members.  But  even 
where  the unions are most  firmly based,  they remain voluntary membership 
associations and  their main  basis is made  up  of militants. 
So  the unions respond to their grass roots movements,  interests and 
pressures.  In  1968-1973  this basis was  often turbulent,  on a  massive and 
spectacular scale in Italy and  France.  In both cases,  the  'hot  autumn'  of 
1968  in Italy and  the 1968  crisis in France,  the initiative came  from  local 
militants rather than  from  the union machine,  which was  sometimes  shaken up 
and  caught  short.  In both cases the result was  the entry of the unions  into 
the undertaking {cf 2.2.2.3),  hitherto refused by  the employers,  and also 
a  thorough internal reform involving  'democratization',  ie consultation and 
information on  matters  such as drafting the list of claims,  deciding on  a 
strike,  holding discussions or reaching agreement.  And  in both cases the 
unions managed  on  the whole  to tap this great movement  in order to increase 
their representation and  negotiating power. 
A similarly broad grass roots movement  emerged  in the UK.  Its effect on 
the union movement  was  much  more  restricted,  perhaps because the unions 
already had  the means  of dealing with company  issues,  perhaps also because 
in general it was  a  question of more  traditional  claims,  mainly relating 
to wages. 
In Belgium,  unofficial strikes called into question the former  agreements 
and  sometimes  attacked the union bureaucracy,  especially the highly centralized 
system of decision-making on  inter-trade social  planning. 
The  response to this movement  was  the introduction of consultation and  of 
staff meetings.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany  and the Netherlands,  the 
unofficial  strikes of 1969  and  1970  led the unions to adopt  a  more  obdurate 
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(in the second  case,  some  unions  such as the NVV  metallurgy union tried to 
obtain powers  of action within the undertaking). 
Small  left-wing groups  (the extra-parliamentary left) played a  part in 
these movements  in several countries (Italy,  France,  Belgium).  Sometimes 
they injected a  more  radical note into the claims  (eg regarding material 
working conditions or disputes about  work  organization and  sometimes  they 
turned against the established unions.  However,  their influence was  very 
limited in this respect  (even that of the Italian  'basic unitary committees•). 
They  were  more  effective in expressing a  new  awareness than in creating a 
rival machinery.  So  their main  effect was  to reinvigorate and  revive the 
union movement,  which  to  some  extent  adopted  them  within its ranks in Italy 
and  France  (especially the CFDT  in France). 
In nearly all cases the main  result of this militant movement  was  to 
assert or confirm the position of the union in the undertakings. 
2.2.2.3  The  union in the undertaking 
The  unions have  only a  very limited position here in the Federal  Republic 
of Germany.  Although union  influence plays a  large part in the elections to 
the works  council  (cf. 2.3),  there is a  clear division between union and 
council  since the latter must  work  in co-operation with the employer.  The 
union has  spokesmen  (Vertrauensleute)  who  represent it, collect the dues 
and  ensure contact between the two  sides,  but  they have  no  direct negotiating 
responsibility and  need  not  necessarily be  consulted.  The  introduction of 
these  spokesmen  (and  sometimes  the links with those elected by  the Betrie-
bsrat)~is evidence o£  the  uni~n~! desire to assert their presence within 
the undertaking.  But  they are not  an active partner in it. 
The  French union delegates do  not  have  much  more  power  either.  In France 
the union delegate has no  power  to negotiate an agreement  unless the union 
specifically confers such powers  on  him  (but  he is often the one  to start a 
local dispute and  sometimes to conclude the agreement  at the end  of the 
dispute).  At  least he  can provide information to  the employees.  The  French 
1968  law  enables him  to exercise this right outside working hours and 
premises,  but  some  branch agreements give wider rights.  In Belgium,  trade 
union delegates'  rights were  specified and  considerably extended by  a 
national agreement  in 1971. 
Their position is strongest  in the UK  and  Italy.  In the UK  the shop 
stewards (or office representatives),  elected by  each group of union members, 
whom  the employer accepts as a  negotiating party have all the more  freedom 
in that the union rules are often very vague  with regard to their powers. 
They  ensure compliance with the agreement  and  with custom  and  practice and 
negotiate the necessary changes.  Their margin of action. was  increased b,f-
the periods of wage  restraint during which  local  arrangements  (on payment 
by  results or productivity) acquired more  significance.  In a  medium  or 
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group of union members),  but  they often meet  in committee to discuss the 
affairs of the undertaking;  this multi-union committee and  its elected 
chairman have greater freedom  of action because they are not  tied to any 
one dorr.inant  union.  The  meeting of the combined  committees may  be very 
important  in a  company  with several  establishments. 
So  delegates are both full  union members  (elected only by union members) 
and very autonomous  in their relations with the unions. 
The  delegate  (tillidsmand)  in Denmark  is closer to a  shop  steward than 
to a  Vertrauensmann,  in  ~pite. of his title. He  represents the union but is 
also the spokesman  for the employees vis-a-vis the management  and  takes 
part in company  negotiations where  necessary.  In medium  and  large-scale 
undertakings,  the delegates meet  in committee under a  general delegate. 
The  difference from  the British case lies in the  amount  of control 
exercized by  the union machine. 
The  1968-1970  strikes in Italy brought  a  new  institution,  the worker 
delegates  (delegati operai)  appointed directly by  the body of employees 
of a  production unit,  and  this system has become  general,  with the active 
support of the unions.  In small  groups of thirty or forty employees  (in 
principle homogeneous  by production unit  but  in fact  grouped  on  a  more 
flexible basis in the case of maintenance staff or white-collar employees) 
the employees  (who  all have a  vote,  union members  or not)  elect a  group 
delegate,  with no  special union ticket  (often on  a  blank ticket).  He  can 
be removed  at any time. 
The  body  of delegates forms  the works· council  (consiglio di fabprica) 
which  has practically taken over from  the former  internal  commissions.  It 
is unitary and directly elected by all the staff;  nevertheless the unions 
regard it as the union representative in the undertaking.  It has  extensive 
powers  to negotiate,  call strikes,  sign the company  agreement.  It consults 
its constituents frequently in the general  assembly.  In fact,  more  than 90% 
of delegates are unionized. 
Although the  system has not  completely replaced existing institutions, 
it now  covers most  of the  industries in the  south and  the north.  The 
weakening of union unity which it seemed  to  have  brought  about  makes  the 
liaison between the works  council  and  the local  committees  (which only have 
union members)  more  difficult.  The  recent  trend has been to  strengthen the 
'executive'  of the committees,  to  incorporate in them  representatives 
proposed or appointed  by  the unions,  and  to reduce the terms of reference 
and  scale of the meetings  and direct  consultations.  This also brings out 
their dual  nature more  clearly (elected by all and acting as a  basic union 
section). 
Yet  the councils are an  innovatory institution and  have  given the Italian 
unions much  more  insight  into what  is happening at rank and  file level  and 
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to a  problem which faces all the European unions  to  some  extent. 
Can  one see any  close links between this grass roots movement,  which was 
answered  by  the strengthening of the union presence in the undertaking,  and 
the 1969-1973  economic trend  (especially the employment  situation)  ? 
Although many  thing~ point to a  new  tendency towards centralization,  the 
issues which arouse most  interest  (on-the-job protection,  working conditions) 
were  not  economic  and  suggest  the opposite.  There are many  reasons why  the 
unions attach increasing importance to their position-_and activities in the 
undertaking. 
2.2.2.4  Powers of the confederations 
In some  countries,  not  only have the confederations remained very powerful, 
compared  with the professional federations  (or professional associations or 
the national trade unions)  which they incorporate,  but their powers  have 
tended to increase. 
In the Netherlands,  as we  noted earlier, the  cr1s1s and  the return to a 
rather dictatorial  incomes policy has put  the confederations back in control 
of branch decisions  (1973  central agreement)  and  then,  for lack of other 
solutions,  placed this control  in the hands of the government.  In Belgium, 
the difficulties experienced in inter-trade planning (the gaps  between  strong 
and weak  sectors,  vulnerable and  protected sectors,  as regards working hours 
or pay are too wide)  led the government  in 1976  to rely on  branch negotiations 
while keeping them  under  supervision.  In Ireland,  the Employer-Labour Conference, 
as already mentioned,  set up  the machinery for central negotiations-even in the 
absence of a  single employers confederation. 
Although no  institutional changes have occurred in France the confederations 
there have  increased their authority.  The  branch  federations still retain much 
autonomy  in negotiations but  the emergence of new  claims and  issues has put 
the main  initiative in the hands of the confederations.  The  crisis brought 
an increased need for overall policies.  The  ensuing political debate  involved 
the main  social  forces of the country and as a  result, within the trade union 
movement,  gave the confederations an added responsibility (even if only to 
affirm their neutrality like the Force  Ouvriere). 
In Denmark  the 1971  congress gave  the 10 the right to make  collective 
agreements on  'questions of general interest to all employees'.  Although 
the unions still play a  major role in negotiations,  the confederations 
have made  use of their new  powers  - for which the crisis gave them  many 
opportunities. 
In Italy,  although the branch organizations remain at the centre of the 
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this is because they wanted  to regain control after a  period of very 
fragmented  action,  but mainly it was  in response to basic trends.  These 
included the extension of the list of claims to very general  issues 
(schools,  health,  housing),  the general  economic  crisis and  the employment 
crisis.  They  have also  embarked  on  correspondingly wider-scale action.  B.y 
statute the horizontal organizations now  have half the votes in the CGIL 
confederal  conferences  (the vertical organizations are in a  majority in 
the CISL).  It should be pointed out  that there is a  marked  difference 
between the unitary works  council  elected by all and  the area councils 
reserved to union members. 
This  increased power  also  extends to regional  horizontal organizations. 
In Denmark  the  LO  has  set up  departmental  organizations with departmental 
advisers to co-ordinate union activity at that level and  settle labour 
problems locally.  In Italy the provincial unions  are acquiring more  power 
since the regional  reforms made  them  the  surety for the new  regional 
authorities.  In France,  particularly in the CFDT,  regional  unions distinct 
from  the traditional departmental unions have developed for the same  reasons 
as in Italy,  together with local,  sectoral or basic unions which  can  serve 
as logistics centres for  local action and  act more  effectively upon  public 
opinion.  They  have  proved very active in employment  disputes. 
2.2.2.5  Union  pluralism.  Unions  and parties 
Where  it is based  on differences of conviction or doctrine,  union pluralism 
lost  some  of its importance with the development  of bargaining in the  1960s. 
It seems  to have regained it with the crisis. 
The  only exception to this trend was  the successful amalgamation in the 
Netherlands in 1976  of two  confederations,  the NVV  and  the NKV  (one Socialist, 
one  Catholic)  into the new  FNV.  The  third, Protestant,  confederation,  the CNV, 
remains apart;  but  its main  support  now  comes  from  white-collar workers and 
agricultural workers. 
On  the other hand,  the common  front  pacts are  in trouble nearly everywhere. 
In France the pact  concluded by  the CFDT  and  the  CGT  in 1965  in spite of a 
number  of crises is still in force and  the two  organizations took  joint action 
in several areas  i~  1977.  Yet  there is some  tension as a  result of the split 
in September in the alliance of the two  left-wing parties,  the Socialist Party 
and  the Communist  Party,  and  of the COT's  alignment  with the Communist  position. 
Similarly,  in Belgium  political  events  (the participation and  absence of the 
Socialists in the government  from  1974  to  1977)  seem  to have  brought  some 
divergences of opinion within the common  front  established between  FGTB  and 
esc  in 1965. 
In Italy,  the unification of the three confederations  (CGIL,  CISL  and  UIL) 
seemed  a  logical  consequence of the unitary strikes of 1968-1970 and  of the 
establishment  of works  councils.  It was  achieved  in the case of the federation 
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federative pact.  This  involves common  structures at the various levels, 
with each confederation having equal representation and  decision-making 
power  (by a  4/5  majority).  But  separate structures still remain and  are 
being reinforced.  Moreover,  the tripartite machinery is becoming awkward 
and  finding it difficult to take action as a  result of the tensions.  The 
political upheavals  (especially those resulting from  the Communist  Party's 
success in the June  1976  elections) are accentuating the differences of 
view. 
In France,  as in Italy, the more  unstable political situation has  induced 
the political parties to try to tighten their control and  increase their 
influence over the unions,  whose  independent attitude worries them  (particularly 
in Italy where  the-co-ordination of· the three organizations guaranteed the 
unions'  autonomy  and  powers),  and  to establish themselves  inside the 
undertakings.  In both countries the Communist  ~arties are setting up  an 
increasing number  of works  cells.  In France the Socialist Party is trying 
to do  the same  with its union sections  (and  so,  to a  lesser degree,  is the 
Gaullist Party).  The  recovery of influence by the  confederations goes hand 
in hand with growing political differences. 
Clearly the situation in France and  Italy is a  special one  because of the 
possible change  in political majority and  the wide divisions between  the 
political forces.  But  more  generally,  as a  result  of the crisis and  the 
economic  policies adopted to deal with it, government  arbitration and  the 
influence of the political parties are playing an  increasingly important 
role.  Even  in Denmark,  where  the  LO  and the Social Democrat  Party have 
always had good  relations (the two  organizations have  'cross participation' 
on  their respective steering committees),  the emergence of a  minority 
Social Democratic government  has created tensions  between these two 
branches of the labour movement. 
This  same  cr1s1s also  ~xplains why  leftist tendencies have  become  weaker 
or disappeared within the unions.  The  union organization which  had  welcomed 
such tendencies most,  the French CFDT,  reacted against their excesses in 
1973  and  even more  after the  1976  congress.  We  noted earlier (cf.  2.1.3.3) 
how,  by contrast,  extremist left or right-wing movements  found  support  among 
the victims of the crisis.  Sometimes this took violent  forms,  as in Italy, 
and it always fostered very lively critiques of the established institutions, 
unions and  parties.  In Denmark  these movements  have  encouraged  strong critism 
of the labour tribunals.  Prosperity made  it easier for them  to press their 
claims and  the crisis made  them  more  extreme  and  more  violent.  The  ren~wed 
centralization of decision-making has also tended  to  strengthen the big 
political parties. 
2.3  Worker  representation in the undertaking 
Union delegates in the undertaking (cf.  2.2.2.3) are of course staff 
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limited,  the law of 15  January  1972  enabled them  to attend,  on  an advisory 
basis,  meetings of the supervisory board and general meetings of the 
undertaking.  The  nine European countries have also set  up  a  system of 
representation in management,  directly elected by the entire staff, by 
various means  and  procedures.  Many  of them  have also  introduced 
representatives onto the supervisory boards.  We  shall return to this 
later (4.2). 
In some  cases this representation is a  long-standing institution.  In the 
UK  it arose out of the experience of the First World  War  and  was  revived by 
the Joint Production Councils during the Second  World  War.  After 1945,  thanks 
to the impetus of the Labour  Government,  these became  Joint  Consultation 
Councils with wider responsibilities.  In France,  Belgium  and  the Federal 
Republic of Germany  works  committees were  set up  by  law,  such as the conseil 
d'entreprise in France  (1946),  the comite d'entreprise in Belgium  (1948)  and 
the Betriebsrat  in the Federal Republic-of Germany  (1952),  in the aftermath 
of the war  in order to establish a  system of collaboration which gave the 
employees  some  say in the life of the undertaking.  In all four cases the 
attempts to establish employee  participation were  motivated  by  the lessons 
of the war  and  the need  for reconstruction. 
The  Italian commissioni  interne were  set up  by an inter-trade agreement; 
since 1968  they have  been largely replaced by  the consigli di  fabbrica. 
Lastly,  in several  countries laws  have  been  enacted recently to renew 
or reinforce these institutions.  The  1972  law  in the Federal Republic of 
Germany  increased the powers  of the works  councils.  In the Netherlands 
works  councils were  set up  under the 1950  law and  substantially strengthened 
by  the 1971  law.  In Denmark,  after attempts in 1947  and  1964  which were 
considered rather unsatisfactory,  an agreement  between  DA  and  LO  in 1970 
set up  co-operation committees  (separate from  the  union delegation).  B,y 
the law of 1 May  1974  Luxembourg  set up  the comite mixte d'entreprise 
(joint works  committee)  on  the model  of the German  Betriebsrat and  the 
Belgian conseil d'entreprise.  In Ireland the Employer-Labour Conference 
recommends  the general  establishment of joint councils.  The  French case 
is more  similar than might  seem  to the above,  because quite apart  from  the 
1966  law a  number  of legislative or contractual measures were  taken to 
widen the committee's terms of reference.  In the  UK  the CBI  recently 
advised any of its members  employing more  than 500  workers to set up 
company  councils with  sections in each establishment,  and  this has been 
done  in some  cases. 
This  second  wave  of legislation was  no  longer  a  response to the patriotic 
and  democratic post-war spirit. Rather it followed  on  from  the crisis in 
industrial relations to which  we  referred earlier and  was  an attempt  to 
facilitate direct dialogue within the undertaking on  issues such as working 
and  employment  conditions which  are difficult to deal  with at branch level. 
The  systems adopted differ profoundly.  In most  cases the works  co.aittee 
96 is a  joint body,  sometimes  ~epresenting both sides equally  (Belgium, 
Luxembourg,  Denmark- in the'two latter cases the  executive staff sits 
with the management),  sometimes  chaired by the head of the undertaking 
(Netherlands,  France).  In other cases the committee is an employees' 
meeting which meets the management  in order to hold discussions  (Federal 
Republic of Germany).  In the Netherlands the employees'  representatives 
can meet  without the manager.  The  German  formula  of a  chairman elected by 
the employees  was  adopted by  a  draft  law  in 1977· 
The  employees'  representatives are elected according to formulas which 
ensure that the various categories,  workers,  white-collar employees, 
technical and management  staff, are represented on a  more  or less equitable 
basis.  They  are often divided up  into electoral colleges.  The  Netherlands 
prefers election by  company  department.  In Belgium,  if there is a  sufficient 
number  of young  employees,  these will  form  a  separate college with their 
own  representation.  As  we  said,  in Luxembourg  the  executive staff sits with 
the management.  Separate councils for  executive staff have  been recommended 
by  some  employers  (Belgium)  or by  law  (France,  1977). 
What  is surely the most  important aspect is the relationship between this 
elected representation and  actual union representation since the two  very 
often coexist.  In two  cases,  the  second  has eliminated the first  :  in the 
UK  the introduction of company  bargaining and  the  increased responsibilit7 
of the shop  stewards,  acting individually or in committee,  has eliminated 
all but  a  small  number  of joint councils (joint councils sometimes also 
means  committees of both management  representative and  shop  stewards).  In 
Italy works  councils co-opted entirely by the unions have  taken over from 
the internal commissions  (elected by the body  of employees  but  according 
to more  'parliamentary'  procedures  :  voting open  to all the employees of 
the undertaking).  It should be noted in passing that the CBI's attempts to 
establish elected company  councils aroused protests on  the part of the  TUC 
which objects to any representation by  non-unionized staff (non-unionized 
employees  have  no  right of vote).  In British Leyland,  the council is made 
up  only of shop  stewards. 
At  the other extreme,  there can be total separation.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany  the union is not  the spokesman  for the employees  in 
the undertaking although it can  sign company  agreements)  and  any employee 
may  stand as a  candidate for the council.  Although the unions have much 
influence on  the elections,  there are no  provisions giving them  control 
over it. 
In France,  Belgium  and  the Netherlands, all the staff, unionized or not, 
can vote.  But  the only employees  entitled to stand as candidates are those 
nominated  by  the representatives.  In Denmark  the union delegates are members 
of the co-operat.ion committee. 
An  important  special feature in some  countries is a  third staff 
representation outside the committee or council or union delegates,  which 
is also elected (in analogous conditions)  and  is responsible for putting 
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employees'  claims to the management  and  tries to  settle the differences. 
In France the management  meets the staff delegates on  a  regular basis and 
they put  forward  the employees'  individual or collective claims. 
In many  cases special health and  safety committees have  been  set up, 
as  sub-committees of the works  committee  (France),  as bodies parallel to 
the works  committee  (Belgium),  or in the form  of specialized union 
representation (the UK). 
Leaving aside the question of the management  or control of the undertaking's 
social institutions,  and  to simplify a  little, three main  functions of the 
staff representatives can be  distinguished in the undertaking  : 
a.  the establishment  jointly with the employer of working rules,  whether, 
dependiDg on  national  laws,  in the form  of ·bargaining proper in 
co-determination  (form of wages,  payinent  by  results;.working.hours, 
shift-work,  recruitment and  dismissal rules,  the  'social plan'  in case 
of staff reductions,  training programme,  safety and  health rules and 
measures,  job qualifications,  evaluation and  nature of the  job); 
b.  the presentation and  discussion of grievances,  ie discussion with the 
employer of all oases where  members  of staff consider they have  been 
badly or unfairly treated,  whether on  the basis of law,  agreement, 
staff regulations or equity; 
c.  consultation,  ie the 9pportunity,  on  the basis of information provided 
by  the employer,  to express opinions and  to discuss matters with him 
without  having to.reach an agreement  proper  (market  situation,  choice 
of plant or products,  work  distribution and  work and  employment  prospects). 
Within the undertaking the same  institution may  perform the three functions. 
In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  provided a  clear distinction is made  from 
matters for negotiation with the union,  and  although the fact  that the 
agreement  (Vertrag)  with the union and  the agreement  (Vereinbarung)  with the 
works  council are two  separate legal  categories,  the Betriebsrat has all three 
functions.  It holds discussions with the head  of the undertaking until agreement 
is reached  (with the possibility of mediation)  on  the main  internal rules of 
staff management  and  on  the settlement of emergency  problems  (social plan if 
the undertaking is being reorganizedi.  It ensures  the implementation of the 
company  texts,  collective agreements and  other agreements  (Vereinbarungen) 
and  is responsible for resolving grievances.  It also receives detailed 
information on  the undertaking's economic  and  technical situation. 
This unified institution is made  possible by  keeping the union outside 
the undertaking or at least not  giYing it any responsibility in the undertak1ng 
(in fact,  it has  'Vertrauensmanner'  there,  has access to it and  under certain 
conditions can sit on  the council).  In systems where  the only representation 
is union representation,  the three functions can also be combined.  The 
Italian works  councils and  the British shop  stewards'  committees negotiate., 
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pointed out  in this context that the British Employment  Protection Act  of 
1975  obliges the employer to disclose to the union representatives any 
information the absence of which would  seriously hinder them  in conducting 
negotiations (this includes employment,  productivity,  profits, etc). 
The  other extreme is France where  each fUnction is entrusted to a 
different institution :  bargaining to the union  (and the union representatives 
in the undertaking if the latter authorizes it), grievances to the staff 
delegates and  consultation to the works  committee. 
In most  of the other cases the union representatives perform or can 
perform the first two  functions  (Belgium;  in the Netherlands the unions had 
no  works  representation for a  long time,  especially as regards grievances); 
the Danish shop  stewards have very extensive negotiating powers.  Consultation 
or  'co-operation'  is reserved to the committees. 
The  area of consultation has  sometimes been defined as the area where 
the two  parties have  common  interests.  The  advantage of this definition is 
that it:excludes from  this area the main  bargaining issues  (pay,  working 
hours,  social guarantees)  where  disagreement  is considered normal  (in other 
words  which are a  question of the labour market  and can be decided by means 
of the pressure - strikes or lock-outs - which this market  permits).  But 
this legal fiction does not  stand up  to serious examination.  It is difficult 
to regard the issues on  which legislation and  agreements have  concentrated 
over the last few  years as issues on  which interests converge without  conflict 
- for instance,  the decisions to be taken in case of mergers,  reorganization 
or partial closure, or the organization of work  and  improvement  of working 
conditions and  environment.  In fact it is to the extent that these issues 
were  liable to produce conflicts that' the law or agreement  came  into being. 
It may  be  true that the two  parties, the employer  and  the workers,  face a 
common  problem which  cannot  be settled properly at any other level,  but often 
this is also a  problem that is difficult to settle in any  case.  So  this area 
can be defined less in terms of convergence of interests as in terms of the 
need to bring those concerned directly in contact  with one  another  (and that 
is why  it can often use the channel of negotiation provided one  exists in 
the undertaking). 
Has  this area expanded  in recent years  ?  The  prov1s1ons  seldom  seem  to 
cover any really new  territory.  The  German  law of 1972  specifies all the 
cases in which the works  council has co-decision rights but  embodies  nothing 
radically new  in relation to the 1952  law,  although the employers regarded 
it as seriously restricting their internal decision-making rights.  The  French 
law of 1966  specifies the employers'  obligations as regards disclosure of 
information;  the 1973  December  law  specifies the committee's responsibilities 
as regards working conditions  (and under certain conditions sets up  special 
committees).  But  this is nothing new.  In many  cases the obligation to provide 
information and  introduce_consultation with which  the employer must  comply 
if he  wishes to reduce his staff complement  or reorganize the undertaking 
has been made  more  clear-cut and  rigorous.  He  must  give detailed and  reasoned 
information on  dismissals or time-limits for examination and discussion of 
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always  required to be informed. 
So  at first  sight the changes  look very slight,  involving only a  change 
in the quantity of information to be provided and  in the precision of the 
procedures laid down.  Surely this did not  require new  texts ?  But  if not, 
why  did countries which did not  have this institution feel it necessary to 
create it during the 1970s· (especially Denmark  where it appears that the 
union delegation system worked  very well)  ?  Perhaps on  the contrary a  new 
problem  had  arisen which  needed  to be dealt with and  perhaps there was  new 
resistance to overcome. 
The  answer  seems  relatively simple.  What  was  created,  even if this was 
often not  admitted by  law,  was  an area of negotiation  (and at the  same  time 
the distinction,  clear in principle,  between consultation and  negotiation 
became  blurred).  This is very evident as regards  issues where  the committee 
practically has the right of veto  (ie that require its approval).  This area 
includes workshop  regulations and  internal rules  (Luxembourg,  Belgium,  France, 
Netherlands),  sometimes working hours and  shift-work (Netherlands,  France 
subject  to  some  reservations),  more  often health and  safety measures.  But  it 
also applies to areas where  in strictly legal terms its powers  are only 
consultative  :  the examination of training measures,  even if this does not 
give rise to  impassioned discussion,  does influence management  decisions 
(at least has a  preventive influence,  since it prevents some  proposals from 
being implemented).  And  this applies even more  to the discussion- usually 
impassioned - of employment  difficulties.  This influence is not  formalized 
by any agreement.  The  employer  can continue along his road.  But  it is very 
dangerous for him  to dismiss the  'opinion'  given to him.  This consultation 
does not  lead to any contract,  but it is certainly a  form  of bargaining. 
The  German  case confirms this.  Even  if one wanted to distinguish between, 
on  the one  hand  co-decision and  agreement  and  on  the other collective 
bargaining as  such and  the contract,  it remains true that discussions between 
the works  council  and  the employer,  sometimes  protracted and difficult,  and 
often leading to an agreement  in the proper form,  are a  genuine  form  of 
bargaining. 
But  what  kind of bargaining and  how  can it be defined in relation to the 
usual collective bargaining forms  ? 
In most  countries precautions have been taken to maintain the carefully 
drawn  borderlines between the two  areas,  whether  between the areas inside 
and  outside the undertaking as in the Federal Republic of Germany,  or 
between the area of negotiation and  that of consultation or co-operation 
as in Belgium,  the Netherlands and  France. 
100 In the Federal Republic of Germany  a  strict legal distinction is made. 
On  the one  hand  the union has no  specific functions within the undertaking. 
Even  ensuring the application of the collective agreement  is the council's 
responsibility.  On  the other hand  only the union  m$Y  call a  strike  (and it 
is only to the union that the employer  can reply by  a  lock-out).  The  works 
council not  only has no  right to do  so  but  cannot  even call for it; it is 
obliged to remain  'neutral'.  Furthermore,  questions of pay,  working hours 
or overtime p$YMent  pertain to the union and  the agreement,  while staff 
management  rules and  more  generally internal rules pertain to the council 
and  co-decision.  So  there are two  territories (inside and  outside the 
undertaking),  two  procedures for discussion (strike or no  strike) and 
agreement  (Vertrag and  Vereinbarung). 
In countries which  have both a  union delegation and  a  works  committ•e in 
the undertaking there is a  clearer division between the area of collective 
agreement  (where  the union usually has the monopoly)  and  that of consultation. 
A few  exceptions apart  (in France the works  committees  can sign profit-sharing 
agreements),  there is a  clear legal differentiation :  only the union signs 
the enforcing text,  the text which requires an explicit agreement.  Generally 
the union organizations are very  jealous of this privilege. 
It may  seem  questionable whether  in either of these cases the legal 
distinction still corresponds to the facts.  There is no  doubt  that  some 
parties are still passionately in favour of it. The  German  employers do 
not  wish to give up  the neutrality of the undertaking (although they accept 
that the union representatives should be protected in it). The  French and 
Danish unions do  not  want  to lose their power  of negotiation or want  the 
committees to allow the employers to settle issues without union intervention. 
But  is this the right distinction ? 
Is the division of the area in the Federal Republic of Germany  in fact  as 
clear-cut as it seems  in principle ?  Is there not  quite a  lot of continuity 
between the pay discussions of the Tarifvertrag and the company  agreements 
on  the forms  and  basis of payment  by  output,  or between the agreements which 
protect the employees  from  rationalization and  the formulation by  the council 
of a  'social plan'  ?  Is there not  a  close connection between the general 
standards which  employers and  unions are considering as  r~ards working 
conditions and  the determination of these conditions within the autonomy 
of the undertaking  ?  To  an outside observer,  perhaps because of his 
ignorance,  the distinction made  between  these two  areas looks like a 
question of convenience,  justified for pragmatic reasons,  rather than a 
difference based on  principles. 
This is even more  true of the distinction made  between bargaining and 
consultation.  It seems  quite pointless in the case of Italy,  France and  the 
UK.  In the latter two  countries the unions may  reopen an issue dealt with by 
the committee in order to discuss it and  negotiate  (with good  reason this 
procedure has even  been regarded as the criterion of a  'good'  works  committee, 
ie one  which takes the first  look at the issues and refers the most  difficult 
ones to actual negotiation).  In both these countries,  negotiation can lead 
to a  written agreement  or to a  more  or less formal  and  often verbal agreement. 
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strike :  signature by  only one union,  unilateral  employer's decision which 
is tacitly accepted for want  of anything better,  'statement of disagreement', 
or agreement  which  is implemented  although not  signed).  In the UK  one  finds 
all kinds of agreement,  including the referral - often not  very explicitly 
- to custom  and  practice.  In all three countries it is nearly always possible 
to reopen the discussion on whatever  subject  and  at any time,  regardless of 
whether an agreement  has been  signed.  Moreover,  much  of the bargaining (or 
discussion)  takes place within the undertaking,  without  being bound  by many 
rules and quite informally,  and  leads to an equally informal  agreement 
(especially in the case of negotiations and  agreements at the end  of a 
dispute).  Lastly,  a  strike may  occur without  union instructions,  and  in 
fact  strikes are often based on  local action.  So  in France a  strike can 
equally well  be the result of unsuccessful  consultation of the works 
committee.  This is often the case with consultations on manpower  reductions. 
How  should one  distinguish between negotiation and  consultation here ? 
In Italy,  in particular,  contrattazione covers both negotiation and 
consultation,  although the forms  of agreement  and  discussion procedures 
are not  identical for fixing wages  or discussing investment.  It might  be 
better to  speak of different methods  of influencing decisions,  of 
determining the rules in force. 
Curiously enough,  in most  cases where  the two  structures of representation 
coexist,  this does not  seem  to worry  the unions,  whether in Denmark  where  the 
unions themselves  set  up  the second  structure,  or in France,  where  the unions, 
while checking on  possible abuses,  tend to regard the committee as the 
institutional guarantee that they will be able to  obtain information,  express 
their views and  consult  the employees  where  appropriate.  In Belgium,  however, 
despite the strength of the unions,  certain difficulties arise in the interface 
between the trade union delegation and  the works  council. 
No  doubt  this is because the committees and  councils,  although they have 
a  genuine bargaining function,  do  not  do  the  same  thing as the unions.  It 
has long been asserted,  especially in the UK  and  the United States,  ie in 
countries where  the unions have  always wanted to  have the monopoly  in 
representing the employees,  that works  councils were merely a  less effective 
substitute for company  negotiation.  Certainly it is true that they made  a 
kind of negotiation possible in cases where  the usual habits and  structures 
did not  really enable the unions to negotiate.  But  this may  not  be the whole 
truth.  Perhaps the  shop  stewards  in the UK  can offer more  effective 
representation to the extent that they are also fairly independent of the 
union organization and do  not  always  commit  it. The  Italian works  councils 
embody  both features.  In short,  is there not  a  whole area of negotiation 
which does not  lend itself easily to agreement  and  in which the unions are 
more  reluctant to commit  themselves,  namely  the area of participation a 
priori in decisions - the  same  area we  described  in the case of employment 
and  the organization of work  ?  This is also the area where  it can be useful 
for those involved to participate directly. 
Perhaps this can be described as a  level of negotiation,  with its own 
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main  problem is how  to integrate it with traditional negotiation.  There is 
a  vast area-to be explored here and  it is necessary to collect facts and 
classi(y the different  customs before looking for possible solutions. 
Some  procedures already exist  :  the organized relay system  from  one 
institution to another (the French union demand  that if the works  committee 
does not  approve the training programme,  this programme  should be referred 
to the unions for negotiation;  the British shop  stewards  seem  to have  achieved 
this referral easily for other issues);  the relay by  conflict  (which occurs in 
the case of spontaneous strikes in France and  Italy in the form  of a  referral 
by  the works  institutions to the union or the federation);  or the careful  (and 
pragmatic) division of functions  (which is apparently the case in the Federal 
Republic of Germany  and  perhaps in Denmark);  not  omitting all cases where 
systems of representatives elected by  everyone are in competition or conflict 
with systems of trade union representation.  Systematic study is required here. 
2.4  The  public authorities 
The  state intervenes in industrial relations in various forms.  Firstly, 
the state is itself an employer,  a  direct  employer of civil servants and 
other state employees  and  the local authorities,  an indirect employer of 
all the public undertaking employees.  As  a  major  employer and  because it 
is a  state, it therefore acts as focal  point  and  point of reference and 
its decisions influence those of others. 
It also acts as the partner and  guardian of collective bargaining in 
general.  By  law and  ad hoc  action, it lays down  the procedures,  rights and 
permitted resources;  it determines the rules of the game  and  intervenes in 
the relations of power.  Since it is elected on  a  programme  and must  attempt 
to respond to demands,  it also has a  social policy, tries to achieve the 
policy objectives and delegates them  to the two  sides of industry or shares 
them  with them.  Lastly,  when  bargaining is unsuccessful,  the dispute becomes 
serious or the difficulties are so  great that bargaining cannot  resolve them 
~lone (employment  difficulties or inflation,  for  example)  it intervenes to 
guide the debate,  organize it, take part in it and  sometimes  settle the 
matter. 
The  public sector is far from  homogeneous  and  any  comparison of the legal 
status of its various employees  would  require lengthy discussion.  However, 
it is usual to  dis~inguish between the civil:servants (the local authority 
employees are more  or less aligned  ~ith them)  and  the other public sector 
employees  (contractual state employees,  employees  of national undertakings). 
TOgether they make  up  a  large proportion of the workforce and  one  which is 
tending to increase rapidly,  especially since the crisis, because of the 
fall in recruitment  in all other sectors. 
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of public sector employees  are becoming less marked  and  the  same  applies to 
the differences between the public sector and  the private sector,  both as 
regards the procedures and  the content of the discussions. 
Sometimes  the legal distinctions are still very clear-cut.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany  the pay of civil servants is laid down  by the legislator, 
following consultation;  that of the other public  sector employees is fixed 
by  collective agreement.  In France the law  on  collective agreements applies 
neither to civil servants nor to the national undertakings  (railways, 
coal-mining,  electricity, gas,  etc).  In Denmark  there is a  clear distinction 
between the civil servants and  those state employees  who  are covered by a 
collective agreement. 
In practice this difference is less well-defined,  however.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany,  the content  of the legislator's decisions as regards pay 
and  holiday pay  tends closely to reflect the outcome  of the private sector 
negotiations.  Although this is not  the case on  France  (the civil servants 
are not  paid a  thirteenth month's wages  and  their pay is not  aligned to that 
of the private sector), the procedures of discussion  (one might  even oall it 
negotiation)  have  changed.  The  public undertaking unions and  the management, 
the civil servants and  the Secretary of State negotiate and  sign agreements 
which  cannot  perhaps be called collective agreements but  which  have the same 
scope and  features  (wages,  working hours,  job evaluation,  working conditions, 
protection against modernization in public undertakings,  etc). 
Sometimes  the distinction was  eroded more  easily.  In the UK  the nationalized 
undertakings have  always  negotiated in the same  way  as the private sector, 
although the seriousness of any  strike in the public sector often led the 
Prime Minister to mediate  (this occurs nearly every year in the case of 
British Rail)  or posed bitter political problems  (the miners'  strike and 
Mr  Heath's government).  In the civil service each department  has a  Whitley 
Committee  (as do  many  private industries),  since although strikes are 
unusual  here they are not  forbidden.  It is in this area that the change  has 
occurred,  for civil servants and  public sector employees  now  resort to the 
go-slow,  to the work  to rule,  or even  to the strike as  such  (post  office, 
hospitals,  ports,  local authorities),  in spite of the fact  that the 
arbitration agencies"still retain their autonomy  (civil service. arbitration 
board).  A department  has been set up  to establish and  review civil service 
pay  in order to keep  it in line with that in the private sector. 
In Belgium  the law  has been  changed.  The  1955  law which  provided for 
consultation with the civil service unions but  not  for negotiation was 
gradually overtaken by  a  procedure of informal talks which  led to  social 
planning agreements similar to those in the private sector.  The  new  law 
(19  December  1974)  officially recognizes negotiation,  sets up  separate 
institutions for negotiation and  conciliation and  allocates the issues 
at  stake between these two  procedures.  Even  before the implementing 
decrees were  published,  these guidelines were  being broadly followed. 
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There is very clear co-ordination of action between the public and  private 
sector unions.  In 1977  the public sector waited for the outcome  of the private 
sector negotiations before presenting its list of claims.  Apart  from  social 
welfare,  governed by  very different procedures,  the clauses generally tend 
to be similar. 
The  Conseil  national du Travail covers the public services where  they 
coexist with private undertakings in the same  sector (e.g.  health services). 
In Italy there were  particularly marked  differences between the public 
administration and  the remainder  (private industrial sector or state-
participating industry).  A very large number  of national or local officials 
belonged to autonomous  category unions or specialized unions.  Faced  with 
these corporative organizations,  each attached to its local privileges, 
and  sometimes highly dependent  on the political party in the same  way  as 
a  political group,  the confederated unions have  fought  to assert the rights 
of collective bargaining and  the need  for a  more  functional  organization 
and more  rational classification.  The  right to negotiate,  at least in 
economic matters,  has been recognized since 1975  in most  public services. 
Rationalization is progressing more  slowly. 
While  the civil servants are tending to resort more  and  more  to negotiation 
and attempting to imitate the private sector procedures,  it is not  rare either 
to find that the public industry sector has given  impetus to or acted as a 
model  for the private sector.  In the UK,_Italy and  France,  soon after being 
established the national undertakings wanted  to introduce a  new  type 9f 
industrial relations,  giving full place to consultation of the unions within 
the undertaking.  In  Fr~ce, for example,  the  joint consultation machinery 
of the Electricit' de  France has few  equivalents  in the private sector.  The 
same  applies to the content of the agreements.  The  national undertakings 
wanted  to be  'good  employers'.  In Italy the state-participation undertakings 
and their associations did much  towards the  'modernization'  not  only of 
economic  life but  also of industrial relations - although some  years ago 
Qbn£industria regained the initiative and  began to·prove increasingly dynamic. 
In France the idea and  model  for the  'contractual  policy'  came  from  the public 
sector.  This policy includes respect  for its union partner,  placing trust in 
negotiation and  agreement  which are regarded as a  mutual  undertaking and 
compliance with the relevant  rul~s of procedure.  Although the private sector 
only adopted this model  in part and although its scope was  restricted because 
of the opposition of most  unions to anything in the nature of an industrial 
peace clause,  the policy has had  major results. 
One  reason why  the public sector played this initiating role was  of 
course the power  of the unions.  The  rate of unionization is particularly 
high in the public sector in the UK,  France and  Italy, as we  have  seen 
(perhaps because in the first two  countries at least the unions are more 
closely involved in staff management). 
Can  the j·ob  security of the public sector strengthen this role of 
industrial leadership during a  period of crisis ?  There is little doubt  in 
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unions to resort to strikes (post-office workers,  miners,  electricians) and 
that they occupy a  strategic position.  It is certain too that any decisions 
concerning them  are therefore reviewed very carefully  :  no  government  can 
recommend  wage  restraints with any  chance of success unless it begins by 
orderine its own  house.  The  relative influence of these two  considerations 
may  depend  on  more  than one  factor.  Certainly it may  depend  on  the governments' 
authority,  but  also  on  their political hue  (a left-wing party is more  dependent 
on  the support of the  employees,  at  least of those on  strike). 
Has  this situation resulted today in advantages in terms of pay and  other 
working conditions for the public  sector employees  ?  This is asserted by the 
employers  in the Federal  Republic of Germany  and  Luxembourg  (they say the 
unions are too  powerful  and  that the government  has less reason to resist 
them  than a  private employer who  is tied to the constraints of his balance 
sheet).  In the UK  it was  considered that the Civil Service Pay Research Unit 
leaned a  little too far towards the civil servants  (perhaps because of the 
concern for the quality of recruitment).  In France,  although the results of 
the contractual policy were generally well  looked  upon,  it is most  doubtful 
whether the public sector as a  whole,  and  even less the civil servants,  have 
gained any advantages over their private sector counterparts  (the contrary is 
in fact  true of the management  staff).  It is difficult to draw any general 
conclusions. 
2.4.2.1  The  state and  the rules of the game 
It is generally the law which lays down  the rules of the game  in disputes 
or negotiations,  whatever the division of powers  between the legislator,  the 
public bodies responsible for  implementing the law and  the courts.  Even  in 
a  case like the UK  where  absence of intervention is the rule (at least in 
the past),  the public authorities define the general  framework  of the 
discussion,  implicitly at least.  In  several countries,  the specific nature 
and  scope of the legal requirements have  become  clearly defined again and 
even accentuated by  the events of recent years.  In certain cases,  however, 
the two  sides of industry have had  a  greater share in formulating the law 
which lays down  the rules of the game.  The  state legislator in now  giving 
the trade associations more  say in formulating the laws which govern them. 
The  above  comment  is very important,  for these new  laws were generally 
a  response to an unexpected increase in disputes or to an increase  judged 
excessive,  to the emergence of irregular or surprising practices,  to the 
feeling that the usual rules were  inadequate or ineffectual,  in short to 
a  crisis in the institutions and  sometimes organizations.  Faced with this 
crisis,  a  'good'  reaction  o~ the part of the legislator (ie one which works 
in fact)  was  not  to attempt to  impose  order but  to try to restore order by 
following new  procedures or by bringing in the two  sides of industry. 
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discussion on  the other.  The  model  for this is the Royal  Commission  on 
Trade Unions  and Employers'  Associations in the UK,  called the Donovan 
Commission after its chairman,  thanks to the scale and quality of the 
research it commissions  and  its penetrating analyses.  But  this is not 
an isolated example.  The  1972  and  1976  co-determination laws  in the 
Federal Republic of Germany  (they were  not  based  on  collective bargaining 
but  the issues they deal with are certainly those with which this report 
is concerned)  were  preceded by  in-depth reports and  by  a  major research 
programme.  Similarly in France there is the research undertaken under 
the planning Commissariat  to assess the implications of the 1968  events, 
and  the Sudreau Committee  report  on  company  reform. 
These reports are not  just a  means  of utilizing and  guiding university 
research.  They  are also a  means  of compiling and  assessing the experiences, 
ideas,  projects and  doctrines of the two  sides of industry.  Whether  because 
the impartial experts are members  of such a  committee or because they give 
their evidence to the committee  (or both),  and  whatever their position,  the 
result is the same.  The  analysis of the situation incorporates their views 
and  the suggestions and  recommendations made  take account  of their possible 
reactions and  are often submitted to them  for opinion. 
What  is perhaps  even more  important is the careful observation and  analysis 
of actual trends recorded and  attempts to formulate recommendations  on  this 
basis.  The  Donovan  Report  did not  confine itself to noting the gaps between 
the official bargaining system and  actual practice. It sought  to establish 
to what  degree the second,  hitherto  'informal'  system  could be reintroduced 
into the official procedures of the two  sides and  reconciled with the first. 
It sought  to regulate and  order the procedures by  making  them  formal  and 
legitimate.  In the  same  way  the Budreau Report  draws the appropriate lessons 
from  the recent negotiations and disputes and  takes the tendencies they noted 
to their logical conclusion  (eg direct staff expression on  working conditions). 
No  report or research has directly generated an overall  law.  But  several 
laws have drawn  on  the findings of the reports and,  in fact  and  in law,  brought 
the two  sides of industry together to formulate them. 
This is clearly true of the French law of December  1968  which  enables 
the union to enter the undertaking.: Both unions and  employers had  come  face 
to face with this issue during the Grenelle negotiations of June  1968  and 
had adopted a  quasi-protocol agreement,  reserving themselves points of 
divergence and  agreeing on  the need  to call on  the law to settle them.  To 
a  large extent  they paved  the way  for 'the law and  although in the end  the 
government  had  to· 'arbitrate'  since they did not  reach a  genuine agreement, 
the unions criticized some  of the legal provisions.but did not  oppose  them. 
This law was  adopted almost  unanimol.\sly,  which  seems  extraordinary for a 
decision which  some  months  before had  still provoked passionate discussion 
until one remembers  that the main  areas of disagreement  had  been removed  by 
the direct negotiations between the two  sides of industry. 
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legal and  legislative habits.  Its main  object is to affirm the worker's rights 
within the undertaking rather than to  codif,y the  forms  of negotiation and 
organization.  It would  not  be too much  to  say that basically it codified the 
procedures of representation which  had  automatically sprung from  the autumn 
strikes and  the mediation procedures of the Ministry of Labour during that 
period.  It is probably because it drew direct  support  from  a  social movement 
that it managed  to establish unionism in the undertaking,  to restore all 
their authority to the union organizations and  to  consolidate the negotiations 
(although this scarcely helped to calm  the disputes). 
In the above  two  cases the initiative came  from  the employees'  unions or 
the employees  themselves and  the employers accepted the decisions rather than 
contributing to them.  But  in France the 1971  law  which  regulates bargaining 
procedures  (favouring the company  agreement  and  giving the state wider powers 
of intervention in the neglected sectors)  is a  typical  'negotiated'  law and 
even requires that the outcome of the negotiations be ratified by  Parliament 
(unanimously).  Even  if it is far from  being revolutionary,  this does reflect 
important  changes. 
In the UK,  the failure of the Industrial Relations Act  (1971),  which was 
replaced by  the 1975  Employment  Protection Act,  can parhaps be  explained as 
a  result of the contrary procedure.  Even  though the 1975  Act  still incorporates 
important  elements of the earlier one,  the  1971  Act  tried too hard to  impose 
a  legal  system which  was  foreign to those concerned.  The  oppostion of the 
unions alone would  not  have  been  enough  to prevent it without  the tacit or 
active complicity of the  employers. 
One  cannot  go  so  far as to  say that  in general  the public authorities 
delegate to the two  parties the responsibility for making the laws which 
concern  them~  But  at times this is true - and  the authority of the state 
seems  in no  way  to have  been  impaired by  this.  After all, free collective 
bargaining means  letting the two  sides settle their own  affairs as they 
wish.  So  it would  not  be inconsistent  sometimes to extend this principle 
even to the rules governing their contracts. 
The  administrative custom  of entrusting certain functions of recognized 
public interest to the management  of the two  sides of_industry is no  doubt 
in line with this growing habit  of delegation.  This delegation has existed 
in certain social  institutions for a  long time.  In various forms,  the market 
and  employment  services,  placement  and  continuous training are entrusted to 
the two  sides of industry,  or the two  sides are closely involved;  the same 
applies for social  security (insurance,  retirement or unemployment  schemes) 
- although there is evidence of some  disappointment  in this area (very strict 
supervision and  the fact  that  a  reform was  rejected by  several unions in 
France means  that the idea of social  security as  such being managed  by those 
concerned is something of a  fiction).  The  system  of delegation becomes  more 
interesting in the case of issues where  there is a  large degree of disagreement 
or dispute or of control over the_implementation of the laws.  In the UK  the 
responsibility for health and  safety regulations  was  withdrawn  from  the five 
ministerial departments which  formerly dealt with it and  entrusted to a 
108 tripartite Health and  Safety Commission  {by  the Health and Safety at Work 
Act,  1974).  Similarly,  the Employment  Protection Act  of 1975  helped the 
unions to gain recognition as bargaining party from  the employers and  helped 
to create a  mediator for disputes by  setting up  the Advisory Conciliation 
and  Arbitration Service,  managed  by  a  tripartite council.  Its recommendations 
have no  binding force but  should have considerable moral  force  {whether it 
is a  question of recognition or of compromise  in a  dispute).  In France,  the 
national agency  for the improvement  of working conditions has also  set up  a 
tripartite admi~istrative council. 
2.4.2.2  The  state in negotiation  law-and  agreement.  The  extension o£ 
agreements 
Apart  from  the above  oases where  the state brings in the two  sides of 
industry to define the rules of the game  or where  the responsibility is 
divided between  law and  agreement,  much  more  often the otate intervenes 
in the actual negotiation,  either in order to make  its outcome  binding, 
or to guide it, or even to take part  in it, whether officially or 
unofficially. 
The  extension of a  collective agreement  makes  it binding for the branch 
and the region for which it was  concluded and  for all the employees  and all 
the employers,  even those·who  have not  signed it.  In fact  the first objective 
is usually achieved by other methods,  either by  the unions legally committing 
all the employees,  or because the interpretation of the non-discrimination 
clauses achieves the  same  result  (Federal Republic of Germany).  The  second 
procedure is the most  widespread.  The  royal decree in Belgium,  the generally 
binding decision in the Federal  Republic of Germany,  the extension decree in 
the Netherlands and  France all have the  same  effect of transforming an act 
of private law  into an obligation under public  law,  of transforming an 
agreement  into a  regulation. 
In some  cases the extension is almost  a  matter of course,  so  that the 
two  sides of industry acquire genuine statutory power.  In Belgium  the law 
of 15  December  1968  authorizes the national  labour council to  conclude 
collective agreements which  in fact if not  in law  'are incorporated into 
state regulations'.  So  there must  be some  concerted action by  the legislator 
~d the administration on  the one  hand,  and  the two  sides of industry on 
the other if the general result is to remain coherent. 
Wherever  inter-trade negotiation occupies an  important  place {Denmark, 
Italy,  France,  Netherlands),  the agreements to which it leads often  ~~ve 
the value of a  law,  the formulation of which the public authorities have 
left to the two  sides.  Very  good-examples are the agreement  on the sliding 
scale in Italy and  the establishment of supplementary insurance against 
unemployment  and  supplementary pensions in France.  One  of the most  curious 
examples  no  doubt  is the increase {to 90 %)  of the maternity allowance for 
women  workers.  The  two  parties agreed to it and  agreed to an  increase in 
their social  security contributions so  that all the public authorities had 
to do  was  to transform this agreement  into a  decree. 
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for it.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany  a  government  report  lays down  in 
detail the objectives of asset  formation.  This could have  led to a  law but 
in fact  it led to negotiations.  In many  cases the principle of equal  pay and 
equal  opportunities for men  and  women  was  laid down  by  law.  Although it was 
well  known  that  the law  had  only limited effect,  it was  hoped  that  by this 
means  the idea would  be  incorporated into contractual practice  (with,  as we 
have  seen,  very varied success).  In France the changeover to monthly payment 
was  an_initiative of the President of the Republic although it was  quite 
readily accepted by  the two  sides of industry after 1971  (reciprocally,  the 
recent  agreement  which gives general application to  some  aspects of this 
measure was  rapidly embodied  in a  general  law in December  1977). 
These  kinds of procedure do  not detract  from  the autonomy  of the two 
sides.  Not  only are they free not  to observe them  (in this case they can 
expect  legislative measures,  but  they may  also prefer them  because they 
can  'negotiate'  them,  as happened  in the case of several  branches which 
refused the change to monthly payment  in December  1977),  but  they can 
also discuss the entire content of the decision.  They  can decide in 
what  form  asset  formation  should be encouraged,  what  kind of investment 
should be  supported,  what  time-limits should be  set.  These  issues were 
resolved  in different  ways  in Denmark  and  the Federal Republic of Germany, 
as were  the stages in the introduction of monthly  payment  in Belgium  and 
France. 
In some  cases the public authorities take part in the negotiation,  either 
on  the stage or in the wings.  In Ireland,  the Government  succeeded  in changing 
the national  pay agreement  of 1975  by offering concessions  (subsidies)  on 
food  and  transport prices.  It was  easier to reach the 1969  and  1974  French 
agreements  on  employment  because the government  made  reciprocal  concessions. 
Similarly,  the  1970  inter-trade agreement  on vocational training supplements 
a  1966  law,  specifies its implementing conditions and  paves the way  for the 
1971  law on  its financing which obliges the employers to allocate a  certain 
percentage of the employees'  pay to training.  B.y  contrast,  the  1971  law adds 
to the agreement  by  requiring that the works  committee must  examine  the 
'training plan'.  A later agreement  (1976)  is designed to lay down  the 
procedures of this examination.  Here  the overlap is so  close that one 
could probably  speak of concerted action. 
Naturally this co-operation of the government  in the negotiations can 
be viewed  very differently from  country to country.  It seems  to be current 
practice in the Netherlands,  especially for pay questions.  At  the other 
extreme,  in the Federal  Republic of Germany,  the  two  sides  jealously defend 
their autonomy.  In France,  any  'political' measures rouse distrust,  but 
administrative measures are accepted readily - and naturally the distinction 
between the two  is very fragile.  But  in the many  cases where it exists at all, 
this intervention  'on an  equal  footing'  by the state which negotiates and 
contracts rather than  imposing its sovereignty is an interesting new  departure 
and  has produced results which would  have  been very difficult to achieve by 
other means. 
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However,  one  should not  forget  that there are  cases where  the state 
imposes its authority.  The  state can intervene in emergency  situations,  in 
order to oblige the two  sides of industry to take account  of other obligations 
or constraints or to extricate them  from  an  impasse.  This action is not  confirmed 
to mediation or arbitration in cases of social conflict  in the usual  sense of 
the term - and  to which  we  will return.  It also covers much  less clear-cut or 
foreseeable situations where  political decisions must  take priority. 
As  we  showed  earlier (of.  1.2.3), this is well  illustrated by  incomes 
policy,  in the very pressing form  it took on  with the economic  crisis.  This 
policy reflects the various extremes.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany  the 
government  did not  go  beyond  the confines of joint action in order to halt 
the rising inflation rate.  Although its statement  of an acceptable rate of 
pay increases  (and its criticism of cases where  this rate was  exceeded)  is 
very similar to a  directive,  its main  weapon  remains control of the money 
supply.  At  the other extreme,  the French Government  froze wages  in the last 
quarter of 1976  and  decided that they should be  strictly tied to the cost 
of living in 1977;  the Dutch Government  determined the 1976  wage  increase. 
Although the Italian Government  usually prefers to act  by  persuasion,  it 
partly suspended application of the sliding scale,  a  measure decided on 
by  inter-trade agreement. 
One  of the possible results of such intervention - which will be 
successful mainly if the political situation encourages it - is to -shift 
the issues to be dealt with from  the .area of negotiation to that of public, 
political or even electoral debate. 
Arbitration (which we  are not  of course using in its strict legal  sense 
here)  can probably take place more  easily and  with less risk if it is based 
on  wide  consultation and,  where  possible,  an arrangement  or tacit agreement. 
In this case the state intervenes to take responsibility for  &~  unpopular 
measures,  for measures which the organizations would  find it hard to persuade 
their members  to adopt  even if they do  not  fundamentally dispute their 
soundness.  In Belgium,  for instance,  in view of the social  security deficit 
and  particularly the unemployment  insurance deficit, it seemed  essential for 
the government  to attempt conciliation but  also for it to take the final 
decision. 
Similarly,  in Denmark,  in the recent  cases where  the government  took 
l~al decisions on  matters on  which  the two  sides of industry had  not  managed 
to reach agreement,  this procedure,  unusual  in the other countries,  was  no 
doubt  made  more  acceptable by  the fact  that it helped the two  sides to come 
closer to agreement.  The  1975  law  correcting the operation of the sliding 
scale by  adding measures to control  other incomes  was  based on the proposal 
of the mediator (ie on  the proposal  he had regarded as acceptable to the 
two  parties). Similarly,  in March  1977  the law  endorsed the proposal  by  the 
mediator  (which had  been accepted by the employees and  rejected by  the 
employers)  to fix a  national minimum  wage  at a  high rate.  Obviously the 
Ill economic  trend has  some  influence here.  On  the other hand,  the government 
had allowed the 1973  strike to  spread  (clearly this was  a  very wide-scale 
dispute,  accounting for more  than 3 900  000 lost working days). 
Yet  it is not  always possible for the government  to work  on  the basis 
of a  quasi-agreement.  In Belgium,  following the failure of inter-trade 
negotiations,  and  although it was  hoped  that the branch agreements would 
adopt  the wise recommendations made  by the confederations before they 
separated without  reaching agreement,  the law of 24  December  1976  prudently 
authorized the government  to base the royal decrees making collective 
agreement  compulsory not  only on  a  review of legality, according to usual 
custom,  but  on  a  review of economic  and  social advantages.  However,  the 
law was  not  extended after the end  of 1976. 
In France,  the restriction of pay  increases to increases in the cost of 
living is not  based  on  any  agreement  or genuine concerted action.  It was  an 
authoritarian measure  justified by the emergency  aituation and  therefore 
regarded with distrust by  all the unions,  both in the public and  the private 
sector. 
To  conclude one  should perhaps refer again to  the many  faces of the 
public authorities.  Naturally the agencies of repression whose  task is to 
evacuate an  occupied plant  in no  way  resemble the  factory inspectors in the 
eyes of the workers  involved or of the employers.  Similarly,  the various 
administrative branches operate according to a  different  logic and  in a 
different manner.  An  administration dealing with  employment  rarely acts 
on  the same  principles as a  financial administration.  The  latter gains in 
authority in times of economic difficulties. 
At  an  even more  general  level,  public authorities means  firstly the 
administration,  ie a  politically neutral authority which  is generally 
respected for its abilities and  impartiality,  even by  those who  criticize 
it severely;  secondly the government,  ie a  political coalition or a  party 
whose  powers  give it special authority and  responsibilities;  thirdly the 
political parties,  ie organizations with opposing views  and  programmes 
which  compete  for votes. 
The  more  dictatorial and  exceptional  the intervention of the public 
authorities is, the more  clearly the face of the government  will appear 
behind the administration.  The  more  this intervention is disputed,  the 
more  clearly will the political parties be visible  behin~ the government. 
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3.1  Industrial disputes 
It is particular~y difficult to draw  comparisons in the field of 
industrial disputes.  Not  only are national statistics not  compiled in 
the  same  manner  (Denmark  does not list disputes which  involve a  loss of 
fewer  than 100 working days,  the Federal Republic of Germany  does not list 
unofficial strikes very precisely) but,  what  is even more  important,  the 
legal definition of the strike, _and  thus the access to it and its place in 
the negotiations,  vary greatly from  one  country to another.  The  same  number 
of days of strike does not  involve the  same  economic  cost for this depends 
on  whether the strikes are local or national whether the decision was 
foreseeable well  in advance or whether the strike was  the result of a  sudden 
decision.  Strikes have  a  different meaning in the  Federal  Republic of Germany, 
Denmark,  the UK  and  Italy. 
The  right to use lock-outs differ as least as much  and  perhaps more  :  it 
is one of the employers'  usual tactics in the Federal Republic of Germany 
whereas its use is subject to close restrictions in France.  In practice, 
though,  the situation is not  so different  :  in France selective or repeated 
strikes (generally under cover of technical unemployment)  have  provoked  a 
use of the lock-out  in response which is no  longer out of the ordinary. 
These reservations must  be borne in mind  in the future discussion.  They 
make  the common  trends or convergences which  appear even more  striking and 
significant. 
There is no  need to discuss again the familiar differences in the rate 
of strikes in the nine countries.  The  number  of days lost by  strike per 
1000 employees  can vary from  1 to  100  (and  even more  in extreme  cases) 
between the countries most  affected and  least affected (Italy and  the UK 
in the first case,  the Netherlands,  Denmark  and  the Federal Republic of 
Germany  in the second).  Over  the last fifteen years Italy has lost over 
3000 days  (3013  in 1969);  the rate in the Netherlands fell to 2  (1967)  -
not  to mention  Luxembourg  which does not usually lose a  single day. 
So  the parallels evident  in the changes are remarkable. 
Certainly the parallels are not absolute.  Strikes are not  chance 
Phenomena.  As  a  result of the infectiousness of discontent and  success,  of 
the dissemination of objectives and  means  of action,  or of the political 
trend  (especially economic  policy decisions),  work  stoppages happen  in 
clusters,  even  when  the relevant decision is decentralized.  The 
untrustworthiness of the figures is even more  marked  when  the decision 
113 is highly centralized,  either an inter-trade decision  (Denmark,  Netherlands), 
or that of a  major branch (Federal  Republic of Germany).  The  major strike 
movements  do  not  therefore occur at exactly the  same  moment,  even where  there 
is great  similarity between  economic  situations,  levels of development  and 
economic  trends.  But  over a  certain period,  the similarities are quite evident. 
This suggests that the causes of strike are similar in spite of differences 
of law and  tradition. 
Looking back,  ~he great  peak reached  in all the industrialized countries 
between  1968  and  1973  seems  easy to understand  (although it was  quite unexpected 
by  the governments,  the two  sides of industry and  the experts).  Full  employment 
generally,  or even labour shortage,  growth and  inflation,  can easily be used to 
explain the increased number  of disputes in terms of the well-known  effect of 
economic  cycles.  It should be  pointed out,  however,  that this increase was  so 
large that it must  be regarded as  something more  than a  cyclic phenomenon.  In 
France in 1968  the industrial crisis (an estimated  150 million days were  lost) 
became  a  national crisis for several weeks.  In Belgium,  the country of concerted 
action and  planning,  the number  of strike days rose to  1 423  000  in 1970 and 
1  240  000  in 1971  respectively (or 482  and  406  days per thousand  employees). 
In 1969  Italy lost more  than 37  million strike days  (3013  per thousand  employees). 
In the UK  the figure rose rapidly from  1968  (less than 4  700  000 to  1972  (nearly 
24  million,  or 1044  per thousand  employees). 
The  same  happened  on  a  different scale in countries with a  low. strike rate. 
In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  although the  1969  increase was  modest  in 
overall terms  (less than 250  000  recorded days lost), the  1971  total was  quite 
exceptional  (nearly 2  600  000 or 118 per thousand).  In the Netherlands,  although 
the annual  average was  around  25  000  from  1962  to  1967,  there were  262  000 days 
of strike in 1970  (70 per thousand)  and  still nearly 135  000 in 1973  (35  per 
thousand).  Lastly,  in Denmark,  1973  was  a  highpoint with over 3·900 000 strike 
days,  a  quite exceptional total. 
This movement  is of course international and  affected nearly all the 
industrialized countries  (Sweden,  United States,  Japan). 
The  cyclic factors are clear.  But  no  doubt  the movement  had deeper roots. 
Even  if one tried to explain it by  the rising inflation rate, this inflation 
would  have to be defined and  demarcated.  Without  wanting to discuss the theory 
fUrther,  it is clear that the monetary drift probably had  structural  causes. 
This is even more  tr~e of the strikes.  Their increase marks at the very least 
a  rise in levels of aspiration,  a  change  in methods of action and  a  weakening 
of constraints and  controls. 
This is confirmed  by  the second major  event  of that  period  :  the maintenance 
(or renewed  increase after a  decline) of strikes in spite of the crisis.  The 
best  evidence that the economic  trend alone cannot  explain the peaks of 
1968-1973  is that the reversal,  violent and  profound as it was,  of this 
economic  trend did not  eliminate them.  Although the pressures of unemployment, 
the erosion of margins,  fear of the future and  the uncertainties of the present 
quite certainly brought  a  measure  of calm  in several cases,  on the whole  they 
did not  reduce the rate of conflict to the level of the 1960s. 
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the 1968  crisis seems  to have  concentrated into one year what  in other 
countries was  spread over several.  The  following years showed  an average 
rate;  only in 1976  did it go  up  again to over five million.  But  this was 
a  high figure during a  period when  unemployment  had  exceeded the 5 ~ peak. 
In the UK  the figure in 1975  was  somewhat  less than six million,  in 1976 
less than 3 300  000.  But  this was~more the result  of the Social Contract, 
the incomes  policy pact  between government  and unions,  than merely of the 
pressure of un~ployment (of course the economic  climate had  some  influence 
on  the acceptance of the Social Contract,  but it is worth noting that it was 
imposed  by  a  centralized decision);  1977  brought  signs of a  renewed  increase. 
In the other countries the level of disputes remains high and much  higher 
than usual.  In Italy in 1975  a  new  peak of 22  million was  reached  (the figure 
in 1976  was  still sixteen million,  which  corresponds to the renewal  of the 
branch collective agreements)  1974  and  1976  showed  high rates in the Federal 
Republic of Germany  (over one million and  over half a  million) as did 1976  in 
Belgium  (nearly 900  000 days lost). Similarly,  in recent years the total strike 
figure in Denmark  was  above  the norm  ( 184  000 in 197 4,  21 0  000 in 1976,  and 
these figures  should be  supplemented by  the d~s lost on  smaller strikes which 
often more  than double them).  In Netherlands the period of calm  in 1975  and 
1976  was  followed  by  the great strike of February  1977. 
A careful  examination of each country would  no  doubt  show  the variety of 
circumstances and  reasons.  Since the decisions imposed  b,y  a  crisis come  from 
the government,  or because they affect  everyone equally,  they can easily lead 
to major disputes wherever the bargaining is highly centralized.  This was  the 
case of the February 1977  strikes in the Netherlands in protest against the 
employers'  resolve to obtain a  partial suspension of the sliding scale and 
refusal to accept  a  2  ~ general  p~ rise.  This was  also the case of the 
government  intervention in Denmark.  Major branch disputes can partly explain 
the high figures recorded in the Federal Republic  of Germany.  In France  1976 
brought  a  rather violent  shift in economic  policy at a  moment  when  inflation 
was  speeding up. 
But  the variety of possible detailed explanations cannot  conceal what 
they have in common.  During the recent crisis the quantity of days of strike 
bore little relation to the short-term employment  market  trend.  This is true 
of all the profoundly different  systems of industrial relations, of labour 
and management  with very different organizations,  powers  and  policies and 
of governments with very different  economic  policies (and  attitudes). 
The  assertion that during the first period the full  employment  policies, 
backed up  by inflation,  had shifted the seat of power to the shopfloor deserves 
to be fully understood.  This did not describe a  short-term economic  trend but 
a  lasting transformation of methods of action and  power  relations,  as can be 
verified by  an examination of the different  forms  of strike. 
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and  forgotten forms  of strike and  at times of unofficial or illegal procedures 
during the crisis in industrial relations from  1968  to 1973.  In Italy,  France, 
Belgium  and  the UK  the strikes were  fairly often accompanied  by  occupation of 
the work  place,  and  in France this practice,  condemned  by  the labour tribunals 
although sometimes  not  without  hesitation and  delay (in the case of occupations, 
delay in acting makes  a  great difference),  has also become  a  frequent  one (it 
is becoming  so  in Denmark  too).  In some  cases the management  was  kept  in against 
its will in order to force it to negotiate.  In extreme cases,  nearly always 
cases where  the undertaking threatened to close down,  the occupation was 
accompanied  by  a  return to production and unofficial  sale of-the product.  In 
the case of bankrupt  undertakings,  occupation is a  means  of protest entirely 
comparable to the strike,  even if it is no  longer a  strike in the strict sense 
of the term  (wage  earners in France and  Italy continue to call it that).  Some 
countries make  widespread use of picketing in order to discourage non-strikers 
by  various means,  and  the methods  used have  become  tougher.  In some  cases 
picketing was  combined  with blocking deliveries.  The  strike itself has also 
taken on  special  forms  :  repeated  stoppages to disorganize production, 
bottleneck strikes to block a  strategic sector,  output  strikes,  especially 
go-slows to protest against over-rapid work  rates  (they are a  kind of fait 
accompli,  a  means  of obtaining claims without  waiting for the employer's 
agreement).  The  courts do  not  recognize many  of these strikes as such 
(although the employers  sometimes agree to discuss the issues rather than 
take this pretext for repressive action). 
These  unusual  methods  and  these unofficial procedures are very generally 
related to the origins of the strike,  which is often a  local initiative more 
or less controlled by  the militants or local union representatives and  not 
organized by the central machinery.  In some  countries where  the law  imposes 
industrial peace for the duration of the contract  or where  there is strong 
union discipline (often the two  go  together),  the  strikes were  often  'wildcat' 
or at least unofficial  strikes.  They  were rarely directed against the union 
but  sometimes did try to exert pressure on  it to  force it to  commit  itself, 
and  at any rate they were  often called without  waiting for union agreement. 
This much  painted picture shows  the change of methods used and  the shift 
in the centre of initiative.  Today,  however,  the passage of time and  changing 
economic  climate force us to consider other questions- such as what·remains 
of this sudden  outbreak of· strikes.  We  have  seen that the crisis brought little 
reduction in them.  But  did it not  change their form  ?  Is it not more  difficult 
tod~ for a  small group to take the initiative and responsibility of a  work 
stoppage  ?  After shifting towards the workshop,  has the power  not  returned 
to the hands of the organizations ?  Was  1968-1973  a  passing excess or does 
it herald a  fundamental  change  ? 
Certainly there is a  change,  as shown  by  all we  have  said about  the 
current methods of dealing with employment  and  pay and  the operation of the 
organizations.  But  nuances have to be added  to this pict-ure.  Once  again, 
the change is not  simply a  movement  backwards. 
The  picture that has been drawn  of the trend  in the preceding period 
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the essence of the industrial relations system untouched,  in others it 
changed it  • 
Firstly it would  be excessive to draw the Federal Republic of Germany 
or the Netherlands into this picture.  True,  both experienced strikes which 
infringed the industrial peace pact  and  caused disquiet and  reflection.  And 
in both cases the internal discipline of the organizations was  tested and, 
in particular,  the unions had  to make  efforts to establish closer contacts 
with or gain recognition in the undertaking.  But  all in all  ~here were  rarely 
aay occupations and  even more  rarely any illegal  'sequestration'  of executive 
ataff.  Even  more  important,  the traditional bargaining system was  perhaps 
shaken up  in some  years and  thus became  more  flexible.  But  it was  not 
profoundly changed,  especially as regards its main characteristic  :  disputes 
and  bargaining still concern the industry not  the company.  The--main  changes 
occurred elsewhere,  in an area only partially controlled by  the unions either 
in the Netherlands or in the Federal Republic of Germany,  namely  the area of 
participation by  the employees  in decisions directly affecting the staff and 
in economic  decisions,  the area of works  councils or committees and  supervisory 
boards. 
At  the other extreme,  what  happened  in the UK,  Italy and  France was  far 
more  than an unrestrained outburst,  bringing in its w~e more  flexible 
methods and more  democratic union structures.  It was  a  change  in the very 
system of bargaining. 
The  Italian case is the most  instructive.  The  most  frequent  form  of 
strike there is still the branch strike, directly connected with the 
negotiation of a  collective agreement  {the peak years of conflict were 
also those when  the agreements were  renewed)  or at least a  common  claim. 
But  what  is called a  branch strike in Italy today has little in common 
with a  branch strike in the Federal  Republic of Germany.  Although the 
general objectives are laid down  by  the central organizations and  although 
they draft· an action programme,  the implementation of this programme  is 
very decentralized.  In fact it is the local or company  sections which 
deal practically with the claims and,  above all,  which decide on the timing, 
length and  forms  of the action.  The  branch strike is no  longer a  general 
work  stoppage at a  given moment.  It is a  series of decentralized measures 
which the national unions attempt  to co-ordinate and  standardize.  Nor  is 
the strike any  longer the ultimate means  of pressure if bargaining fails. 
It goes hand  in hand  with negotiation,  giving it impetus and  stimulating 
it; it is involved in it to the extent that it is itself a  local negotiation 
which  can act as a  precedent  and  example  for the overall negotiation.  The 
decisions taken by one undertaking may  anticipate the industrial branch 
decisions or even run counter to the  joint rules of the employers. 
So  the branch strike is a  means  of closely associating the grass roots 
in the actual negotiation by means  of the general  assembly and  the actions 
of the delegates.  Sometimes  this requires  some  artifice. Strikes for  'reforms' 
{housing,  health,  transport) which the  Cons~itutional Court  has now  recognized 
as lawful  (1974),  and  strikes for an  even more  distant objective (protection 
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have less following because they derive much  more  from  a  central initiative. 
B.Y  contrast,  strikes involving branch interests have a  high rate of following 
because of these organizational  formulas. 
Moreover,  there are no  unofficial  strikes.  With  such flexible conduct 
of disputes,  it would  need a  curious accident  for  a  union not  to  see itself 
and  its policies reflected in a  locally-based movement. 
The  legal  situation is radically different in the UK  since nine strikes 
out of ten are considered unofficial there.  This  was  true of the ten years 
during which the Donovan  Commission  reported and  is even more  true today. 
And  the exceptions,  which  account  for much  more  than the other 10% in 
terms of days of strike and actually make  up  over half the days lost during 
peak years such as  1971  and  1972,  tend to be  cases where:the unions,- tired 
of being outstripped by  their members,  take the reins in their own  hands. 
That  means  that  in accordance with the Donovan  Commission  diagnosis,  the 
second  system of negotiation,  at  company  level,  is dominant.  The  strikes 
are a  matter for the  shop  stewards and  the groups  which  elect them  rather 
than for the actual unions,  except during periods of major conflict.  The 
centre of initiative in disputes has  shifted permanently,  and  not  because 
of any passing excesses fostered or determined by  the economic  trend. 
This does not mean  that  the new  economic  trend_has not  enabled the 
central organizations to gain strength and  acquire more  authority.  But  they 
are no  longer what  they were.  Their  joint co-ordinating and organizing duties 
have  changed  because their means  of action have  changed. 
In broad lines,  the same  conclusions could  be drawn  for France.  The  shock 
of 1968  and  the experience of the following years  led to a  type of strike 
very close to the Italian type,  although less centralized and  co~ordinated 
(and,  of course,  involving a  far fewer  number  of strikes and  therefore more 
localized action).  The  union~s role is more  to disseminate its policy keynotes 
and  ideas,  to awaken  its members  to new  objectives or methods;  then,  when  a 
dispute breaks out  locally, to guide it and  where  appropriate co-ordinate it 
with others and  to bring about  an acceptable compromise. 
This extreme decentralization of the dispute goes hand  in hand  with a 
slightly greater centralization of the end-of-dispute agreement  (and a  fairly 
centralized collective agreement  or arrangement).  Unlike  in the UK,  the union 
delegates control the strike,  but  the union controls the agreement. 
This new  type of dispute obviously corresponds to different bargaining 
forms.  But  this example  shows  that there may  be a  time-lag between the two 
(which is very marked  in Italy).  France has nothing like the British company 
bargaining system and its union delegates are not  shop  stewards.  On  the other 
hand  in France the decision to strike is controlled very little by the centre. 
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A strike at the Electricite de France stsms  from  a  carefully considered decision 
taken by  the national union  (although even  in this case there is some  local 
initiative.  Among  public employees,  the case of the post office employees is 
quite different,  as shown  by their own  strike in  1974).  A confederation such 
as Fbrce Ouvriere has its own  conception of the agreement  and  therefore often 
displays a  different attitude towards disputes. 
At  any rate, this tendency is more  than the result of circumstances alone 
and  certainly indicates a  basic change. 
In other countries,  the picture is even less clear.  In Belgium  and Denmark 
the powers  of the unions  seem  to protect them  from  any  surprises from  below. 
But  are they still so  protected  ?  The  proportion of unofficial  strikes is so 
high in Denmark  as to recall the UK  in the 1960s.  There  have  been lack of 
discipline and unofficial strikes in Belgium.  Although there is no  doubt  of 
the firm  control exercized by  the  LO,  esc  and  FOTB,  they may  have to give 
more  room  to decentralized dispute and  review their position in the 
undertaking. 
The  Federal Republic of Germany,  Luxembourg  and the Netherlands stand 
apart  because disputes there had very little connection with the emergence 
of the undertaking as the centre of decision and  above all of industrial 
bargaining.  But  in at least three other countries,  the UK,  Italy and  France, 
and  to  some  extent also in Belgium  and Denmark,  the frequent  and  wide-scale 
local disputes (official or unofficial depending on  national tradition)  served 
as a  good  means  of establishing a  new  forum  of discussion and-decision-making 
within the system of industrial relations.  As  we  said earlier, this shift 
reflects a  shift in the whole  bargaining system.  And  it is significant that 
this change was  the result of local disputes,  of the initiative of local 
delegates and militants. 
No  useful  comparison  can be made  of procedures for set.tling disputes 
without  first distinguishing between two  types of dispute  :  the dispute 
stemming  from  disagreement  between a  national union and  an employers' 
association which  have not managed  to reach agreement at the end  of the 
bargaining process;  and  the very different kind of dispute,  which starts 
on  the shop  floor and  then extends to a  whole  plant,  on  local  problems· 
which have often not  been fully or thoroughly discussed before the strike. 
In the first case conciliation procedures may  help prevent a  confrontation. 
In the second a  compromise  can be reached if the  issue is fully explored. 
It is perhaps an oversimplification to say that  in the first case the strike 
is born of the failure of negotiations,  while in the second  case,  negotiations 
are engendered by  the strike or at least  stimulated by  it. 
Many  of the disputes in the UK,  France and  Italy are of the second  type. 
The  go-slow is an expression of discontent,  perhaps following an initial 
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union,  and  the undertaking calls on  the specialized staff and  social relations 
services.  So  the dispute clarifies the issue and  leads to contacts between 
those who  will deal  with it. The  public authorities,  the factory inspector or 
the prefect in France will  intervene mainly in order to bring the two  sides 
into contact,  to pull down  the barriers between them. 
In many  undertakings in the UK  the strikes called by the shop  stewards 
are also a  factor of relations with the management.  Depending on  the importance 
of the case,  the union which is 'called on'  in this way  will  intervene more 
or less actively. 
A small  number  of such disputes may  become  protracted and  end  in an 
impasse.  In that  case the nature of the outside intervention may  change. 
In France,  apart  from  the above officials, the public authorities may  also 
appoint  another official to mediate,  without· any  powers  other than those 
conferred-on him  by the official nature· of his task ·or his personal prestige. 
In Italy; mediation b,y  the public authorities is often decisive both in 
negotiations and  in disputes,  although no  form  of constraint is available 
to them. 
On  the other hand,  conciliation (or arbitration) takes on  a  quite 
different  function if the dispute arises at the end of formal  bargaining, 
especially if it has become  legal only because no  agreement  was  reached 
(industrial peace obligation).  The  conciliation service may  have  no  binding 
power,  as in the Federal  Republic of Germany  and  Belgium  where unions and 
employers are quite ready to apply conciliation procedures or make  use of 
the national  conciliators but  not willing to accept  any arbitration that 
would  weaken  their autonomy.  Or it can be much  more  binding,  like the 
conciliation procedures in the Netherlands or the  (more  rare but  not 
exceptional)  intervention of the public  a~thorities in.Denmark,  for 
instance in the form  of legislation.  In both Denmark  and  Luxembourg 
the conciliation procedure as such is obligatory but  its results are 
not  binding on  the two  parties (in Denmark  they decide by  a  vote). 
Should a  distinction be made  between  interpretation disputes and 
disputes concerning the establishment of a  right  ?  Some  countries make 
a  strict legal distinction between disputes of rights and  disputes of 
interests - for  instance Denmark,  the Federal Republic of Germany  and 
the Netherlands.  others make  no  such general distinction (eg the UK) 
or only attach limited practical  importance to it (France).  Disputes 
of law  can be  settled by  the courts,  by  joint bodies set up  by the 
two  sides (for engineering in the UK  or the  joint  Labour  Court  - which 
is not  a  law court - and  the Employer-Labour  Conference in Ireland). 
The  tribunals or courts have often been the target of criticism,  both 
in Ireland and  in Denmark,  because perhaps their· task of implementing the 
texts is particularly thankless during periods of incomes  policies. Denmark 
strongly criticizes the practice of imposing fines for unofficial strikes 
(flat-rate fines paid to the plaintiffs in lieu of damages).  In France the 
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functions,,  insufficient  specialized departments),  have the fault of 
concentrating on  settling individual disputes after the employees  and 
employers  have  separated,  ie have very little official say while the two 
sides are still in contact. 
In the UK,  in spite of the traditional distrust of the two  sides towards 
any  judicial procedure,  the tripartite Advisory Conciliation and  Arbitration 
Service seems  to have  had  a  favourable reception. 
Lastly,  exceptional procedures exist  everywhere to deal with exceptional 
cases and  the major crises showed  that if they do  not  exist they are easy 
to create.  The  Grenelle conference which laid down  the broad lines of an 
agreement  after the 1968  strikes in France is a  very good  example.  Nobody 
criticized the Prime Minister for the lack of any  legal  foundation when  he 
called a  conference between the confederations of employers  and  employees, 
or pointed out  that under their statutes the confederations did not  have 
the right to  sign a  pay agreement. 
3.2  Bargaining structures 
As  we  noted above,:_forms  of dispute are linked to bargaining forms.  This 
does not  necessarily imply  any coincidence between the area covered by  a 
dispute and  that  covered by  an agreement.  Or rather,  such coincidence exists 
only where  the agreement  imposes  an industrial peace clause on  both sides 
and if there is general  compliance with the clause,  ie if there are few 
strikes in infringement of that rule.  That  is the  case in the Federal 
Republic of Germany  (where an undertaking not  covered by  a  collective 
agreement  and  threatened with strike by  the union  can protect itself 
against dispute simply by belonging to the employers'  association,  ie 
to the collective agreement  which that association has signed,  which 
embodies  the obligation to keep  the peace).  The  Friedensraum  (area of 
peace)  is identical to the Kriegsgebiet  (area of war).  More  or less 
the same  applies in the Netherlands. 
In another group of countries there is an obligation under the law and 
by tradition either to keep  industrial peace or at least not  to embark  on 
a  d~spute before exhausting certaip··procedures;  but there are frequent 
infringements  (Denmark)  and they can  even make  up  the main  issue of dispute 
(the UK).  In that case,  there is in fact  no  real  coincidence of principle 
between the area of agreement  and  that of dispute.  A good  number  of 
small-scale disputes  (shop floor,  establishment,  company)  which arise 
are not necessarily  'circumscribed'  in the same  way  as an agreement. 
Lastly,  in a  third group of countries,  there is no  rule enforcing (France) 
or still enforcing (Italy)  such coincidence.  Disputes can arise in the branch 
or in the undertaking.  Go-slows  may  be decided in the undertaking_in support 
of branch bargaining;  specific company  disputes may  be settled either by  a 
company  agreement  or by  reference to a  branch agreement  (and often by the two). 
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end-of-dispute agreements  (especially company  disputes)  and  collective 
agreements with their clauses as two  different  forms  of bargaining and 
agreement,  especially as regards their relations to the dispute. 
In our survey of pay negotiations we  pointed  to certain elements in the 
bargaining structure (cf.  1.2.1) and  especially the  fac~ that the European 
tradition,  which  is very different in this respect  from  that in North America 
or Japan,  gives priority to branch  (industry or sector) bargaining.  Although 
this priority is under serious threat  in several  cou~tries and  may  even be 
abolished,  either by  being controlled by  the inter-trade negotiations  (Denmark), 
or by the  emergence of company  bargaining (the UK),  in general  branch bargaining 
remains very frequent.  Over  the last thirty years,  and  in spite of the scale 
of economic  and  social  changes,  what  is perhaps most  remarkable is the stability 
of this structure. 
What  is a  branch or an  industry ?  How  is the bargaining unit made  up  ? 
We  have already asked this question in relation to the structure of trade 
associations  (cf.  2.2.2.1).  It should be pointed  out that the answer is not 
generally the  same.  Although in some  cases the area covered by  an association 
is the  same  as that  covered by  a  collective agreement,  this is far from  being 
the rule.  In some  cases the definition of an  industry is the same  (the activities 
covered by the metal-workers'  collective agreements  in the Federal  Republic 
of Germany  and  France are more  or less the same  as those of the employees of 
I.G.  Metall  or the various metal-workers'  federations),  but  the organization 
is national while the bargaining unit  is regional  ('Land'  in the Federal 
Republic of Germany,  'departement'  in France).  In other cases an~ 
grouping of national unions,  grouped partly by  trade,  makes  industry-wide 
bargaining possible (the employers'  federatio~ is sometimes of the  same  kind, 
at least in the beginning,  as  shown  by the complex of the structure of the 
'Union des industries metallurgiques et minieres'  in France).  Similarly,  in 
the UK,  the metal-workers'  unions have  set up  the Confederation of Shipbuilding 
and  Engineering Unions  to negotiate with the Federation of Engineering Employers. 
Again  in Denmark,  there is a  central association of metal-workers grouping 
several  national unions in order to deal  with the  employers of that branch. 
The  opposite is more  frequent,  however.  A single employees'  organization 
signs a  number  of agreements,  each covering a  more  restricted field than that 
of the employers'  association.  This is often the  case with dispersed industries 
or activities such as  food  and  trade.  It also partly explains the very wide 
gap  between  the number  of collective agreements and the number  of national 
employees'  unions.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  for example,  there 
are  some  20 000 collective agreements in force and  -16  national unions  (of 
course many  of- these 20_ooa agreements are company  agreements.  Some  of them 
are also  explained by  the breakdown  by~). 
In recent years,  areas formerly  covered by different  agreements have 
tended to be  combined.  In Denmark  the various branches of the graphic industry 
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association has an ambitious  'rationalization'  plan) although they still 
have  no  joint agreement.  In Italy in recent years the entire textile sector 
was  brought  under a  single agreement  and  the same  applies to the very diverse 
food  sector.  Here it is difficult to distinguish the role of the desire for 
reorganization and rationalization from  that of the short-term economic  trend 
which  favours a  grouping of forces.  In any case,  this is not  the only tendency. 
As  a  result of the crisis,  some  industries may  detach themselves,  for bargaining 
purposes,  from  the larger ~hole to which  they formerly belonged.  Although there 
was  no  legal breakaway,  this was  the case of the iron and  steel industry in 
France in 1967  and  again in 1977.  So  the economic  climate can act  both ways. 
In general it is true to say that the employers'  organizations tend to 
try to define the bargaining unit by the product  {the product market,  the 
technology)  and  thus to restrict its scale by underlining its specific 
nature,  while the employees'  organization defines it by  the labour market 
and  thus enlarges it, in local terms at least.  But  apart  from  the fact that 
this is not  a  general tendency (in France,  several metal-workers'  unions 
wanted  this enormous  complex to be divided up  into more  homogeneous 
industrial branches,  while the employers were  staunchly in favour of unity, 
perhaps because they are organized as a  union for  bargaining purposes), 
many  other factors also  come  into play. 
Some  of these affect the choice between  bargaining at national or at 
~egional level.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  in spite of exceptions 
such as the printing trade,  bargaining is usually at Land  level.  In Italy, 
it is predominantly at national  level,  although the t~  unions are organized 
at provincial  level  {in recent years efforts have  been made  to develop horizontal 
area organizations).  Provincial agreements in addition to national agreements 
exist only in agriculture and  the building industry.  In both cases the 
administrative and  political structure,  which is classically federal  in the 
Federal  Republic of Germany  and  more  centralized in Italy (where  the recently 
acquired regional  autonomy  has not yet affected negotiation),  is probably the 
main  explanation.  What  will  be the effect of the  strengthening of the three 
regions in Belgium  and  of the new  structure of the UK  ? Although in the first 
case the effect on the confederal organizations is already apparent,  it is too 
soon  to measure it in the branches. 
In France,  the choice is influenced more  by  the nature of the  br~nches, 
their homogeneous  character {similar size of undertakings and  similar 
situations among  regions)  and  the quota of large undertakings with several 
establishments  (which have good  reason to wish for less national  co-ordination). 
The  chemical  industry has a  national collective agreement,  the construction 
industry fixes wages  by  departement,  the metal-working industry has traditionally 
been covered by  regional collective agreements but  in the last ten years has 
seen an increasing number  of national  agreements  {on  working hours,  the change 
to salaried status, vocational  tra~ning,  job evaluation,  pay of engineers and 
executives). 
In Denmark,  a  small  country,  the existence of 'discussions and  agreements 
at two  levels,  national and  local,  perhaps reflects the desire to allow for 
some  local discussion within a  highly centralized  system. 
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to country.  But  in very general  terms,  branch negotiation remains widespread 
because the branch is the traditional place of discussion and meeting,  where 
the formulas  of discussion,  bargaining and  agreement  are most  firmly established. 
Often this is also  because in spite of all the economic  and  technical upheavals, 
there is still a  strong sense of the unity and  specific nature of the  'occupation' 
(this is certainly more  true of small  branches of industry than of the very large 
ones,  of paper,  glass and oil than of metals;  construction is a  difficult case). 
Often the branch is the place where  a  real  sense of community  can be expressed 
in face of the confederations'  rather abstract  requirements  (which are more 
strictly economic  or based  on  more  long-term views).  So  it is easy to understand 
why  when  the negotiations become  difficult or the crisis entrenches the two  sides 
in irreconcilable positions,  branch discussion has more  powers of resistance than 
talks at  a  higher level,  as shown  by the case of Belgium  and  France. 
With the development  of company  discussions,  the branch has obtained other 
advantages too.  The  employers  can resort to branch negotiations because this 
helps them  to keep discipline and  avoid any divergent  measures;  the employees 
can do  so  because this will  endorse  and  consolidate their achievements in one 
field or another.  In both cases this applies above all to  small  and medium-
sized undertakings which often have neither the economic  nor the personnel 
resources to attempt  an  individual agreement.  Broadly speaking,  the difference 
between large and  small  undertakings widens when  the branch agreement  gives 
way  to the company  agreement. 
The  public sector nearly always adheres to branch negotiation,  because 
of its centralized decision-making powers,  whether in the case of the large 
national undertakings which  in themselves make  up  a  branch  (coal-mining, 
electricity, railways)  or the public services as  such.  The  UK  is the 
outstanding case of a  country where decentralized  bargaining plays only a 
minor role.  In France agreement  or dispute still occur at national  level 
(this is only broadly true of the dispute,  however).  We  have already noted 
the public sector groupings in Italy.  In Denmark  too  the bargaining with 
public sector  ~mployees is highly centralized. 
Overall,  the Federal  Republic of Germany  no  doubt  remains most  faithful 
to branch bargaining,  partly because bargaining at a  higher level is the 
exception there  (although not  legally impossible),  partly because many 
company  issues are dealt  with by  the Betriebsrat.  In Belgium  the branch 
joint committees  find it easier to resist the crisis and  continue to  sign 
agreements when  this becomes difficult at  confederal  level. Moreover,  the 
main  reforms  in Belgium are embodied  in branch agreements.  In France, 
collective branch agreements remain the stable core of industrial relations, 
although not  incorporating any very reformist measures.  In Luxembourg it is 
sometimes difficult to draw the line between branch and  company  agreements. 
Italy is probably an intermediate case.  The  national collective agreement 
remains the centre of gravity there,  but  it is used more  as a  means  of 
co-ordinating the widely dispersed talks and disputes and  of giving the 
results achieved  in the undertakings general application.  It has only 
limited powers of discipline and disseminates innovations rather than 
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more  power  (especially by  leading to the introduction of more  wide-scale 
bargaining units in some  industries).  Employers  are sufficiently worried 
about  the strikes which might  accompany  collective bargaining as to propose 
to the unions that collective agreements  should be turned  into planning and 
policy agreements for  company  bargaining - but  the unions rejected this 
proposal,  fearing it might  inhibit their local action. 
As  shown  by the Donovan  Report,  the UK  clearly has two  parallel bargaining 
systems;  the first and most  official, branch bargaining,  is now  only of 
secondary importance  (except  in the public sector).  It lays down  fairly 
general minimum  conditions and  leaves it to the shop  stewards and  the 
company  to regulate practical working conditions. 
Conversely,  branch bargaining can be  supervised or circumscribed by the 
central organizations,  with more  or less government  support  or constraint, 
in some  countries.  In Denmark  the two  confederations,  DA  and  LO,  together 
discuss general working conditions and  find it all the easier to oversee 
the lower-level talks because all the collective agreements expire on  the 
same  date.  In the Netherlands,  the crisis restored full  power  to the 
traditional framework  institutions.  Pay  talks are only held at branch level 
if the confederations have  not  managed  to agree;  and  even  in this case the 
objectives remain very general and  vague  since the branches are not  very 
distinct one  from  the other.  In Ireland the  system is more  circumstantial, 
and  from  1970  to  1976  pay questions were  decided  in the main  by national 
agreements. 
The  nature,  frequency and  scope of inter-trade bargaining between the 
organizations we  call confederal varies greatly according to country.  Such 
bargaining is fairly rare only in three countries  (the Federal  Republic of 
Germany,  the UK  and  Luxembourg)  and  widespread in all the others.  In spite 
of the differences in situation, it is worth trying to  distingu~sh the 
different  functions of this level of bargaining. 
1.  One  case must  be considered apart,  ie where  inter-trade bargaining is 
an exceptional response to an exceptional  situation.  In France in 1968  (and 
in 1936)  the meeting of the confederations under the chairmanship of the 
Prime Minister was  a  means  of dealing with an overall  social crisis and 
finding overall  solutions in face of very widespread strikes affecting the 
most  varied branches and,  by contagion,  the entire economy.  Many of the 
issues of this bargaining could have been dealt with  just as well  or better 
at branch level  (as they were after the near failure of the Grenelle meeting). 
But  in this case the decision  'at the highest  level'  had  symbolic and political 
value.  It recognized and  endorsed the exceptional  nature of the dispute and 
asserted that its settlement transcended the individual interests of the 
occupations.  B.y  their nature the decisions taken at  such a  meeting are no 
different  from  the decisions taken by  a  government  or parliament  in face 
of a  serious political crisis.  Because  such a  political crisis is also a 
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and  the government  to resolve it (and the outcome  therefore comprises 
legislative measures,  such as recognition of the union in the undertaking, 
regulations such as those on  the very marked  increase in the guaranteed 
minimum  wage,  and  contractual measures  such as pay increases. 
2.  A second  case is that where  inter-trade bargaining is to  some  extent 
necessary because of the nature of the employment  conditions to be settled, 
for example if social security contributions  (whether supplementary or not) 
are so  high that  compensatory measures must  be taken among  underatakings 
and  also among  branches.  In France in 1970 the extension of the 90 % 
maternity leave pay to women  workers was  negotiated at  inter-trade level 
because it would  clearly involve very different costs for the iron and 
steel industry and  for the garment  industry.  The  same  would  apply to 
supplementary pension  schemas  for executive staff.  Yet  these technical 
arguments,  which  tend to be  considered first in order to  justify inter-
trade bargaining,  are rarely totally compelling.  Many  social security 
questions can be dealt with at branch level with no  great difficulty, 
(eg unemployment,  as  shown  by  the Belgian system  of social security 
funds- 'Fonds de  securite d'existence' -or the  French  'Assedic') 
and  harmonization may  be  enough  (although insurance and  reinsurance 
techniques could also be applied).  Although it is true that many  of 
these questions have  been  settled at confederal  level, this was 
generally not  so  much  because of any strict need  to  spread the 
burden fairly as an attempt  to avoid  systems that  were  too different 
or privileges that were  too glaring.  France,  which  has frequently 
resorted to confederal bargaining (supplementary pensions,  unemployment 
insurance)  clearly shows  that inter-trade harmonization or co-ordination 
of pensions for example,  still leaves major inequalities in some  branches, 
categories or undertakings. 
There are other methods of performing this second  function of central 
bargaining.  In spite of the difference in legal methods  used,  there is no 
difference in kind between the effect of a  law and  that of an inter-trade 
agreement  (especially if it has been  'extended').  Or rather,  the difference 
is not  one  of the  substance or nature of the obligations; it lies in the 
possibility given to the parties involved to review the measures taken and 
in their right  to administer them  themselves.  Two  of the main  reasons for 
proceeding by  agreement  are that this maintains the rules outside the realm 
of politics as  such and  avoids bureaucratic controls.  If there is no  danger 
of either of these,  there will be less reason to  proceed in this way.  In 
Denmark,  supplementary pension schemas  were  introduced by  law and  the law 
entrusted them  to a  tripartite body. 
In this case as in the following ones,  the inter-trade agreement  is a 
kind of legislation drafted by the two  sides of industry and  by public 
authority delegation.  So  its results can be very close to those of the 
opposite procedure of  'negotiated law'  (cf.  2.4.2.1). 
3.  The  third case is that where  inter-trade bargaining lays down  the rules 
of the game  for the parties.  In Denmark  the procedures for bargaining at 
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by  an outline agreement  of 1936.  In France the 1968  bargaining laid down  a 
major part of the  'negotiated law'  on  the right of association in the 
undertaking of December  1968.  In Belgium  the National  Labour  Council  often 
played the  same  role to  implement  the social programming agreements. 
There are many  possible substitutes for this function.  So  far as we 
know  the German  DGB  has never bargained with the  employers on  the rules 
of conduct it urges its members  to follow and  these derive from  a  tacit 
understanding (they are intended to be acceptable to the other side).  A 
report presented to the public authorities who  accept its recommendations 
may  have the same  effect.  Thus  during the First World  War  in the UK  the 
Whitley Committee  recommendations  gave rise to a  large number  of~ 
Councils as permanent bargaining units.  The  fact that defining the 
procedures is left to negotiations merely shows  the  import~t positio~ 
of the two  sides of industry 1n  the political  bystem  (and their desire at 
times to  stand apart  from  the political scene).  Of  course there is no  reason 
why  the  same  regulation should not  be laid down  separately branch by  branch. 
The  functions and  structures of the Whitley Committees  vary considerably in 
the UK  and  one of the most  familiar examples of a  procedural agreement,  that 
of the engineering industry is in fact distinct  from  the Whitley Council model. 
4.  As  our review of the second  case showed,  inter-trade bargaining may 
simply have the function of co-ordination and  harmonization  (have an equivalent 
function for the branches as branch bargaining has for the undertakings).  It 
draws  the general  framework  within which the outcome of the branch bargaining 
must  remain  (supplementary pension schemes  in France),  or it imposes  a  general 
settlement  in cases where different  settlements according to branch could 
produce wide divergences  (1975  agreements in Italy on guaranteed wages  and 
the sliding scale),  or it gives general application to clauses which are 
already very widespread and  which it appears cannot  be further extended by 
bargaining (paid leave in several countries,  monthly payment  in France in 1977). 
This co-ordinating and  hannonizing function has the advantage of disciplining 
the branches (it speeds up  the laggards and  slows  down  the most  advanced 
branches)  and  giving the employees more  equality.  So  it is very useful as 
a  final  stage or at any rate when  branch bargaining is sufficiently advanced 
to require co-ordination. 
Naturally the law  can equally well  assume  this generalizing function. 
In several cases the length of paid leave is fixed by  law.  Or  the two 
procedures can be combined  to give even wider general application (this 
was  the case of the change to monthly payment  in France in December  1977 
Where  the inter-trade agreement  was  immediately embodied  in law). 
To  take but  one  example,  an inter-trade guaranteed minimum  wage  can be 
introduced by  law  (Netherlands,  France)  or by  inter-trade collective 
agreement  (Belgium). 
5·  A rather contrasting function is that of persuasion or stimulation. 
Because they have great authority and  because the real nature of the issues 
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initiative in defining the broad lines of objectives and  the broad policy 
lines in the hope  of persuading the branches of  indust~y to  implement  them. 
In this case the agreement  is less important  in terms of what  it concludes 
than of what  it proposes,  less in terms of the rights it establishes than 
of the prospects it opens.  Its scope  can vary greatly from  a  statement  of 
intent to the promulgation of a  new  course of action,  depending on  how  it 
is received.  In France this was  the case of the  joint declaration on  monthly 
payment  (1970)  and  the agreements on  employment  (1969),  vocational training 
(1970)  and  working conditions  (1975).  In Belgium,  some  collective agreements 
signed in the National  Labour  Council are also programme  agreements. 
In fact  the fourth and fifth functions are often combined.  The  establishment 
and definition of a  programme  is often also the regularization of a  practice 
which has already emerged  in some  areas,  at least  in the undertakings.  It is 
rare for a  confederation to  introduce a  new  programme  that is not  inspired by 
practical experience.  In Denmar~ the various attempts to establish original 
forms  of participation,  going so  far as co-operation committees in 1973,  are 
a  good  example. 
In this case there is often very close contact  between the two  sides of 
industry and the public authorities.  The  official research committees present 
their conclusions  (generally the two  sides of industry are on the committee 
and/or express their views on it). The  public agencies may  be officially 
responsible for part of the programme  (in the UK,  Denmark  and  France for 
improvement  of the working environment;  in the Federal Republic of Germany 
for asset  formation).  At  times it is difficult to  pinpoint  which  body took 
the first  step or even where  the responsibilities lie (they can be allocated 
in such a  way  as to produce rivalry between the administration and  the two 
sides of industry).  Such  contacts are in no  way  surprising considering the 
executive and  administrative authorities have  long ceased confining themselves 
to the role of guardians of the  law  and  are setting up  an increasing number 
of separate services. 
6.  The  inter-trade agreement  can not  only frame  the branch agreements but 
also lay down  binding limits for them  or even replace them.  The  development 
of incomes policies over the past  four years often led to this situation. 
But  it occurred long before the crisis in the case of Denmark.  There the 
general  employment  conditions common  to all the branches are negotiated for 
a  same  period as the collective agreements,  although a  little earlier,  by 
the two  confederations,  LO  and  DA.  Branch talks relate only to specific 
branch questions.  It is clear that the number  of general  issues may  vary 
with the economic  trend;  during inflation and if attempts are made  to 
restrain wages,  the confederations will be responsible for the overall 
determination of wages. 
The  procedure in the Netherlands is not  very different although backed 
by  a  quite different institutional machinery  (a  'private'  institution for 
discussions,  the Labour  Foundation,  and  a  'public'  institution, the Economic 
and  Social  Committee).  Since the Netherlands already has a  long tradition of 
incomes  policy and  the public authorities are accustomed to intervene,  the 
128 procedure is even more  centralized.  The  branches  have  only very limited 
autonomy  for many  of the general questions. 
Although occurring on  a  more  occasional basis,  but  backed  by  a  standing 
institution,  the Employer-Labour  Conference,  the national  (ie inter-trade) 
wage  agreements in Ireland have  the same  effect.  Although they must  be 
followed  by decentralized agreements to become  effective, their provisions 
must  be  observed strictly.  The  Conference has the authority to interpret the 
agreement  and  act as arbitrator in case of differences; it is also authorized 
to  judge whether the agreement  has been correctly applied. 
The  branch negotiations can also be  'managed'  i~ different ways.  After 
the failure of the confederal bargaining in.Belgium in 1976,  the parties 
published a  joint statement  of principle before separating.  The  government 
considered this sufficient and  gave the  joint branch committees the right 
to negotiate on  the basis of a  list of issues.  The  Social Contract  in the 
UK  is an agreement  between the Trade  Union  Council  and  the government.  But 
it has the same  effects as the preceding cases. 
At  the other extreme we  have the Federal  Republic of Germany,  where 
concerted action seeks to relate only to information and  discussion and 
does not  affect the autonomy  of the parties concerned  (ie the branches) 
- the disappearance since 1977  of this form  o~ concertation,  although 
probably definitive,  does not  prove that the guiding spirit which 
inspired it is dead;  or France where  the government  takes dictatorial 
action vis-a-vis the undertakings in order to limit  pay increases. 
In all these cases it is not  always  easy to distinguish between actual 
bargaining,  which is on  a  joint basis,  and  the three-sided talks in which 
the government  intervenes (cf.  1.2.3 and  2.4.2).  Sometimes  the government 
does not  intervene directly in the bargaining but  influences it by making 
certain offers and  threats (Ireland),  sometimes it arbitrates,  especially 
after a  breakdown  in the talks (Denmark)  or even  calls into question some 
of the bargaining results (sliding scale in Italy),  sometimes it replaces 
it ('authorizing'  law in the Netherlands,  'Barre Plan'  in France). 
However,  even if the pressures of inflation and unemployment  operate 
in favour of and  justify government  intervention and  cause procedures of 
very different origins to end  by  becoming  similar, this must  not  allow one 
to forget  that the reasons why  the two  sides of industry resort to inter-trade 
negotiation may  stem  from  very different attitudes.  Sometimes  the reason was 
to keep aside from  the government  and  the public authorities (in Denmark, 
although the two  parties accept  the legitimacy of occasional  intervention, 
they are not  prepared to accept  the government  making any lasting change 
in the rules and  procedures)  and  sometimes it was  that the public authorities 
invited or forced  them  to enter into inter-trade negotiations (in the UK, 
the Trade  Union  Council  has in fact  been rather reluctant to play any major 
part in determining incomes  policy over the last thirty years). 
129 In spite of these differences of approach and  origin,  because of the wide 
field they cover and  because they  'make  the law'  for a  large part of the 
economy,  inter-trade associations are often situated on the borderline of 
industrial relations and  form  part of the political scene.  Even  if the law 
carefUlly separates the prerogatives of the public authorities,  and  in 
particular the parliament,  from  the rights of interest groups,  the latter 
are political agents and  necessarily become  more  so  the larger they are. 
So  their activities are at least as significant in the context of the 
political  system as in that of the industrial relations system and  their 
links with the policy-makers are at least as close as with the industrial 
relations specialists.  The  differences between  countries are  so  marked 
because they also relate to the differences of political system. 
The  development  of company  bargaining is one  of the major trends of the 
last twenty years and  outside observers have  seen  in it the beginnings of 
a  rapprochement  between the European and  the North American  systems.  It is 
not  a  traditional bargaining form  and  was  greeted with distrust as much  by 
the employees'  unions as by the employers'  associations.  The  employees 
feared that to situate the bargaining within the undertaking entailed the 
risk of having to accept  the employer's reasoning all the way  and  no  longer 
being able to oppose it with trade,  category or class arguments.  The  employers' 
associations feared that  company  bargaining would  not  only divide and  weaken 
their world  (and  reduce the strength of their associations)  but  also abolish 
the principle of separation between production,  which is an area of 
collaboration and  peace,  and  sharing of the results,  which is an object of 
dispute and  haggling.  It would  mean  that the discussions were  brought  into 
the undertaking (and  in some  countries where  there are strong links between 
unions and political parties, politics would  also  be brought  in). 
In many  cases it would  be more  correct to  speak of negotiation at plant 
level rather than at undertaking level.  It is at  plant  level that the shop 
stewards are the most  active in the United  Kingdom  and  most  agreements are 
concluded at that  level.  The  Confederation of British Industry would  like 
to consolidate plant agreements in undertaking agreements  (the wave  of 
mergers contributed to this parcelling out of agreements  :  the new  large 
undertakings have  frequently respected the special provisions and  even the 
negotiating autonomy  of the units absorbed.  In Italy,  bargaining takes place 
at undertaking,  plant and  departmental  level.  In France,  although the agreement 
mainly concerns the undertaking,  conflicts frequently  concern specific plants 
(and they lead to unofficial bargaining). 
Bargaining at  company  or plant  level is not  predominant  anywhere  except 
in the UK.  In no  case has it replaced or eliminated bargaining at  sectoral 
level.  But  the trend certainly exists,  although in different  forms  and 
with different aims depending on  the country. 
1.  Agreements  are signed within an undertaking for the main  reason of 
protecting by  collective agreement  the employees  of an undertaking which 
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the German  DGB  consistently attempts to do.  In the main  these agreements 
repeat the corresponding branch agreements with minor modifications.  LO 
in Denmark  proceeds in the  same  way  but it also attempts to make  undertakings 
suspected of trying to  stand apart  pay an additional price by  imposing a 
single-union clause.  Similarly in Belgium  there are many  company  pay 
agreements where  no  branch agreement  exists or where it has fixed poor 
rates. 
~ension procedures,  in countries where  they are normally applied,  often 
lead to very similar results by different means,  forcing the recalcitrant 
undertaking to apply the branch agreement. 
Perhaps one  should  include in this group the  company  agreements which 
have the effect of tying an  undertak~ng to a  fictitious branch agreement. 
In France,  for  instance,  the unity of the metal-workers'  union does not 
allow a  separate national agreement  for iron and  steel.  Regions with a 
large iron and  steel industry are covered by  a  regional agreement  instead. 
In the  othe~ regions the negotiation of a  company  agreement  is a  means  of 
formulating clauses similar to those of the Moselle agreement  and aligning 
them  with it. 
2.  The  company  agreement  may  also supplement  or adapt the branch agreement. 
It takes account  of the special situation of an undertaking,  adding advantages 
justified by  local occupational habits or designed to help the company  to 
recruit  labour.  This  second  type of agreement  coexists with the first  in 
the Federal  Republic of Germany  and  Denmark.  In the Federal  Republic of 
Germany  it reflects the DGB's  attempts to extricate itself from  the confines 
of the branch and  sometimes to acquire more  influence at the cost of the 
works  council.  In Denmark  it indicates the presence and activity of the 
union delegate  (or spokesman). 
There is a  whole  range of possible methods  from  simply adapting the branch 
agreement  (questions of payment  for a  special skill specific to the undertaking, 
of defining the institutions of staff representation,  of deciding whether to 
close down  on  a  public holiday) to formulating a  new  and  original agreement. 
It should be noted that  company  agreements are usually found  in large 
undertakings which often do  not  confine themselves to granting a  few  additional 
advantages in order to keep  and  attract their staff but  also have a  social 
policy often drafted by specialists employed  by  the management.  In this case 
the company  agreement  acquires a  fair degree of autonomy,  quite apart  from 
the fact  that it also co-ordinates the establishments in the various regions 
of the country which may  be covered by different  agreements as a  result of 
regional  bargaining. 
Apart  from  the Federal  Republic of Germany  and Denmark,  this is also the 
case in France which has few  company  agreements but  where  such agreements do 
affect a  great  number  of large and  very large undertakings  (and  consequently 
affect quite a  substantial proportion of the employees).  The  employers' 
associations often regard them  with some  distrust,  fearing they might  be a 
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rules.  The  small  and  medium-sized undertakings often regard  them  as a  means 
of pressure to persuade them  to agree to make  further concessions. 
3.  Many  agreements made  by  large undertakings  in fact  form  part of the third 
type,  the autonomous  agreement.  This does not  mean  an agreement  which  need 
not  comply with the stipulations of the branch agreement,  but  one  which 
regards these as minimum  requirements and  which is quite free to add 
additional or new  clauses to it.  Looking carefully at the dynamic  of 
bargaining,  it is clear that  in France,  Italy and  the UK  a  large part of 
reforms  (on paid leave,  redundancy payments,  supplementary pension  schemes, 
early retirement,  job protection,  the right of association,  disclosure of 
information)  stemmed  from  company  agreements  (the  branch or inter-trade 
agreements then followed  their example). 
One  reason for this trend towards  'autonomy'  is the growing importance 
of certain issues.  Prosperity and  inflation have  made  control of real wages 
an urgent  issue,  which is easier to discuss in the establishment  or the 
undertaking  (or in a  branch comprising only a  very  small  number  of 
undertakings).  It was  primarily on  this issue that the shop  stewards in 
the UK  increased their power  and  developed the  'second bargaining system' 
which  came  to predominate over the  'first'  system  probably as a  result of 
the repeated constraints of incomes  policy and  wage  restraints.  It is also 
easiest  to discuss the conditions of working life and  its organization 
within the undertaking.  The  productivity agreements  in the UK  formalized 
(and thus made  it possible to adapt)  established  industrial practices. 
Elsewhere,  as in Belgium,  the discussions held by  works  councils fostered 
company  bargaining.  Lastly,  in Belgium,  Italy and  France,  and  sometimes  in 
the UK,  the new  employment  difficulties also gave rise to  company  bargaining, 
often with the participation of the public authorities,  local or not. 
Company  bargaining on  all these issues can  be  the more  autonomous  because 
it does far more  than merely act  as a  relay of branch bargaining.  It deals 
with issues which  cannot  or cannot  easily be dealt with at  branch level. 
When  it assumes this position,  however,  company  bargaining is in no  case 
very clearly linked to branch bargaining.  In some  cases this is because the 
delegates responsible for it, like the British  sho~_stewards, have a  very 
poorly defined position in the unions and  make  wide use of their independent 
powers  in the major undertakings,  especially when  they are in committee,  in 
some  cases because neither the unions nor the employers are quite  sure what 
the function of each bargaining level  is_.•  More  generally,  issues specific to 
the undertaking are  sometimes  not  covered by  formal  bargaining in its proper 
form.  This  can  be because unofficial agreements with many  implicit clauses 
(and all the misunderstandings this can  engender)  and  taking very untraditional 
forms  (management  reply to a  question,  minutes at  the end  of a  dispute,  internal 
'unilateral'  note  from  the management  settling an  issue after discussion)  are 
current,  as in the UK  and  France;  or because bodies which are not  really unions 
and  not  really responsible for bargaining deal with a  large number  of the issues. 
In the Federal  Republic of Germany  mo~t internal  questions are reserved to the 
works  council  and  a  careful line is drawn  between  the union contract  and  the 
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although it is far from  having the  same  responsibilities as the German  works 
council,  may  partly explain why,  in spite of the  fact  that  similar disputes 
developed as in the UK  and  in spite of the major  wave  of large company 
agreements,  company  bargaining has not  developed  in the  same  way  there as 
in the UK  and  has remained much  more  restricted and  informal. 
The  changes  in bargaining structures,  such as  the development  of company 
bargaining,  are not  the outcome  of any premeditated plan or the  implementation 
of a  programme.  They  are the result of taking given opportunities to settle 
an issue rather than based  on  any consistent  resolve by  one party or the 
other.  Not  surprisingly,  therefore,  there is no  automatic  co-ordination 
between the different bargaining levels and  methods.  It must  also  be  pointed 
out that attempts to achieve  such  co~ordination have  not  been very successful. 
Relations between the various levels remain very  unstable and  there has been 
no  systematic allocation of the issues involved to particular channels of 
discussion. 
In 1971  in the UK  the attempts to create order in this area were  made  by 
law,  contrary to the British tradition of very reluctant  state intervention 
(if not  abstention),  perhaps because the dual  nature of bargaining methods 
was  more  established there than elsewhere.  Without  wanting to analyse the 
now  defunct  Industrial Relations Act,  it may  be  said that its objective 
was  to bring company  discussions back under the authority of the unions, 
to  increase union authority and  the responsibility of the associations, 
and  to make  the contractual  commitment  of the agreement  more  explicit by 
enabling it to be  endorsed legally.  The  failure of this law,  due to the 
firm opposition of the unions and  the lukewarm  support of the employers, 
cannot  be explained only in terms of loyalty to tradition and  protest at 
any innovations inspired by  the U.S.A.  example,  £or  some  provisions 
which shift bargaining outside the purely private area of the gentleman's 
agreement  were  in fact  also  embodied  in the  1975  law.  What  this failure 
does  show  is the difficulty of trying to discipline from  above the trend 
towards decentralized action which  leads to  company  bargaining,  and of 
drawing into the contract an area which more  than  ever involves constant 
and  dynamic  relations between the two  sides of industry. 
In Italy,  on  the contrary,  the attempt  in the  1960s  to organize 
bargaining at different levels,  by  the contrattazione articolata, or 
articulated bargaining,  was  reflected in the agreements themselves.  The 
national  agreements  included  'referral'  clauses which  specified and 
demarcated the subjects which  could also be negotiated in the undertaking 
(more  precisely,  the  'rinvio'  was  at first organized on three levels) and 
also  comprised  a  'truce'  or  'union.peace'  clause.  Today  this system has 
practically disappeared  in industry although in principle it still exists 
in trade and  banking.  The  discussion may  now  take place in the undertaking 
again,  at  any time and  on  any  subject,  whether or not the issue is dealt 
with in the branch agreement.  The  bargaining takes place on all fronts and 
is no  longer  'articulated'  in the strict sense of the word.  As  we  said earlier, 
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and  making  the branch agreement  responsible for laying down  programmes  and 
approaches.  Similarly,  in France the rather vague  attempts to distinguish 
between  'perfect'  (non-extendable)  and  'imperfect'  (which can be renegotiated 
in the undertaking)  branch agreements have  long been put  aside.  Bargaining 
takes place at three levels but  is not  organized  among  the three levels. 
In other countries,  such as Belgium,  the inter-trade associations and 
the branches (the sector) have  complex reciprocal  relations (until early 
1977  the branches tended to wait  for the associations).  The  allocation of 
functions between the national and  the regional  level is often far from 
clear.  Lastly,  there is an evident  lack of co-ordination between the  joint 
and  the tripartite national meetings.  In spite of the great  number  of 
organizations and  institutions, much  vagueness remains.  In Denmark  there 
is only union representation at the various levels,  as in Italy and 
especially in the UK.  But  the number  of unofficial  strikes (mostly an 
a  small  scale)  shows  that the co-ordination is far from  perfect there 
either. 
In Ireland,  the radicalization of national  trade unions has  led them 
to  concern themselves more  and  more  directly in problems  considered internal 
to the undertaking. 
Without  wishing to  suggest  any paradoxes,  we  could  say that the case 
where  least problems arise is where  there is no  co-ordination at all between 
the different_levels,  as in the Federal  Republic  of Germany,  because of the 
separation between  the area and  methods  of co-determination with the works 
council  and  those of bargaining with the union. 
In the absence of any  formal  co-ordination,  is there at least  some 
evidence of a  'rational' allocation of bargaining issues between  the 
various levels ?  To  some  extent there is, as we  noted in the context 
of inter-trade bargaining.  In Italy and  Denmark  the guaranteed wage 
cannot  be decided  by  the branch.  Similarly it is more  logical, if not 
necessary,  to discuss the sliding scale  (eg in Italy and  the Netherlands) 
and  unemployment  benefits (France)  at the highest  level.  Obviously,  decisions 
on  national  pay  policy,  where  this can be  negotiated  (Denmark,  Ireland, 
Netherlands)  clearly fall within the confederations'  terms of reference. 
Yet  what  remains most  notable,  apart  from  the  small  number  of cases 
where  the nature of the issues at  stake demands  it, is the arbitrary nature 
of the allocation of issues between the various levels. 
Why  is it that  in the UK  supplementary pension schemes  tend to be 
formulated  on  a  company  by  company  basis with the result that a  recent 
act  proposes first of all to regularize these measures rather than to 
merge  them  again into a  larger whole  ?  The  deciding factor is not  the 
desire for a  reasonable allocation of responsibilities but  company  habits 
and  the delay of the national unions  in considering the question.  Is it 
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specific to a  branch of industry ?  A system of inter-trade adjustment  would 
surely seem  preferable,  especially during a  period of high unemployment  when 
unemployment  strikes very unequally depending on  the branch.  The  reason for 
this choice lies more  in the vitality of bargaining by  sectors.  Is it natural 
that  job evaluation should be  incorporated in the Fiat company  agreement  ? 
Elsewhere it would  be negotiated by  the branch;  but the decision to deal 
with it at this level primarily shows  the resolve of the unions  (accepted 
by  the employers)  to link this issue to the organization of work  and  to 
influence this organization and  also to bring the weight  of the workers' 
delegates to bear.  Was  it really necessary in France to  spend  two  years 
negotiating an agreement  on  the conditions of working life at inter-trade 
level  ?  This subject  could have lent itself well  to talks close to the 
undertaking,  but it is evident that the employers  wanted  to keep  a  certain 
distance in order to lay down  guidelines. 
From  these and  other examples it is clear that  the choice of bargaining 
level is only very partially dictated by  the actual nature of the subjects 
to be discussed  .•  It is based far more  on  the strategic concerns of both 
parties.  The  unions are concerned to mobilize their forces as best they can, 
to arouse the employees'  interest and  to offer them  tangible results.  The 
employers want  to avoid any overlap of measures or multiplication of pressures. 
Where  can the two  parties best find points of agreement  and  opportunities for 
joint progress ?  Within each organization,  who  takes the initiative, relays 
it, supports it, controls it ?  Among  the organizations,  is there any 
institutional means  of coming  to an arrangement or reaching agreement  ? 
We  have pointed often enough to the emergence  in the bargaining system 
of new  issues which  favour inter-trade discussions or company  discussions 
for this to be  clear.  We  do  not mean  that the allocation of issues to one 
or the other is merely a  question of chance or opportunity.  But  this 
allocation can be  explained less by  any  economic  reasoning than by  the 
logic of contact and  confrontation,  less by the  'rational' criteria used 
to allocate responsibilities on  an organization chart  than by  the social 
movements  which bring new  subjects to the fore.  The  conditions of working 
life are largely a  company  question,  not  just because it is more  convenient 
and  practical to deal  with them  at this level but  particularly because the 
movement  which  put  them  on  the agenda was  born within the undertaking and 
because in several countries the employers and/or unions have  agreed or 
decided to respond directly to this movement  and  to draw their support 
from  it. Wage  restraints can hardly be discussed at anything but  confederal 
level;  what  is more  important  is whether or not  the confederations agree to 
assume  actual political responsibility (ie a  responsibility of the same 
nature as a  decision by the public authorities,  which takes the national 
interest rather than individual  interests as its point of reference),  or 
to help combat  inflation (this responsibility iB  political in another sense 
too,  since it is assumed  in the well-defined conditions of a  parliamentary 
and  government  majority). 
The  changes  in powers  (the militancy or support of the employees  in the 
case of the unions,  the capacity to deal  with and  respond to their problems 
in the case of the employers)  and  the changes in means  of action therefore 
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difficulties of co-ordination more  clearly;  they are related not  only to 
the tangled nature of the issues or to the chance  way  in which issues 
attract attention but are due  rather to  the diversity of resources and 
approaches,  to the fact  that  social  events have led the organizations to 
adopt  several strategies at the  same  time.  For it is the strategies which 
must  be co-ordinated or at least reconciled. 
3.3  Bargaining procedures 
We  are not  using the  term  procedures in its strict legal  sense  (formalities, 
necessary stages before the bargaining becomes  valid)  but  in the wider and 
perhaps less rigorous  sense of the approach and  conduct  of the two  sides of 
industry during the bargaining.  This  cannot  be  examined  in detail,  for to 
our knowledge  there is no  systematic  study comparing the bargaining procedures 
in the nine countries today.  In the absence of any  such study,  which would  be 
a  very useful aid to understanding the practical  scope of the rules of law 
and  the extent to which  the strategies of the two  sides are based  on  them, 
we  must  confine ourselves to a  few  general  remarks. 
Bargaining procedures  can  be laid down  by  law,  which at the very least 
fixes the general rules,  with the more  or less substantial participation of 
the tribunals  (obviously more  significant in common  law countries).  But  they 
are also laid down  in part  by  the two  sides of industry themselves,  either 
implicitly by  the habits they have adopted,  or explicitly by  agreements in 
due  form. 
The  role of the law is quite clear.  Even  in the UK  the official doctrine 
has long been that of abstention by  the public authorities; this neutrality, 
at first reserved then benevolent,  was  equivalent  to approval  of a  number 
of basic bargaining principles.  The  tendency in all countries over the last 
twenty or thirty years to promote  collective bargaining and  to give it more 
autonomy  has by  an apparent  paradox led instead to increased legislation on 
procedures,  in order to give more  facilities for meeting,  mutual  recognition 
and  the development  and  conclusion of bargaining.  Thus  the  1975  Act  in the 
UK  conferred  on  a  joint  service the mediating function for recognition of 
the unions  by  the management.  The  conclusions of the Advisory Conciliation 
and  Arbitration Service are not  binding but if an  employer rejects them  the 
union is entitled to  seek redress  from  the Central Arbitration Committee  on 
the  substance of its claims.  In  France the  1971  law obliges the two  parties 
to meet  if one  of them  so  requests;  it also  enforces discussions at regular 
intervals  (wages must  be  examined  at least  every year).  In the UK  the new 
rules which  oblige the  employer to provide the unions with the information 
necessary to the proper procedure of the bargaining have been  specified by 
the same  joint service,  ACAS,  in a  draft  code of practice (the scale and 
precision of the  information that may  be required are striking;  the draft 
code has  four headings  :  pay,  conditions of service,  employment,  productivity 
and  financial  data).  If the employer refuses to disclose the relevant  information, 
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union recognition. 
In this case,  the trend in the law is clear :  it is to produce the 
maximum  amount  o£  negotiation and  to provide the means  £or this,  to avoid 
where  possible any  settlement o£  questions o£  substance,  and  to associate 
the two  sides in implementing the procedure.  Although it does not  go  nearly 
as far,  the French  1971  law was  drafted in the same  spirit (and,  we  repeat, 
consultation o£  the two  sides o£  industry has assumed  a  form  equivalent to 
agreement). 
Kany  o£  the procedures may  also be laid down  in the agreement itself. 
In Denmark,  the main principles o£  bargaining,  including that of-
industrial peace imposed  by  the agreements,  were  laid down  in an agreement 
o£  1910  ('the norms')  between  DA  and  LO.  The  principal rules o£  the actual 
negotiation originate £rom  an agreement  o£  1936.  This very £irm stability 
does not exclude  the possibility o£  flexibility,  £or the 1976  bargaining 
was  based on  derogating rules on  which  the two  confederations had  agreed 
informally.  In Italy the main  body  o£  bargaining and  dispute procedures is 
the result o£  practice. This applies to the introduction and  then disap-
pearance o£  'articulated' bargaining and  to the setting up  o£  internal 
committees and  their replacement by works  councils to create a  union 
bargaining unit within the undertaking (the 1970 law endorsed this 
innovation).  In the  UK  the procedure agreements,  whether  tacit or formal, 
are more  the work  o£  the branches.  In 1976  the engineering industry renewed 
its procedure agreement,  after a  break o£  a  year,  and  introduced into it a 
status quo  clause  (eg regarding dismissals :  i£ a  dismissal is disputed, 
the contract o£  service remains valid pending the results of talks). 
There are other,  unilateral procedural codes.  In the Federal Republic 
o£ Germany  the DGB  laid down  the recommended  rules o£  conduct which  its 
members  generally obey  (with regard to calling strikes or approving 
agreements).  Often these rules are tacit, £or practices can vary widely 
£rom  one  branch to another in a  same  country.  In France,  the UI  and  the 
Federal Republic of Germany  there are more  similarities between printing 
industry bargaining than between the branch bargaining procedures in 
general within each country. 
More  generally,  even when  the law is fairly precise and detailed,  the 
two  sides o£  industry can apply it differently.  In France,  the law makes 
it possible to conclude fixed-term or indefinite-term agreements;  the 
second  system became  dominant  there as a  result of practice,  with the 
major consequences this implies.  In Denmark  it is customary £or agreements 
to expire on  the same  date,  thus making it easier £or the confederations 
to exercise control. The  law o££ers opportunities which  some  countries 
have made  use o£  and  developed according to custom  (at times the law  simply 
recognizes the custom,  as has been.the case in several countries with 
company  agreements). 
137 At  a  rapid glance and  subject  to the conclusions that may  arise from  a 
more  detailed study,  it is tempting to believe that this sharing of functions 
between the law and  the decision of the parties themselves influences the 
very nature of the procedure followed.  When  the parties lay down  a  good  part 
of the procedure,  whether because of the relative abstention of the law and 
the importance of branch agreements  (the UK),  or because of the vague nature 
of the legislative texts which  leave much  roo~ for the parties'  own 
interpretation (France,  Italy),  surely they tend  to give procedural  rules 
priority over  substantive rules and are more  concerned with the possibility 
of discussing a  question than with obtaining a  definitive response to it ? 
And  in this case,  surely it becomes  even more  difficult to  separate agreements 
over rights and  agreements over interests,  the interpretation (or management) 
of the contract  from  the determination of the contract.  This theory may  be 
open to question and  certainly needs  correcting.  Perhaps Denmark  is the 
country where  the procedures are based most  firmly on  the terms of the 
agreement  and  where  a  rigorous distinction is made  between disputes over 
rights and disputes over interests.  No  doubt  the  theory would  seem  more 
firmly based if it also  covered the  frequency of meetings and  the flexibility 
of the arrangements.  But  such as it is, it seems  to raise an  important  question. 
Lastly,  discussion of the origin of rules of procedure  should  not  mask 
the fact  that there are very profound differences between countries in the 
extent to which procedures are formalized.  One  of the most  striking features 
of industrial relations in Italy is the completely informal  nature of 
procedures,  which  leaves great  scope for the imagination and  even for 
improvisation.  This is also true to a  large extent  in France;  and  in both 
cases,  it is despite the long-standing legal tradition (and  Roman  Law)  and 
the fact  that  specialists in industrial relations were  and  still are primarily 
lawyers.  This  informality can perhaps be traced back to the origin of this 
body  of law,  which  stemmed  from  the two  sides of  industry rather than from 
the State,  and  the fact  that  the courts have  had  little share in its 
formulation  (there is a  very great difference compared  with the Federal 
Republic of Germany). 
This difference has  important  consequences  on  bargaining procedures 
(see 3.3.3.). 
A purely legal  study would  have to make  a  detailed comparison between 
the main  procedural  rules,  such as recognition of the bargaining parties 
(and possibility of pluralist representation),  obligation  (or not)_to 
bargain and  content  of this obligation,  or methods of conciliation or 
mediation.  And  once  a  valid agreement  had  been  concluded it would  also 
have to  consider whether it is of fixed-term or not,  the nature of the 
obligations it involves  (eg industrial  peace clause),  the procedures for 
(1)  The  following section attempts to give a  generalized account  which 
deserves to be more  fully developed  and  given more  detailed demonstration. 
It might  be well  to recall in this connection that although  I  have borrowed 
many  facts and  ideas ·from·my  colleagues,  I  alone am  responsible for the 
conclusions. 
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' cancelling or renewing it, and  so  forth,  to give only a  brief and  incomplete 
list.  We  shall  leave this task to the legal  specialists.  What  we  shall 
concentrate on  is showing the consistency between  the various procedural 
methods  by presenting two  main  types of bargaining procedure - at the risk 
of simplif.ying rather crudely. 
In order to do  so  we  shall employ  the distinction Otto  Kahn-Freund  made, 
as regards industrial relations in the UK,  between two  types of bargaining, 
contractual  (or static) bargaining and  instituitonal  (or dynamic)  bargaining (1). 
We  believe that with slight modifications this distinction applies to two 
fairly general types of procedure,  for the UK  is no  longer an isolated case. 
Otto  Kahn-Freund  characterized the British 'institutional' method  as 
follows  :  In contrast to cases where  the parties meet  only to bargain and 
conclude an agreement  and  then separate until the next  bargaining process, 
there exists a  permanent  institution where  the two  parties are represented, 
to which  they have delegated their powers  and  which  prepares the agreements 
(Otto  Kahn-Freund  notes that a  similar institutional continuity exists in 
the Belgian  joint committees).  Secondly,  the agreements thus formulated are 
not  really contracts,  for they do  not  have  the  same  legal validity (until 
recently,  collective agreements were  not  regarded  as contracts in the legal 
sense of the term  in the UK  and  the  same  applied  in Belgium  before the law 
of 5 December  1968  on  collective agreements).  Thirdly,  since it is always 
possible to re-examine an issue,  they tend to reinterpret a  decision that 
has been  taken earlier or to take a  new  decision,  to be  open-ended rather 
than of fixed duration,  Fourthly,  since the same  institution often  'makes 
the law'  and  interprets it, plays both the legislative and  the  judicial 
role,  it becomes difficult to tell the two  functions apart  so  that the 
distinction between  conflicts of right and  conflicts of interest has 
little meaning.  Fifthly,  such talks are conducted  in a  very similar 
spirit to that of common  law  (although the writer notes that  common 
law  countries such as the United States and  Australia make  a  careful 
distinction between the two  kinds of dispute and  that  Belgium,  which 
has a  'systematic'  law,  at the  same  time has  'institutional'  bargaining). 
Lastly,  since the main  aim  is to settle issues as they arise, this 
method  gives priority to procedural  rules over substantive rules,  to the 
bargaining machinery over its outcome,  the contract or agreement.  The 
writer notes that,  as  shown  by  the importance attached to  custom  and 
practice,  this approach,  like common  law itself which is the product  of 
the corporations of lawyers,  is linked to the heritage of the medieval 
guilds. 
We  believe it is possible to generalize these  features,  which as a 
whole  are particularly British (and  some  features  of which  have already 
been relegated to the past  in the UK). 
(1)  Otto  Kahn-Freund,  Labour  and  the Law,  Stevens,  London,  1972,  pp.  56-59 
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In France the joint committee must  meet  often because of the diversity of 
subjects to be discussed and  the frequency with which it is called upon 
to interpret;  this does not mean  that it looks  anyt~ing like the Whitley 
Committee,  but it does  have one of its characteristics,  namely  frequency 
of meetings,  the presence  (with some  variations)  of the same  people and 
contihuity of decisions'and~preoccupations. Although· the  inten~~ty and 
frequency of conflict are greater in Italy,  surely the same  applies there, 
especially when  the talks about  renewing a  three-year agreement  are spread 
over several months,  and  sometimes nearly a  year.  American  studies have 
shown  the existence of a  continuous bargaining process concealed behind 
administration of the contract,  while the settlement of individual  cases 
makes  up  a  kind of jurisprudence and  establishes new  rules.  In such a  case, 
continuous bargaining plays a  minor although not  insignificant role.  But  in 
the cases we  have  just mentioned,  where discussions ~re often reopened,  if 
only as a  result of the alternation between branch and  company  discussions, 
it may  become  central. 
In France and  Italy the agreement  obviously does have  a  legal value 
(in both countries there is the  same  tendency to· apply increas'ingly pften to 
the courts and  in Italy especially the  judges have assumed  an increasingly 
important role since 1970).  But  if one  looks more  closely,  one does £ind 
major similarities.  In France in many  cases the two  parties agree not  to 
go  before the courts  (or where  possible to  lend a  deaf ear to the  judges' 
decisions).  A kind of infra-law prevails in occupational  practice,  a  local 
law which  remains outside the courts'  terms of reference because it is not 
subject to them  and  which deals with questions as  important  as the real 
definition of the right to strike or lock-out.  This phenomenon  is extremely 
common,  if one  interprets the reluctance to go  before a  court as due  to the 
awareness of having a  separate (or,  more  precisely,  particularist) set of 
rules specific to the trade,  occupation or branch  concerned.  It often becomes 
evident during the bargaining as  some  recent disputes in France and  Italy 
clearly show. 
In France,  the preference for open-ended  agreements is endorsed by 
practice and  law  (a number  of rules forbid the expiry of a  contract  from 
cancelling out all its effects).  For a  long time  the effect of this was  to 
bring the agreement  closer to the regulation (analogous to an act of public 
law)  than to the contract and  to make  it more  difficult to modify it since 
meetings were  few  and  difficult.  B,y  contrast, if this preference is 
accompanied  by  a  certain continuity of bargaining,  the contrary occurs. 
What  is most  important  no  doubt  is not  the fixed  term of the agreement 
itself but  the industrial peace clause which  accompanies it. If it is not 
forbidden to reopen the discussion at any time and on  any  subject  so  that 
the bargaining is open-ended,  the agreement  cannot  have  a  genuinely 
contractual  character.  If moreover,  there are frequent  contacts,  continuity 
can be  ensured  (naturally,  failing any·agreement  between the'parties7  this 
can also mean  a  constant  reopening of the question and  lead to disorder). 
French and  Italian law make  a  formal  distinction between conflicts of 
right and  conflicts of interest which  is important  in theory.  However,  if 
the claimants.  whether· staff delegates or--workers'  delegates,  no  longer 
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and  a  claim  (demand  for a  new  right), if little appeal  is made  to the courts 
and  that appeal  is mainly  limited to the parties'  rights after separation, 
and  lastly if it is not  equally always  easy to distinguish between 
renegotiation and  interpretation of the agreements,  especially if contacts 
between the different  levels of bargaining are complex and  poorly regulated, 
this distinction,  valid in theory,  loses much  of its practical  import.  Here 
again,  continuity of negotiation,  where  it exists,  erodes it to  some  extent. 
In our opinion,  the priority given to procedural rules over substantive 
rules is one of the most  striking,  if least remarked,  features of the 
bargaining trend  in France over the last ten years. 
This is not  only because many  clauses,  presented traditionally in the 
agreements but  little used  in the past,  have assumed  a  real  importance 
(interpretation clauses)  but  also and  above all because company  practice, 
and  especially company  disputes,  have made  one  of the main areas of concern 
of the two  parties,  unions and management,  that of  contact~, of ways  and 
means  of establishing contact with each other.  The  leitmotiv of the desire 
to bargain on  the part of the unions and of the  search for responsible 
partners on the part of the  employers are sufficient  evidence of this.  Even 
the frequently irregular procedures  employed  are  evidence of the priority 
attached to  communication - perhaps one  should add,  direct  communication 
between those concerned.  The  distrust of all institutional mediation 
procedures derives from  the  same  reason  (as does  the acceptance of an 
ad  hoc mediator who  will not  impose  any  external  rules). 
In Italy,  reference has  even  been made  in agreements at undertaking and 
branch level, particularly in these of 1976,  to  procedimentalizzazione  : 
the main  part of the agreements in which management  undertakes,  for example, 
in the chemical  industry,  to  communicate  their investment  plans to the trade 
unions and  from  time to time  review their implementation with them,  contains 
a  strict timetable for meetings,  the details of information to be  supplied, 
and  the  form  of discussion.  Th~se regulated exchanges of views do  not  lead 
to a  contract.  But  since they could always  be  settl~ by  open dispute they 
are more  than a  consultation.  If all goes well  they do  more  than endorse 
the absence of conflict  (this is sufficient for management),  but  they also 
exert  ~ positive influence,  probably mutual,  by aligning the  ideas of both 
parties and  thus  improve  the chances of anticipating disputes.  (1) 
Lastly,  the similarity between this practice and  common  law with its 
traditions specific to an occupational  community  seems  most  enlightening 
to us.  It is not  that  France or Italy have  abandoned  the deductive rigour 
of Roman  law to adopt  common  law.  But  surely one  could regard this corporative 
tradition primarily as a  means  of protecting the rules and  habits of an 
occupational  group against  outside rules and methods,  above all those of 
the state and  public administration ?  This is clear-cut when  the basic 
element  is a  craft,  with its skills and  secrets.  But  other sources of 
particularism exist  :  even if it involves no  craft as such  (no  apprenticeship, 
(1)  Umberto  Romagnoli  and  Tiziano  Treu,  I  Sindacati  in Italia :  storia di 
una strategia (1945-1976),  Bologna,  Il Mulino,  1977,  pp.  273-278. 
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rules and  autonomy.  Specialized glass-workers,  the drivers,  delivery-men and 
salesmen of food,  railway employees  whatever their grade,  may  form  communities 
of this kind.  As  we  said earlier,  no  theory of the particular.communities of 
collective action has yet  been  put  forward.  But  it is clear that  whatever the 
nature of these communities,  it is in the rules of working relations  (and 
especially in the set of rules which often do  not  go  beyond  the verbal  stage 
or at least are merely internal regulations),  that they express their 
particularity,  or rather their particularism, vis-a-vis the universal 
pretensions of state law.  The  links between the rules of industrial 
relations and  those of common  law do  not  derive from  any historical 
continuity but lie rather in the approach,  an approach  from  below 
which  primarily reflects the habits and  convictions of a  community 
and  asserts the irreducible nature of its experience,  refusing to 
submit  to outside criteria or be measured  by  an outside body. 
Institutional or continuous bargaining is not  therefore a  British 
speciality or curiosity.  It is one  Of  the major types of bargaining.  It 
is practised,  though with major difference of detail,  by the UK,  Ireland, 
Italy,  France and  to  some  extent  Belgium.  On  the other hand,  the contractual 
procedure  (periodic,  limited-term agreements with an industrial peace clause 
and  only exceptionally giving the possibility of reopening the discussions, 
making  a  clear distinction between disputes of right and  of interest,  giving 
priority to  substantive rules and  the contract  over procedural rules and  the 
'machinery')  is the model  followed  by  the Federal  Republic of Germany, 
Luxembourg,  Denmark  and  the Netherlands.  Here  again,  hawever,  there are 
major differences,  involving for instance the role of the government  in 
the Netherlands or that of the confederations in the Netherlands and Denmark. 
The  two  major types must  be distinguished in order to make  comparisons 
more  intelligible and  effective.  Surely the failure of the  1971  law  in the 
UK  was  largely due to measures of a  'contractual'  kind  (in this case measures 
very close to those  found  in the United States) being grafted onto an 
'instituitional'  system? Surely the limitations of the French  'contractual 
policy'  (especially the difficulty of making  the undertaking more  strict 
by  imposing time-limits and  procedures for denouncing it) have the same 
origins ? 
Moreover,  these two  types of procedure perhaps reflect two  major trends, 
the balance between which makes  up  the autonomy  of the industrial relations 
system.  If that  system is to  some  extent a  delegation of power  by the state 
which  allows the parties to make  their own  legislation, this delegated 
legislation will no  doubt  enable those concerned  both to protect their 
particularity (which is why  delegation represents more  than a  saving of 
energy by  the public authorities but  also respect  for their particularism) 
and  bring them  within the general rules.  The  two  parties do  not  play the 
same  role as regards  satisf,ying  th~se two  requirements.  In general  the union 
tends to represent the particularities of the community  of employees  (often 
of their traditions vis-a-vis economic_ pressures);  its function is more  that 
of expression,  from  below,  of bringing to light the employees'  needs, 
acquired values or habits,  although it may  of course aim  for a  much  wider 
class solidarity.  B,y  reason of their job and  their responsibilities, the 
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reluctant to accept  everything required by  the public administration.  So 
although neither party can be  aligned entirely with either one  of these 
requirements,  the  employees'  unions place more  emphasis  on  the first,  the 
employers more  on  the second.  For the same  reason,  the great waves  of claims, 
especially those due  to the shift of power  towards the shop  floor and  to 
the easing of social  and  economic  constraints,  give priority to the first 
requirement.  A more  stable social balance favours  the second  requirement. 
The  fact  that the three countries affected most  severely by  the cr1s1s 
in industrial relations in 1968-1973  are also those where  continuous 
bargaining has  increased in importance is not  a  matter of chance,  if this 
interpretation is correct.  The  assertion of special requirements goes hand 
in hand  with more  inward-looking bargaining which  is more  protected from 
outside influences. 
Lastly if continuous bargaining is defined as.a general  bargaining 
trend,  this will avoid any  confusion between  cases where  it is firmly 
established such as the UK  and  cases where it ia recent  and  fragile,  not 
yet  fully embodied  in the rules of law,  as in France and  Italy.  Frequent 
bargaining may  be  equivalent to a  standing committee,  but  with one 
difference  :  it is far more  vulnerable to the short-term economic  and 
political trend and  can easily (as happened  in France)  become  less 
frequent  or even  rare.  So  it is fragile and  liable to be eclipsed. 
What  can be said - and this is the importance of the distinction -
is that the crisis which would  be  engendered  by  blocking such a 
system is not  of the  same  nature and will  not  call for the same 
remedies as the crisis of a  system where  the contractual  element 
predominates. 
In describing two  types of bargaining we  have  sought  to define two 
systems  (with the inevitable simplification to demonstrate their internal 
logic).  For the  same  reason our definition stressed the rules of the  system, 
in particular the negotiating rules.  But  our more  recent  thoughts on  the 
matter have  revealed that the system of industrial relations and  the political 
system of which it is a  part  have more  than one  specific feature  in common, 
as also between the former  and  the national  culture,  particularly the political 
culture in which it is immersed. 
Another characteristic of the procedures has  been  inadequately studied 
in our view.  A comparison between the nine countries reveals its importance. 
That  is quite simply the fact,  as far as the parties are concerned,  of being 
forced  (even if of their own  free will)  to  follow  a  fixed  procedure with 
very little option,  or,  on  the contrary of being able to  choose between 
various methods.  Many  excellent  analyses of bargaining procedures made  in 
the United States concentrate only on  American,  ie very rigid procedure, 
so  they cannot  easily be transposed to  systems where  various choices are 
possible. 
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bargaining.  Will  the union which wants to raise an issue do  so  within the 
undertaking,  the branch or at  confederal  level  ?  What  level will the employer 
who  replies accept  ?  In  some  countries the customs and  rules leave very little 
choice.  This  seems  to be  the case in Denmark,  and  to  some  extent  in the UK, 
where  the branch agreement  is tending to have  less importance.  B.Y  contrast, 
other countries seem  to offer a  wide  margin of freedom,  ranging from  shop-
floor strikes to inscription in a  plant or company  movement,  from  local to 
branch bargaining.  That  is certainly the case of France and  Italy and 
sometimes of Belgium. 
The  choice may  be between consultation (within the undertaking)  and 
bargaining (external method).  In France,  for  instance,  a  claim may  pass via 
the staff delegates or,  although this is not  its legal function,  via the 
works  committee,  or be processed by  the bargaining machinery.  But  in the 
Federal  Republic of Germany,  the distinction between matters pertaining to 
the works  council  and  the agreement  (Betriebsvereinbar  and  those 
pertaining to the union and  the contract  Tarifvertrag  is in principle 
a  rigorous one  and  to a  large extent it is equally rigorous in practice 
(although there are frontier disputes).  In the first  case there is a 
choice,  in the second there is none  (or at least  very little). 
The  possibility of choice may  derive from  the  coexistence of trade 
structures and  company  or industry structures in the employees'  representation. 
In some  sectors in the UK  a  claim may  pass via one  channel  or another.  Does 
this also apply in Ireland,  and  is the distinction not  much  more  clear-cut 
in Denmark  ? 
Lastly,  there may  also be external alliances,  support  from  other branches 
or public opinion.  Certainly public opinion is always  important  to the 
bargaining parties,  although only in the medium  or long term  and  only 
indirectly.  But  there are wide  variations between  countries  (and  even between 
branches and  between  types of dispute within each  country)  as regards the 
immediate and  short-term importance of public opinion.  Evidently it is 
more  important  in France and  Italy than in the Federal  Republic of Germany 
and  the Netherlands. 
We  could list other sources of variation and  other possibilities of 
choice.  Those  we  have  mentioned at least  suffice to  show  the consequences 
this factor may  have. 
No  doubt  the most  simple consequence lies in variety of possible 
strategies open  to the parties.  In a  rigid system,  a  party engaged  in 
bargaining can take only a  relatively small  number  of decisions.  In some 
cases, all the strategies may  be po·ssible.  The  moment  the number  of choices 
increases,  this is no  longer the case and  the range of possible methods  and 
situations increases rapidly. 
This  increase in variety is based largely on  a  difference in the nature 
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in a  game  which  has well-defined rules.  In the  second he  chooses the game 
he will play.  In other words,  the strategic decisions relating to dispute 
and bargaining are decisions on  the very nature of the framework,  on  levels 
of discussion,  on  the nature and  scale of the interested parties (an employer, 
a  regional or national association;  a  group of craftsmen,  a  workshop,  a  plant, 
semi-skilled workers),  on  the external alliances that  can be established 
(local popularity or regional,  branch or trade solidarity). 
So  the predictability of the results varies greatly partly because the 
possibility of choosing the  'game'  makes  the results indeterminable and 
because the relevant  resources are consequently much  more  variable.  It is 
not very difficult to predict the outcome  of pay  negotiations within a 
traditional  framework  if one  knows  the basic data.  It is impossible to 
predict  the outcome  of a  company  dispute which may  be transformed into a 
symbol  of the difficulties of a  particular region  (such as Wallonia or 
Brittany)  or category of employees. 
In some  cases this procedural variety may  have a  specific result  :  the 
'politicization' of the talks or dispute,  which may  draw  support  from  public 
opinion or the local or national authorities.  This means  that  in the public 
mind  the discussions will be linked to divergent  political directions and/or 
be  based  on  a  governmental  or legislative decision.  This  case deserves to  be 
considered separately since this is when  the industrial relations system 
loses its autonomy. 
Lastly,  fixed  and  variable procedures probably do  not  involve the  same 
type of negotiators or organizational leaders.  The  professional negotiator 
will find it easier to act  within fixed  systems as will the man  whose  main 
virtue lies in his in-depth knowledge  of a  trade,  an occupation or a  social 
environment. 
This division into two  opposing types is clearly a  simplification,  in 
extreme  cases  even  a  caricature.  Yet  we  consider it most  important  to draw 
attention to these two  trends in bargaining procedures in order to facilitate 
the  exchange of views  and  experiences between  experts and  to establish a 
meaningful  comparison. 
4.  NATURE  AND  ROLE  OF  COLLECTIVE  BARGAINING 
4.1  Worker  participation in company  decisions 
management 
bargaining and  joint 
Joint management  or co-determination  (Mitbestimmung)  is of course not 
a  new  practice since in the Federal  Republic of Germany  it dates back to 
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the employees  in company  decisions since this lay at  the basis of the laws 
which  set up  works  councils or committees in several countries in the aftermath 
of the Second  World  War.  Yet  it is also true that  there has been a  new  surge 
of interest in the last ten years in the idea of participation and  joint 
management,  stimulated no  doubt  by  the preparation of the EEC  fifth Directive 
which was  reflected in several  countries by new  laws,  including the original 
country where  the idea was  born,  and  by  new  discussions and  new  projects. 
The  reasons for this renewed  interest are not  a  question of fashion or 
simply of a  new  current of ideas.  As  we  have  seen,  the workers'  increasing 
interest in their working conditions and  organization and  their growing 
concern with  job security posed questions which  concern the company  more 
directly than the branch and  which relate not  only to the results of the 
company  decisions but  to the decisions themselves.  In many  cases it was 
not  economical  or efficient or even  feasible to  intervene after the event 
in order to make  corrections.  So  it seemed  preferable to act  a  priori, 
before the decision.  Moreover,  the crisis in industrial relations produced 
more  grass-roots initiatives on  the  sho~ floor and  in the plant  and  thus 
also proposed the response  :  why  not  discuss matters with the employees 
themselves  in their workplace  ?  During this difficult period,  the Federal 
Republic of Germany  seemed  the country least disturbed by  the crisis.  To 
what  extent  could this success be explained by the original method  of 
achieving this participation,  by  Mitbestimmung  ? 
This was  not,  of course,  the only response.  There are other,  equally 
classical ones.  The  response to the emergence of problems  specific to the 
undertaking and  to  claims originating on  the  shop  floor can be  to bring 
the bargaining closer to the undertaking (betriebsnah),  a  method  which 
has appeared  in most  countries to  some  extent,  although very unequally 
(cr.  3.2.3).  The  response to a  priori participation in decisions can 
be bargaining,  or consultation within the undertaking.  It is clearly 
no  chance that the  second  wave  of legislation on  works  committees 
broadly coincided in time with the renewed  interest in joint management 
(cf.  2.3).  In industrial relations systems where  the centre of gravity 
lies in the branch of industry (or even at a  higher level as in Denmark 
and  the Netherlands),  the main  concern was  still to find methods of 
discussing at a  different  level, at company  or plant  level - and it is 
well  known  that  such a  change  cannot  occur without  profound  changes in 
the bargaining rules and  system.  Many  of the special  features of an 
industrial relations  system,  and  in particular many  of the procedural 
rules,  are related to the main  bargaining level used.  (1) 
So  it is somewhat  artificial to  separate,  as  we  have  done,  the discussion 
of works  committees  from  that of participation on  boards of directors or 
(1)  The  ILO  book,  mentioned earlier, Collective bargaining in the 
industrialized market  economy  countries,  from  which  we  have borrowed 
this conclusion notes,  for  instance,  that  company-bargaining makes 
grievance procedure.and union recognition rules more  necessary and 
makes  bargaining monopoly more  natural. 
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heading of joint management  and  not  of bargaining between trade union and 
professional association,  although here the undertaking is regarded  from 
two  different angles  (that of labour and  social decisions and  that of 
economic  decisions).  However,  in Belgium,  France,  the Netherlands,  both 
institutions are (or would  be,  since in the first  two  cases this is no 
more  than an assumption)  legally and  theoretically distinct.  It is also 
somewhat  artificial to consider  joint management  in the context of 
collective bargaining.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany  the two 
activities are separate,  both in terms of the institutions performing 
them  and  of the law  involved.  But  in some  countries at least bargaining 
can perform the same  functions which are attributed to  joint management. 
We  shall confine ourselves here to participation in the major  economic 
decisions of the undertaking.  We  must  examine  the different  forms  this 
participation has taken in the nine countries before trying to assess 
their consequences. 
In using the term  participation we  are not  presuming that this relates 
to an area of common  interest where  convergence of views  is the rule.  In 
some  cases,  on  the contrary,  there is a  very clear opposition of interest 
and  conflicting relations.  We  do  not  think this is a  difference of substance 
(who  would  dispute that there may  be divergence of opinion between management 
and  workers on  an employment  policy ?)  but  one of approach,  ie of the ways 
and means  of asserting divergent  points of view while yet  retaining the 
possibility of reaching a  decision. 
The  institutions allowing for a  degree of participation in decisions are 
radically different and  this difference tended to  increase between  1968  and 
1973,  the years of the great  wave  of strikes.  Have  they become  more  similar 
since ?  Certainly they have as regards discussions and  exchanges of views, 
but  their approaches still seem  to differ profoundly. 
The  first  type is the German  system,  backed  by law,  which  has been 
applied  since July 1976.  Apart  from  participating in the formulation of 
various organizational or reorganization decisions,  the employees  in 
undertakings with more  than 2000 staff (some  600  or  700  undertakings and 
nearly a  quarter of all  employees)  are represented by delegates elected 
(in some  cases put  forward  by  the union)  to the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat),  a  high-ranking management  body  which appoints the board 
of directors  (Vorstand).  Their number  is equal  to that of the representatives 
of the shareholders but  includes one representative of the senior executives 
(which is why  the DGB  does not  regard this as parity representation).  The 
rather complex voting system  tends in fact  to give the chairmanship to a 
representative of the employees.  If there is a  tied vote,  the chairman has 
an additional  vote in order to resolve the impasse. 
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although on the whole  it still remains to be  seen  how  the system will  work, 
the intention emerges  clearly.  While  ensuring that a  decision will always 
be reached and  theref9re giving greater weight  to  the shareholders'  votes 
in case of a  tie, the aim  is to associate the employees,  via their 
representatives,  very closely in the major  company  decisions on  a 
quasi-parity basis. 
The  laws of Luxembourg  (May  1974)  and  Denmark  (1973,  implemented  in 
early 1974)  were directly inspired by the German  example.  They  provide for 
minority employee  participation (one third in Luxembourg,  two  representatives 
in Denmark)  on  the board of directors (these boards have wider powers than 
the German  supervisory boards).  In Denmark  the law has a  very wide  scope 
since it covers all undertakings of more  than 50  employees  (the employees 
have already exercized their rights here  in one  thousand undertakings out 
of a  total of some  1900  involved).  When  it is on  this scale one may  well 
ask whether  joint management  has the same  meaning  as in the German  case. 
At  the other extreme is Italy where  employers  and  unions are equally 
reluctant to sit together on  the boards;  the  employers because they do  not 
want  to increase the unions'  powers  and  fear lest their presence would  make 
it impossible to reach any decisions,  the unions  because they are afraid to 
drop the substance for the  shadow,  exchange their real bargaining powers 
for a  semblance of participation in decisions.  Fbr Italy - and this is 
why  the case is interesting - is probably the country where  investment 
decisions,  the location and  nature of investments,  their effects on 
employment,  on  the restructuring of undertakings  or the organization of 
work,  are most  widely discussed a  priori.  But  this discussion takes place 
during collective bargaining,  by the classical methods  of bargaining and 
agreement.  Access to these decisions or,  to use union language,  'control' 
over these decisions is certainly a  union objective,  and  an objective which 
they attempted to uphold throughout  the crisis; and  in their view this is 
one of the major innovations of the great contractual drive of the years 
1968-1975.  But  this objective was  pursued and  achieved without  the unions 
losing their  'autonomy of dispute',  without  committing themselves in company 
decisions other than in terms of the clauses of an agreement  and  thus without 
forfeiting their right to  embark  on  dispute if a  problem arises.  At  company 
level, the works  councils adopt  the  same  attitude of informal  bargaining 
and  not  participation.  The  recent talks on  the German  model,  the  EEC  directive 
and  above all the scale of economic  commitments  assumed  by the unions  (why 
not  turn this into  joint management  ?),  do  not  seem  likely to lead to very 
radical legislative changes  (except  perhaps as a  result of instability in 
the political situation).  At  best they may  lead to a  law establishing a 
general obligation,  embodied  in various agreements,  jointly to  examine 
company  investments and  their effects on  employment.  (1) 
(1)  In a  system based on  bargaining and  which  has also always given only a 
very  small  place to consultation and  practically none  to  joint management, 
that of the United States,  the institutional  solution to this problem is 
identical  :  expansion of the area of subjects for negotiation.  Conversely, 
the Federal  Republic of Germany  considers it contrary to the law  (which 
includes working conditions among  collective bargaining issues)  that a 
collective agreement  should  cover  investment  matters. 
148 Belgium,  France  and  the UK  semm  very close to  Italy. 
In Belgium,  one  of the two  big union federations,  the CSC,  is in favour 
of a  formula with a  works  coupcil  similar to the  Betriebsrat and  a  tripartite 
supervisory board.  The  other,  the FGTB,  is against this and  instead aims at 
a  formula of  'worker control'  (it should be noted  that this is the  same  term 
as is used  in Italy) at all levels.  The  employers  are also opposed to a 
formula which  in their view requires a  community  of wiews  between the parties 
which is still a  distant_goal. 
In France,  the Sudreau Report  (March  1975)  proposed a  voluntary experiment 
with  'co-supervision'  formulas  (minority employee  pariticpation; their 
representatives would  be  exempted  from  any real  executive decisions;  the 
terminology is not  very precise here).  Even  this attenuated formula was  not 
greeted very favourably either by  the unions or the employers  (apart  from 
a  small  Catholic minority in both cases).  It may  find  some  favour  among 
politicans,  however,  and  may  have  a  chance of success in years to  come  as a 
result of the likely fluctuations in the short-term economic  trend.  But  even 
then,  the two  parties would  probably only use this method  as an additional 
channel  of information. 
Lastly,  in the UK  the Trade Union  Council's traditional lack of interest 
in joint management  seems  to have  gradually evolved  following the discussions 
provoked  by  the Donovan  Committee until their position was  completely reversed, 
as the Bullock Report  (1975)  was  drafted in response to the wishes of the 
majority of the unions.  This report  proposes a  single-tier board  (instead of 
the two-tier boards of German  and  French company  law),  with two  thirds of its 
members  made  up  equally of the shareholders and  the employees'  representatives 
(the latter elected by  the unions)  co-opting the other third  (2x + y).  A 
minority of unions and all the employers are violently opposed  to this system 
for very  similar reasons.  They  fear that this project will bring confusion 
between bargaining and  company  decisions.  The  Labour  Government  White  Paper, 
without  settling all the outstanding problems,  confirms a  major trend in the 
report  :  the wage-earners'  representatives will be trade  ~ion delegates or 
a  direct offshoot  of these delegates. 
The  Netherlands  stands apart  here.  The  1971  law which was  adopted 
unanimously by the Economic  and  Social  Committee  provided that  the boards 
of directors whould  henceforth co-opt  thei~~embers upon  proposals by the 
shareholders'  meeting or the works  committee  and  that these two  institutions 
would  have  a  right of veto  (multinationals were  excluded  from  this measure). 
More  time is required before the effects of this measure  can  be assessed. 
The  formula  involves  some  difficulties hawever.  The  Hoogovens  works  committee 
refused to exercise its rights.  The  NVV  Socialist  unions wants the works 
committee to become  a  Betriebsrat,  without  the presence of the  employer or 
his representatives and  with the right of veto on  certain decisions.  The 
CNV  Protestant union wants parity on  the board of directors. 
France,  on  the other hand,  has long had  a  kind of joint management 
(although it has  never called it by this name)  in several  large nationalized 
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representing the public authorities,  the users and the staff.  But  these 
councils have very limited powers  and  the strict  supervision of the state 
and  unstable representation of the users have  not  produced any original 
pattern of shared management.  The  Left  has prepared projects to  renew 
these structures. 
In 1977  Irela~d enacted a  bill designed to test a  system of staff 
participation on  the board  (there is only one  board)  of seven large national 
undertakings  (from lists presented by  the unions,  the staff elects one third 
of the board of directors).  At  present there is evidence that the hesitation 
and  caution prevailing on  both sides is giving place to growing confidence. 
The  aim  of this experiment  is to  serve as an  example  for the private sector. 
More  generally there exist many  formulas to associate staff representatives 
and  management  representatives in some  aspects of personnel management 
(promotion,  discipline)  in the public sector in France and  Italy.  In this 
case the unions do  not  feel  that  joint management  threatens to  'integrate 
them  in the system'. 
Obviously it is not  possible to  compare  the effectiveness of the various 
institutional formulas.  Firstly this is because  some  are too  recent to enable 
one  to assess their consequences.  But  above all it is because their consequences 
are far too diverse to lend themselves to any overall assessment.  Lastly,  it 
is because  such a  comparison would  no  doubt  not  be very meaningful.  Industrial 
relations is too  complex a  subject  for one to be  able to transpose the legal 
provision or practice of one  country to another with any ease,  for  example 
co-determination to Italy or autonomy  of dispute to the Federal  Republic of 
Germany. 
So  it is more  interesting and  more  useful to try to discern the reasoning 
behind one or other approach  (the elements which  generally accompany  it) and 
to note what  advantages  each involves in the eyes of those concerned and  what 
difficulties it encounters. 
4.1.3.1  The  factors of choice 
We  shall not  discuss in detail the doctrinal discussions which  have and 
still do  occupy an  important  place in union politics.  Without  wishing to 
dismiss them,  (it is a  fact  that as a  result of historical tradition one 
formula or one  institution takes on  a  particular colouring and  a  meaning 
in unionist  opinion which  is difficult to change),  we  must  reduce them  to 
their correct  scale.  It is quite legitimate for some  unions in France,  Italy 
or Belgium  to regard  joint management  as a  co-operative practice contrary 
to the class struggle and therefore not  in line either with their objectives 
or their methode  of ~ction.  But  no  general  statement  can be deduced  from  this 
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context or historical tradition.  In spite of its political neutrality, 
the DGB  has roots which  are as Socialist as those of the  FGTB  or the  LO, 
just as the  TUC  has  close links wth  the Labour Party.  One  cannot  regard 
collaboration versus class struggle,  Socialism versus its contrary,  as 
two  separate paths.  The  change of attitude of most  of the  TUC  vis-a-vis 
joint management,  moving  from  opposition to urgent  demand,  is surely not 
the result of any weakening of militancy or Socialist conviction but  in 
fact  the contrary.  So  such schematic oppositions must  be discarded.  It 
must  be  pointed out  again that  America  is a  typical case of unions which 
prefer bargaining and  consultation to  joint management  and that in France 
the moderate Socialist union of FO  is of exactly the  same  opinion. 
The  discussions have often been warped  by  considerations of doctrine 
on  the part of both sides which are hardly relevant.  Joint management  does 
not  imply  harmony  of interests;  otherwise why  would  such precautions be 
taken to determine the respective weights of the.two parties ?  And  w9uld 
so  much  importance be attached to their designation if there was  no  clash 
of powers  ?  In this context,  the Dutch  formula appears a  bold one  :  the 
mutual  right of veto may  mean  that those representatives are chosen who 
impress both parties most  by their excellence or  who  do  not  disturb either 
party.  Is it possible to leave so  little room  for the expression of divergent 
interests and  points of view  ?  We  shall be able to decide this on  the basis 
of experience  (as always,  not  forgetting the specific features of each national 
case).  Even  the term  joint management  is not  entirely accurate.  Did  the DGB 
and  the employees'  representatives  jointly manage  the mines  and  iron and  steel 
works  in the coal  and  steel  industry which  had  a  'qualified'  version of 
Mitbestimmung  ?  The  word  co-determination is more  faithful to the real meaning 
and  more  in line with reality,  ie implying an influence on  the decision.  This 
method  of influence can be compared  to that  opened  by  negotiation,  but  here 
again there are circumstantial  factors.  For this  influence was  won  in Italy 
only after very great  conflict and during a  period of great political 
instability.  In France it was  won  mainly as a  result of several major disputes, 
some  unofficial and  many  spectacular.  The  means  by which it is established are 
not  necessarily those by  which this influence is maintained,  however.  Very 
strong bargaining powers  may  be accompanied  by  a  very low dispute rate,  as 
is the case in Denmark. 
Do  the Fiat  employees  have more  influence on  the choice of products,  the 
location of investment  or employment  policy by  their bargaining than the 
Volkswagen  employees  with their co-determination  ?  Are  workers more  able 
to protect their jobs and,  in_particular, are they more  able to assert the 
criteria they consider appropriate for taking an  employment  decision by  going 
on  strike in the UK,  Belgium  and  France or by  Betriebsrat action in the Federal 
Republic of Germany  ?  Merely raising the question  shows  that one  cannot  answer 
it in terms of more  or less.  The  differences between these methods  of control 
over decisions are primarily qualitative differences.  The  possible objectives 
and  probable results are not  the  same. 
One  could begin by  asking what  factors act  in  favour of one  or the other 
method  within the general  framework  of the industrial relations systems.  It 
is most  likely that  a  single union makes  joint management  easier.  The  element 
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pluralism makes  it more  awkward  to participate in difficult decisions  (on 
restructuring,  staf~ reductions,  etc).  Conversely the kind of co-determination 
found  in the Federal  Republic of Germany  works  to  the detriment  of the minority 
unions,  at least as regards their access to the undertaking.  In countries where 
there is strong union competition  (even if there is unity of action)  such as 
France and  Italy, it becomes  even more  difficult to establish participation. 
Perhaps the cautious system applied in the Netherlands was  to  some  extent a 
reaction to the unions'  traditional pluralism  (although this has  lessened 
since 1976). 
Pluralism does not  represent  a  decisive obstacle,  as  shown  by the fairly 
satisfactory operation in France and  Italy of the  joint  committees in the 
public sector.  But  it does create difficulties. 
The  overall power  of bargaining of the unions may  be  another important 
factor.  More  precisely,  the more  members  a  union  has,  the more  disciplined 
and  consistent it is, the easier it will  find it to  introduce co-decision-
making  and  the fewer  dangers will arise.  On  the other hand,  the more  its 
power  is based on its capacity of mobilization rather than its actual 
membership,  on  the militancy and  the power  of conviction of its officials 
rather than discipline,  the more  it will  prefer the more  limited commitment 
of negotiation  (even when  this negotiation becomes  semi-permanent,  it is 
only so  because it is backed  by  a  movement).  The  Federal  Republic of Germany 
and  Denmark  belong to the first type,  Italy and  France to the second. 
This is not  a  deciding factor either  a  union as strong as the FGTB 
has reservations about  joint management.  But  it is a  favourable  condition. 
A political condition is often added  to this,  namely  that the unions 
find  joint management  more  acceptable if a  political party close to them  is 
in power.  And  it is true that the projects of the  Left  in France include 
proposals for  'relaunching'  participation in the management  of public 
undertakings  (some  unions have  agreed to this proposal)  and  that any 
profound political changes  in Italy would  raise the question again there 
too.  But  it is doubtful  whether this is generally true.  One  must  not  confuse 
the conditions which make  it possible to adopt  legislation on  joint management 
(in the Federal  Republic of Germany  and  perhaps in the UK)  with those which 
make  the formula more  attractive to the unions;  or the more  general  effects 
of the political situation with the very profound  and  basic choices of methods 
of action.  A change of government  majority in France or Italy may  make  the 
main  unions more  willing to adopt  a  'policy of presence'  and  to accept 
economic  responsibilities.  But  it would  be surprising if this was  enough  in 
the short  term to  change their basic approach to bargaining. 
4.1.3.2  The  choice 
So  the factors of choice we  have  noted are very general  ones.  They  are 
not very decisive either.  B,y  contrast,  the choice between one  or other method 
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This appears clearly in one  area,  union representation and  action in the 
undertaking.  One  exception apart,  strong union activity in the undertaking 
does not  seem  to  coexist with the participation of employees'  representatives 
on the management  boards.  So  it is worth asking whether the two  are compatible. 
An  extreme  case is the Federal  Republic of Germany.  The  counterpart to 
co-determination,  ie to the rights of the Betriebsrat and  of the staff 
delegates on  the supervisory boards,  is the  extremely restricted role of 
the union  in the undertaking.  Although the union  now  has its delegates who 
can  form  a  union  section and  whose  jobs,  ie union activities, are protected, 
their functions are purely legistic.  They  ensure  that union dues are collected 
and  keep  in contact  with the rank and  file.  But  they do  not  bargain or ensure 
implementation of the agreement,  they are not  involved in possible disputes 
nor do  they present  claims.  All  these functions are reserved to the elected 
representatives.  Moreover,  there is a  careful  legal distinction between 
agreements resulting from  collective bargaining (the Vertrag)  and  those 
resulting from  co-determination (the Vereinbarung).  The  spirit of these two 
agreements is not  the  same,  in the one  case there is dispute and  bargaining, 
on the other concern for the  common  interest.  And  the means  of settling 
disputes also differ in the two  cases.  On  the one  hand  the strike,  on the 
other conciliation and arbitration by the mediating board  (Einigungsstelle) 
or tribunal.  So  although the large undertakings also have  company  agreements 
in the union meaning of the word  (Vertrag),  and  although the unions have 
tried to assert their position in the undertaking,  there remains a  fundamental 
division between the outside (relations between the undertaking,  or more  often 
the branch association,  and  the union)  and  the inside,  ie the two  levels of 
co-determination,  with the Betriebsrat and  on  the  supervisory board. 
The  other extreme is Italy where,  on  the contrary the unitary union 
representation by  the works  councils  (1)  has  in most  cases eliminated any 
other body,  in particular the  'parliamentartly'  elected non-union bodies 
called internal  committees.  Inside and  outside the undertaking,  the union 
is the only  employees'  representative.  It bargains,  ensures implementation 
of the agreement,  knows  of the issues at  stake,  presents claims;  all these 
functions  come  under the general activity of contrattazione,  which includes 
the possibility of dispute {to adopt  the terminology we  suggested earlier 
{cf.  3.2.2) this is a  typical  example of continuous bargaining).  For the 
time being at least,  joint management  does not  exist. 
The  situation in the UK  is very  similar,  in spite of two  differences,  the 
much  wider autonomy  of the  shop  stewards and  the wider division,  in large 
undertakings,  into various crafts unions,  or at least unions with limited 
terms of reference.  This difference helps explain the TUC's  new  interest in 
{1)  We  are describing the current  situation (1978).  It must  be remembered 
that this system is fragile,  based  on the agreement  between the three 
large unions  and  on a  kind of political truce within and among  the 
unions.  Obviously the two  conditions are subject to  change. 
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that this system will  become  general  very  soon. 
In Belgium  too  the unions have  considerable control  in the undertaking 
where it is exercised as much  by  the union delegation as by  the works 
committee.  France has works  committees which are more  independent  of  th~ 
union· sections, at least  in cases where the rate of unionization is low; 
but  on  the whole  there is much  in common  (origins,  convictions and militancy) 
between the two  representations and  a  fairly strong continuity (because of 
the characteristics of dispute and  negotiation in  France)  between the two 
institutions.  So  it can be  likened to the  same  model. 
The  Netherlands,  however,  is closer to the German  model  in the autonomy 
of its works  committee  (because of the traditional weakness of the union in 
the undertaking).  In Luxembourg  the  same  law  (6  May  1974)  set  up  joint works 
committees with various co-decision powers  and  introduced participation on 
the boards of directors.  This is the same  situation as in the Federal  Republic 
of Germany. 
Does  staff representation by  the union within the undertaking,  whether 
it is exclusive or dominant,  exclude participation on  the boards  ?  Denmark 
seems  to be an  exception since there the union delegate  (tillidsmand)  is 
present  and  active in the undertaking in the same  way  as the  shop  steward. 
But  has he the  same  powers,  in a  system which is highly centralized ?  The 
rate of small  unofficial disputes is much  lower than in the UK.  But  does 
that domonstrate the internal discipline or the relative weakness of this 
union action ?  It is difficult to tell. It will also be interesting to 
observe the experience in Ireland,  although for the moment  it relates only 
to the public sector  (and  even there only to  some  cases). 
Collective bargaining is certainly one means  of influencing company 
decisions of limiting the undertaking's freedom  to base them  on  production 
factors.  The  1973  agreement  between  DA  and  10 stated  :  'The right of the 
employer to direct  and allocate the work  and  to use the competent  labour 
force must  be  exercized in compliance with the provisions laid down  in the 
collective agreements and  in co-operation with the  employees  and  their 
delegates •••• '  Why  should this not  apply to other  economic decisions too? 
In general,  then,  there is surely a  choice between two  methods,  even 
if the one does not  exclude the other.  The  method  of joint management .is 
more  compatible with unions outside the undertaking,  at least as regards 
their responsibilities;  the method  of negotiating decisions with union 
action within the undertaking.  Similarly one method  coincides more  closely, 
for the clear reason that it is supplementary to it, with what  we  have 
called contractual  bargaining,  the.other with continuous bargaining. 
4.1.3.3  Difficulties 
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general  conclusions we  shall attempt  to present these. 
The  major difficulty in joint management  is that of relations between 
bargaining and  joint management.  Leaving aside the difficulties of the 
relations between the union as negotiator and  the union as partner in 
joint management  on  the supervisory boards,  we  can confine ourselves to 
relations between the union and  the works  council. 
Firstly the separation between the two  is not  entire.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany,  in all large undertakings the union  corresponding to 
the DGB  has enough  influence to collect sufficient  signatures to enable it 
to present  a  proper list of union claims in its name.  It can also be invited 
to enter the undertaking and  attend the council's meetings.  Since three---quarters 
of the elected delegates are union members  (77 %  out  of 191.  000  elected delegates 
in 1975),  it receives the information it needs.  Lastly, it organizes the training 
of the delegates at the cost of the undertaking.  So  the  separation is only entire 
in the case of minority. unions.  This  scarcely affects the DGB  itself. 
Some  collective agreements contain clauses protecting employees' 
representatives against discrimination - a  principle laid down  by  law.  On 
the other hand,  in December  1978 the Federal  Labour Court  adjudged that the 
trade union was  not  entitled to demand  that  elections of representatives 
take place within the undertaking,  even outside working hours. 
Does  this presence allow for union action ?  In spite of the rigorous 
legal distinction,  an overlapping between what  is decided  by  an agreement 
(Vertrag)  and  what  derives  from  the company  agreement  (Vereinbarung)  is 
far from  rare.  In principle the law  forbids the councils to deal  with pay, 
but  is it not  inevitable that they should do  so,  if only to control the 
gap  between real  wages  and  agreed wages  ?  The  wage  drift offers an area 
of dispute between  one  side and  the other.  Working  hours  come  under the 
Vertrag,  but  the time-table and  especially flexible working hours  come 
under the Betriebsrat.  The  ambiguity becomes  even  greater,  as we  have 
seen,  in the context  of the quality of working. life.  The  connection 
between the norms  of the agreement  and  the decisions of the undertaking 
can be very close.  It has happened  that the employers,  with the co-operation 
of the councils,  have  trespassed into the area reserved to the agreements 
during company  discussions.  Conversely,  the DGB  has often tried  (systematically 
in some  cases)  to bring the bargaining closer to  the undertaking,  and  has 
succeeded  in doing so  in some  large undertakings.  It has  even occurred for 
a  company  agreement  to provide for  equal  pay  in establishments in different 
regions,  whatever branch agreement  they come  under.  By  contrast,  the rubber 
industry undertakings refused their association the right  in 1970 to  conclude 
an agreement  with I.G.  Chemie  providing for  supplementary company  agreements 
{a form  of 'articulated'  bargaining). 
So  the balance is less stable than it might  appear and it is based  on 
pragmatic thinking rather than on  any rigorous legal distinction.  This 
system has the advantage,  thanks to the integration of the various  functions 
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integrated  (which is also  no  doubt  a  result of the council's extensive powers 
and its manpower  and  resources which are in no  way  equivalent to those of 
the French or Italian delegates).  By  contrast,  it may  change  and it would 
require limited changes  for it to  end  up  like the  Italian system. 
Conversely,  what  are the advantages and  drawbacks of having exclusive 
or almost  exclusive bargaining ?  One  is, of course,  that this makes  it 
easier to establish communications between the rank and file and  the 
machinery,  between  shop  floor concerns and  the decisions.  In both Italy 
and  France,  the non-'contractual'  style of bargaining reduces the internal 
tensions of the organization and  has  strong expressive powers.  But  France 
is a  special  case,  for there the large number  of institutions,  each in 
principle with its.distinct function,  makes  it more difficult to demarcate 
between claims,  consultation and  bargaining than  in Italy and  the  UK. 
The  main drawback  is a  counterpart to this advantage.  Communication is 
made  easier because the bargaining is based  on  ease of mobilization.  But 
when  the union movement  weakens  or comes  to a  standstill, the control  by 
bargaining also risks becoming weaker.  So  the control  is not  only necessarjly 
less general  (it cannot  cover everything)  but also less continuous.  It is 
more  sensitive to the  short-term  economic  trend or the social  'temperature'; 
the Italian agreements on  joint  examination of investment  decisions risk 
producing nothing but  formal  consultations,  a  risk increased by  the serious 
crisis.  This discontinuity is particularly flagrant if the mobilization 
results from  dispute.  In France the employment  disputes often ensured that 
employees'  rights were  well  protected,  and  even  more  often the possibility 
of dispute has  led to effective bargaining.  But  in many  cases the attempt 
at mobilization proved  impossible or failed.  In  such cases the gaps  in the 
system become  blatant.  No  doubt  this discontinuity and  fragmentary nature can 
be  corrected by more  extensive negotiation and  by  increasing the power  of 
the unions.  But  in Italy the increase in bargaining and  unionism has far 
from  filled the gaps.  Even  with a  higher rate of union membership  and  a 
tighter-knit network of agreement,  it is certain that  frequent  and  semi-
permanent  negotiation would  still remain a  more  fragmentary means  of action 
than participation in the decisions of the boards. 
Such participation is more  sensitive to the economic  and  social trend. 
Perhaps one  should add  that it is also more  sensitive to the political 
climate - maybe  just  because bargaining is here entering a  new  field 
where  rights are not  yet  firmly established. 
To  resume  the difficulties encountered,  a  union is unlikely to accept 
without  reaction having no  say over  company  questions.  On  the other hand, 
if it chooses  'autonomy in dispute',  ie the priority of negotiations,  it 
will find it difficult to  intervene'more than occasionally in company 
decisions.  In both cases new  trends are possible,  and  they may  be  speeded 
up  by  the pressures of the  economic  situation.  But  these trends would  have 
to be on  a  major  scale. 
156 4.2  Place and  scope of collective bargaining 
We  have discussed  employee  participation in the management  bodies of 
the undertaking and  more  specifically forms  of joint management  because of 
their special  importance and  topicality.  But  they  are only one  aspect  of a 
more  general  question which we  must  now  discuss.  ~~at is the place of 
collective bargaining in industrial relations systems  ?  In what  areas and 
on  what  subjects does it prove  effective  ?  Does  it leave any  room  for other 
procedures  ?  And,  by  the  same  token,  what  is the nature of the obligations 
contracted during the negotiations  ? 
Although bargaining is now  a  long-standing practice,  backed  by  many, 
strong institutions,  and  although there has  been  time  for industrial relations 
law to become  established and  well  founded,  it would  be  wrong  in our view to 
regard it henceforth as a  fixed or even  stable procedure.  On  the contrary, 
pressing new  problems often arise in it, the procedures are often modified 
with use and  the relations evolve.  The  scale of human  and  material  resources 
allocated to it is no  guarantee that it will operate without  friction.  At 
best  one  may  hope  that the necessary changes  can  occur without  any major 
break (naturally there is no  guarantee of this). 
We  shall  not  examine  in great detail the procedures and  commitments  but 
will try to  be as objective as possible and  attempt  to  pinpoint the major 
problems and  trends. 
Bargaining does  not  cover all branches of activity in all regions in 
the  same  manner  or as effectively.  Its effectiveness varies according to 
the size of the undertaking.  It does  not  deal with all the subjects concerning 
relations between  employers and  employees.  Yet  from  these four points of view 
(industry,  region,  size of undertaking,  subject),  the last thirty years have 
been characterized by  progress in bargaining,  especially in some  countries 
and  from  1968  to  1974. 
We  shall briefly recall the conclusions we  have already drawn.  In the 
Federal  Republic of Germany,  Denmark,  Luxembourg  (and probably Belgium), 
few  branches or even undertakings of any importance are not  covered by a 
bargaining system - which  can leave out  (and this  in any case is true in 
Belgium)  some  small  and medium-sized undertakings.  However,  in the  UK  and 
even more  in France or Italy, there are still  'contractual deserts';  in 
commerce  or the branches with a  semi-crafts tradition,  and  sometimes  in 
sub-divisions of branches which are not  less favoured as such,  whole  areas 
are not  covered at all or  (more  frequently  in France and  Italy)  covered by 
provisions which add  very little to the two  sides'  legal obligations and  the 
effectiveness of which,  though not  insignificant,  is strictly limited.  If 
one  combines the criteria of branches with that of sizes of undertaking,  the 
picture looks  even worse.  In Belgium,  the UK,  Italy and  France,  there is 
sometimes  a  considerable gap between the largest  undertakings,  which  could 
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whom  do  avoid it. The  'marginals'  in bargaining,  whether they are marginal 
by  the nature of the branch in which  they work,  size of their.undertaking 
or their particular status (homeworkers,  intermittent or temporary workers), 
form  a  considerable mass  which  the long crisis risks increasing further. 
It is so  considerable that  in some  cases this even affects competition  (not 
only because  'slave'  wages  are paid but  because the undertakings are outside 
any agreements). 
If it is further  swollen by all those who  have  long been  searching for 
a  job,  especially the youngest  unemployed,  this marginal mass,  without 
direction or means  of action or adherence to an organization,  can also 
become  a  major  cause of social unrest. 
Although a  growing area is covered by  bargaining,  one  must  not  forget 
the very grave dangers  caused  by  its inadequacies. 
As  regards bargaining subjects,  the main  finding is the  same.  Especially 
over the last ten years,  bargaining has covered  new  territory.  It has proved 
no  more  than halfway successful  in the most  traditional area,  that of pay, 
by  only very partially controlling real wages.  In the UK,  thanks to the 
plant bargaining of the  shop  stewards and  the policy of raising the minimum 
wage  of several  confederations,  it manages  to recuperate part of the wage 
drift.  The  accelerating pace of inflation transformed this task into a 
labour of Sisyphus.  However,  the crisis and  the  incomes  policy have made 
it necessary to  look at the subject afresh,  and  in a  different  way  according 
to country. 
Another major trend of the past· few  years is the introduction in 
agreements of supplements or substitutes to social security,  a  trend firmly 
backed  by  the recent  establishment of unemployment  benefits or security of 
incomes  funds. 
Even  newer  is the interest in continuous vocational training (incorporated 
into agreements in France),  job protection,  the quality of working life, 
equal  status and  conditions for manual  and  non-manual  workers.  In the two 
last cases,  bargaining attempts to regulate phenomena  which were  formerly 
entirely at the mercy  of technical  (organization of work)  or market  factors 
(inequalities) -which also  showed  that in both cases behind the technical 
or market  factors lay social factors,  which  lend  themselves better to  change. 
The  productivity agreements in the UK  formally  introduced into the area of 
discussion the unilateral practices of the various trades;  the discussions 
in Italy and  France  ended  with an admission of the relative nature of what 
was  until then a  unilateral decision by  the organization men. 
The  area which has opened  up  in the space of a  few  years is too vast to 
be controlled entirely.  It would  be  easy to  show  the limits of what  has been 
achieved.  Employment  policies are hesitant,  the criteria of work  organization 
uncertain,  the positions of the various parties hesitant if not  ambiguous. 
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with new  problems,  its capacity of innovation and  its realism. 
It is not  extraordinary that to  some  extent  bargaining resulted in 
extricating certain decisions from  the play of market  forces  (and,  more 
generally,  preventing them  from  being taken on  the basis purely of short-
term  economic  criteria;  nor is it extraordinary,  for  example,  that  the 
decision on  staff cuts  (ro recruitment)  is more  difficult to  take if it 
must  be adapted to the current  economic  situation.  Bargaining is a  kind 
of regulation and  there would  be  no  need  to regulate if the market 
produced all the desired results.  So  the object of bargaining is to 
substitute rules accepted as more  fair for the  spontaneous play of 
economic  forces  (it certainly does  not  always  succeed;  the  'battle' 
against  inequalities is neither quite whole-hearted nor very effective). 
However,  these regulations,  especially if they concern payment  by 
result or employment,  also  have  the effect of amortizing or avoiding 
market  sanctions for the individuals concerned.  An  inflation rate must 
rise dangerously high before its effects on  employment  become  visible 
to the employees  (so  any corrective action tends  to  be tardy).  Unemployment 
itself,  since  improved  benefits have  been paid,  has fortunately produced 
less dramatic results;  but  that also means  that disturbances of activity 
were felt less.  In fact,  since extensive compensatory means  exist,  the 
economic  decision seems  more  arbitrary.  When  will  the state stop giving 
aid to a  deficit  sector ?  When  will  a  large undertaking close or reorganize 
one of its unprofitable establishments  (or workshops)  ?  It is becoming 
increasingly rare for there to  be  no  way  out  of such a  situation.  The 
success of protective measures necessarily made  the effects of some  of 
the  economic  constraints more  uncertain. 
No-one  would  dream  of seeking to abolish unemployment  benefits or  job 
protection.  But  it may  be worth considering what  substitutes our society 
finds acceptable for these out-dated disciplinary measures.  One  is certainly 
the disclosure of economic  information,  but  even  more  important  perhaps -
and  here we  are not  really going outside the  subject  - is the participation 
of the citizens in private and  public decisions. 
The  term "unofficial bargaining"  used here is certainly vague.  However, 
we  shall use it to designate everything below  or outside formal  bargaining 
and  the agreement  which allows for the  expression of points of view and 
their adjustment  or the exercise of an  influence,  even if not  substantiated 
by  a  signature below  a  decision. 
As  an  example  we  can take Luxembourg  which recently  (1974)  introduced 
both certain  joint management  elements very similar to those in the Federal 
Republic of Germany  and  joint contacts to deal  with employment  issues.  The 
collective agreement  (in its strictly legal  sense)  seems  to have only a 
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safety,  apprenticeship,  social  claims and  the management  of social welfare 
are matters for the staff delegation  (and the board).  Joint  committees pave 
the way  for bargaining,  appraise the disputes  (before embarking on  conciliation 
where  appropriate);  the  joint works  committee is informed,  consulted and  co-
decides on  general  working conditions;  tripartite bodies which  include the 
public authorities deal  with employment  difficulties. 
In  some  other countries some  of these elements would  automatically be 
covered by  collective bargaining.  An  American union would  find it difficult 
to accept  that management  of the contract  and grievance procedure  should  not 
be the normal  consequence of the collective contract.  And  to  some  extent  the 
separation between  joint works  committee and  bargaining as  such is arpitrary. 
But  in spite of these reservations,  and  even assuming that all these forms 
of discussion,  consultation or co-decision,  whether those of the Belgian and 
French works  committee,  the unofficial  bargaining of the Italian works  council 
or the British shop  stewards,  are merely  extensions of special  forms of 
collective bargaining in general,  it still remains true that the number  and 
scale of the  informal  forms  of discussion have  changed  the face of traditional 
collective bargaining. 
1.  Firstly,  the development  of unofficial bargaining has changed  the nature 
of the contractual undertaking.  We  shall return to this point  (cf.  4.2.4). 
We  can  say here and  now  that  the  'agreements'  resulting from  discussions 
with a  works  committee and  the staff delegates,  even if they settle the 
issue permanently,  do  not  have the value of a  contract with its specific 
mutual  obligations.  New  consultation,  for  example  after encountering an 
unexpected difficulty,  may  amend  its terms. 
2.  Moreover,  communication within the organizations  (between the rank and 
file and  the permanent  union officials,  and  also  between undertakings and 
employers'  association,  or within the undertaking,  between management  and 
heads of department)  has become  crucial.  The  structures on  which it is 
built may  be more  or less democratic,  but  they must  allow for it. The  time 
has  probably passed,  in undertakings as in unions,  when  the management  made 
provision for  everything and  could unhesitatingly  commit  the  subordinates 
or agents.  Delegates are no  longer given full  confidence or free of the 
need  to  consult  those they represent  (whether this consultation is official 
or not);  the management  can  no  longer retain in its own  hands alone the key 
to  industrial relations.  The  increased number  of forums  of expression and 
action at various levels call  for contacts and  co-ordination.  There is no 
need  to demonstrate that the requirement  of disclosure of information is 
extremely  expensive and  will absorb considerable  resources in the 
organi7.ations. 
3.  As  a  direct  consequence,  unofficial rules,  'internal' or tacit ·law 
which  does  not  appear before the courts but  often regulates workshop  or 
office relations by  tacit arrangement  or trade practice,  are becoming 
increasingly important.  The  jurists will  have  a  major task if they try 
to deal  with it (this will  presumably be done more  by  the executives of 
the undertaking or by  union advisers than by university professors). 
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network of regulations,  while respecting its local and  specific nature 
(why  should what  is true of printing apply for iron and  steel or large 
stores ?).  The  continental  countries surely have  much  to learn on  this 
subject  from  British practice. 
4.  Lastly this variety of contacts and  exchanges  is bound  to affect 
relations within the undertaking,  as regards the definition of jobs and 
responsibilities and  also the chain of command.  The  signature of a 
collective agreement  fixing wages  and  working hours can_in no  way  change 
the organization of an occupation.  Frequent  consultation on  conditions 
of working· life, the work  load,  job evaluation and work  organization 
will,  however,  affect it. This is not  a  new  phenomenon.  Ip co-operation 
(sometimes without it) with the union,  the craftsmen often imposed their 
concept  of their trade.  But  they did it tacitly and often unilaterally 
because they had  succeeded in being left to  produce  in peace.  By  contrast, 
frequent  consultation makes  decisions explicit and makes  it more  necessary 
to  share them.  So  it will  lead to more  rapid changes,  in line with the 
requirements of the two  sides,  to the forms  of organization. 
Consultation,  participation and unofficial bargaining are certainly 
extensions of bargaining.  But  they also react  back on  it and  change it. 
Because  they were born of the resolve or need  to  bring the discussion 
and  the decision closer to the level of implementation,  because they 
were  often generated by  pressure  from  below,  they affected contractual 
habits and  rules.  They  have weakened  the contract  in the strict sense 
of the term,  but  in order to make  room  for further methods of expression 
and  participation in the decision. 
Participation in company  decisions may  erode the traditional bargaining 
system  from  below,  but  the role of the two  sides of industry in political 
life exerts pressure on it from  above.  A detailed analysis of this would 
involve an  examination of the political  systems themselves,  which is 
outside our ability or context.  We  shall merely make  a  few  general 
comments. 
The  manner  in which  interest groups  (employees'  unions and  employers' 
associations are among  the most  important  such groups)  participate in 
political life varies very widely.  In some  areas which are considered 
specific enough  to be able to be delegated without  injury or at least 
to allow for wide  involvement  of those concerned  without  danger,  they 
frequently participate in establishing guidelines  and  in management. 
This is true of social security,  placement  or training institutions. 
However,  the national differences emerge  clearly when  one  is dealing 
with more  overall policies.  In the Federal  Republic of Germany  concerted 
action takes great  care to respect  the autonomy  of the participants  (and 
above all that of the public authorities who  do  not  commit  themselves 
vis-a-vis the two  sides of industry).  At  the other extreme,  in the 
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of the interest groups.  French planning,  in spite of the fiction that  there 
are no  binding decisions,  has  for  some  time closely associated unionists 
and  employers in the selection and  examination of major objectives.  Tbday 
this participation is more  restricted again,  especially on  the part of 
the unions.  The  UK  has tried-various formulas of association in economic 
development  and  incomes  policy.  Belgium  has  set up  a  growing number  of 
planning boards,  both for  economic  planning and  for a  planned and  concerted 
joint  social policy. 
There is too much  variety here to make  any analysis possible.  Yet  we 
may  note the vicissitudes of these formulas  which  are generally as fragile 
and  short-term as political arrangements.  However  essential it is for the 
two  sides of industry to be associated  in economic  policy,  the forms  this 
takes are as fluctuating as the policies themselves.  For  example,  the 
weakening of the concerted  economy  formulas  in France  can be  explained 
primarily by  the political and  social  climate. 
Several  countries also have  stable institutions which  form  part of the 
parliamentary assemblies or have  a  different  status and  where  the interest 
groups  can be consulted.  The  Netherlands and  France  have  an  economic  and 
social  committee,  Belgium  a  national  labour council.  The  reform  in France 
in 1969  which was  rejected by  referendum would  have given the representation 
of interests voting powers. 
Perhaps,  however,  regardless of the standing of these institutions,  when 
it comes  to the crunch they tend to  be  superseded.  Difficulties are often 
resolved at  ad  hoc  meetings  :  in Belgium at  "summit  conferences" rather than 
by  the national  labour council;  in France in May  1968  at meetings with the 
Prime Minister at  Grenelle rather than in the established institutional 
framework. 
Lastly,  one  current means  of access to power  and  influence over the 
public authorities'  decisions is the link between  trade associations and 
political parties.  There are strong links,  taking very different  forms 
which we  cannot  analyse here  (the relations between the French Communist 
Party and  the CGT  are clearly not  the  same  as those between the  Labour 
Party and  the  TUC  or those between the Italian Christian Democrats and 
the ~ISL), between union and  party in Italy,  the  UK,  Belgium,  Denmark 
and  France.  They  probably  loosen during a  good  economic  trend and  period 
of political  calm,  and  tighten in times of crisis or possible change. 
This is the only  justification for this brief  summary  :  as we  showed 
in the case of employment  and  wage  policy,  the crisis which  began  in 1974 
led not  only to  increased and  more  open government  action during the 
collective bargaining but  also meant  that  the unions and  employers' 
associations were  brought  into public debates on  a  national  scale in 
which decisions inevitably refer to political criteria.  This reference 
may  not  be  explicit if the parties and  interest groups manage  to find  a 
common  position in face of the crisis or easily reach agreement.  It is 
explicit if the dabate is prolonged or the disagreement  continues. 
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as the decisions are not  too difficult to make,  either because they can be 
taken gradually and  empirically step by  step,  or because the possible replies 
to these difficulties are not  too different one  from  the other  (one  could 
even regard this as the definition of planning 'a la fran9aise'  in the sense 
Jean Monnet  used it).  B,y  contrast  such action becomes  involved in the troubles 
and  stresses of political life if these conditions are not  satisfied.  Without 
excluding the possibility that they may  be  satisfied, the crisis makes  it less 
likely.  Certainly,  an  emerg~cy situation can  impose  the need  for agreement, 
but it may  not  be  a  lasting one. 
Strengthening the confederations and  the influence of political decisions, 
tightening the links with the parties  (which may  of course produce tension), 
establishing more  frequent  contacts with the governments,  and  possible 
involvement  in political debates  (in the sense of debates between the parties) 
- all these effects of the crisis we~en the professional autonomy  of the two 
sides of industry by  giving priority to their political responsibilities.  They 
reduce the autonomy  of the industrial relations system as a  whole  (and  especially 
of collective bargaining) vis-a-vis the political  system. 
In two  countries,  Italy and  France,  the possibility of a  change  in the 
political majority after a  long period without  change also weighs  on  the 
bargaining.  Some  bargaining issues have  entered the electoral debate  :  wage 
structure,  level of the guaranteed minimum  wage  and  the upgrading of manual 
work  are now  party political programme  points  (to  such an  extent that, 
especially as regards wage  structure,  the unions  wish they were left to 
settle their own  affairs).  Conversely,  most  of the trade associations 
openly express their views  on  the choice they wish. 
The  pressure exerted  'from below'  on  traditional collective bargaining 
and  the pressure  ~from above'  have at least one  consequence in common  : 
they weaken  the contractual nature of the tgreement  as a  firm undertaking 
for a  fixed  term with precise clauses which  can be revised only in very 
exceptional  circumstances.  The  conditions of working life or  job protection 
are areas in which the employees  want  to act  upon  the decision without 
necessarily taking responsibility for this and  also where  the complex 'ocal 
situations require too much  movement  to and  fro,  the diversity of interests 
requires too many  centres of action,  for the undertaking to be a  simple and 
firm  one.  Conversely,  where  there are exchanges of views with the  publ~c 
authorities or political parties,  any agreements  and  undertakings that  have 
been made  can only be qualified as contracts by  analogy  (and  the debates can 
only be  called bargaining by  analogy).  For they can have neither the duration 
nor the definitive quality of a  contract.  Because  of the unstable economic 
situation and  the high number  of factors to be taken into account,  in short 
because of the unpredictability of the future  (including political alignments 
or coalitions),  such  joint resolves are radically different  from  a  contract 
because they are necessarily subject to revision. 
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eonverge,  there are two  possible policies.  One  consists of expanding the 
bargaining and  making it more  flexible,  at the cost of a  possible profound 
transformation,  in order to integrate the new  procedures;  the other,  by 
contrast,  consists of separating the two  areas which adjoin it as widely 
as possible in order to maintain the strictly contractual nature .of the 
agreement. 
The  first policy is what  we  have called institutional or continuous 
bargaining.  Here  the agreements are flexible  in the sense that revision 
is always  possible.  Procedure clauses take priority over the  ~ubstantive 
clauses,  which  ensures continuity of revision.  The  refusal or omission 
to make  any distinction between disputes of rights and  disputes of 
interests make  the legal value of the commitment  more  vague  and  set it 
apart  from  the contract.  At  that price,  the bargaining may  without  harm 
absorb unexpected factors or risks or fluctuations of the economic  trend 
and different  situations.  In fact  that is the principle of this type of 
relations.  Instead of one  or other of the parties having to bear the risk 
(too  bad  for the one  who  made  the wrong  provisions or,  more  generally, 
the one for whom  things turn out  badly;  it ~sup to him-to deal  with the 
unforeseeable),  this risk is made  a  subject  for  joint discussion and 
adjustment  on  a  parity basis. 
This procedure is neither simple nor convenient  because the discussion 
and  adjustment  are achieved  by  whatever means  of pressure are available and 
are thus the outcome  of the play of forces  (and of very heterogeneous forces). 
It can leave room  for abuses  on  both sides and  requires much  good  faith.  But 
no  contract with strictly laid down  clauses can do  without  it, as Shylock 
learned to his cost. 
The  other policy consists of separating the bargaining from  what  happens 
in the undertaking (for example  by  reserving it to other institutions and 
giving it other rights)  and  from  political life (by avoiding where  possible 
any  formulas which officially involve the trade associations in the public 
authorities'  decisions).  Where  this proves  successful,  the contractual 
nature of the agreement  may  be  preserved fairly strictly.  The  purity of the 
bargaining can be mainta.ined  if the area in which  bargaining as  such operates 
is carefully demarcated. 
There is no  point  in trying to compare  the value of the two  policies. 
The  choice is not  only or even mainly  one of criteria of efficiency or 
utility.  Rather it is a  choice of the manner  in which the two  sides of 
industry can  intervene in industrial relations in political and  economic 
life.  In the one  case,  priority is given to the views of social groups 
which  attempt  together to  establish the limits of their respective wishes 
and  powers  by  means  of discussion,  dispute and  compromise.  In the Other, 
there is an  attempt  to distinguish methods  of action according to the 
issues to  be dealt with and  to reserve a  more  restricted and  better 
defined area for the trade associations.  These are two  different methods 
of giving expression to and  dealing with social demands.  The  difference 
also relates to the very machinery of expression  and  action and  the 
organization of the public authorities. 
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overall  judgement,  it is still essential not  to interpret one  policy in 
terms of the other.  Institutional or continuous bargaining is not  a 
bastardized version of contractual bargaining in which the commitments 
are less strict and  the parties show  less good  faith.  Although it often 
came  about  as a  result of conflict and  because it brought  in new  problems 
and  new  measures,  it is not  equivalent to disorderly or unbalanced 
contractual bargaining.  Conversely - a  criticism that has been made 
more  rarely - contractual bargaining does  not  mean  an institutional 
bargaining that is more  rigid, more  limited or more  blind to the 
problems of the time. 
Yet  in both cases the balance achieved is precarious and  fragile.  No 
one would  dispute this in the case of the UK,  Italy or France  (and many 
changes may  occur in these three countries).  Perhaps it is also true of 
those countries which  have  emerged  from  the industrial relations crisis 
of 1968-1974  without  major  changes and  which managed  most  successfully 
to resist the 1974  economic  crisis. 
If our analysis is correct,  the re-emergence  of unemployment  and  the 
economic  crisis after thirty years of growth  cannot  be  regarded as a 
'return to order'.  Heavy  as they are,  the new  economic  constraints are 
not  the  same  as those of 1930.  Above  all, the pressure of problems to 
be dealt  with in the undertaking has not  disappeared.  For pressures 
from  above  do  not  cancel  out  pressures from  below  but merely add  further 
pressure.  That  is one  reason why  one  cannot  predict an  easy or harmonious 
future for collective bargaining. 
5·  FUTURE  OUTLOOK 
There  is no  method  of determining the future  outlook of a  social 
practice as complex as collective bargaining.  On  the contrary,  as 
soon as one goes beyond the short  term,  one  can··be  sure that the 
major developments or changes will be due  to  circumstances  {whether 
these are defined as conjunctions of events,  accidents or breaks), 
ie to  factors which  by definintion are unpredictable.  Quite apart 
from  the likely but  vague  proposition that  things do  not  change 
overnight,  even the broad  lines of the future,  ten years from 
now,  are uncertain. 
So  should  we  not  attempt  to predict  ?  There is one main  advantage 
in doing so,  quite apart  from  the merit of making  us very aware of the 
limitations of our knowledge  and  imbuing us with a  healthy sense of 
modesty,  and  quite apart  from  the fact  that it forces us to assess 
what  we  know  much  more  carefully.  That  is that although we  may  not 
be able to predict actual  events,  we  may  learn to  understand their 
scope and  novelty when  they arise;  failing the ability to predict 
the future,  we  may  understand the unexpected better when  it happens. 
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offer an aid to reflection and  to make  people more attentive and alert. 
In the main  the prospects follow on  from  what  we  have  suggested throughout 
this study.  Here  we  will merely  connect  up  the ideas more  systematically. 
The  aim  of collective bargaining is to lay down  rules established 
jointly (or on  a  tripartite basis including the public authorities)  for 
industrial relations,  to achieve a  compromise  between different  requirements, 
points of view  and  arguments,  thus producing a  balance which depends  on the 
available resources of the parties.  Any  factors that modify these requirements 
and  resources also affect the outcome  of the bargaining and  sometimes the 
bargaining itself.  The  thirty years of economic  growth between the end  of 
the Second  World  War  and  the sudden crisis in 1974  are therefore to  be 
regarded  in this context as a  period of major  change.  These  long-standing 
changes  found  expression in the crisis of industrial relations in 1968-1973.  (1) 
It appears paradoxical that the rise in  the  standard of living,  the 
improved  flow of information and  even the development  of bargaining should 
have resulted  betw~en 1968  ahd  1974'not  in industrial peace and  a  decline 
in  stri~es, but  on the contrary in an  increased.frequency of disputes,  and 
of unofficial disputes.  This  could be  explained by the transformation in 
industrial relations caused by  the easing of economic  constraints and  the 
increased aspirations and  requirements. 
1.  The  easing of economic  constraints is primarily an effect of full 
employment  policies.  In most  European  countries the thirty years from 
1945  to  1974  were  a  period of full  employment,  probably for the first 
time in history (although often it was  also a  period of shortage of 
manpower  which called for a  large  immigrant  labour force),  or at  least 
of continued  improvement  of the employment  market  (2).  Even if one  does 
not  accept  the theory that  bargaining is strictly determined by  the 
labour market  situation it is clear that  when  there is a  'seller's 
market'  those  who  offer work  are generally in the  stronger position 
(Lord  Beveridge was  the first to  foresee this). Certainly this alone 
does not  give  everyone  easy access to  employment;  there are regional 
difficulties,  industries lose  impetus,  skills become  obsolescent, 
there are handicapped people.  But  overall,  the balance is more 
favourable  to the employees  and  they are therefore becoming 
(1)  This paragraph is based  on the research of Henry  Phelps  Brown  and  in 
particular,  'Quelques  remarques  en  guise de  conclusions a la conference 
sur la determination des salaires'  in Determination des salaires, Paris 
OCDE  1974  (the conference was  held  in July 1973). 
(2)  From  this point of view,  the Republic of Ireland is a  case apart. 
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essential for them  to act  as a  compact  whole  and  strikes can be  called 
even if they are not  unanimous  or on  a  large scale.  A small  group  can 
press its claims and  its point of view with some  success. 
The  rise in real  wages  contributed to easing these constraints.  Whatever 
the pressure of consumption  (and it has often been noted that demand  tends 
to increase in available resources thus often increases the dissatisfaction), 
the nature of this pressure is different  once  basic needs are better satisfied. 
The  ambition to  improve  one's standard of living is a  strong motive  force;  it 
does not,  however,  have  the  same  power  of constraint as poverty or hunger. 
The  freedom  of choice,  the freedom  to refuse a  job or wait  for a  job is greater 
for those who  have  least responsibilities,  greater during periods of life which 
involve fewer responsibilities  (young people before marriage,  couples after the 
children have  left home).  Although it is no  doubt  increasingly difficult to 
exploit this freedom  as age and  habit reinforce the individual's social 
integration in our consumer  society -·which is another reason why  this freedom 
is most  manifest  among  the young - it is encouraged by  economic  factors. 
The  improvement  in the standard of living contributes to greater security. 
The  individual  has more  protection against the hazards of economic  life (and 
life itself) because it is easier for him  to call  on  the solidarity of others, 
parents,  friends or members  of a  same  community  and  in particular because 
national or private insurance and  social security  systems are more  secure. 
Economic  risks are thus reduced or better covered.  As  a  result too,  economic 
constraints affect the individual  less directly,  are less directly reflected 
in private suffering or privation (as we  noted earlier, thia also makes  the 
economic  constraints less obvious  :  the closure of an  establishment  which is 
part of a  large group does  not  seem  as incontestable as the bankruptcy of a 
small  undertaking). 
Lastly,  inflation has also helped  ease these  constraints,  though to very 
different degrees and  over a  very different  period of time according to  country. 
Inflation makes  it easier for  employers  to make  concessions on  wages,  disturbs 
established habits and  price or income  structures,  and  makes  the requirements 
and  expectations more  vague  by  blurring the terms  of reference.  It also leads 
to anomy.  It has  even been  suggested that it has  been as much  the result as 
the cause of anomy.  At  any rate no-one would  dispute that  from  this point of 
view it has  some  of the characteristics of a  vicious circle. 
The  outcome  of this easing of constraints has  been a  shift of power.towards 
the  shop  floor,  an  increased opportunity for  expression and  action at grass 
roots level,  whether through or separate from  the organizations representing 
the rank and  file,  and  sometimes  by  small  groups  on  the basis of their diverse 
interests and  prospects. 
2.  This diversity is actually increased by  the spread,  without  precedent  in 
history,  of information and  education.  There is no  need  to  show  the importance 
of the extension of secondary education until the age of 18  years and  of higher 
education.  Although education is spread very unequally by  social group,  especially 
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have become  a  focus  of study in the last fifteen years),  it no  longer concerns 
only a  small  elite but  covers a  high proportion of the younger generation. 
Similarly,  there is no  need  to discuss further the importance of the spread 
of the mass  communication media and  their effects.  The  'parallel school'  as 
it has been called may  use methods  which  surprise the traditional teachers 
but  serves as a  powerful  means  of information,  of contact  between  social 
groups and  of comparison. 
To  judge by  the work  done  over the past  ten years,  this development  has 
not  greatly improved  the inequality of social opportunities nor brought  much 
greater democracy of access to the most  desirable  jobs.  On  the other hand it 
has certainly increased not  only information and  reflection but  also the 
aspirations and requirements relating to occupational life, to the  job or 
task performed,  or to  social relations,  where it has made  comparisons more 
acute and  produced doubts  about  the foundations of inequalities and differences. 
In fact  it has  increased people's aspirations and  expectations of life in 
general,  by giving them  more  means  of controlling their future and  above all 
a  greater capacity to predict  and  understand their life.  Perhaps the school, 
whether in the usual  form  or parallel  education,  is not very well  adapted to 
economic  life and  gives a  poor preparation for it at times;  but  the requirements 
it generates also influence this economic  life (for example,  they may  lead to 
an  'improvement'  in the  jobs offered).  No  doubt  this is hardly a  direct  factor 
of equalization,  but  perhaps it is an indirect factor  since it lies at the 
source of the general  sense of impatience and  questioning. 
These  requirements are fostered  by growth and  the habit of growth.  At 
the end  of thirty years,  everyone  expects his income to increase at the end 
of the year,  expects  new  products to be available,  expects the state, the 
public agencies·and t_he"local  authorities to offer new  services or new  forms 
of protection.  This  continuous progress forms  part of the obligations of the 
public authorities,  of the contract  between the elected and  the electors -
and  the elected who  do  not  assume  such obligations are very likely to  be 
penalized,  as is often demonstrated  by  the fate of the outgoing majorities 
in times of crisis. 
3.  The  result of the easing of economic  constraints,  and  the change and 
increase in requirements  (or levels of aspiration) is to disturb or change 
a  number  of social  balances.  The  institutions of social  control  also become 
less rigid.  This is probably true of society in general  (the family,  the 
political  system,  the means  of repression),  but  this subject  is outside our 
field of study.  It is particularly true of the hierarchy,  authority and 
discipline of the undertakings  (and more  generally the organizations; 
although discipline is not  the union's main  source of power,  they too may 
find it more difficult to achieve  consensus among  their members).  Every trade, 
every organization and  every occupation has its own  constraints.  But  which of 
these are necessary and  which arbitrary ?  Since  1967  or  1968 there has been  a 
general  review of this subject.  The  whole  balance of traditions and  rules which 
make  up  occupational  life have  been discussed  :  working hours  (night work, 
rigid timetables,  the length of working days performing different  jobs),  the 
work  load,  pollution  (even if habitual,  can it be  eliminated ?),  organizational 
rules,  the allocation of jobs.  Sometimes this was  because the technological 
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required changes,  sometimes  because the  employees  no  longer accepted certain 
inconveniences  (at times worsened  by  the more  rapid pace of production and 
new  requirements). 
It is important to draw attention,  as  we  did  in the first  part of this 
study,  to the change  in regulations and their content.  But  in order to assess 
the scope of this change,  it is equally important  to note the change of controls 
and  constraints,  of institutions and  powers.  The  ensuing readjustments  in social 
relations,  both as regards the chain of command  and  in terms of co-operation, 
cannot  be reversed overnight.  The  emergence of at  times poorly defined and  at 
times conflicting procedures of discussion,  bargaining and  consultation in the 
undertaking is the direct result.  The  introduction of joint management  in the 
undertaking and the new  forms  of continuous or institutional bargaining are a 
direct response.  They  are means  of dealing wit~ and  controlling the current 
major  social  change. 
For a  correct  evaluation of national  situations,  the analysis must  be 
taken fUrther  :  for  instance,  to what  extent  has  law or practice,  by  endorsing 
these new  social controls,  by opposing or amending  existing controls,  affected 
the balance of forces  ?  British employers for  example,  tend to consider that 
the major developments  in UK  legislation have  reinforced trade union power. 
There is no  doubt  that  labour law has  evolved very rapidly almost  everywhere 
in the last ten years.  But  the effect of this development  on the respective 
power of the two  sides of industry remains  to  be  assessed.  That  effect is 
certain to differ considerably from  country to  country. 
The  cr1s1s which  struck the countries of Europe  in autumn  1974  can 
almost  be contrasted point  by point with the preceding period.  The  outbreak 
of speeding up  of inflation made  it seem  a  great  danger  (whereas hitherto it 
had  been accepted fairly easily).  r~ssive unemployment,  at rates which  had 
not  been  seen since the crisis of the 1930s,  followed  full  employment. 
Growth  slowed  down  or came  to a  halt  (at  times became  negative).  International 
competition became  more  acute,  especially with the advent  on the scene of 
the developing countries in some  areas. 
These  phenomena  may  prove lasting.  Even  taking an optimistic view and 
on  the basis of resolute action,  no  country expects to restore full 
employment  for  several years.  So  high unemployment·rates,  or at  least rates 
much  higher than in previous years,  can be  expected beyond  1980.  Inflation 
may  be reduced,  but  apart  from  the significance of the inertia theory, 
inflation too has  long-term causes.  In the short  term,  cheap  energy will'. 
be  scarse  (there are many  very pessimistic prognoses for the future)  and 
in spite of possible fluctuations it is unlikely that  the price of raw 
materials will  fall.  The  increased competition in steel, textiles,  clothing 
or electronics will  be more  likely to increase  (expanding to the car industry 
next,  for example).  The  industrialization in sudden bursts of the developing 
countries may  end  by  producing a  new  international division of labour (the 
optimists call it a  new  international  economic  order).  For Europe  in particular, 
which has  few  raw material or energy resources,  this would  imply a  'restructuring' 
of industry and  the whole  economy  on  a  scale which is difficult to foretell at 
present  but will certainly require far more  than  marginal  adjustments. 
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incorporate any more  favourable  elements,  one may  well  ask whether the effect 
of the crisis may  not  be  (or is already)  to cancel  out  the achievements of 
the years of growth.  These years could be regarded as a  historical  exception, 
as a  happy  combination of circumstances without  future.  In spite of its special 
features,  for the combination of inflation and  unemployment  is very different 
from  the depressions of the usual  economic  cycle,  the crisis could be regarded 
as a  return of the economy  to the fixed order.  By  eliminating the opportunities 
of growth and  full  employment,  it restores the traditional  economic  constraints. 
But  if our earlier analysis is correct,  this  interpretation cannot  be 
accepted.  Certainly the emergence  of unemployment  changes the positions of 
buyers  and  sellers on  the  employment  market.  But  what  is more  striking is 
that it changes  them  relatively little. As  we  noted,  it produces only a 
slight fall  in industrial disputes,  nor does it erode demands  regarding 
the quality of working life. It has  brought  a  considerable  increase in 
benefits and  guarantees,  which  have  led to an unprecedented  employment 
policy.  But  this alone cannot  reverse the trends  we  have described, 
partly because certain factors of the  economic  and  social  situation 
still operate  (the  standard of living has  not  gone  back twenty years, 
the universities are not  empty  although their growth has been halted), 
partly because the inertia of the social balances  is much  greater than 
that of the economic  climate or the employment  market.  Certainly these 
balances are not  immutable and  a  very serious upheaval  would  no  doubt 
destroy them.  But  such an upheaval  would  have to  be fairly drastic, 
probably sufficiently large to carry with it a  large part of society. 
So  in spite of adverse  circumstances,  and  although there are now  fewer 
economic  resources with which to  respond  to it, we  should regard the shift 
of powers  and  the changing nature of demands  as an  established fact.  Both 
are now  an  integral part of the social  fabric.  It is true that  they can  be 
expressed and  appear  in very different  fashions.  But  they  cannot  be  cancelled 
out  except  by a  major  economic  and  social disaster. 
Does  this mean  that  the cr1s1s has  not  brought  any  long-term change to 
occupational life and  bargaining,  apart  from  the  immediate difficulties ? 
On  the contrary,  in our view  two  major  changes  can be  seen. 
1.  The  first  is the new  priority attached to overall policies,  to decisions 
on  a  national  or international  scale,  to  summit  action.  The  main decisions, 
or at  any rate the  framework  for taking secondary decisions,  is at the least 
national  (and  there is sufficient reason to think that it could profit 'by 
being supra-national  and  that  the Community  of the Nine  has a  vast area of 
possible action here),  whether these decisions relate to  overcoming inflation 
by  a  policy of credits,  incomes  or wages,  to restricting unemployment  and 
increasing employment  by making it easier for young people to  find  jobs, 
to early retirement,  to reducing working hours,  to distributing the very 
heavy burden of allowance payments,  or lastly whether they relate to 
industrial policy as such.  By  contrast with the preceding period when  it 
was  easier to give free rein to  localized action and  when  it was  often 
advantageous for wage  increases or social benefits,  the opening or conclusion 
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of talks,  with relatively little prior co-ordination,  and  when  the  forces of 
chanec  could  be decentralized,  the new  situation  once  again gives priority 
to outline decisions and  power  to the top-level  organizations (ie the 
confederal  organizations).  Incomes  poli0ies and  employment  policies are not 
drafted  piece by  piece,  nor  can  they  be merely the result  or  sum  total of 
local dec]sions.  (Of  course,  recognition of the need  for overall  action does 
not  mean  that  it will  be  easily achieved  not  that  it will  be  easy to agree 
on  the means  to  be  employed). 
The  pressure of social  readjustments at  the workplace,  as opposed  to 
the traditional  bargaining framework  which  was  the branch,  contributes to 
the development  of industrial  relations within the undertaking and  the 
establishment.  By  contrast,  the general  policy problems  contribute to, 
or in countries where  this was  already current  practice,  reinforce the 
intervention and  importance of inter-trade discussions and  of the 
organizations responsible for  conducting them. 
As  in the previous case,  this is not  a  new  phenomenon.  The  confederations 
have  always  had  great  power  in Denmark  and  the Netherlands.  Italy and  France 
have  long had  the habit  and  practice of bargaining and  inter-trade agreements. 
The  Netherlands and  the UK  have  a  long history of co-operation between the 
government  and  the two  sides of industry·,  in spite of the difficulties and 
ups and  downs.  But  in all  these cases,  the crisis gave  new  vigour to the 
traditional  institutions,  restoring the wages  policy in the Netherlands and 
the UK,  making  the two  sides of industry in Denmark  and  Belgium  accept 
government  intervention in areas which  are specifically occupational  - and 
intervention of a  fairly dictatorial character - impelling Ireland towards 
centralized bargaining.  Although  some  of these procedures were  a  question 
of circumstance and  more  easily because  they were  presented as exceptional, 
it is unlikely that  they will  not  be  followed  up,  because the difficulties 
to which  they  respond are of a  lasting kind.  So  a  different  level of 
bargaining has certainly taken  over or at  least  acquired  new  importance. 
The  consequences are  easy to  see.  The  development  of inter-trade 
bargaining increases the authority,  prestige and  power  of the confederations. 
Although there are great differences from  country  to  country (the DGB  and 
the  TUC  are not  as centralized as the  LO  in Denmark,  or the  EDA  in the 
Federal  Republic of Germany  as centralized as the  DA  in Denmark  or the 
Italian Confindustria),  the trend  is the  same  everywhere.  The  weak  co-
ordinating bodies have  acquired greater authority;  the policies of the 
national unions  (or federations)  are more  carefully guided or structured 
from  above.  Branch decisions are subject  to greater control. 
In Belgium  since 1977,  and  in France  since 1978,  there has clearly been 
a  return to  branch bargaining (and  in other places too,  the  failur~ of 
central controls has given rise to centrifugal movements).  Experience has 
made  it clear that it is impossible to deprive local bodies  (branch or region) 
of all initiative and  decision-maki~g powers.  The  question is how  much 
freedom  should they be  allowed  ?  In France,  the  framework  is sharply defined. 
In the United  Kingdom,  the upsurge of sectoral demands  and  strikes would  seem 
to call  into question the future of "free" bargaining. 
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more  directly in industrial relations.  Again  this is not  a  new  phenomenon 
as  such.  Even  in countries like the Federal  Republic of Germany  where  the 
parties are very  jealous of their autonomy  and  take most  care to preserve 
it, there have  been  more  contacts between the two  sides of industry and  the 
public authorities and  more  place has been given  to legislative intervention 
which has established new  rules of co-determination.  More  generally,  over 
the_.past  ten or fifteen years much  of the large-scale bargaining has  involved 
three rather than two  parties (the third party,  the government,  often intervened 
rather discreetly;  however it could make  use of very varied methods).  It is 
clear that the crisis has also made  such intervention more  open  and  more 
influential,  sometimes more  dictatorial, as regards both wages  and  employment. 
Tripartite bargaining is not  only more  difficult and  more  binding because 
of the extra party which  can,  where  appropriate,  use its own  methods  of 
imposing its wishes.  It is also different  by nature because it imposes 
different procedures of discussion and  agreement.  It differs from  branch 
bargaining,  in spite of the analogies  (primarily  the use of the  same 
vocabulary).  It too  occupies a  different area from  the contract. 
The  third consequence is that it almost  inevitably leads to general 
policy debates,  and  therefore often politics as such,  entering into industrial 
life. It reduces the gap  between  the area of the trade associations and  that 
of political organizations such as the parties because it refers to criteria 
which are no  longer of interest to a  single industry or satisfy the needs of 
a  particular occupation but relate to the general  interest or the requirements 
of the national  economy;  in other words  it refers to criteria which have  a 
purely political definition.  As  we  noted earlier,  this intrusion of industrial 
life into political life is less obvious where  there are fewer political debates 
and  where it is easy to reach agreement  on  objectives and  methods;  it becomes 
far more  apparent if this is not  so.  But  it is not  a  chance  phenomenon,  a 
product of the wishes of the parties and  governments;  it is a  direct  result 
of the nature of the issues at  stake. 
2.  The  second  change,  which is already becoming apparent  and  is likely to 
become  more  important  is the return to or increase of the constraints of 
efficiency. 
It would  of course  be absurd to  pretend that  these constraints had  been 
forgotten  in the past thirty years.  On  the contrary,  there had  never before 
been  so  much  talk of organization,  productivity and  efficiency.  The  gradual 
establishment  of the EEC  contributed a  great deal,  by means  of trade,  to 
increasing the pressure of competition  (within and outside the EEC).  More 
than one dispute or bargaining was  motivated by this pressure,  whether it 
was  pressure to  compensate for the competition and  correct its social 
consequences or to adjust its effects. 
It is in face of these pressures and  their daily expression on the  shop 
floor or in the office that  over the last ten years the unions'  policy has 
been to attempt  to organize protection,  which they sometimes  succeeded in 
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much  more  than mere  discontent at  work  rates considered  excessive;  it reflected 
the attempt  to  change  the priniciples of organization.  Although this same 
tendency appears only to  some  extent  in the UK,  the manner  in which productivity 
agreements tried to  'atone'  for the abandonment  of traditional practices  (which 
were often restrictive) also  indicates the presence of protection,  in this case 
organized by  the skilled workers.  The  German  trend  seems  quite different,  but 
this is no  doubt  because organization there is based  on  very different principles, 
especially as regards the acquisition of skills. 
Can  one generalize ?  Part of the malaise of the executives  stems  from  the 
fact  that criteria of efficiency are being applied to them  too. 
Is a  reversal  likely in this area ?  It is unlikely that  France and  Italy 
will revert  on  a  large scale to the more  individual  forms  of payment  by 
results.  But  it seems  certain that  the requirements of productivity and 
efficiency will  come  to the fore there as elsewhere.  They  may  take on  new, 
less individual  forms,  they may  evaluate the expenditure on  labour on  a  less 
short-term basis and  become  less dictatorial.  This is probably the area in 
~hich it will  prove most  necessary to make  an effort of imagination if new 
forms  of organization and  pay are to be  introduced. 
All  in all, it is easy to  see that  economic  constraints have  acquired a 
new  severity;  this applies both to overall  economic  policies and  to policies 
of efficiency within the undertaking. 
5.2  The  future 
There is much  uncertainty about  the future of collective bargaining. 
We  shall  confine ourselves to a  brief summary  of the factors  involved. 
1.  The  economic  uncertainty is the most  evident  of all.  Early in 1979, 
during the revision of this paper,  it is a  daunting task to hazard  a 
medium-term  forecast.  Even  on  the most  optimistic assumptions,  there is 
little likelihood that the economy  will  recover rapidly;  so  the present 
difficulties can be  expected to continue.  Conversely although the 
possibility of an abrupt  deterioration in the crisis cannot  be discounted, 
it is extremely difficult to  foresee  what  the social  consequences would  be. 
How  would  the  systems of allowances and  payments  face up  to a  marked  rise 
in unemployment  ?  What  would  happen  to the procedures of protection against 
dismissal  ?  tihat  would  the unemployed  masses  say  and  do,  and  what  would  the 
political and  social  consequences be,  of an increase in the number  of people 
who  would  thus  re~ain for a  long time  on  the fringes of working life ? 
Clearly there are no  simple answers to these questions. 
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Still more  serious is the uncertainty with respect to the actual  goals. 
Even  though  today  the partisans of zero  growth  carry little weight,  economic 
growth,  because it is accompanied  by many  conditions,  no  longer evokes 
entr.usiastic support.  The  energies of management  are engaged  in industrial 
reorg~~ization, but it arouses little response from  the masses,  which  only 
see the drawbacks  (the decline of traditional sectors of employment,  closures 
and  unemployment). 
Yet it should be noted in this context that  the collective bargaining 
system is surely only capable within certain limits o£  responding to economic 
fluctuations.  Because it is a  decentralized  system working by delegation, 
it is not certain that it will prove equally effective if it becomes  urgent 
to take decisions on  a  national scale and if local interests can no-longer 
serve as a  guide  to understanding the national interest. The  decentralization 
and delegated autonomy  which  are its virtues are also perhaps its limitations. 
So  bargaining would  find it difficult to respond  to a  very serious crisis. 
Moreover,  a  serious crisis could disturb it severely or even destroy it. 
Freedom of negotiation has been considerably reduced in a  number  of 
countries  (as in France,  where  the framework  set up  by  the public authorities 
was  given  the most  authorisation form)  whilst  there are  grounds £or pessimistic 
views  as to its future  (the breaking o£  the social contract in the United 
Kingdom  led a  number  o£  observers  to adopt bleak views  o£  the future).  There 
is widespread uncertainty in regard not only to the legitimacy and  the long-
term beneficial e££ect of freedom  to express one's interests but also to the 
~ability of the actual rules o£  the  game. 
2.  The  uncertain political situation must  also be mentioned.  In nearly every 
case the crisis weakened  the established majorities.  In two  countries,  France 
and Italy,  more  important changes may  occur and  this may  arouse more  emotion 
because  people are not accustomed  to an alternation of majorities and  because 
the opposition between  the  two  groups o£  electors is very ~arked. 
Here  we  touch  upon  another limit o£  the bargaining system.  Much  of its 
legal  framework  is accounted for by political bodies  so that when  political 
movements  acquire greater  importance  the bargaining institutions are likely 
to reflect them.  Whatever  happens,  the results of the March  1978  elections 
in France will certainly have profound effects on  the industrial movements 
(on the scale,  form  and  object o£  disputes and bargaining).  The  possible 
political changes in Italy are already strongly influencing the parties' 
behaviour.  In both cases a  change of majority might alter the rules of 
bargaining and  overthrow the procedures.  In both cases it can be  seen 
that the industrial relations system is in part a  political system  so 
that it necessarily reacts to political changes.  More  precisely,  when 
major  changes occur it becomes  clear that industrial relations are 
subordinated  to the political  system. 
But  once again,  although  this dependence is obviously real,  what is 
more  striking are its limits.  In France at least,  in spite of the strong 
feelings aroused  by  the political campaign  and  the hopes or £ears about 
its outcome,  in our  view it is more  likely that numerous  conflicts will 
arise than that there will be  any major  social crisis,  and more  likely 
that bargaining will be revived and  renewed  than that  any major changes 
wili occur in the rules o£  the  game.  Certainly the industrial relations 
system is not fully autonomous.  Yet its autonomy is Pairly wide.  Events 
will show  whether  this is true. 
3.  A third,  less obvious but nevertheless important  source of uncertainty 
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groups and  above all their identity.  Which  groups  will  be the motive 
forces tomorrow,  which groups will affect the social debates most  ?  How 
will  they be defined,  how  will  they be demarcated  and  structured ?  In view 
of the experience of the last ten years  some  caution is indicated.  Very  few 
of the new  groups which have asserted themselves  since then were  foreseen. 
We  shall  confine ourselves at this stage to posing a  few  questions. 
What  is the future of the group of executive  employees  ?  In  some  cases 
they are united with the other employees  in the  same  organizations,  in other 
cases they are separate;  sometimes  they openly appear on  the management  side 
during discussions in the undertaking,  sometimes  on  the other side,  sometimes 
too  they are tempted to take on  the role of mediator or intermediary;  they 
are threatened by  'malaise'  but  guard their privileges.  Will  they form  an 
autonomous  social  force  in bargaining ?  Or rather,  since this is already 
the case in several  countries,  how  much  autonomy  will this group  have 
compared  to the traditional bargaining parties and  how  much  influence  ? 
Will  it act as guide or at least as point of reference for the mass  of 
employees  ?  With its rapid growth in numbers  and  skills,  will it affect 
the balance of the negotiations  ? 
Will  the transformations of the labour market  make  any profound  changes 
in the opportunities and  powers  of the various  employees,  in their respective 
wages  and  in their social  status ?  Will  not  the rise in the social  scale of 
manual  workers,  which  is sometimes the object of a  concerted policy,  be 
greatly helped by the employment  situation (which is less unfavourable to 
them  in the immediate future)  ? As  regards skilled workers,  will not  the 
reversal of their position in relation to that of the employees  (or in 
countries where this reversal  has already occurred,  the reinforcement  of 
their advantages)  be  speeded up  by the short-term  economic  trend  ?  No  doubt 
these groupings are too  simplified and  a  distinction should  be made  by  branches 
of industry and qualifications  :  many  diplomas or degrees,  which  have  now 
become  commonplace  acquisitions,  will  no  longer entail the  same  privileges 
or have  the  same  sales value;  some  trade skills will acquire greater importance. 
The  gap  between declining branches and  expanding  branches will  widen.  It is 
still very difficult to assess the overall  effects of this. 
Will  the respective positions of the private and  the public sector remain 
the  same  ?  Certainly the security of the public sector and  the capacity of 
the private sector to  avoid  centralized constraints will  become  more  established. 
On  the other hand  the criteria of efficiency may  be  applied more  equally to 
both and  in a  more  similar manner.  Will  the third  employment  network of which 
there has been  some  talk in several  countries,  ie a  sector that  is neither 
subject  to market  requirements and  advantages  nor  linked to the public  services 
as  such,  develop with its own  characteristics and  problems  ? 
Will  the  impetus of the women's  movements,  which are backed  by  the massive 
entry into work  of women  and  which react  to the burdens and  constraints that 
weigh  them  do~m as a  result of the organization of economic  life and  also of 
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procedures and  objectives of the trade assiciations and  bring a  more  equal 
division of responsibilities between  men  and  women,  a  new  concept  of militant 
(and  occupational)  life and  a  transformation of relations between the  sexes  ? 
This  is one of the least uncertain  cases and  there is every likelihood that 
this movement  will  gather force. 
Certainly the likely medium-term  changes are  limited and  in recent years 
too much  emphasis  has  been  laid  on  the discovery  of new  groups  (the new 
working class,  the  new  managers,  the new  communications  specialists,  etc). 
The  trade associations and  more  generally the  interest groups  exert  a 
strong stabilizing influence.  In recent years they actively absorbed  the 
new  claimc  and  new  issues and  gave  due attention to the new  categories of 
employees.  There is no  reason why  they  should  not  continue to do  so.  As  a 
result  they will muffle the  shock of innovation,  reduce possible antagonisms, 
anticipate any  divisions or breaks and  integrate the  newcomers  or new  ideas. 
This  integration will  not  result  in  immobility.  The  new  social patterns do 
not  upset  the picture of the trade associations,  but  they are reflected  in 
new  types of organization,  new  doctrines  and  new  programmes. 
Many  of the prospects  for the future  can  be deduced  from  an  examination 
of the tendencies at  work  now.  If we  acsume  that  these tendencies will  not 
be  reversed  by  any  economic,  political or social  upheaval  (this assumption 
is very uncertain  in  the first  case,  likely in the  second,  probable in the 
third),  they will  outline the  future.  At  most  we  can  attempt  to  add  some 
precision to the picture,  although obviously this involves  some  theorjzing 
and  therefore uncertainty. 
Much  of the bargaining system will  remain based  on  the  same  foundations 
and  the  same  procedures.  Although branch bargaining now  has a  more  limited 
scope  and  deals only with  some  of the  issues that  arise,  and  although this 
trend is likely to  continue,  it will  probably remain an  important  means  of 
decision wherever it is already  so.  The  stability of the organizations will 
contribute to  the stability of the institutions. 
This  stability aside,  it is also useful  to point  to the probable  changes. 
They  will  automatically occur  in two  directions,  indicated by the two 
tendencies at  work  :  relations within the undertaking and  the relationship 
between collective bargaining and  political life. 
5.2.2.1  Relations within the undertaking 
If the trend  towards  participation continues  (meaning the fact  that the 
employees  and their representatives can  influence  a  priori the  company 
decisions  on matters  such as organization and  employment),  it is conceivable 
that as regards pr9cedures and  institutions aD  increasingly wide  gap will 
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loads,  work  rates,  qualifications,  quality of the  product)  and  commercial 
and  financial  overall  questions  (choice of product  and  market,  choice of 
investment,  job creation).  The  first group of issues are a  matter for the 
plant or  shop  floor;  the  second,  for the undertaking.  There are already 
indications of a  similar division of tasks  in the  new  two  levels of co-
determination in the Federal  Republic of Germany,  that of the works  council 
and  that  of the supervisory board  (the  same  would  apply to  Luxembourg).  In 
other countries too,  a  similar distinction could  emerge,  on  the basis of 
existing institutions;  for  example  there could  be  an  increased division of 
labour between  the plant  council  and  the works  committee  (Belgium,  FEance) 
or between the co-operation committee  and  the board of directors  (Denmark). 
The  question is :  would  this be  enough  ?  Is there  not  a  need  to develop 
means  and  methods  of participation in the production or work unit  ?  And, 
in this case,  how  would  it mesh  with the norma]  intervention procedures 
of the hierarchy on  the one  hand  and  the representative institutions on 
the other  ?  These  problems  have  been  encountered  in m0re  than  one  experiment. 
As  regards the operation of workshops  and  offices,  ie to  ensure the 
protection of goods  and  services,  two  forms  of decision  (and association 
in the decision)  must  be distinguished,  Production questions  (at  least  in 
the sense of work  organization and  efficiency of production)  can at most 
be.partially delegated to the operatives within the production unit, 
whether establishment  or workshop,  ie to the working team,  provided they 
are given the necessary technical  and  operational  services and  that  the 
economic  framework  is defined. 
This could give the production units,  which are often the working teams, 
a  fairly extensive autonomy.  There  could be close  co-operation between 
workers and  management  as regards  starting a  new  manufacture,  defining jobs 
and  responsibilities or solving technical difficulties,  with a  tendency 
towards less management  and  more  autonomy  for the  working teams.  In this 
area,  'participation'  could take on  very varied  forms  depending on  the 
technological  requirements  (cost  of plant  and  equipment,  degree of 
flexibility or technicality)  and  the requirements  of the product  (quality 
requirements and  production costs),  with a  wide  range of possibilities 
from  traditional management  to delegation pure and  simple to  the production 
team.  But  if such participation took  shape,  its forms  would  differ from  that 
of bargaining. 
The  trend towards delegating production responsibilities,  the need  to 
allow for the development  of individuals and  groups  (development  of their 
skills and  concerns),  and  even more  the need  to avoid making a  technological 
situation static by  crystallizing it once  and  for all,  could  contribute to 
encouraging forms  of organization that are flexible and  capable of change 
and  adjustment  to  economic  changes or changes of development,  rather than 
rigid organizations  (in the long term this would  also affect  the choice of 
equipment).  No  doubt  the preference for  'flexibility' is both a  condition 
and  a  consequence of increased participation. 
Determining the  economic  framework  of production  (how  much  should  be 
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in the real  sense of the word,  using the traditional resources of the unions 
but  in a  very decentralized way.  On  the assumption that dictatorial fixing 
of work  rates and  the constraints of payment  by individual output are becoming 
less and  less acceptable,  it will  become  necessary gradually to replace them 
by  a  contract  on  objectives and  by  pay  linked to  this contract,  both of which 
will most  often be  collective.  This  'contractualization'  of economic  requirements 
will  no  doubt  become  even  more  necessary when,  as  we  noted earlier,  economic 
requirements assume  a  much  less simple,  indisputable or unequivocal  form. 
So  one  could  conceive of a  trend  towards  self-organization within the 
framework  of production contracts,  although they  would  also reflect the 
diversity imposed  by  equipment  and  markets. 
No  doubt  the major  economic  decisions of the  undertaking will  be  based 
on  quite different  procedures.  It would  be reasonable to  expect  that  in 
future the staff representatives,  whatever their doctrinal  stand on  joint 
management,  will demand  more  and  more  information  and  consultation.  Failing 
joint management,  there would  ~ery probably be  a  form  of self-supervision. 
The  question  involving most  uncertainty is how  much  direct  influence the 
employees'  representatives will demand  and  obtain  and  how  much  effect 
indirect  influences will  have,  ie the influences of general  economic  policy 
or planning decisions. 
Of  course,  formulas  for  small  and  medium-sized  undertakings have  still 
to  be worked  out.  The  formulas  obviously  cannot  be the  same  as for the large 
groups,  but  it would  be highly ill-advised to let it be thought  that  small 
size alone would  solve all problems. 
5.2.2.2  Industrial  relations  system  and  political life 
As  '1-le  said  earlier,  the  cr1.s1s  has reinforced  the power  of the confederal 
organi7.ations and  brought  increased  government  action and  the introduction 
of political  criteria.  In addition,  the scale and  urgent  nature of the 
likely economic  change8 1  eg  chAnges  in the respective  importance of branches 
of industry resulting from  a  new  international division of labour or the 
massive transfers of resources and  manpower  required  by  these changes,  makes 
it unlikely that  they will  occur gradually as a  result of market  forces. 
Lastly,  the degree of solidarity needed  for retraining and  transfers also 
goes  beyond  the  Joca1  scale or that  of the branch of industry and  will mean 
that other dechlion-rnaking criteria have  to be  added  to the economic  criteria. 
One  could  even  ask  whether  economic  movements  on  such a  vast  scale and 
requiring such  extensive solidarity can occur at  all  except  on  the basis 
of strong convictions,  of social movements  which  are a1so  political movements. 
As  regards  job protection,  retraining,  occupational  or geographical 
mobility where  appropriate,  compensation for loss of job and  total or 
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their differences between branches and  regions - collective bargaining, 
which will  continue to deal with all these matters,  will  frequently be 
oriented,  guided and  structured by  political constraints,  by  the decisions 
taken by  the public authorities and  by  the debates on  the major national 
options. 
The  consequences of this will  probably differ greatly from  country to 
country because  each national political  system  (and political  balance)  is 
so  different.  The  point  should also  be made  that  they are particularly 
difficult to  foresee  because one of the effects of politization is to 
increase the variety of possible coalitions and  consequently enlarge 
the range of options open  to organizations.  We  shall  confine our 
discussion to  the two  extreme  cases. 
1.  Contacts between  economic  and  political life,  petween the undertaking 
and  its social  environment,  have  already assumed  more  importance at  local 
level,  in towns,  districts and  ~mall regions.  This contact  is important 
because it gives general  questions of employment  or protection of the 
environment  a  more  concrete  form  so  that reciprocal  requirements  can  be 
pinpointed more  clearly.  If non-economic  criteria also  play a  role in 
the undertaking's decisions,  it may  be preferable  for the undertaking 
to consult  on  them  at local  level;  since the  employees'  new  demands 
are backed  by  local  opinion and  interests, it may  be  in the union's 
interest  to  strengthen its social position and  its contacts with 
local life in general.  So  it is quite useful  for  both sides of 
industry to  look towards their immediate  environment,  and  that if 
a  third party intervenes in their debates it should perhaps be the 
local authorities. 
The  increased emphasis  on  regional life in most  countries is a  lasting 
trend of the political  system.  It  should act  in the same  direction as the 
other trends. 
Decentralized contacts with political  life are also  important  in that 
they make  it possible to  compensate  for the centralizing effect of overall 
policies  (and  perhaps avoid  the  simplifications inherent  in national  debates). 
This trend  presupposes that  the establishments will  be relatively 
autonomous  in relation to the main  company.  In  several  countries union 
organization is already tending to  strengthen its local  representation. 
In the case of both types of trade associahon,  new  responsibilities 
are falling to the  share of the inter-trade bodies. 
2.  Perhaps a  new  channel  of Community  action is also opening. 
Industrial relations  systems are specific to  the particular country. 
Both  in practice and  in law,  bargaining has  rule~ which  do  not  go  beyond 
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communication between  countries.  Yet  joint action would  encounter redoubtable 
obstacles because of the differences of law and  the differences of spirit 
we  noted earlier. 
Perhaps the present  economic  trend has opened  up  a  new  area on  the fringes 
of the traditional  branch bargaining system and,  more  generally,  of bargaining 
in the strictly legal  sense.  This area,  on  the confines of the occupational 
and  the political area,  is that of employment  policies in the wider  sense 
(stimulating employment,  retraining and  transfers,  training and mobility). 
There  is little doubt  that  a  Community  policy is more  effective than a 
national policy in this context  as  experience has  already shown.  Is it 
impossible  for the two  sides of industry to be associated more  closely 
in a  more  positive common  economic  policy ?  Their  common  interests should 
be clear enough  for this to  encourage  co-operation between the national 
organizations.  And  because this co-operation would  cover  an  area r1hich  is 
legally 1 ess 1vell  demarcated  and defined,  it would  not  be  inhibited by the 
weight  of each nation's specific rules. 
In view of the difficulties of the situation,  it is of course  just as 
likely (in terms of probability alone it is even  more  probable)  that  national 
reflexes will  win  the day,  especially protectionist reflexes.  But  one  could 
also  conceive of Community  action being greeted  favourably and  creating a 
supranational  field of action for the two  sides of industry.  Certainly this 
area would  be  situated on  the borderlines of collective bargaining,  but  it 
would  have  some  possibility of acting upon  the bargaining and  influencing 
it in order to bring the countries closer. 
The  two  preceding paragraphs  should  be viewed  as an essay or work  of the 
imAgination  (we  are well  aware  that  in this area as in others  imagination 
is  gener~lly less bold or innovating than reality will  turn out  to be).  At 
best  they ma;y  nerve to give a  more  striking picture of problems that will 
probably ari::1e. 
l\t  any rate,  the prospects  Ne  have  outlined are ·based  on  the conviction, 
1vhich  ~.lhou1n  be  stated openly,  that  in spite of its limitations,  weaknesses 
or inequalities,  the virtues of collective bargaining are  such as to make 
it an  instr1~ent of economic  distribution and  social adjustment  or 
tr:u;sformat ion  that  \·muld  be difficult  to replace;  it is democratic because 
it is b3.sed  on  the adhesion and  wishes of those  involved  (although it 
certainly does  not  represent  all the interests);  it is decentralized because, 
by its very structure,  it responds to all the diverse local  factors  and  can 
settle m.•.ny  issues loca1ly  (although it evidently does  not  settle them  all 
and  does  not  collect all the relevant  information);  it is flexible because 
it is baserr  on  the vast machinery of trade associations and  joint  institutions 
v1hi0h  allovJ  for  frequent  encounters  A.nd  confrontations beh1een different  points 
of vierJ  and  intere8ts  (although it can also  be  bogged  down  in procedures). 
Our  brief survey of its results  show  that  bargaining goes  far beyond  the mere 
determination of 'li-rages.  But  even  in that  limited field,  it has  provep.  far 
superior,  overNhe1mingly  superior,  in spite of its defects,  to  any other 
method  of wage  allocation. 
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channels have  become  blocked or negotiations have  broken down.  More  than 
one  perspicacious analyst  has prophesied the end  of free bargaining  :  · 
because it too  crude~ reflects the inequality of forces,  it reinforces 
social inequalities;  because it gives  free rein to the expression of 
interests,  in a  difficult period it would  unleash conflicting desires  -
in other words,  it could lead to a  vicious spiral  because it is too 
squarely opposed  to an industrial policy essential to the survival 
of Eur9pe,  it should be kept  strictly under control;  becau~e public 
intervention is more  influential and varied today  than ever before, 
free bargaining through demands  for  subsidies and  for protection 
against  competition could bring about  a  corporate State by  which 
it would  ultimately be absorbed. 
Far  from  being unfounded,  these critisms indicate very real and  even 
very present dangers  (although to a  varying extent depending on the country). 
No  one  would  maintain that direct reiations between  employers and  wage  earners' 
unions alone,  could constitute the entire social  policy.  The  war of all against 
all,  even  in the attenuated  form  of one  group outbidding another in respect of 
wages  and  salaries,  is one of the perverse effects that  could be provoked by 
inflation.  There is no  mechanism  to make  sure automatically that  consideration 
of immediate  interests will  lead to  long-term reasoning and  an overall vision. 
And,  as mentioned above,  the dividing line between effective industrial policy 
and  uneconomic  subsidies is clear only on  paper. 
In  simple terms,  is this not  another way  of saying that  the results of 
industrial relations cannot  replace an  economic  and  social policy ?  One 
aspect  of the political  system  cannot  claim to be  the entire political 
system,  nor  even to guide or regulate it.  To  appreciate its solidity, 
and  adapt ability,  and  to rely on  it, does not  imply that it should 
provide the  solution to all problems.  It simply means  that political 
decisions and  social measures would  be much  more  difficult to adopt  and 
apply without  the procedures and  mechanisms  of collective bargaining, 
or if the relative autonomy of collective bargaining were  not  recognized 
and  respected. 
Perhaps,  to  conclude,  we  should be more  explicit about  this conviction. 
Much  of our study and  especially its conclusion was  designed to point  out 
the difficulties facing collective bargaining today,  the new  problems with 
which it has to deal,  the need  it has  experienced  to  change its methods, 
procedures and  even spirit.  But  our aim  was  less to  show  the fragility and 
limitations of bargaining than to  indicate the problems that  remain to be 
solved.  The  picture we  have drawn  of the results achieved during the very 
varied circumstances of the past ten years and  of the changes which  have 
already taken place suggests that  these problems  can  be resolved. 
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Industrial  relations  and  collective  bargaining  in  the  Community were  shaken  by two 
successive crises- in 1968 and 1973. 
The  mean  features  of the  1968  crisis were  an  increase  in  the  number of strikes,  the 
emergence of new social and occupational groups, the use  of new forms of industrial 
action, the assertion of new priorities and objectives, and the questioning of traditional 
authorities. 
The second crisis, in 1973, was marked by inflation and imbalances in international trade, 
but more  than  anything else  by the threat posed  to full employment and  the  loss of 
confidence in growth prospects. 
The study demonstrates how collective bargaining has adapted to these new conditions 
and how far it has been able to help solve problems such as the fight against inflation and 
unemployment, the preservation of rights and advantages gained in the social field, the 
improvement of working conditions and workers' desire for a better quality of life at the 
place of work, etc. 
The  future  of collective  bargaining  is  however beset  by a  great deal  of uncertainty: 
economic uncertainty (collective bargaining might not be able to cope in a very serious 
crisis), political uncertainty (industrial relations are part of the political system and reacts 
to  changes  in  it),  uncertainty  with  regard  to  the  identity  of the  various  social  and 
occupational groups and their interests, concerns and objectives. 
Possible changes in  collective bargaining are  likely in  two areas:  relations within the 
individual company, and the relationship between collective bargaining and politics. 
Within  individual  companies there  will  be  an  increasingly marked  tendency towards 
participation -that is, for employees to be able to exert direct influence on the company's 
decisions, particularly with regard to the organization of work and employment. 
With  regard  to the  relationship  between  collective  bargaining  and  politics, industrial 
redeployment and a new international division of labour will mean that economic criteria 
will have to be linked with criteria based on largely political decisions. Salgs- og  abonnementskontorer  ·  Vertriebsburos  ·  Sales  Offices 
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